MISCELLANEA GENERALIA 15
UNISA 1993

C. P. T. Nandé

CHARISTION
CPT NAUDÉ

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in collaboration with

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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA
PRETORIA

ISBN 0 86981 796 5

Typeset by Tensor Letterset
Tel 77-7366, Pretoria

Cover design by
Gerda Scholtemeijer

Printed by
Sigma Press, Koedoespoort

Published by the
University of South Africa
Muckleneuk, Pretoria

CONTENTS • INHOUD

τὴν Θηβαῖων πόλιν, καὶ οὐκ ἀνασ|τήσω Ἀθήνας οὐδὲ Σπάρτην οὐδὲ Πλαται||ὰς οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τῶν συμμαχεσ|αμένων οὐδεμίαν ....

23. *In Leocr.* 80–81, delivered c. 330. The oath reads as follows: ΟΡΚΟΣ. οὐ ποιήσομαι περὶ πλείονος τὸ ζῆν τῆς ἐλευθερίας οὐδ' ἐγκαταλείψω τοὺς ἡγεμόνας οὔτε ζῶντας οὔτε ἀποθανόντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τελευτήσαντας τῶν συμμάχων ἅπαντας θάψω. καὶ κρατήσας τῷ πολέμῳ τοὺς βαρβάρους τῶν μὲν μαχησαμένων ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πόλεων οὐδεμίαν ἀνάστατον ποιήσω, τὰς δὲ τὰ τοῦ βαρβάρου προελομένας ἁπάσας δεκατεύσω. καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν ἐμπρησθέντων καὶ καταβληθέντων ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων οὐδὲν ἀνοικοδομήσω παντάπασιν, ἀλλ' ὑπόμνημα τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις ἐάσω καταλείπεσθαι τῆς τῶν βαρβάρων ἀσεβείας.
The version is probably not by Lycurgus himself but was added by whoever prepared the extant version of the speech for publication.

24. See Siewert's detailed comparison, *op. cit.* 9–11.
25. Since Thebes had been annihilated by Alexander and 'the Corinthian League' in 334 (cf. Diod. 17.9ff; Plut. *Alexander* 11.4f; Arrian *Anab.* 1.8; Justin 11.3.8), the clause was no longer relevant.
26. Siewert (1972), 75.
27. See above, note 9.
28. See above, note 9.
29. *Hellenica* 6.3.20; 5.35 (presumably reflecting contemporary propaganda).
30. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.33ff.
31. Hdt. 7.132, quoted above.
32. The closest is Pausanias' appeal (just before the battle) for Athenian and Spartan cooperation (Hdt. 9.60) and his prayer to Hera (9.61), texts quoted below, note 70: but this certainly does not constitute a formal covenant.
33. Thuc. 2.71.2: Παυσανίας γὰρ ... ἐλευθερώσας τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀπὸ τῶν Μήδων μετὰ Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἐθελησάντων ξυνάρασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον τῆς μάχης ἦ πὰρ' ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, θύσας ἐν τῇ Πλαταιῶν ἀγορᾷ ἱερὰ Διὶ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ξυνκαλέσας πάντας τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀπεδίδου Πλαταιεῦσι γῆν καὶ πόλιν τὴν σφετέραν ἔχοντας αὐτονόμους οἰκεῖν, στρατεῦσαί τε μηδένα ποτὲ ἀδίκως ἐπ' αὐτοὺς, μηδ' ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ · εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμύνειν τοὺς παρόντας ξυμμάχους κατὰ δύναμιν.
34. Thuc. 3.58.4: ἀποβλέψατε γὰρ ἐς πατέρων τῶν ὑμετέρων θήκας, οὓς ἀποθανόντας ὑπὸ Μήδων καὶ ταφέντας ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐτιμῶμεν κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον δημοσίᾳ ἐσθήμασί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις .... (58.5) πρὸς δὲ καὶ γῆν ἐν ᾗ ἠλευθερώθησαν οἱ Ἕλληνες δουλώσετε, ἱερά τε θεῶν οἷς εὐξάμενοι Μήδων ἐκράτησαν ἐρημοῦτε καὶ θυσίας τὰς πατρίους τῶν ἐσσαμένων καὶ κτισάντων ἀφαιρήσεσθε.
35. *Plataicus* 58–62 (c. 373 B.C.).
36. See especially 59: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τρόπαια πόλει πρὸς πόλιν γέγονεν, ἐκεῖνα δ' ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς ὅλην τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας δύναμιν ἔστηκεν .... (60) ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἡρώων μνησθῆναι τῶν ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον κατεχόντων καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν τὰς τιμὰς αὐτῶν καταλυομένας, οἷς ὑμεῖς καλλιερησάμενοι τοιοῦτον ὑπέστητε κίνδυνον, ὃς καὶ τούτους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας Ἕλληνας ἠλευθέρωσεν. This is the context in which one would expect to find a specific reference to a covenant and to an annual panhellenic festival.
37. H. Tudor, *Political Myth*, London, 1972, 37 f.
38. Cf. Thompson (1985), 3–7.
39. For details see *The Oxford History of South Africa*, Oxford, 1978, vol.1, 355–61.
40. *Ibid.* 12–18 and 146.
41. Cf. Robertson, 1976, among others.
42. Afrikaans: 'Geloftedag'. The official English translation of the holiday is now 'the Day of the Vow'; however, until about a decade ago the title 'Day of the

Covenant' appeared in calendars. The Afrikaans word 'gelofte' means both 'vow' and 'covenant' (cf. D.B. Bosman, I.W. van der Merwe and L.W. Hiemstra, *Bilingual Dictionary*, 8th edition, Cape Town, 1984). In English, the words 'vow' and 'covenant' do not have precisely the same meaning: 'vow' means 'a solemn pledge or promise binding the person making it to perform a specified act or behave in a certain way' (thus *Collins' Dictionary*, 2nd edition, London, 1986, *s.v.*), while a covenant is the agreement itself, 'the contract between two parties' (*ibid, s.v.*). The substitution of the English term 'covenant' by 'vow' suggests a recent tendency to emphasize the human, rather than the divine role in the act, that is, that it was a one-sided gesture. I do not know whether any official explanation was given for the change in the English nomenclature.

43. Cf. the official Guide for the Voortrekker Monument, Pretoria, c. 1961 (cited by Thompson [1985] 188). In the 'Hall of Heroes', one of the friezes depicting the history of the Afrikaner nation shows Sarel Cilliers enunciating the oath. He stands on a gun-carriage with his arms outstretched to heaven. Seven men look on reverently. The Guidebook has the following commentary: 'Sarel Cilliers has mounted Old Grietjie the Voortrekker gun and repeats the vow that if the Lord gave them victory over the enemy, *they would consecrate that day and keep it holy as a Sabbath in each year and that they would build a church to the glory of God*'.
44. James A. Michener, *The Covenant*, New York, 1980, 484f. (emphasis added). Michener does not refer to the promise to build a church.
45. In the official English guidebook the text of the oath is preceded by the epigraph 'The Covenant'. In the actual Afrikaans inscription however there is no epigraph.
46. Cf. Thompson (1985), 178ff.
47. The publication of Gustav Preller's *Voortrekkermense* (volumes 1–6, Pretoria, 1918–38), in which he refers to the vow in much detail (vol.2), possibly gave impetus to the resurrection of the myth. Cf. See also G.J. Preller, *Andries Pretorius: Lewensbeskrywing van die Voortrekker Kommandant-Generaal*, Johannesburg, 1940, 48ff.
48. Cf. van Jaarsveld (1964), 78–87 and Thompson (1985) in reference to the quinquennial festival at Paardekraal, near Krugersdorp.
49. Cited by Thompson, *ibid.* 226.
50. Quoted in Graham Leach, *The Afrikaners: Their Last Great Trek*, Johannesburg, 1989, 3. In 1983 the Botha Government conceded limited political rights to Coloureds and Indians.
51. Compare, for example, the emphasis on the reconciliation between Athens and Sparta against the common enemy, Thebes, in the 370s version of the Oath of Plataea.
52. Cf. Thompson (1985), 170.
53. Although an English version of the journal entry appeared in *Zuid Afrikaan*, I quote Thompson's more accurate translation from the original Dutch (emphasis added).
54. See above and note 45.
55. *S.A. Archival Records: Notule van die Natalse Volksraad 1838–1845*, ed. J.H. Breytenbach, Cape Town, c. 1958, 270–73, 282–85, 290, 293f; cf. also J. Bird, *Annals of Natal*, vol. 1, 453–58, cited by Thompson (1985), 172; see also G. Preller, *Andries Pretorius*, 32ff.
56. An imposing inscription containing the canonic text of the 'Covenant' (see above) dominates the entrance of the church. The date is significant. On May 31, 1961, South Africa became an independent republic outside the British Commonwealth. A large majority of the (white) electorate, in a referendum held the previous year, gave the Prime Minister, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, the mandate for implementing his grand design of 'Separate Development'. Amidst growing opposition from the rest

of the world and increasing internal unrest, the ruling party, thus 'beleaguered', continued to implement this policy for over a quarter of a century.

57. Cf. F. Lion-Cachet, *De Worstelstrijd der Transvaler*, 3rd ed., Amsterdam, 1900 (the first edition was published in 1882), 201, note 1.
58. H.J. Hofstede, *Geschiedenis van den Oranje-Vrijstaat*, The Hague, 1876; the Celliers journal is cited *verbatim* pp. 50–66. The translated version (here quoted) is from J. Bird, *Annals of Natal*, vol.1, 238–52 which Thompson cites. The truth or otherwise of 'deathbed' statements (the dying, like kings, may not tell lies!, cf. Arrian, *Anabasis*, 1.1) is not the point at issue here (cf. note 59, below). It is Hofstede himself who refers to the document as a 'deathbed statement' ('Ik laat hier het journaal woordelijk volgen van den Heer Charl Celliers ... een stuk, dat op zijn sterfbed door hem geschreven is ...'. This fact is not evident however from the text itself, although the author swears that his account is true (p. 50, '... want onzen God heeft "de waarheid lief".'). Whether he did stand on a gun-carriage in 1838 and utter the precise words he cites in the present context, we have no way of establishing. But in a historiographical (or mythographical) sense the account is true as far as the circumstances which prompted its writing required it to be.
59. We should not let the solemnity of the supposed circumstances surrounding the composition of the document cloud our critical judgement. A deathbed account of an episode in the life of its author, like a last will and testament, does not necessarily have to be written when one is literally breathing one's last! It is a literary artefact in which the author leaves a lasting image which he or she wishes to project to future generations. The *Res Gestae* of Augustus is an example which springs readily to mind. Michael Millgate (*Testamentary Acts: Browning, Tennyson, James, Hardy*, Oxford, 1991, 2) writes as follows: 'Valedictory gestures are not confined to the elderly ... and the apprehension of death ... can operate very much like old age itself in shaping what may prove, irrespective of age, to be the final phase of a writer's working life'. He also makes the following comment (p.5): 'We have been taught to respect and revere the words and actions of the dying and the legal and ethical significance accorded to last wills and testaments has doubtless had its effect upon the standard editorial privileging of authors' "final intentions". But it ought to trouble us more than it customarily does that we automatically approach a number of major writers ... by way of the texts, commentaries, and canonical frameworks they established only in late career, and that we unreflectingly depend upon literary biographies that may be largely based on immaculately laundered archival evidence and on uncheckable assertions emanating from the subject's famous but not necessarily scrupulous old age — or from a widow, widower, child, or other dubiously authoritative relict or representative'. This opinion no doubt applies to any author who tries to reconstruct himself and his actions with a view to a literary *Nachleben*.
60. If this was the case, then Pretorius did not bother to mention it and Bantjes did not know about it.
61. W.S. van Rijneveld, who signed the *verbatim* copy of the document which Hofstede cited, was also dead. (Hofstede, 66).
62. Thompson (1985), 170.
63. *Ibid.* 171f.
64. Cf. Plutarch, *Life of Aristides* 21.3, quoted above.
65. Thompson (1985), 171.
66. *Ibid.* 179f. See also Leach (1989), 10–12.
67. On this occasion the name of the holiday was changed from Dingaan's Day to 'Geloftedag', which was considered more appropriate.

68. As Plutarch attributes the initiation of the Covenant to the Athenian Aristides and makes it into a universal institution applying to all Hellenes, not merely to Plataeans (as we find in Thucydides)
69. Cf. F. Lion Cachet (1900), 200f; the same tendency is apparent in other patriotic/nationalistic literature published after the 1880s (e.g. J.C. Voigt, *Fifty Years of the History of the Republic of South Africa*, 2 vols., London, 1899; 2.87).
70. Hdt. 9.60 and 61: '῞Ανδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀγῶνος μεγίστου προκειμένου ἐλευθέρην εἶναι ἢ δεδουλωμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, προδεδόμεθα ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἡμεῖς τε οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ Ἀθηναιοι ὑπὸ τὴν παροιχομένην νύκτα διαδράντων. νῦν ὧν δέδοκται τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν τὸ ποιητέον ἡμῖν· ἀμυνομένους γὰρ τῇ δυνάμεθα ἄριστα περιστέλλειν ἀλλήλους ...' (61) ὥστε ... ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν Παυσανίην πρὸς τὸ ῞Ηραιον τὸ Πλαταιέων ἐπικαλέσασθαι τὴν θεόν, χρηίζοντα μηδαμῶς σφέας ψευσθῆναι τῆς ἐλπίδος.
71. Cf. note 25, above.
72. *BCH* 99 (1975) 51 (? after 261). Decree of the 'Hellenic league' honouring Glaukon, son of Eteocles in that:

> he has contributed to making more lavish the *sacrifice in honour of Zeus Eleutherios and Concord and the contest which the Greeks celebrate on the tomb of the heroes who fought against the barbarians for the liberty of the Greeks.*
>
> ... καὶ τὸν
> ἀγῶνα ὃν τιθέασιν οἱ ῞Ελληνες ἐπὶ
> τοῖς ἀνδράσιν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ ἀγω
> νισαμένοις πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους
> ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας.

Translated by M.M. Austin, *The Hellenistic World*, Cambridge, 1980.

73. Plutarch, *Life of Aristides* 11.8.

The above essay is based on a lecture–discussion presented for the Department of Classics at the University of South Africa in July, 1990. I am much indebted to the comments and suggestions of the participants on that occasion, especially Professors Ursula Vogel-Weidemann and C.P.T. Naudé, who also commented on a draft of the lecture. The views here expressed are entirely my own, as are any errors and misinterpretations.

VIRO DOCTISSIMO C.P.T. NAUDÉ *OB DIEM NATALEM OCTOGESIMUM COLLEGAE ET AMICI HOC LIBELLUM LIBENTES DANT ET DEDICANT*

Charl Pierre Theron Naudé, member of the S.A. Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns and Correspondent der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, was born on 17 August 1912 at Aliwal North as the second son of the late Rev. W.J. Naudé. After matriculating at age sixteen he worked in Johannesburg in the civil service while studying part-time at the University of the Witwatersrand where T.J. Haarhoff was his principal mentor. In 1936 he obtained the BA degree with Greek and Latin as his majors, and in the following year the BA Hons degree in Greek and Latin literature. The Transvaal Education Diploma followed in 1939. In 1940 he was awarded a university post-graduate scholarship with a view to furthering his studies overseas, but the war prevented him from availing himself of this grant at the time. While employed as lecturer in the Department of Classics of the University of the Witwatersrand he obtained the MA degree *cum laude* in 1943, with a dissertation entitled 'The Problem of the *Ciris*'. In 1946 he could eventually continue his studies at St. John's College of the University of Oxford where the BA Hons degree in Literae Humaniores, with Ancient History and Philosophy as majors, was awarded him in 1948. After returning to South Africa he resumed his connection with the Department of Classics of his previous Alma Mater, first as lecturer, from 1949 till 1952, and then as senior lecturer, from 1953 till 1956. In the meantime he continued his academic studies, completing his doctoral examination (doktoraal) at the University of Leiden in 1955 in the subjects Ancient History, Greek and Archaeology. In the following year the degree DLitt et Phil (Leiden) was conferred on him for a thesis entitled 'Ammianus Marcellinus in die lig van die Antieke Geskiedskrywing', with Professor W. den Boer as promoter. His career as academic teacher in Ancient History and Historiography, however, only commenced in 1959, when he accepted an appointment as senior lecturer in the Department of Classics at the University of South Africa. In acknowledgement of his singular

academic merits he was promoted to a professorship in Ancient History and Historiography in 1963, to the first chair 'historiarum rerum Graecarum et Romanarum' in this country. He held this position until his retirement as professor honorarius at the end of 1977. However, the Department of Classics continued to make use of his wide experience and ready advice in both teaching and research, and even now, in 1992, he is associated with it in various functions.

In spite of pioneering countless study guides on the history of the ancient Near East, Greece and Rome as well as ancient historiography, and in spite of the at times overwhelming administrative burden which he had to take upon himself as Head of the Department of Classics and as one of the founders of *Acta Classica*, the Proceedings of the Classical Association of South Africa*, he still *made* time for the publications and reviews listed below. All of these, as also the post-graduate research projects which he initiated, testify to his intense and at the same time differentiated interest in the whole field of classical studies. Apart from this, the many students at all levels whom this doyen of ancient history and historiography taught and inspired found him to be somebody who was at no time chary of giving assistance and encouragement. Above all, his colleagues and students past and present will always remember the *humanitas* and genuine concern which characterized his relations with them.

> And though so much distinguished, he was wise
> And in his bearing modest as a maid.
> He never yet a boorish thing had said
> In all his life to any, come what might;
> He was a true, a perfect gentle knight.

These words from the general prologue to the *Canterbury Tales* might have been written with C.P.T. Naudé in mind — to whom we extend our warmest and sincerest wishes *ad multos annos*.

17 August 1992 U.V.

* For a more extensive review of his activities in this regard cf. H.L.G(onin), 'Caroli P.T. Naudé in honorem', *Acta Classica* 20 (1977) vii.

1. LIST OF PUBLICATIONS BY C.P.T. NAUDÉ

(a) 'Navolging of Imitatio as 'n verskynsel in die Latynse Letterkunde', *Helikon* 1 (1951, 1 en 2).

(b) 'Professor T.J. Haarhoff sestig jaar', *Tydskrif vir Letterkunde* 2 (1952, 1).

(c) '*Ammianus Marcellinus in die lig van die Antieke Geskiedskrywing*', Doctoral thesis, Leiden 1956.

(d) 'Battles and Sieges in Ammianus Marcellinus', *Acta Classica* 1 (1958).

(e) 'The Glaze Technique of the Attic Vase', *Acta Classica* 2 (1959).

(f) '*Die Romanisering van minderontwikkelde volkere in die Romeinse Ryk*', Mededelings van die Universiteit van Suid-Afrika, B.22 (1960).

(g) '*Die Ontstaan van die Romeinse geskiedskrywing*', Mededelings van die Universiteit van Suid-Afrika, C. 28 (1961).

(h) 'An Aspect of Early Roman Historiography', *Acta Classica* 4 (1961).

(i) '*Mythus en pseudo-Mythus in die Grieks–Romeinse geskiedskrywing*', Mededelings van die Universiteit van Suid-Afrika, A.30 (1963).

(j) 'Fortuna in Ammianus Marcellinus', *Acta Classica* 7 (1964).

(k) 'Die Romeinse geskiedskrywing — besinning en perspektief', *Acta Classica* 9 (1966).

(l) 'The Alleged Embassy of C. Terentius Varro, C. Manilius and M. Aurelius Cotta to Greece in 203 B.C.', *Pro munere grates, studies opgedra aan H.L. Gonin*, Pretoria 1971.

(m) 'The Date of the Later Books of Ammianus Marcellinus', *American Journal of Ancient History* 9.1 (1984).

(n) 'Flavius Merobaudes and the Death of the Elder Theodosius', *Varia Studia in honorem W.J. Richards*, Die Universiteit van die Oranje-Vrystaat, Bloemfontein 1987.

(o) 'Imitatio in die Latynse letterkunde', *Theros, studies opgedra aan professor E.L. de Kock*, Johannesburg 1989.

2. BOOK REVIEWS

(a) G. Avenarius, Lukians Schrift zur Geschichtsschreibung, Meisenheim 1956 — *Mnemosyne* (Nederland) 9 (1958).

(b) W. den Boer, Tussen Kade en Schip, Den Haag 1957 — *Historia* (S.A.) 4 (1959).

(c) V. Ehrenberg, The Greek State, Oxford 1960, *PACA* 3 (1960).

(d) F.J. Stein, Dexippus et Herodianus rerum scriptores quatenus Thucydidem secuti sint, Bonn 1957 — *Mnemosyne* 14 (1961).

(e) J.R. Hawthorn & C. MacDonald, Roman Politics 80–44 B.C., Macmillan 1960 — *PACA* 4 (1961).

(f) D.W.L. van Son, Livius' behandeling van de Bacchanalia, Amsterdam 1960 — *Mnemosyne* 15 (1962).

(g) W. den Boer, F.W.N. Hugenholz, Th. J.G. Locher, Gestalten der geschiedenis in de Oudheid, de Middeleeuwen en die Nieuwe Tijd, Den Haag 1960 — *Historia* (S.A.) 7 (1962).

(h) A.B. Breebaart, Enige historiografische aspecten van Arrianus' Anabasis Alexandri, Leiden 1960 — *Mnemosyne* 16 (1963).

(i) L. Ferrero, Rerum Scriptor. Saggi sulla storiografia romana (Trieste, Univ. degli Studi, Ist. di Filol. Class., 9), Trieste 1962 — *Mnemosyne* 18 (1965).

(j) G. Rohde, Studien und Interpretationen zur antiken Literatur, Religion und Geschichte, Berlin 1963 — *Historia* (S.A.) 10 (1965).

(k) G. Gottlieb, Das Verhältnis der ausserherodoteischen Überlieferung zu Herodot. Untersucht an historischen Stoffen aus der griechischen Geschichte, Bonn 1963 — *Mnemosyne* 19 (1966).

(l) H.H. Schmitt, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Antiochos' des Grossen und seiner Zeit, *Historia Einzelschriften* 6, Wiesbaden 1964 — *Mnemosyne* 20 (1967).

(m) A. Demandt, Zeitkritik und Geschichtsbild im Werk Ammianus, Bonn 1965 — *Gnomon* 41 (1969).

(n) R. Häussler, Tacitus und das historische Bewusstsein, Heidelberg 1965 — *Mnemosyne* 22 (1969).

(o) G.A. Lehmann, Untersuchungen zur historischen Glaubwürdigkeit des Polybios, Münster 1967 — *Mnemosyne* 23 (1970).

(p) Sir Ronald Syme, Ammianus and the Historia Augusta, Oxford 1968 — *Bibliotheca Orientalis* (Ned. Inst. v.d. Nabye Oosten) 27 (1970).

(q) Stephen Usher, The Historians of Greece and Rome, London 1969 — *Bibliotheca Orientalis* 28 (1971).

(r) Jürgen Deininger, Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechenland 217–86 v.Chr., Berlin, New York, 1971 — *Historia* (S.A.) 12 (1972).

(s) W.R. Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth-century Athens, Princeton 1971 — *Bibliotheca Orientalis* 30 (1973).

3. LIST OF DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS AND MASTERS THESES COMPLETED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF C.P.T. NAUDÉ

(a) *Doctoral dissertations*

B.X. de Wet The role of Kleon in the history of Thucydides, 1967.

K. Rosen King and people in Macedonia. A study of their relations under Philip and Alexander, 1970.

G. Cipolla Popular tradition and literary convention in ancient bucolics. A study of the influence of folklore and folk-songs, particularly Sicilian, on the Bucolics of Theocritus and especially Vergil, 1971.

G. Chapman Themes in Aristophanes, 1976.

Jan Scholtemeijer 'n Literêre Analise van die 'Nomen Antoninorum'-Tema in die *Historia Augusta*, 1980.

(b) *Masters theses*

A. Tronson Callisthenes and the divinity of Alexander: a study in typology, 1972.

J. Scholtemeijer *Virtus-fortuna-libertas* as tema in die *Epitomae de Tito Livio* van Lucius Annaeus Florus, 1973.

P. Hasse Die *Bellum Antiochinum* by T. Livius, 1975.

L.A. Botha The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and the Asiatic campaign of Agesilaus, 1980.

H. van Oosten Prolegomena tot Eutropius se *Breviarium ab urbe condita*, 1980.

M.A. Forbes Plutarch's *De Herodoti malignitate.* A study of his critical methods and attitudes, 1983.

TROUBLED SPIRITS IN PERSEPOLIS

by John Atkinson
(University of Cape Town)

On taking Persepolis Alexander conducted a massacre of the population, and four months later, in the May of 330 B.C., he ordered the destruction by fire of the buildings on the royal terrace. The atrocity and the devastation form a chapter in the history of war crimes, and not surprisingly have been an embarrassment to Alexander's admirers. Arrian passed over the massacre, and dealt with the destruction of the city as briefly as he decently could; earlier writers may have shifted the blame onto Thais. But it has not been only apologists who have looked for mitigating factors. Thus, for example, Heckel writes: 'Even if Alexander did destroy the palace as an act of policy, he may nevertheless have regretted the action later.' [1] This suggests that Alexander did not intend to destroy the 'palace' but acted on an impulse, which he later regretted, and implies that an impulsive act would have been less reprehensible than an act of deliberate policy.

A.T. Olmstead, whose history approaches the subject from the Persian point of view, throws the emphasis on the massacre of the Persepolitan men, and continues: 'The barbarities at Persepolis were followed by an act of sheer vandalism — the burning of the marvelous palaces on the platform.' [2] Olmstead means that the destruction was deliberate but pointless, for: 'the burning of Persepolis was a symbol to the world that the great crusade had reached its destined end. Unfortunately, both symbol and crusade were equally out of date.' [3] Olmstead uses the term vandalism, which has the connotation of mindless destruction, but it does not quite fit in with Olmstead's subsequent description of the sack of Persepolis as a 'symbol to the world', and Olmstead veers from outright condemnation of Alexander to criticism of him for an error of judgement.

There can be no doubt that the fires were started deliberately. The buildings on the terrace were well enough spaced that the fires in the Apadana, the Hall of One Hundred Columns and the Treasury must have started separately. The fires off the terrace must also have been started separately. There was water on the terrace. The construction of the Treasury, with its

massive walls, probable mud-sealing over the roof, and absence of windows, should have made it non-inflammable: it would have taken some effort to destroy the Treasury by fire.[4]

The fire was deliberate, but that does not tell us whether it was premeditated or simply organised on the spur of the moment. Premeditation is indicated by Arrian's account, according to which Alexander decided on the destruction of the royal city, and referred the matter to a meeting of his officers. Parmenion argued the case for sparing the royal buildings, but was overruled.[5] In the Cleitarchean tradition the burning of the royal buildings happened because an Athenian courtesan, Thais, egged Alexander on to arson. Troops took up the call, torches were collected, pipers summoned, and Alexander headed the Dionysian procession, with Thais as his guide. Alexander hurled the first torch into a royal building, and Thais followed suit.[6] One cannot automatically assume that Arrian's version is closer to the truth. Arrian depended on Aristobulus and Ptolemy as his main sources, of whom Aristobulus was prone to presenting Alexander in a favourable light, even at the expense of the facts, while Ptolemy had an immediate reason for suppressing the rôle of Thais, since she was, or became at a later stage, his mistress and then wife.[7] Furthermore, the tale of the clash between Alexander and Parmenion belongs to a series of tales of such confrontations, which may have been elaborated after Parmenion fell victim to Alexander in late 330, whether to show that Parmenion had a history of obstructionism or to enhance his record as a sane adviser.[8]

Arrian's version, therefore, may not be wholly correct, but that does not make the Cleitarchean account historical. It would be out of character if Alexander acted only on impulse in such a matter, and yielded the initiative to Thais.[9] We should therefore work on the assumption that the burning of Persepolis was premeditated, not least because the Corinthian League revived the programme of the Greek alliance which confronted Xerxes and vowed to maintain an undying memory of Xerxes' sacrilege in destroying temples. There was unfinished business when Alexander took Persepolis, and to avenge the burning of Greek temples was a divine imperative. The issue was non-negotiable, if Alexander chose to take it up. The sources agree that Alexander claimed that the arson was retribution for Persian crimes.[10]

The issue of the burning of temples had a history that went back before Xerxes' invasion of Greece. In the context of the Ionian revolt the allied forces took Sardis and destroyed the city by fire. As the blaze spread, the temple of Cybele caught light, and, though Herodotus does not say it was deliberately burnt, the Persians later treated it as arson, and claimed it as justification for their burning of Greek temples.[11] Xerxes is made to complain that Aristagoras' men went to Sardis and destroyed 'temples and sacred groves'.[12]

Persian retaliation started with the burning of the temple at Didyma.[13] Then Datis and Artaphernes torched the temples on Naxos, but spared Delos.[14] Pausanias says that the Persians were responsible for destroying by fire the temple of Hera on Samos and that of Hera in Phocaea.[15]

When Xerxes invaded Greece the first phase of the destruction was directed at the Phocians, with the systematic destruction of all settlements and their temples, including the oracular centre at Abae.[16] Once in Athens, it took the Persians some while to gain control of the Acropolis, and as they broke into the sacred enclosure they set fire to every structure.[17] According to Herodotus, Xerxes tried to make amends next day for the burning of the Parthenon, and later sent instructions to Mardonius to offer the Athenians the rebuilding of the temples which he had burnt. The offer was rejected.[18] What Xerxes had missed Mardonius torched and destroyed before he pulled out of Attica.[19] There is no suggestion in Herodotus that the burning of temples by Xerxes' troops was anything more than an act of war, motivated by anger, frustration and a desire for revenge.

The standard line in the fourth century was likewise that the Persians' sacrilegious firing of Greek temples was a war crime.[20] Thus the emphasis in the earliest accounts of the destruction of Persepolis was naturally on retribution exacted for the devastation wrought by Xerxes, particularly with regard to Greek temples.

Temples were not a feature of Persian religion, according to Herodotus.[21] The tower structures known as the Ka'ba of Zoroaster at Naqsh-i Rustam and Solomon's Prison at Pasargadae have been identified by some as fire temples, like the fire temple discovered at Susa,[22] but a counter-view is that the two tower buildings were depositories.[23]

The attitude of the Persian kings to temples as a feature of alien religions was ambivalent, if judged in religious terms, but in political terms it appears that there was a pragmatic policy of supporting the temples of peoples who accepted the king's sway, and of destroying temples of the recalcitrant. Thus Cyrus commissioned the building of a new chief synagogue in Jerusalem, and Darius recorded that he had restored the temples (ayadana) which Gaumata the Magus had detroyed.[24] By contrast Xerxes was pleased to record that in dealing with troublesome areas of his empire he had destroyed the temple (*daivadana|m* [singular]) where *daivas* were worshipped.[25] The text is problematic as the connotations of *daiva* and *daivadana* are uncertain (Kent translates *daivas* as 'false gods'), and the point of reference is disputed: it might refer to the temple of Marduk in Babylon, but R.N. Frye rejects that idea and considers that the *daivas* must be either Indo–Iranian deities, or Elamite gods.[26] It has even been suggested that the temple might have been the Athenian Parthenon.[27] M. Schwartz argues that Xerxes was not out to destroy 'false religions', since on the day after he destroyed the Parthenon he urged the priests to offer

sacrifices as usual.[28] But in the Persepolis text Xerxes does say that he decreed the banning of the worship of the *daivas* and that he worshipped Ahuramazda in the place where the *daivas* had been worshipped. This was at least *Religionspolitik*.

There are two strange passages in Cicero, where it is said that Xerxes ordered the destruction by fire of the Athenian, or Greek, temples because he believed that the gods could not be contained within walls.[29] But elsewhere he attributes to Cotta the use of Xerxes as a standard example of one who overthrew temples and altars by brute force, and not by rational argument.[30] The source for this cannot be determined: perhaps Posidonius, as he is mentioned elsewhere in *De Natura Deorum* at 1.6 and 122, but then one must identify another source for Cicero's references to Xerxes' iconoclastic justification for the demolition of temples. The general tenor of Posidonius' comments on 'orientals' suggests that, if it was he who wrote that Xerxes torched temples to free the gods from artificial constraints, his purpose was to demonstrate another facet of Persian megalomania. But Cicero's formulation of Xerxes' purpose appears to stem from a sympathetic, rather than a hostile, tradition. The general point about the Persian attitude to temples may have been inspired by Herodotus 1.131, but the elaboration of Xerxes' reason for burning temples is post-Herodotean. There is no evidence that Alexander knew of any Persian iconoclastic argument.

It is difficult to determine what Alexander's purpose was in destroying Persepolis, beyond what was claimed in his openly stated reason. He was signalling the end of the Achaemenid dynasty by destroying the royal buildings at Persepolis. The message may have been directed more at the Greeks than the Persians and their subjects, but the purpose in that event is still unclear, especially as the context is uncertain: Alexander apparently did not know whether Agis' revolt had been squashed when he was in Susa,[31] and may only have learnt of Agis' death in the summer of 330, after the death of Darius.[32] But as news spreads at the speed of the fastest mode of transport,[33] and the battle of Megalopolis could have happened early in 330, even on the 'late' dating, it is quite possible that Alexander already knew of Agis' death when he organised the destruction of Persepolis. Thus the sequence of these events is uncertain, which makes it the more difficult to determine whether, and how, concern about the Greek states played a part in Alexander's decision.

We need to consider the episode from another angle, and that relates to Alexander's problems with his own troops. To get a sense of the state of mind of Alexander's troops before the final destruction of Persepolis we need to trace the main events in their war, at least from the time of the battle of Gaugamela. That had been a spectacular victory, despite the menace of the firepower of the Persian archers, the weight of their elephants, the impact of their cataphract cavalry and the fiendish appearance of scythe

chariots. The Persian losses were heavy, and those on Alexander's side relatively light, but Darius lived to fight another day.

The battle was fought on about 28 September 331 B.C.[34] The initial chase after Darius was futile, and Alexander decided to head south rather than east. The march of c. 460 km between Arbela and Babylon would have taken the army till at least 21 October, and there they rested for some 34 days.[35] The next phase took the troops to Susa, a distance of c. 370 km, and they arrived in the latter half of December. So far so good, and little resistance. But the going got tougher after they crossed the Pasitigris (Karun), and headed into the Zagros mountains. From Susa to Persepolis was some 620 km, but the journey was lengthened by the need to confront the Uxii who contested their passage of the Persian Gates. They probably reached Persepolis before the end of January 330, or possibly early in February.

The 'vulgate' sources record that, as Alexander approached Persepolis, he was confronted by a column of Greeks who had been employed as slave labour by the Persian king, and had been maimed by the amputation of limbs considered redundant for the tasks they were put to.[36] The story has often been branded fictitious, but the details of the grants supposedly made to them[37] suggest that the story had some factual base. If true, the encounter with the mutilated Greeks would help to explain the savagery of the onslaught on Persepolis, for Alexander himself is reputed to have written in a letter that he gave orders for a massacre of the Persepolitans.[38] The letter may have been elaborated to denigrate Alexander, but that does not mean that the massacre was a fiction. The massacre and the tale of the column of mutilated Greeks clearly belong together, thus, if someone invented the tale of the massacre to discredit Alexander, then one should posit that the tale of the mutilated Greeks was invented subsequently by some apologist who wished to provide a justification for the massacre. These two stages in the development of the myth should have been passed before the production of the account on which Curtius and Diodorus depended — presumably Cleitarchus. This is possible, but there is no good evidence to justify rejection of the massacre story, and Arrian's haste to pass over the details of the occupation and destruction of Persepolis suggests that there was indeed an atrocity. Arrian does introduce a personal criticism of Alexander at this point in his narrative.

This was a predatory army, as one can see not least from the mundane issue of food supplies. On Engels' calculations Alexander's troops and his cavalry horses would have needed c. 174 tons of grain per day,[39] and the army was obliged to remain in the area of Persepolis for four months before it could head for Ecbatana.[40] Not surprisingly the long stay was interrupted by a thirty day campaign into the hinterland.[41]

The sack and arson of the buildings on the royal terrace came at the

very end of the army's stay in Persepolis. Ahead lay the long march north towards Ecbatana and the next encounter with Darius. The troops were not to know that Darius would make a tactical withdrawal, and then turn to flight, nor that he would be betrayed and killed by his own officers.

At the end of their long stay in Persepolis there were many factors that might help to explain the final destruction of the buildings on the royal terrace: boredom and frustration, the large numbers of men, the derelict or empty buildings. For some, vandalism was an expression of thwarted creativity.

Then there was the rôle of Alexander in this drama. By actively participating in the fire-raising he was no doubt consciously identifying himself with his troops. But at the same time, in organising first the massacre and then the destruction of the city he was binding the men closer to him by shared participation in gratuitous acts of violence and destruction.

The massacre involved a paradox: on the one hand Alexander was, consciously or unconsciously, using the principle that shared guilt enforces loyalty. On the other hand, the destruction served to condition the men who participated to act upon orders without the inhibition of conscience. The paradox is explained, if not resolved, by the consideration that conscience is a mix of memory of past instruction, ideals, and fear of detection or punishment. The ethic of discipline and collective honour was nurtured by fear, and would prevail over inhibitions inspired by any higher ideals.[42]

When it came to the final destruction of Persepolis by fire the troops who participated would have been anxious about what lay ahead, and that emotion must have added its burden to the baggage of psychological trouble they were already carrying.

The question then arises whether the details of the destruction offer any clue to the motivations of the perpetrators. It is conventional to attribute acts of vandalism to psychological disorder or anti-social behaviour, and not to consider any further the particulars of the damage wrought. Where an avowed reason is offered for the vandalism, that may well be accepted as an adequate explanation. But some art historians have taken such acts of 'vandalism' more seriously, and would apply the term iconoclasm to many manifestations of wilful damage to works of art.[43] We could label as iconoclastic the attack on imperial images in the riots in Antioch in 387, or the destruction during the Nika Riots of 532 of the museum collection held in the Baths of Severus in Constantinople.[44] Whatever the label, the focussing of destruction on one element of a work of art or one structure rather than another calls for some investigation.

Alexander's pyrotechnic extravaganza razed not only the royal buildings on the terrace at Persepolis, but also what were apparently the residences of the nobles to the south of the terrace. Thus the target was not simply the images of Persian royalty, but also of the apparatus that supported

the monarchy. There is a theory that the structures on the terrace were aligned to serve as a guide to astronomical observations that related to the functioning of the site as a religious centre.[45] The destruction of buildings off the terrace, however, suggests that Alexander was not targeting the royal buildings for any religious significance they may have held. As for the damage done to reliefs, it does not appear that there was any coordinated attempt to deface representations of the winged ring with human bust, which used to be regarded as symbolising either the Fravahr/Fravashi (the king's *daemon*) or Ahuramazda,[46] but is now regarded by some as the symbol of Khvarenah, the Glory or Fortune of the Persian king or nation.[47] The degree to which Zoroastrianism had shed its aniconic principles during the Achaemenid era is a matter of debate, and insofar as Zoroastrianism was supposed to be aniconic, Persepolis ought not to be a promising hunting ground for religious iconoclasm. But Alexander may have chosen to destroy Persepolis by fire because he was aware that fire was central to the cult of Ahuramazda. His awareness of the significance of fire for the Persians was assumed at least later in Zoroastrian tradition, as he was accused of extinguishing sacred fires (*Greater Bundahishn* xxxiii, 14).[48] Debris from the Treasury included evidence that Alexander's troops smashed a great number of mortars that were used for *haoma* in sacred rites.[49]

The wreckers of the Treasury went to some trouble to smash items of stone tableware: some 600 items are listed.[50] It is possible that the plates were broken as men tried to prize off precious metal coverings or decorations, but there is no solid evidence that the plates were so adorned.[51] As the stoneware was found covered by the debris of the original destruction of the building, it is reasonable to attribute the breaking of these objects to Alexander's troops. The presence of Xerxes' name on some 53 items is not enough to explain the systematic breakage. The destruction may however be seen as an attack on symbols of luxury, and a manifestation of anger at luxury objects that appeared to have no value as booty. The same motive may explain the destruction of the mortars.

Curtius 5.6.5 refers to the tearing up of robes, the smashing of vases and the dismemberment of statues, albeit in the initial assault upon the city, when the troops were allowed to pillage at will. The dismemberment of statues is illustrated in the Treasury wreckage by the female statuette, perhaps from Phocaea, which had its head knocked off.[52] The demolition squad was thus not deferential towards Greek works of art. Again it was a case of an attack on a luxury object that had no value to soldiers on the move.

While there is little to justify the label of religious iconoclasm, there is a pattern in the damage done to the reliefs that calls for something more than the tag of simple vandalism. The doorway of the Tachara (Palace) of Darius was decorated with reliefs showing Darius walking, followed by

two attendants, one holding a parasol: in each case the face has been damaged, with the eyes as the first target of the attack.[53] The west gate of the Hall of One Hundred Columns bears a relief showing the king in combat with a rampant bull, and the king's face appears to have been deliberately damaged.[54] The north doorway of the same structure has a relief showing the king on his throne supported by five decks with rows of his subjects. The faces have been systematically damaged.[55] The southern portico of the same hall has a relief showing the monarch on his throne with a single attendant, and his throne is supported on a stool borne by three superimposed lines of subjects. The faces of the king and his subjects have been damaged, with the eyes as the centre of the patch of damage. There also appears to be damage to the feet of the attendants.[56] The same pattern recurs on the relief carved on the southern column of the eastern gateway of the Tripylon, which again shows the king on his throne attended by one man, with the supporting stool borne by three lines of subjects.[57] The winged ring with bust over the head of the king is relatively unscathed, but that could be because it was high enough up to be out of harm's way. And so on.

One cannot exclude the possibility that all these deliberate defacements were the work of later generations — possibly Muslims demonstrating iconoclastic zeal.[58] But one may look to the Treasury to provide some evidence of the damage done by Alexander's men, since the debris of the original destruction seems to have remained essentially undisturbed until the excavation of the site this century. The Treasury yielded two bas-reliefs showing the king on his throne, holding audience. The better preserved of the two was not much defaced, except for the area around the eye of the king.[59]

The pattern of damage of the reliefs at Persepolis does not support the notion that it was only a consequence of clumsy attempts to remove precious metal adornments attached to the reliefs. Furthermore, while a number of reliefs were damaged in the same way, there are rows of figures on the Apadana reliefs that were left alone. This suggests that there was no general order to deface reliefs in a particular way. One is left with the conclusion that the attacks on individual reliefs were driven by the urges of the men who did the damage.

Why then the repeated attacks on the faces on the reliefs, and in particular on the eyes? This is not so surprising in that the eyes are a common target of iconoclastic 'vandalism'. Those who attack works of art tend to mutilate rather than destroy, and to blot or hack out what makes the subject effective.

If there was a religious element in the defacement of these reliefs, then it might reflect the idea that blindness was the divine punishment for transgressions of divine law, normally where the crime was witnessing a god or the god's domain against the god's wish. Thus in Greek mythology Teire-

sias was blinded for seeing Artemis or Athene bathing, and Phineus was likewise punished for seeing the gods' intentions.[60] A quasi-historical myth told of how Alexander's troops burst into the temple of Demeter at Miletus to plunder it and were immediately blinded so that they should not see the women's secrets.[61] It is therefore possible that those who 'blinded' the king or his attendants on the reliefs at Persepolis saw this as a way of exacting vengeance for Xerxes' sacrileges.

It may be that Persians were notoriously fearful of being blinded,[62] or were particularly vulnerable to a facial wound when in full armour,[63] but the explanation lies more likely in the psychological state of the troops. Though victorious, they were still in hostile territory: their casualties had been heavy, and they had recently met a column of Greek suppliants who had been mutilated by the Persians. In hacking out the eyes of the sculptured figures they were removing the element which gave them the semblance of reality; they were blinding imagined Persians (imagined as witnesses, informers, or simply as the enemy).

This paper has been directed at two interrelated questions: what can be learnt about the ways in which Alexander's troops went about the destruction of the monuments at Persepolis, and what does this tell us about the psychology of those troops as a factor in the final destruction of the royal city? The action needs to be seen in its immediate context, and not just as a message to the Greeks or the Persians. Alexander was not the only one who had difficulty in coping with stress as the campaigns dragged on. Whatever the troops got out of the orgy of destruction, Alexander was to say that the burning of Persepolis had been a mistake, and as for Thais — well at least Ptolemy found her company therapeutic.

NOTES

1. In *Quintus Curtius Rufus: the History of Alexander*, translated by J. Yardley, Harmondsworth 1984, 281.
2. *History of the Persian Empire*, Chicago 1948, 521.
3. *Op. cit.*, 522.
4. On the Treasury E.F. Schmidt, *Persepolis*, Chicago 1953, esp. 158 and 161. Dr. Shapur Shahbazi explained to me the case for assuming that the fire was not accidental.
5. Arrian 3.18.11–12.
6. Cleitarchus' name is linked with this version in Athenaeus 13.576e. The story is told by Diodorus Siculus 17.72.2–6 and Curtius Rufus 5.7.1–12.
7. Plutarch *Alexander* 38.2; Athenaeus 13.576e.
8. Callisthenes may well have initiated a hostile tradition on Parmenion: cf. Plut. *Alex.* 33.10.
9. I have discussed the issues more fully in my commentary on Curtius Rufus' *Historiae Alexandri Magni* Bks. 5–7.2 to be published soon by A.M. Hakkert. Hakkert is also

about to release a book on the burning of Persepolis by G. Wirth, but this paper is written in ignorance of Professor Wirth's arguments.

10. Arrian 3.18.12; Plutarch *Alex.* 38.4; Diod. Sic. 17.72.3; Strabo 15.3.6 p. 730; cf. Curtius Rufus 5.7.4.
11. Herodotus 5.102; Diod. Sic. 10.25.1.
12. Hdt. 7.8β3.
13. Hdt. 6.19.3.
14. Hdt. 6.96 and 97.
15. Pausanias 7.5.4.
16. Hdt. 8.33; Pausanias 10.35.2.
17. Hdt. 8.53.
18. Hdt. 8.54; 140 and 143.
19. Hdt. 9.13.
20. e.g. Isocrates *Paneg.* 155–6 (for an oath taken by Ionians); Lycurgus *c. Leocratem* 81; Diod. Sic. 11.29, presumably following Ephorus. The myth of Xerxes the 'destroyer of sanctuaries' grew in the telling, and caution is needed: A. Kuhrt and S. Sherwin-White, 'Xerxes' destruction of Babylonian temples', in *Achaemenid History II: the Greek Sources*, ed. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg and A. Kuhrt, Leiden 1987, 69–78.
21. Hdt. 1.131.
22. References in M.A. Dandamaev and V.G. Lukonin, *The Culture and Social Institutions of Ancient Iran*; English edition by P.L. Kohl, Cambridge 1989, esp. 343–5.
23. D. Stronach, in the *Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol. 2, edited by I. Gershevitch, Cambridge 1985, esp. 848–52.
24. *Ezra* 1.1–4; Behistun inscription 1.63–4 (text in R.G. Kent, *Old Persian*, 2nd ed., New Haven 1953, 118); Dandamaev, *op. cit.* (n. 22 supra), 298.
25. Xerxes' Persepolis text 4.35–41, in Kent (n. 24 supra), 151.
26. *The History of Ancient Iran*, Munich 1983, 123–4.
27. Noted by M. Schwartz, *Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol. 2, 690.
28. *Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol. 2, 690–1, citing Hdt. 8.54.
29. *De Republica* 3.14; *De Legibus* 2.26.
30. *De Natura Deorum* 1.115.
31. Arrian 3.16.9–10.
32. Justin 12.1.4 with Aeschines 3.133, which is the crucial reference in Cawkwell's case for a late date for the battle of Megalopolis: *CQ* 19 (1969) 163–180.
33. In peacetime conditions the distance between Sardis and Susa might have been covered by Persian messengers in a week: J.M. Cook, *The Persian Empire*, London 1983, 108.
34. *Pace* Plutarch *Cam.* 19 and *Alex.* 31.8; the case is argued in my *Commentary on Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni, Books 3 and 4*, Amsterdam 1980, Appendix H.
35. Curtius Rufus 5.1.39.
36. Curtius 5.5.5–24; Diod. Sic. 17.69.2–9; Justin 11.14.11–2.
37. Curtius 5.5.24; Diod. Sic. 17.69.8.
38. Plutarch *Alex.* 37.3.
39. D.W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, Berkeley 1978, 73, and n. 12.
40. Plut. *Alex.* 37.6.
41. Curtius 5.6.12 and 19.
42. See for general background N.F. Dixon, *The Psychology of Military Incompetence*, reprinted London 1988.

43. Much good work has been done on this subject by D. Freedberg: for example, 'The structure of Byzantine and European Iconoclasm', in *Symposium of Byzantine Studies, University of Birmingham, 1975: Iconoclasm*, edited by A. Bryer and J. Herrin, Birmingham 1977, 165–77.
44. Cedrenus in the *CSHB* text vol. 1, 648, with my comment in *Acta Patristica et Byzantina* 1 (1990) 126.
45. J. George, *Achaemenid Orientations*, Berlin 1979, 196–206; cf. F. Krefter, 'Persepolis', *AMI* 6 (1973) 153–161.
46. The issues are reviewed by J. Duchesne-Guillemin, in *Beiträge zur Achämenidengeschichte*, ed. G. Walser, Wiesbaden 1972, esp. 76–8.
47. A.S. Shahbazi, 'An Achaemenid symbol', *AMI* 7 (1974) 135–44.
48. A reference I owe to M. Boyce, *Zoroastrians*, London 1979, 78.
49. Cf. N. Cahill, 'The Treasury at Persepolis', *AJA* 89 (1985), esp. 383; E.F. Schmidt, *Persepolis*, vol. 2, 53–6.
50. E. F. Schmidt, *Persepolis*, vol. 2, 81–93; N. Cahill (n. 49 supra), 382–3.
51. N. Cahill, *art. cit.*, 383.
52. E. F. Schmidt, *Persepolis*, Vol. 2, 66.
53. Plates in Schmidt's *Persepolis* illustrate these and other reliefs referred to below. I give additional photographic references. In the immediate case see the dust jacket of J.M. Cook's *The Persian Empire* (n. 33 supra); R. Lane Fox, *The Search for Alexander*, London 1980, 262.
54. L. Vanden Berghe, *Archéologie de l'Iran ancien*, Leiden 1966, Plate 42a.
55. L. Vanden Berghe (n. 54 supra), Plate 42b; P. Green, *Alexander the Great*, London 1970, 172.
56. G. Walser, *Die Völkerschaften auf den Reliefs von Persepolis*, Berlin 1966, Plate 6.
57. G. Walser (n. 56 supra), Plate 7.
58. Cf. E.F. Schmidt, *Persepolis*, Vol. 1, 82 on sculpture of the northern stairway, 'vandalised over the centuries'.
59. J.M. Cook (n. 33 supra), Plate 9; cf. the relief showing Darius on the northern staircase of the Apadana: L. Trümpelmann, *Ein Weltwunder der Antike: Persepolis*, Mainz 1988, Plate 14.
60. References in R.G.A. Buxton, *JHS* 100 (1980), esp. 30; *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, Band 2, Stuttgart 1954, cols 436–9.
61. Valerius Maximus 1.1. ext. 5.
62. Arrian 1.16.1; 3.14.3; Curtius 3.11.5 and 4.15.31.
63. Hdt. 9.22.

ÜBERLEGUNGEN ZUR HERKUNFT DES AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS

von Pedro Barceló
(Universität Augsburg)

Für C.P.T. Naudé zum 80. Geburtstag:
'ad multos annos'

Wie viele antike Autoren erweist sich Ammianus Marcellinus als äußerst zurückhaltend, wenn es darum geht, seine Leser über die eigene Person zu unterrichten. Aus einer Reihe von Anspielungen, die sich in seinem gesamten Werk verstreut finden, kann man auf seinen griechischen Hintergrund zurückschließen.[1] In der griechischen Sprache und Zivilisation war er aufgewachsen, die hellenische Kulturwelt bildete seine geistige Heimat. Dies alles wüßten wir, selbst dann, wenn Ammian am Ende seines Werkes nicht jenen berühmten Satz geschrieben hätte, mit dem er sich als Grieche zu erkennen gibt: 'miles quondam et Graecus'.[2] Freilich war Ammian ein Hellene ganz besonderer Art. Als nicht gerade alltäglich muß sein grandioser Versuch gelten, Reichsgeschichte in der Form römischer 'res gestae' zu verfassen. Indem er sich dazu der lateinischen Sprache bediente, bekundete er seine Verbundenheit mit der westlichen Tradition. Wie kaum ein anderer Zeitgenosse empfand er die Notwendigkeit einer Synthese griechischer und lateinischer Lebensformen als tragendes Element des Imperium Romanum.[3]

I

Mit dem allgemein gehaltenen Bekenntnis zum Hellenentum ist aber seine Herkunft nicht hinreichend bestimmt, und da Ammian keine expliziten Auskünfte über seine Heimatstadt gibt, wird diese Frage mit Hilfe indirekter Zeugnisse beantwortet. Es sind im wesentlichen zwei Gründe, die dazu geführt haben, Antiochia als die Geburtsstadt Ammians anzusehen. Zum einen die engagierte und ausgiebige Aufmerksamkeit, die Ammian den antiochenischen Angelegenheiten widmet, die erkennbar ist an einer Serie von Andeutungen, die sowohl seine persönliche Betroffenheit als auch seinen

lokalpatriotischen Stolz zu bestätigen scheinen (Amm. 14. 1; 8).[4] Ferner besitzen wir im Corpus der Korrespondenz des antiochenischen Rhetors Libanios einen an Marcellinus gerichteten Brief (1063 F), der mit dem Historiker Ammian in Verbindung gebracht wird. Aus dem Schreiben geht hervor, daß die Zeilen des Libanios an einen gelehrten Landsmann adressiert waren, der sich damals in Rom aufhielt.[5]

Neuerdings wird diese von der Forschung allgemein akzeptierte antiochenische Zugehörigkeit Ammians von J. Matthews[6] und G.W. Bowersock[7] angezweifelt. Eine Umdeutung der Hintergründe des Schreibens des Libanios bildet den Ausgangspunkt für diese Ansicht. Es wird verneint, daß Ammianus Marcellinus der Empfänger des oben genannten Briefes gewesen sei. Nach landläufiger Meinung war der in Rom weilende Historiker Ammian Adressat der Zeilen des Libanios, die von Seeck auf das Jahr 392 datiert wurden.[8] Diese Annahme bildete einen der stärksten Hinweise für die antiochenische Provenienz Ammians. Genau dies wird nun in Frage gestellt. Ich möchte mich im folgenden der Einfachheit halber der Gedankenführung von Bowersock zuwenden, der alle einschlägigen Aspekte in Kurzform aufgelistet hat, um diese umstrittene Interpretation einer kritischen Würdigung zu unterziehen. Die wichtigsten Punkte seiner Beweiskette lauten wie folgt:

(1) Es wird davon ausgegangen, daß der im Libaniosbrief vorkommende Terminus συγγραφή sich nicht ausschließlich zur Kennzeichnung historischer Schriften eignete. Vielmehr konnten mit dem Begriff auch anders geartete Prosatexte wie etwa pseudo-wissenschaftliche Traktate bezeichnet werden. Damit möchte man die Anspielung des Libanios, der Adressat des Briefes habe Teile seines Werkes in Rom öffentlich vorgelesen, dahingehend deuten, daß es sich dabei keineswegs um die abgeschlossenen Kapitel der ammianischen 'res gestae', sondern um andere rhetorische Arbeiten gehandelt haben kann.

(2) Eine wichtige Belegfunktion wird einigen aus einem medizinisch-magischen Traktat stammenden Versen, die im Corpus Hermeticum zusammengefaßt sind, zugewiesen.[9] Es wird vermutet, daß der erste Band dieses Compendiums aus den Schriften eines gewissen Harpokration aus Alexandria exzerpiert worden sei, was sich in der zweiten Hälfte des 4. Jhs. ereignet haben soll. In diesem akrostischen Gedicht tauchen zwei Namen auf: Magnus und Marcellinus. Nach der Meinung von M. West[10] könnte Magnus von Nisibis, der sich mit einer ähnlichen Thematik beschäftigte, wie sie von Harpokration behandelt wird, dafür in Frage kommen. Da ein Magnus von Nisibis als Adressat eines Briefes des Libanios bekannt ist (*Ep.* 843), wird gefolgert, daß der in den akrostischen Versen vorkommende Marcellinus ebenfalls der Briefpartner des Libanios gewesen sei. Daraus leitet Bowersock die antiochenische Herkunft des in Rom weilenden Marcellinus ab, der als Verfasser rhetorischer Traktate das Wohlwollen der Römer erlangt

hatte und dem überdies eine öffentliche Anerkennung zuteil wurde. In den bitteren Worten gegen die vornehme römische Welt, die der Historiker Ammian findet (Amm. 14. 6), sieht er eine Inkompatibilität zu der aus dem Libaniosbrief ersichtlichen freundlichen Aufnahme des Marcellinus durch das römische Publikum.

(3) Ist aufgrund dieser Faktorenkombination der Historiker Ammianus Marcellinus als Empfänger des Libaniosbriefes in Frage gestellt, so folgert Bowersock, dann ist die antiochenische Filiation des Historikers unhaltbar geworden. Als weiteren Beleg wird das Alexandria-Kapitel aus den ammianischen 'res gestae' herangezogen (Amm. 22. 16). Hier sei in extenso und mit Bewunderung über die Stadt Alexandria geschrieben worden, woraus geschlossen wird, daß der Verfasser dieser Passagen nur ein Alexandriner gewesen sein kann.

Faßt man die einzelnen Aspekte dieser Beweisführung zusammen, so lautet die Kernaussage: Der Adressat des Libaniosbriefes war nicht mit dem Historiker Ammianus Marcellinus identisch. Werkimmanente Kriterien, nämlich die Analyse der alexandrinischen Kapitel, legen nahe, Ammian als Kind dieser Stadt anzusehen.

II

Um es gleich vorweg zu sagen, in keinem der angeführten Punkte vermag die von Bowersock vorgetragene gelehrte Argumentation zu überzeugen. Die dabei vorkommenden Unklarheiten regen zu Reflexionen bzw. Präzisierungen an. Gehen wir diese Punkte einzeln durch.

Zu (1). Seit Thukydides' Zeiten verstand man συγγραφή als einen mit der Geschichtsschreibung zusammenhängenden Begriff. Im 4. Jh. n. Chr. hatte sich daran nichts geändert, wiewohl nicht abgestritten werden soll, daß die vorgeschlagene Deutung von συγγραφή im Sinne rhetorisch-wissenschaftlicher Traktatliteratur denkbar ist. Doch eine solche Lesart stellt die *lectio difficilior* dar.[11] In dem Libaniosschreiben kommt συγγραφή dreimal vor und zwar in der Bedeutung eines abgeschlossenen Prosatextes, etwa in der Form eines Geschichtswerks. Wir hören auch in dem Brief, daß Marcellinus ursprünglich nach Rom gereist war, um die Vorträge der Lehrer der Redekunst zu hören. Rom war damals eine berühmte Bildungsstätte. Der aus Antiochia gekommene Marcellinus wollte hier seine sprachlichen und literarischen Kenntnisse erweitern. Dies gibt gerade für den Historiker Ammian einen Sinn, da dieser das große Ziel hatte, sein Geschichtswerk auf Latein abzufassen. Schon bald brachte er es zu einer solchen Meisterschaft, daß er in öffentlichen literarischen Wettbewerben, bei denen er Teile seines im Entstehen begriffenen Geschichtswerkes las, Erfolge erreichte.[12] Öffentliche historische Vorlesungen waren keine Seltenheit[13], und so ist es denkbar, daß Ammian diese Gelegenheit ergriff, sich einen Namen zu

machen. Die Resonanz, die aus Antiochia kam, ist durch den Libaniosbrief belegt.

Zu (2). Die Infragestellung der Identität des Historikers Ammian mit dem Adressaten des Libaniosbriefes beruht auf einer Reihe von Kombinationen, die ziemlich spekulativ bleiben. Aus vereinzelten Mutmaßungen wird nach ihrer vermeintlichen Klärung ein Bedeutungszusammenhang konstruiert und dieser dann als Argument verwendet. Die dabei vollzogenen Zirkelschlüsse werfen mehr Probleme auf als sie lösen können: Ist es so sicher, daß der erste Band der Kyraniden ein Exzerpt aus Harpokration darstellt? Ist die vorgeschlagene Chronologie so felsenfest, wie behauptet wird? Warum muß der Magnus der akrostischen Verse mit Magnus von Nisibis identisch sein? Ist der Zusammenhang zwingend, daß der Marcellinus der akrostischen Verse der Briefpartner des Libanios gewesen sein muß? Warum muß der im Libaniosbrief benutzte Ausdruck συγγραφή hier ein rhetorisch-medizinisches Traktat bezeichnen?

Nicht nur, daß zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen Hypothesen dargeboten werden; selbst, wenn dies alles so stimmig wäre, wie behauptet wird, was läßt sich substantiell für die Frage der Herkunft Ammians gewinnen? Denn angenommen, der Beweis wäre erbracht, daß der Empfänger des Libaniosbriefes nicht der Historiker Ammian sei, so schließt dies seine mögliche antiochenische Herkunft noch nicht aus. Daher wird als entscheidendes Argument eine weitere Hypothese bemüht, die aus der Deutung des ammianischen Werkes gewonnen wurde: Das lokalpatriotische Motiv, das bei der Behandlung der alexandrinischen Angelegenheiten angeblich durchschimmern soll, womit der Verfasser als Alexandriner erkennbar wäre. Wie steht es wirklich damit?

Zu (3). Die im 16. Kapitel des 22. Buches dargebotene Beschreibung Alexandrias bildet für Bowersock den Schlüssel zur Lösung der Frage nach der Herkunft Ammians: 'The extensive and admiring treatment the historian accords to Egyptian Alexandria may not have been the work of an impressed tourist, but of a native of the city'.[14] Diese apodiktisch geäußerte Vermutung beruht auf nicht näher erläuterten Eindrücken. Fest steht, daß Ammian Alexandria nach dem üblichen Schema seiner Stadtbeschreibungen schildert. Zunächst erzählt er ihre Gründung mit der Anekdote des Mauerbaus (7), dann beschreibt er die Lage der Stadt (8, 9, 10), die Bedeutung des Leuchtturms von Pharos (11), des Serapeums (12) und der Bibliothek (13) wird anschließend unterstrichen. Nach einem Exkurs über Kanopos (14) handelt Ammian die jüngere Geschichte Alexandrias mit einem einzigen Satz ab! (15). Danach ergeht er sich in der Darbietung eines Katalogs der Zelebritäten der Stadt (16, 17, 18), und zum Schluß kommen die seit Herodots Historien verbreiteten Weisheiten über die ägyptische Religion zu Wort (19, 20, 21, 22). Es ist mir unverständlich, wie man aus dieser knappen, gelehrten, distanzierten und dazu noch mit gängigen Topoi

durchsetzten Stadtbeschreibung Kriterien gewinnen kann, die eine alexandrinische Herkunft ihres Verfassers nahelegen sollen. Wie anders schreibt Ammian über Rom und Antiochia, zwei Städte, die einen wichtigen Stellenwert in seinem Leben einnehmen.

III

Mit außergewöhnlicher Sachkenntnis setzt sich Ammian mit der stadtrömischen Topographie auseinander. Die Erörterung der zentralen Bauwerke und Plätze der Stadt Rom entlocken dem Historiker Töne aufrichtiger Bewunderung. Dies gilt vor allem, als er anläßlich des Rombesuchs des Kaisers Constantius II. die Sehenswürdigkeiten der Stadt begeistert aufzählt (Amm. 16. 10).

Das Rombild Ammians vereinigt eine Summe von Eindrücken, individuelle Erfahrungen, historische Reminiszenzen und Reflexionen, die sich wie Bausteine zu einem farbenprächtigen Mosaik zusammenfügen. Zwar schimmert Ammians persönliche Stimmungslage bei der Darstellung des römischen Alltags immer wieder durch, aber sie vermag keineswegs seinen Blick für die sehr komplexe Realität der Stadt zu trüben.[15] Getrieben von einem ungebrochenen Bemühen um Objektivität gelingt es Ammian bei seiner Auseinandersetzung mit den stadtrömischen Verhältnissen, dem banalen Alltagstreiben der Stadt eine Menge historisch übergreifender Aspekte abzugewinnen. Als einprägsame Aperçus eingekleidet oder als markante Sentenzen formuliert, führt Ammian dem Leser die meisten seiner Werturteile vor. Die Ehrfurcht vor der historischen Bedeutung Roms spielt eine durchaus ambivalente Rolle. Einerseits läßt sie die Disproportion zwischen der glanzvollen Vergangenheit und der kümmerlichen Gegenwart besonders kraß zu Tage treten, andererseits vermag gerade diese übermächtige Erinnerung die Erbärmlichkeit der eigenen Epoche etwas abzumildern. Ammians außergewöhnlich engagierte Stellungnahme zu dieser Stadt läßt erkennen, daß er sie aus eigener Anschauung bestens kannte, und obwohl sein dortiger Aufenthalt Höhen und Tiefen erlebt hatte, hielten letztere ihn nicht davon ab, eine ungetrübte Anhänglichkeit jener Stadt zu bewahren, die das bedrohte römische Reich symbolisierte. Gewiß war Ammian kein Römer, obwohl ihm die 'urbs aeterna' sehr am Herzen lag und er sich über das römische Alltagsleben mächtig erregen konnte. Seine detaillierte Kenntnis dieser Stadt und ihrer Menschen schlugen sich in der literarischen Verarbeitung seiner Erlebnisse nieder, die auf Schritt und Tritt Beteiligung und Betroffenheit verraten.[16]

Ähnlich ist die ammianische Stimmungslage, wenn er sich zu Themen, die Antiochia betreffen, äußert. Gleich zu Beginn der erhaltenen Kapitel des 14. Buches werden wir mit der Regierung des Caesar Gallus konfrontiert, der in Antiochia residierte (Amm. 14. 1). Hier tauchen die ersten Bemerkungen auf über die städtischen Verhältnisse der syrischen Metropole.

Wir erfahren von der aufgeladenen politischen Atmosphäre, die durch die Frontstellung zwischen dem Caesar und der munizipalen Aristokratie gekennzeichnet war (Amm. 14. 7). Ammians Schilderung dieser Konfliktlage ist keineswegs objektiv. Eindeutig liegt seine Sympathie bei der von Gallus in die Enge getriebenen städtischen Oberschicht, wohl deswegen, weil er aus ihr hervorgegangen war. Antiochia und seine Umgebung[18] erfahren an verschiedenen Stellen des ammianischen Werkes eine liebevolle Würdigung. Antiochia ist für Ammian jene 'weltberühmte Stadt, mit der sich keine andere vergleichen kann, was den Überfluß an eingeführten und einheimischen Waren anbetrifft' (Amm. 14. 8. 8). Er zeichnet die weltoffene Metropole als die modernste Stadt des römischen Reiches. Ihre Paläste, ihre öffentlichen Anlagen und Bauten, ihre Tempel und Kirchen gehörten zu den prachtvollsten der damaligen Zeit.[19] Prunkstück war die öffentliche Straßenbeleuchtung, über die Ammian in Anspielung auf die Torheit des Gallus sagt: 'Und das tat er, der Caesar Gallus, in einer Stadt, wo die Helligkeit der nächtlichen Beleuchtung mit der strahlenden Helle des Tages zu wetteifern pflegte' (Amm. 14. 1. 9). Aufschlußreich ist der Bericht über den Konflikt zwischen den Antiochenern und Kaiser Julian. Hier zeigt Ammian, der ansonsten ein Anhänger des Julian ist, großes Verständnis für die Anliegen der antiochenischen Kurialen. In einigen Passagen kann er kaum den Tadel für das Verhalten Julians unterdrücken (Amm. 22. 14. 2 ff.). Die Anteilnahme, die Ammian für die Nöte der Antiochener empfindet, die detaillierte Kenntnis der antiochenischen Ereignisse, nicht nur derjenigen, welche die hohe Politik betrafen,[20] sowie die stolze Betonung der Vorzüge der Stadt nähren die Vermutung, daß er sich ihr deswegen so eng verbunden fühlte, weil sie seine Heimat war.

IV

Berücksichtigt man alle bisher vorgetragenen Aspekte, so läßt sich folgendes sagen: Die in Zweifel gezogene Identität des Historikers Ammian als Briefpartner des Libanios wird nicht zwingend bewiesen und so bleibt sie bloße Vermutung. Noch viel weniger überzeugt der Versuch, unter Umgehung der viel aussagekräftigeren antiochenischen Kapitel des ammianischen Werkes, aus der in den 'res gestae' vorkommenden Beschreibung Alexandrias auf die alexandrinische Herkunft des Verfassers schließen zu wollen. Freilich ist zuzugeben, daß die traditionelle Meinung hinsichtlich der antiochenischen Provenienz Ammians alles andere als lückenlos begründet ist. Doch der neuerdings mit soviel gelehrtem Scharfsinn unternommene Versuch, diese zu erschüttern, vermag keine wesentlich stichhaltigeren Argumente beizubringen, die ein solches Revirement plausibel machen würden. So stehen sich zwei Versionen betreffs der ammianischen Herkunft gegenüber: Antiochia und Alexandria.

Möge der verehrte Jubilar, dem diese Überlegungen gewidmet sind, entscheiden, welche der hier zur Debatte stehenden Optionen die größere historische Glaubwürdigkeit für sich beanspruchen kann. Kaum ein anderer Gelehrter scheint dazu prädestinierter zu sein als er, dem Ammianus Marcellinus ein Leben lang Freund und Gefährte war.

Anmerkungen

1. Amm. 18. 6. 22; 22. 8. 33; 23. 6. 20; 25. 2. 5; 26. 1. 1.
2. Amm. 31. 16. 9. Dazu ausführlich mit der wichtigsten Literatur zum Thema K. Rosen, *Ammianus Marcellinus* (EdF 183), Darmstadt 1982, 41–47.
3. W. Enßlin, *Zur Geschichtsschreibung und Weltanschauung des Ammianus Marcellinus*, Klio-Beiheft 16, Leipzig 1923, 3 ff.
4. W. Seyfarth, *Ammianus Marcellinus. Römische Geschichte, Teil 1*, Darmstadt 1975, 10–15.
5. Die betreffende Passage lautet wie folgt: 'Ich erfahre auch, daß Rom selbst mit dem Siegeskranz deine Bemühungen belohnt hat und daß ein amtliches Urteil vorliegt, wonach du einige deiner Rivalen besiegt hast und den anderen nicht unterlegen bist. Das macht nicht nur dem Autor Ehre, sondern auch uns, aus deren Mitte der Autor kommt. Also laß nicht nach, solche Werke zu schreiben und sie von deinem Studierzimmer in die Auditorien zu bringen, und werde der Bewunderer nicht überdrüssig, sondern werde selbst immer berühmter und laß uns daran teilhaben. Solcher Art ist ein Mitbürger, der in hohem Ansehen steht: Mit seinen Werken schmückt er die Heimat.' (*Ep.* 1063 F).
6. *The Roman Empire of Ammianus*, London 1989, 478 ff.
7. Rezension von J. Matthews, *The Roman Empire of Ammianus*, *JRS* 80 (1990) 247 f.
8. *Die Briefe des Libanius zeitlich geordnet*, Leipzig 1906, 463.
9. Vgl. M. West, 'Magnus and Marcellinus: Unnoticed Acrostics in the Cyrannudes', *CQ*, N.S. 58 (1982) 480 f.
10. Wie Anmerkung 9.
11. Die überwiegende Anzahl der Textbelege aus dem Gesamtwerk des Libanios, in denen συγγραφή vorkommt, weisen einen eindeutigen Bezug zur Geschichtsschreibung auf. Vgl. Lib. *Or.* 1. 148; 11. 42; 11. 107; 13. 25; 18. 53; *Ep.* 35. 6; 406. 1.
12. Vgl. Anmerkung 4.
13. Eunap *Fg.* 73; *FHG* 4, p. 46. Vortragsreihen mit literarischen Themen waren ebenfalls sehr beliebt, wie wir aus Macrobius (6.6.1) erfahren.
14. Wie Anmerkung 6, 248.
15. Amm. 14. 6; 15. 7; 19. 10; 26. 3; 27. 3; 28. 1.
16. Zum Romaufenthalt des Ammian vgl. K. Rosen (wie Anmerkung 2) 22–31.
17. E.A. Thompson, 'Ammianus' Account of Gallus Caesar', *AJPh* 64 (1943) 302–315.
18. Vgl. etwa das Kapitel über Daphne, die Vorstadt Antiochias, Amm. 22. 13. 2.
19. Strabo 16. 2. 5; Lib. *Or.* 11. 206; Dion Chrys. 47. 17. G. Downey, *Ancient Antioch*, Princeton 1963, siehe Anhang.
20. Vgl. etwa seinen Bericht über die näheren Umstände des persischen Einfalls des Jahres 256, Amm. 23. 5. 3.
21. Zum Thema Ammian und Antiochia vgl. K. Rosen (wie Anmerkung 2) 15–22.

THE HOMERIC PANDAREOS — A HISTORICAL PERSONAGE?

by G. Cipolla
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At the end of 1963 I took a year's study leave from what was then the University College for Indians, and spent several months in my home town of Toarmina in Sicily, the ancient Greek Ταυρομένιον.

There were then several antiquarian shops to be found in the town, which were dealing in and selling, under the counter, genuine archaeological objects both Greek and Roman, as well as copies and imitations. It was the heyday of the tomb robbers who systematically and, of course, illegally pillaged archaeological sites, some of which were as yet undiscovered by the legitimate authorities.

I was well acquainted with some of the owners of such shops and knew that tomb robbers from all over the island brought archaeological objects to them, which in turn were sold to foreign and Italian amateur collectors.[1]

One of these antiquarians was Francesco Raja, whose wife was the adopted daughter of a by then deceased German gentleman who had originally owned the shop in Corso Umberto, the main street, not far from the Cathedral. Now Ciccio (that is, Francesco) was in full charge of the shop and he possessed a sizeable numismatic and archaeological collection which, on occasion, he would bring out for me to see and to discuss with him some of the more interesting items.

On one occasion he showed me a very ancient bronze ring which, within a recess of what would have been its bezel, displayed four mysterious signs arranged in a crosswise pattern. He asked me if I could give him any information about the ring and the meaning of the signs. I answered that I would have to study the artefact more carefully before venturing an opinion.

Perceiving my interest in the ring, he at once became reluctant to let me take it away for study. Nor would he discuss selling the ring. But he agreed that he would make a plaster cast of the section with the script. This was ready a few days later (Plate 1) and I took it home. The actual size of the seal was 13 mm × 10 mm.

Plate 1



Plate 2

It was not long before I realized that I had before me four clear Linear B signs arranged in a cross-like pattern. I became intrigued. Now the problem was how to decipher the four symbols. The task was made possible with the help of John Chadwick's *The Decipherment of Linear B*, Pelican 1961.

Believing that the symbol 𐀒, as in the plaster cast, was a nominative case and thus the last part of the word, I read the four signs as IIA-ZA-PE-O, that is IIANΔAPEOΣ, the order of the Linear B symbols being 𐀪 𐀬 𐀸 𐀒.[2]

Subsequently I made a pencil drawing of the ring, with its symbols as they would have been in the original, and noticed that 𐀒 was reversed, thus 𐁒. It became clear that the ring was meant to be used as a seal on clay or even wax.[3]

Now who was this Pandareos?

At once I thought of the Homeric character whose name appears twice in the *Odyssey* (19.518 and 22.66) and who, according to ancient commentators,[4] stole the golden dog from the temple of Zeus in Crete and gave it to his friend Tantalus. When his theft was discovered, Pandareos fled to Sicily where he died. Was this Pandareos the owner of the ring? Or was he, as seems likely, some other Bronze Age individual bearing the same name? Who could tell?

I did not think that the ring was a fake. To me it appeared to be undoubtedly genuine. Several Mycenaean gold and bronze rings had been dug up in Sicily.[5] Furthermore, the cross-like arrangement of the Linear B signs was consistent with a common Bronze Age practice adopted in Sicily.[6] So I believed the ring was important. It had to be rescued for scholarship and authentication by experts.

The next time I visited my friend Ciccio I said that I could give no explanation for the symbols on the ring without further close study and once again offered to purchase the ring from him. His refusal was very firm.

Perhaps he thought he had a treasure of great intrinsic rather than scholarly value. I bought several other items from his collection but the object of my desire remained unobtainable. On subsequent visits to Taormina over the years I endeavoured to persuade him to part with it but he remained obdurate.

The last time I returned to Taormina in 1984, Ciccio Raja's shop had disappeared. I learned from another old acquaintance of mine, Giovanni Canedoro (Golden Dog!), who also owned an antiquarian shop in the main street, that Ciccio had died and his widow had 'got rid of all the ancient objects' and had returned to Catania where she was born.

Where is the ring now? I should dearly like to know, for its existence raises a number of intriguing questions, not least of its authenticity. Is the Pandareos of the *Odyssey* a historical personage or a mythical character in a poem sometimes described as a fairytale? Then there is the question of the authorship of the *Odyssey* as opposed to that of the *Iliad*.[7]

The mystery of the ring remains unsolved. Who was Pandareos, its owner?

Notes

1. G. Cipolla, 'Meeting the Past in Southern Europe', *Lantern*, Pretoria 14, 4 (1965) 4–15.
2. More specifically IIA(N)-ZA-PE-O(Σ). According to Chadwick the consonants are omitted from the spelling when they are final or precede another consonant.
   As for the Z, the exact phonetic value in Linear B was still uncertain (Chadwick, *op. cit.* 75). However, we do know that the Greek Z, being a double consonant, was pronounced as zd or dz.
3. See my illustration of the complete ring as I remember it to have been (Plate 2).
4. Homer, *The Odyssey. Text and Commentary* by W.W. Merry, Oxford (1902) 1926. Homer, *The Odyssey*, (ed.) W.B. Stanford, MacMillan, London 1964. (Vide ad locc.) See also R. Graves, *The Greek Myths*, vol. 2, Pelican 1960, 25–31.
5. L. Bernabò Brea, *Sicily Before the Greeks*, Thames & Hudson, London 1957, Plates 56, 57, 58, 72.
6. L. Bernabò Brea, *op. cit.* 127–128.
7. Samuel Butler, *The Authoress of the Odyssey*, London 1897. Butler maintained that a Sicilian noblewoman was the author of the *Odyssey*. Similar views are advanced by Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths*, vol. 1, Pelican 1960, 31–33.

THE SOURCES OF APPIAN'S *BELLA CIVILIA* FOR THE 80'S BC*

by Richard J. Evans
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The exposure of myth or distortion in literary sources is not a task undertaken lightly by the ancient historian, hampered, as he unquestionably is, in his pursuit of formulating a clear and accurate picture of the period which he studies, by a paucity of extant source material. Specific examples of corrupt transmission, especially those which have infiltrated their way into the orthodox modern accounts, cry out, nonetheless, for full identification and, if possible, an emendation in the reading of a text, or a recognition that a particular passage is no longer to be judged reliable. Numerous instances may, of course, be cited,[1] but one such knotty puzzle, not examined in depth before, is to be found in the first book of Appian's *Bella Civilia*.

There the writer states, quite categorically, that Sulla first proscribed about forty senators and sixteen hundred *equites* (*BC.* 1.95), and that more senators were soon added to the list, and that, ultimately, he was responsible for the death of ninety senators, including fifteen *consulares* and two thousand six hundred *equites* (*BC.* 1.103). There is, however, a considerable problem with regard to verification of this claim. Indeed, even the exhaustive study of the Sullan proscriptions by François Hinard has produced, in some cases with the greatest of ingenuity, only about fifty names which might qualify in the very widest sense as 'senatorial'.[2] On closer examination it becomes evident that, of this total number, just sixteen of the names in Hinard's register of the proscribed in 82 were actually political figures of any consequence. Only four of these were consuls or *consulares*, eight were praetors or *praetorii*, two were tribunes or *tribunicii* and two were legates of uncertain senatorial rank. Thus:

1. L. Cornelius Scipio Asiagenes (cos.83)
2. C. Norbanus (cos.83)
3. Cn. Papirius Carbo (cos.85–4, 82)

4. C. Marius C.f (cos.82)
5. M. Iunius Brutus (pr.88)
6. M. Marius Gratidianus (pr.85/4)
7. Q. Sertorius (pr.83)
8. Q. Antonius Balbus (pr.83?)
9. ? Burrienus (pr.83)
10. L. Iunius Brutus Damasippus (pr.82)
11. C. Carrinas (pr.82)
12. M. Perperna Vento (pr.82?)
13. M. Iunius Brutus (trib.83)
14. Q. Valerius Soranus (trib.82?)
15. C. Marcius Censorinus (leg.82)
16. Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (leg.82)

It is obviously quite impossible to reach Appian's eventual aggregate of fifteen *consulares* since the whereabouts of the consular politicians at the end of the 80's is remarkably well attested.[3] In fact, few senior members of the *ordo senatorius* are unaccounted for by the beginning of Sulla's dictatorship in November 82. Besides Sulla himself, just four *consulares*, L. Valerius Flaccus (cos.100), C. Valerius Flaccus (cos.93), M. Perperna (cos.92) and L. Marcius Philippus (cos.91), are attested as certainly alive in 81. The presence in the senate of a further nine *consulares* remains doubtful, but none appear to have been active in the late 80's and most, if not all, were probably already dead.[4] It is, therefore, abundantly clear that Sulla had not the death of fifteen consulars on his conscience, but the exile and death of only four (Oros. 5.21.3): Cn. Carbo who was executed in Sicily, C. Marius C.f. who committed suicide during the siege of Praeneste, C. Norbanus who killed himself at Rhodes and Scipio Asiagenes who retired into exile at Massilia. Of the rest named above, Antonius Balbus was killed in Sardinia, Valerius Soranus in Sicily, the *praetorius* M. Brutus committed suicide, Carrinas, Damasippus and Censorinus were executed after the battle at the Colline Gate, Ahenobarbus was executed in Africa, Burrienus died during the proscriptions, while Sertorius, Perperna and the ex-tribune Brutus went into exile. Just one Roman politician of consular standing, viz Carbo, was, therefore, actually condemned to death, after capture, at the end of the civil war.

In arriving at this rather sensational number of proscribed *consulares*, it seems more than likely that Appian was hoodwinked into perpetuating anti-Sullan propaganda from a source which was sympathetic to the followers of Carbo and the younger Marius. At the very least, this writer appears to be guilty of gross negligence in his use of source material. Such a hypothesis becomes much more plausible when Appian's description of the proscriptions (*BC.* 1.93–96, 101–103) is compared with his account of the

murders carried out on the orders of L. Cornelius Cinna and the elder Marius in 87 (*BC.* 1.71–74). Whereas the later Sullan atrocities are commented upon at length, the coverage of the slaughter of the opponents of Marius, in particular, is deemed worthy of only relative brevity and mild censure. Nevertheless, the ancient sources, including Appian, clearly indicate that nearly as many senior politicians died in 87 as in 82. In fact, the combined *auctoritas* of those killed in 87 far exceeds that of those proscribed by Sulla. Thus:

1. C. Atilius Sorranus (cos.106)[5]
2. Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos.102)
3. M. Antonius (cos.99)
4. P. Licinius Crassus (cos.97)
5. L. Iulius Caesar (cos.90)
6. Cn. Octavius (cos.87)
7. L. Cornelius Merula (cos. suff. 87)
8. Q. Ancharius (pr.88?)
9. C. Iulius Caesar Strabo (aed.90)
10. M. Baebius (trib.103?)[6]
11. Sex. Lucilius (trib.87)[7]
12. P. Cornelius Lentulus (leg.90?)[8]
13. C. Numitorius (sen.)[9]

In 87 seven consuls or *consulares*, one praetor, one *aedilicius*, two tribunes or *tribunicii*, one legate of uncertain senatorial rank and one senator were either killed or committed suicide in the aftermath of the seizure of Rome by Cinna and Marius. The consul Cn. Octavius, L. and C. Iulius Caesar, Atilius Sorranus, P. Crassus, M. Antonius, Q. Ancharius, P. Lentulus, M. Baebius, Sex. Lucilius and C. Numitorius were murdered; Q. Catulus and L. Merula anticipated execution by committing suicide. Moreover, Appian (*BC.* 1.73) also notes that 'all Sulla's friends were killed, his house was destroyed, his property was confiscated, and he was outlawed' (αὐτοῦ τε Σύλλα φίλοι πάντες ἀνῃροῦντο, καὶ ἡ οἰκία κατεσκάπτετο, καὶ ἡ περιουσία δεδήμευτο, καὶ πολέμιος ἐψηφίζετο). This statement surely implies that other politicians also met their end in grim circumstances,[10] but the long-term impact of these events is glossed over in silence.

Appian's discussion of the turbulent 80's occupies rather less than half of his first book on the civil wars of the republican period (*BC.* 1.55–105), and, therefore, cannot be regarded as a completely superficial account. In comparison with an annalistic account the *Bella Civilia* might be regarded as an epitome, but it is far more substantial than other such *periochae*. Thus the history may be condensed, but it is of much greater depth than, for instance, the epitomes of Livy. The conflicting details concerning 87 and 82 which arise in the narrative suggest that he worked from at least

two sources: the first, a composition which is conjecturely pro-Marian, or to some extent impartial, the second, a work which was clearly anti-Sullan.[11] For, although there is the even-handed comment (*BC.* 1.58) that ἐς τοσοῦτον αὐτοῖς κακοῦ τὰ τῶν στάσεων ἀμεληθέντα προέκοψε, and that the supporters of Marius fought with little enthusiasm against the army of Sulla and were routed in the city, the sympathy of the audience is aroused by the expulsion of the *Mariani* after they had been declared *hostes* (*BC.* 1.60). Furthermore, if Marius was exiled for stirring up civil strife, for openly attacking the consuls, and inciting slaves to rebel, it was the unprecedented assault on Rome by Sulla's army that opened the way for future internecine conflict on a much wider and more disastrous scale.

The adventures of Marius after he fled from Rome and Italy (*BC.* 1.61–62, 64–67) are retold at greater length by Plutarch (*Mar.* 35.5–40), and it is possible that Appian had access to this biography.[12] The phrase 'still squalid and longhaired', which is used to describe Marius' appearance on his return after an absence of over six months, bears more than just a similarity to the description provided by Plutarch (*Mar.* 41.4: 'hair uncut from the day of his exile'). The frustration of Marius and the vengeance he planned on his enemies (*BC.* 1.70), alluded to when Cinna was approached by senatorial envoys just prior to their reception into Rome late in 87, also compares well with the episode as related by Plutarch (*Mar.* 43.1). The subsequent murder of Marius' political opponents is more problematic (*BC.* 1.72), however, and indicates quite diverse sources. Thus following the violent death of the consul Octavius either on the Janiculum hill (*BC.* 1.71) or in the forum (Plut. *Mar.* 42.5), the former consul of 97, P. Crassus, who had organized the city's defences, was murdered. Here, Appian's account can be seen to be at variance with the information given by other writers. He was evidently under the impression that Crassus killed his son before falling to his pursuers, but Cicero (*de Orat.* 3.10), who ought to have known the real facts, says that this ex-consul committed suicide.[13] The death of Antonius took place in the country where he was betrayed by a slave of his host (App. *BC.* 1.72; Sen. *Ep.* 47.10; Plut. *Mar.* 44.1–4), but Cicero was aware that C. Caesar Strabo suffered an almost identical fate: *hospitis Etrusci scelere proditum* (*de Orat.* 3.10). According to Appian, Ancharius was cut down on the Capitoline hill when he tried to approach Marius in the hope of a reconciliation, but Plutarch's account of this particular murder is much more vague (*Mar.* 43.3). L. Merula and Q. Lutatius Catulus were to be tried in the law courts, but both took their own lives, the former by opening his veins, the latter by suffocation (*BC.* 1.74).[14] On the whole, it is surely evident that some confusion has crept into the tradition regarding the deaths of, at least, Crassus, Antonius and Caesar Strabo, which again points to the existence of two, or more, earlier accounts which were available to, and employed by, not only Appian, but probably also Plutarch.

While obvious inconsistencies exist for the political events in 87, some of which may be attributed to careless research, the ancient accounts of the Sullan proscriptions are, by and large, muddled to an even greater degree. This becomes readily apparent when the major literary sources are compared. Appian's fantastic figure for the proscribed is not matched by Plutarch (*Sull.* 31.3), who furnishes few names, and a total, including senators and *equites*, of not much in excess of five hundred:

> ὁ δ' οὖν Σύλλας εὐθὺς ὀγδοήκοντα προέγραψεν, οὐδενὶ τῶν ἐν τέλει κοινωσάμενος. ἀγαναχτούντων δὲ πάντων, μίαν ἡμέραν διαλιπὼν ἄλλους προέγραψεν εἴκοσι καὶ διακοσίους, εἶτα τρίτῃ πάλιν οὐκ ἐλάττους.
>
> Sulla immediately proscribed eighty men without consulting the magistrates. Despite general displeasure, after a day's interval he proscribed two hundred and twenty others, then again on the third day not less than this number.

Only the *eques Romanus* Q. Aurelius (*Sull.* 31.3) and the ex-praetor M. Marius Gratidianus (*Sull.* 32.2) are named in the general purge of political opponents at the end of 82; the younger Marius (*Sull.* 32.1), Scipio Asiagenes (*Sull.* 28.7) and Carbo (*Sull.* 28.8) are, however, treated elsewhere in the text. Although Appian discusses the deaths of Marius (*BC.* 1.94) and Carbo (*BC.* 1.96) in some depth, and mentions the executions of Marcius Censorinus and C. Carrinas immediately after the battle at the Colline Gate (*BC.* 1.93), he relates only in very general terms the supposedly widespread havoc which took place when Sulla was elected dictator (*BC.* 1.95–96). The epitomes of Livy Books 88 and 89 suggest that the original work covered the end of the civil war and the beginning of Sulla's dictatorship extensively, but no overall total of the proscribed is forthcoming. This is perhaps a rather significant fact because notorious events and startling figures would definitely have been of interest to the general readership of the *periochae*. The absence of any total for those proscribed by Sulla may simply mean that Livy did not provide this material. Still, the epitomes refer to the deaths of Marius Gratidianus and the consul Marius (*Per.* 88), and the execution of Carbo (*Per.* 89), and note that (Sulla) 'tabulam proscriptionis posuit, urbem ac totam Italiam caedibus replevit' (*Per.* 88).

Thus it becomes evident that Appian is the sole source for the huge numbers of senators and *equites* proscribed between 82 and 81. It should also be remembered that he was, chronologically, the latest of the major writers to deal with this period, and whose compositions are still, to a greater or lesser extent, intact. His sources should be identifiable. Appian almost certainly had access to Plutarch's biographies of Marius and Sulla, but there are sufficient discrepancies between the texts of the two writers,

noted above, to show that the former did not employ these *Lives* as a mainstay for his narrative of the 80's. Livy's history should have been an obvious choice for a historian interested in the republican period, and should have been readily accessible. Most authorities agree, however, that for the two decades after 60 Appian, like Plutarch, preferred to follow the account of C. Asinius Pollio, and presumably relegated Livy, perhaps due to his limited political insight, to a secondary role, if indeed he was consulted at all.[15] Since the consensus of opinion regards Pollio as the more influential source for Appian's account of the last decades of the Roman republic, it seems hardly credible that he would have turned to Livy for the period immediately preceding the establishment of the First Triumvirate. Besides, Livy probably also had recourse to Pollio's history when composing the *ab urbe condita*, and so it is possible to argue that Livy, Appian and Plutarch all made use of another writer, or writers, for the period between 100 and 60.

The historians of the first half of the first century BC are known only from meagre fragments, and even the periods about which they wrote are not known for certain. L. Cornelius Sisenna, for example, wrote a history of Rome from the Social War which probably concluded with the dictatorship of Sulla, to whom he was sympathetic: 'L. Sisenna, optume et diligentissume omnium qui eas res dixere persecutus' (Sall. *Iug.* 95.2). Considering Appian's final assessment of Sulla, Sisenna cannot be the author of damning evidence against the dictator, though it is just possible that the negative remarks about Marius and Cinna emanate from this quarter.[16] Sallust's comment (*Iug.* 95.2) indicates that there were several other works which contained detailed treatments of the 80's,[17] and of the possible writers of this period, five, in particular, deserve some attention since any of these might have been the source for Appian's less hostile treatment of Marius in 87, and his more forthright condemnation of Sulla.

L. Cornelius Sulla himself composed memoirs which were published in twenty-two books, and which greatly influenced later historians' opinions of the time.[18] But he is an impossible choice as Appian's source either for the murders in 87 or for the proscriptions. Moreover, the autobiography of P. Rutilius Rufus, though certainly a source for hostile remarks about Marius, is not likely to have contained spurious material about Sulla.[19] Sempronius Asellio wrote a history which began with the destruction of Carthage in 146, included the death of M. Livius Drusus in 91,[20] and may have continued into the 80's. His attitude towards Marius and Sulla is, of course, unknown, but a son or close relative, A. Sempronius Asellio, praetor in 89, was murdered by creditors at the end of the Social War (Liv. *Per.* 74; Val. Max. 9.7.4; App. *BC.* 1.54).[21] Asellio may have had an axe to grind, though conjecture here can lead only to a *cul de sac.* Fenestella, on the other hand, is a more likely candidate as a source for

the 80's since he wrote a history of Rome, perhaps from the foundation, down to the middle of the first century.[22] His political inclinations are not attested, and, given his antiquarian interests, he might easily have been detached from the intrigues of the day.[23] Fenestella's account may have provided Appian with a more neutral view of these years. Finally, there is L. Lucceius, friend and political ally of both Pompey and Caesar, who was praetor in 67, and who aspired to the consulship of 59 (Cic. *ad Att.* 1.17.11).[24] His history of Rome dealt specifically with the decade 90 to 81, and must have been sufficiently impressive, since Cicero urged him to also write an account of the events of 63: 'Ardeo cupiditate incredibili neque, ut ego arbitror, reprehendenda nomen ut nostrum scriptis illustretur et celebretur tuis' (*ad fam.* 5.12).[25] His work was evidently almost complete by about 55, just before the conference at Luca, where the Triumvirate was renewed. As a loyal supporter of the triumvirs, writing about the civil wars of the 80's, he may be assumed to have followed the antipathy of his *amici* towards Sulla. He may well have also indulged in excessive adulation of Marius. Caesar, of course, went to great lengths to publicize his family connections with Marius in the mid-60's and, as a result, successfully made political capital.[26] Lucceius may, therefore, have dwelt on the less positive aspects of Sulla's deeds to enhance the stature of both Marius and his self-proclaimed heir Caesar. The 80's were not an obvious choice as a subject for a historian at this time, but focussing on this decade made sound sense if the writer intended publicizing Caesar's link with Marius, and perhaps also emphasizing the break from Sulla by Pompey and Crassus. Lucceius was plainly recognized as a subtle propagandist by Cicero who clearly hoped that his own role in the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy could be glorified for posterity. Thus, although Appian is generally regarded as a historian of some accomplishment and ingenuity,[27] his account of the horror of the proscriptions may actually owe more to the biased pen of Lucceius than to his own creative genius:[28]

> μετ' οὐ πολὺ δὲ βουλευτὰς ἄλλους αὐτοῖς προσετίθει. καὶ τῶνδε οἱ μὲν ἀδοκήτως καταλαμβανόμενοι διεφθείροντο, ἔνθα συνελαμβάνοντο, ἐν οἰκίαις ἢ στενωποῖς ἢ ἱεροῖς, οἱ δὲ μετέωροι πρὸς τὸν Σύλλαν φερόμενοί τε καὶ πρὸ ποδῶν αὐτοῦ ῥιπτούμενοι; οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐσύροντο καὶ κατεπατοῦντο, οὐδὲ φωνὴν ἔτι τῶν θεωμένων οὐδενὸς ἐπὶ τοσοῖσδε κακοῖς ἔχοντος ὑπ' ἐκπλήξεως (*BC.* 1.95).
>
> Afterwards Sulla added other senators to the proscribed. Some of these were seized unexpectedly and killed where they were arrested, in their homes or in the streets and temples, others were raised aloft and killed before being thrown at Sulla's feet. Still others were dragged and trampled under foot, and yet none of those present made a sound against such outrages on account of fear.

In conclusion, it is worth referring to the late Roman writer Orosius who states (5.21.3) that Sulla was responsible for the death of four consular politicians ('prima proscriptio octoginta hominum fuit, in quibus quattuor consulares erant Carbo Marius Norbanus at Scipio'). This conflicts with Appian's figure, and is interesting because it illustrates once again the existence of two or more traditions concerning the Sullan proscriptions. Orosius may well have used Livy's history which, I suggest, contained less fanciful material about Sulla, and Livy possibly followed a more sober writer such as Sulla, Rutilius Rufus, Fenestella or Sisenna. Appian's extant account of the 80's clearly stands out on a limb from the rest of the ancient writers, with figures for the proscribed much more exaggerated than others who discussed this period.[29] The idea that Appian used, perhaps inadvertently, perhaps intentionally — he may have enjoyed such embellishments — a writer who covered the 80's in such a way as to win political prestige for his political allies, may be advanced with some confidence. The source of Appian's condemnatory remarks about Sulla in the *Bella Civilia*, Book 1, was surely L. Lucceius, the beneficiary of this anti-Sullan propaganda none other than Gaius Iulius Caesar.

NOTES

* My thanks to Ursula Vogel for her kind and helpful remarks on an earlier draft of this paper. Any inaccuracies which remain are, of course, mine alone.

1. See, for instance, R.J. Evans, 'Quis erat Nunnius?', *AHB* 2 (1988) 42–48; 'Was M. Caecilius Metellus a renegade? A Note on Livy, 22.53.5', *Acta Classica* 32 (1989) 117–121.
2. F. Hinard, *Les proscriptions de la Rome républicaine*, Rome 1985, 329–411, lists fifty-one individuals for whom he claims senatorial status, and a further twenty-four whom he considers to have been *equites*. Some of the names listed here are indeed remarkable, including the sons of Cinna, M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos.78) and Norbanus who cannot have been senators by 82. C. Norbanus C.f. was *monetalis* in 83, but this junior office was never a qualification for senatorial status; the sons of Cinna and Lepidus are not attested as having held senatorial office at this stage. Hinard's list also contains several officers of Sertorius' *consilium* who may never have been senators, and still others whose identification as senatorial he himself is forced to question.
3. R.J. Evans, 'The *Consulares* and *Praetorii* in the Roman Senate at the Beginning of Sulla's Dictatorship', *Athenaeum* NS 61 (1983) 521–528.
4. Evans (above note 3) 523–524.
5. Although Sorranus' *praenomen* is not given by Appian (*BC.* 1.72), his presence alongside other senior politicians allows him to be identified with the consul of 106, who is not otherwise attested after 100, Cic. *pro Rab. perd.* 7.21.
6. Another possibility here is C. Baebius (pr.90), T.R.S. Broughton, *Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, New York 1951–52 (Vols. 1–2), 1986 (Vol. 3), hereafter *MRR.*, 2.28.
7. Liv. *Per.* 80; Vell. 2.24.2: 'Eodem anno P. Laenas tribunus plebis Sex. Lucilium, qui priore anno tribunus plebis fuerat, Saxo Tarpeio deiecit'.

8. *MRR.* 2.28. Lentulus served under L. Iulius Caesar (cos.90), which may be significant since his former commander was also murdered. Marius served as a legate in the *consilium* of P. Rutilius Lupus (cos.91), App. *BC.* 1.40.
9. Perhaps a son of the *monetalis*, dated to 133 by M.H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage*, Cambridge 1974, no. 246. The moneyer was also probably the senator 'C. Numitorius C.f. Lem.', who is placed twenty-ninth on the *consilium* of the *S.C. de agro Pergameno*, dated to 129, *MRR.* 3.150; R.K. Sherk, *Roman Documents from the Greek East*, Baltimore 1969, 70. Cf. H.B. Mattingly, 'The Date of the Senatus Consultum *de agro Pergameno*, *AJP* 93 (1972) 412–423, who suggests redating the *S.C. de agro Pergameno* to 101, and notes, 420 and n.34, that Numitorius was a son of the moneyer, and was the politician killed in 87. Note the variant spelling 'Nemetorius' in Appian's account.
10. A fourteenth politician, M. Caecilius Cornutus (pr.90), was also a wanted man in 87, but managed to escape, App. *BC.* 1.73; Plut. *Mar.* 43.6. See also App. *BC.* 1.71 for the murder of *equites*, who had supported Sulla, a fact often missed by scholars who have tended to postulate only senatorial support for Sulla, and, by and large, just equestrian support for Marius. Thus P.A. Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic*, Oxford 1988, 156.
11. Cf. P.A. Brunt, 'On Historical Fragments and Epitomes', *CQ* 30 (1980) 492: '... there is nothing to prevent us from assuming that in the first book on his *Civil Wars* Appian followed throughout an excellent historian whose qualities can be perceived in what may be a relatively full extract recounting the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus; elsewhere Appian has summarized ruthlessly and probably inaccurately ...'.
12. J. Moles, 'Fate, Apollo, and M. Junius Brutus', *AJP* 104 (1983) 251–2, who also points out the greater influence on both Appian and Plutarch of the history of C. Asinius Pollio for the period after 60 BC down to the battle of Philippi in 42; A.H. McD(onald), *OCD*^{2} 852–3.
13. Livy, *Per.* 80, follows Cicero, but Plutarch's notice of the death of P. Crassus and his son, *Crass.* 4.1, lacks even the few details given in Appian's account.
14. Plutarch's account of Catulus' death is very much shorter, *Mar.* 44.5, and the suicide of Merula goes unrecorded. Livy, *Per.* 80, mentions only the murders of Octavius, Ancharius, L. and C. Caesar, and P. Crassus, but also adds the name Sex. Licinius (Lucilius); cf. Vell. 2.24.2.
15. Moles (above note 12) 251: 'Appian's use of Plutarch is debatable'; 252: '... Asinius Pollio, Appian's basic narrative source in this part of his History'.
16. E. Badian, 'The Early Historians', in *Latin Historians*, ed. T.A. Dorey, London 1966, 25.
17. Tanusius Geminus also wrote a history of the late Republic, Münzer, *RE* Tanusius no. 2; C.J. F(ordyce), *OCD*^{2} 1037, and was consulted by both Plutarch, *Caes.* 22.3 (for the 50's) and Suetonius, *Iul.* 9.2 (for the 60's). He may not, however, have covered the 80's, and also seems to have been regarded as a rather dull writer, Sen. *Ep.* 93.11: 'annales Tanusii scis quam ponderosi sint et quid vocentur'. R. Syme, *Sallust*, Berkeley 1964, 96: 'he (Tanusius) was hostile to Caesar'.
18. For Sulla's memoirs see Badian (above note 16) 23–25; Syme (above note 17) 155.
19. Thus Plut. *Mar.* 28.5; R.J. Evans, 'Metellus Numidicus and the Elections for 100 B.C.', *Acta Classica* 30 (1987) 65–68; Syme (above note 17) 155.
20. Münzer, *RE* Sempronius no. 16; A.H. McD(onald), *OCD*^{2} 130.
21. Münzer, *RE* Sempronius no. 17: 'Sohn des Historikers'; *MRR.* 2.33.
22. The history of Fenestella certainly included the year 57, Wissowa, *RE* Fenestella; A.H. McD(onald), *OCD*^{2} 434.

23. Fenestella apparently possessed a sound reputation among later writers, thus Lactantius, *Inst.* 1.6.14: 'diligentissimus scriptor'.
24. *MRR.* 3.127–8; E.B(adian), *OCD*^{2} 621; R.J. Evans, 'Candidates and Competition in Consular Elections at Rome between 218 and 49 BC', *Acta Classica* 34 (1991) 111–136.
25. D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero: Epistulae ad Familiares*, Cambridge, 1977, 1. 318, suggests that Lucceius's work may not have been published, at least not in the 50's. Lucceius followed Pompey in the civil war, but was later pardoned by Caesar whom he survived.
26. Suet. *Iul.* 11.2; Plut. *Caes.* 5.1
27. Moles (above note 12) 252; Brunt (above note 11) 492–3.
28. Lucceius is said to have written in Greek, Shackleton Bailey (above note 24) 1. 318, and thus may have possessed an additional appeal to another Greek writer, such as Appian, in preference to other historians who wrote in Latin.
29. Thus Brunt (above note 10) 461: 'most of his (Sulla's) victims are for us anonymous, and therefore were probably not men of birth and rank'.

DIE BEGIN VAN DIE ROMEINSE WÊRELDHEERSKAPPY BY POLYBIUS EN LIVIUS

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Polybius stel homself in sy *Universele Geskiedenis* van die jare 264–145 v.C. uitdruklik die taak om vir sy Griekssprekende lesers te toon en te probeer verklaar 'hoe, wanneer en waarom al die bekende streke van die *oikouménê* onder die Romeine se mag beland het'.[1] Hy sien die totstandkoming van die Romeinse wêreldryk, wat hy grotendeels as tydgenoot en deels selfs as ooggetuie beleef het, as die resultaat van 'n bewuste en doelgerigte imperialisme.[2] Daarbenewens is dit sy oorwoë mening dat die begin, die tydsduur en die eindpunt van hierdie unieke historiese ontwikkeling presies afgebaken kan word: die proses begin, sê hy, met die Tweede Puniese Oorlog, strek oor 'n tydperk van net minder as 53 jaar, en eindig met die val van die Macedoniese monargie;[3] met ander woorde: Rome se wêreldheerskappy begin na sy mening effektief met die oorwinning oor koning Perseus van Macedonië by Pydna in 168 v.C.

Livius skryf as tydgenoot van keiser Augustus sy *Ab urbe condita libri* ongeveer 150 jaar ná Polybius, en omdat hy hierdie Griekse skrywer as besonder betroubaar beskou — hy noem hom 'non incertum auctorem cum omnium Romanarum rerum tum praecipue in Graecia gestarum'[4] — gebruik hy hom vir daardie deel van sy reusewerk wat die geskiedenis van Rome se magsuitbreiding na die Ooste beskryf, naamlik boeke 30–45, byna uitsluitlik as sy bron.[5] Die vraag kan dus gestel word of Polybius se bogenoemde opvatting oor die ontstaan en presiese aanvangsdatum van die Romeinse wêreldheerskappy ook in Livius se verwerking teruggevind kan word.

Anders as Polybius, wat graag direk met sy leser kommunikeer, gereeld persoonlike kommentaar oor gebeure lewer, uitwei en bespiegel, verkies Livius dit om as persoon soveel as moontlik op die agtergrond te bly: afgesien van sy 'praefatio' tot die hele werk en kort inleidings tot onderdele daarvan,[6] is persoonlike kommentaar en ontboesemings in sy boeke betreklik seldsaam. Daarenteen klee of 'versteek' hy klaarblyklik baie van sy

gedagtes en gevoelens, ook van sy ideologiese en morele beskouings, in die woorde en gedagtes van die 'dramatis personae' van sy vertelling. Dit is dus nie alte verbasend dat Livius hom nêrens in die 35 behoue boeke van sy werk[7] persoonlik oor die opvallende verskynsel van Rome se gedurige magsuitbreiding uitlaat nie, of oor *hoe* en *wanneer* die oomblik van Rome se daadwerklike wêreldheerskappy nou eintlik aanbreek nie. Maar die leser kom tog wél herhaaldelik in die werk — en inderdaad byna uitsluitlik in redevoerings — verwysings na Rome se heerskappy oor die 'orbis terrarum' teë. Om 'n antwoord op ons vraag te probeer vind, mag dit dus help om *al* die relevante *loci* oor hierdie onderwerp by Livius eens in hulle chronologiese volgorde te versamel[8] en te kyk of daar 'n duidelike geheelbeeld te voorskyn kom wat dan met Polybius se konsepsie vergelyk kan word.

(1) *Praef.* 7: Die outeur verwys terloops (maar blykbaar nie sonder 'n mate van trots nie) daarna dat die '*gentes humanae*' tans 'aequo mente ... imperium patiuntur'.

(2) 1.4.1: Livius skryf na aanleiding van die verhaal van Rea Silvia se swangerskap en die geboorte van Romulus en Remus die oorsprong van die stad Rome en die begin van die '*maximi secundum deorum opes imperii*' aan die beskikking van die 'fata' toe.

(3) 1.16.7: Romulus verskyn kort ná sy dood aan ene Julius Proculus en beveel hom om aan die Romeine die profetiese boodskap te bring dat 'caelestes ita velle ut mea Roma *caput orbis terrarum* sit'.

(4) 1.55.6: Gedurende die uitgrawings vir die fondasie van die Juppitertempel word 'n menslike kop gevind: plaaslike en Etruskiese priesters vertolk dit as 'n voorspelling dat die Kapitool '*arcem imperii caputque rerum*'[9] sal wees.

(5) 5.54.7: Toe sekere leiers ná die verwoesting van Rome deur die Galliërs 'n volksverhuising na die stad Veii voorstaan, herinner Camillus die volk aan bogenoemde ou voorspelling: die Kapitool is die plek waar die '*caput rerum summaque imperii*' gesetel sal wees!

Passasies (2) tot (5) is profeties van inhoud: hulle laat die leser van die begin af verstaan, en herinner hom af en toe weer daaraan, dat dit die noodlot of die gode se wil was dat Rome uiteindelik die hele wêreld oorheers.

(6) 21.30.3 en 10: Voor die tog oor die Alpe spoor Hannibal sy troepe aan: hy herinner hulle daaraan dat hulle die Ebrorivier oorgesteek het 'ad delendum nomen Romanum' en — sê hy by wyse van 'n anachronistiese oordrywing — 'liberandumque *orbem terrarum*'; in par. 10 bestempel Hannibal, nog in dieselfde trant, Rome selfs as die '*caput orbis* terrarum'!

(7) 30.32.2: Na vrugtelose vredesonderhandelings op die dag voor die slag by Zama keer Scipio en Hannibal na hulle onderskeie laers terug; albei wys hulle troepe daarop dat dié veldslag sal beslis of 'Roma an Carthago iura gentibus daret'; want — voeg hy profeties-oordrywend by — nie Africa of Italië nie, maar '*orbem terrarum* victoriae praemium fore'.

(8) 30.33.11: Hannibal herhaal gedeeltelik die pasgenoemde sentiment wanneer hy die volgende môre sy troepe tot die grootste dapperheid aanspoor: die uitslag van die geveg sal vir Carthago òf die ondergang en slawerny òf die '*imperium orbis terrarum*' beteken.

Passasies (6) tot (8), wat die tweede dekade, dit wil sê, die verhaal van die Tweede Puniese Oorlog, as 't ware omraam, is al drie retoriese oordrywings: nr. (6), uit die mond van Hannibal, is stellig die gevolg van sy woede oor Rome se baasspelerige houding jeens sy optrede in Spanje;[10] nrs. (7) en (8), uit die monde van Hannibal en Scipio, is wesenlik slegs geldig in sover dit die westelike helfte van die 'orbis terrarum' betref.[11] Nogtans kan 'n mens seker sê dat hier 'n mate van ooreenstemming bestaan met Polybius se idee dat die proses wat tot wêreldheerskappy lei, by die Tweede Puniese Oorlog begin het.

(9) 31.30.10: Op die Pan-Etoliese kongres in die jaar 200 por 'n Atheense spreker die Etoliërs aan tot oorlog teen die Macedoniërs, en wel 'ducibus diis immortalibus, deinde Romanis, qui *secundum deos plurimum* possent'.

Hierdie passasie is die enigste waar gedurende die Tweede Macedoniese Oorlog enigsins na Rome se besondere magsposisie in die wêreld verwys word: en soos in passasie (2) staan die Romeine hier slegs een trap benede die gode!

(10) 36.17.14–15: Op die vooraand van die slag by Thermopylae in 191 spoor 'n begeesterde consul Acilius sy troepe aan met die opwindende vooruitsig dat hulle deur 'n oorwinning oor koning Antiochus die Grote van Sirië 'Asiam deinde Syriamque et omnia usque ad ortum solis ditissima regna Romano imperio aperturos. Quid deinde aberit', vra hy, 'quin *ab Gadibus usque ad mare rubrum*[12] *Oceano fines terminemus*, qui *orbem terrarum* amplexa finit, et *omne humanum genus secundum deos* nomen Romanum veneretur?'[13]

(11) 36.41.5: Later dieselfde jaar, ná die slag by Thermopylae, waarsku Hannibal koning Antiochus dat hy binnekort in 'Asia' met die Romeine, '*orbem terrarum* adfectantibus', te doen sal kry.

(12) 37.25.5: In die jaar daarna probeer 'n bekommerde koning Antiochus die steun van koning Prusias van Bithynië teen die oprukkende

Romeine wen: hy waarsku hom dat hulle kom 'ad omnia regna tollenda, ut *nullum usquam orbis terrarum nisi Romanum imperium* esset'.

(13) 37.45.8–9: Ná die Romeinse oorwinning oor koning Antiochus in die slag by Magnesia in 190 praat die koninklike vredesonderhandelaar nederig en vleiend van die Romeinse wêreldheerskappy as 'n voldonge feit: hy vra om genade vir die verloorders 'in hac victoria quae vos *dominos orbis terrarum* fecit', en gaan voort met: 'positis iam adversus *omnes mortales* certaminibus *haud secus quam deos* consulere et parcere vos *generi humano* oportet.'[14]

(14) 37.54.15–16: Vroeg die volgende jaar bevestig 'n Rhodiese afgesant in 'n toespraak voor die senaat dat '*orbis terrarum in dicione vestra*' is; maar hy is oortuig daarvan dat die Romeine nie territoriale wins begeer nie, maar dat hulle geveg het 'pro dignitate et gloria apud *omne humanum genus*, quod vestrum nomen imperiumque *iuxta ac deos immortales* iam pridem intuetur'.

Passasies (10) tot (14) het al vyf met die oorlog teen Antiochus van Sirië te doen: dis relatief baie verwysings vir die geskiedenis van een oorlog, en daarby is hulle kragtig bewoord: vóór Thermopylae die entoesiastiese toekomsbeeld deur die consul, ná die slag Hannibal se dringende waarskuwings dat die Romeine ook na Asië sal oorsteek, vóór Magnesia Antiochus se kommer oor die Romeinse imperialisme, ná die slag die Siriese erkenning dat Rome die wêreld se heerser is, en laastens 'n bekragtiging van dié feit deur Rome se belangrikste bondgenoot, Rhodos.

Van passasies (13) en (14) is toevallig die Polybiaanse brontekste behoue:[15] in albei passasies sê die sprekers ook by Polybius dat die Romeine nou die heerskappy oor die *oikouménê* verkry het[16] — wat natuurlik nie beteken dat Polybius nou skielik van sy teorie afgewyk het en sy begindatum van die Romeinse wêreldheerskappy na 190 vervroeg het nie: sulke vleiende, oordrywende woorde word maar net dikwels ná groot oorwinnings gebruik,[17] moontlik nog makliker uit die mond van 'n Oosterling.[18]

Wat by Livius opval as 'n mens sy weergawe met dié van Polybius vergelyk, is dat hy in sy verwerking, in beide passasies (13) en (14), direk ná die vermelding van die verkreë wêreldheerskapy 'op eie rekening' enigsins hoogdrawende en plegtige sinne bygevoeg het (naamlik die tweede helftes van passasies [13] en [14]) waarin die Romeine feitlik op *dieselfde* vlak as die gode geplaas word ('*haud secus* quam deos ... ; *iuxta ac* deos immortales') — nie meer een trap laer, soos in passasies (2), (9) en (10) nie — en waar hulle nou versoek word om voortaan na die mensdom ('genus humanum') om te sien.[19] Dit is baie duidelik dat Livius die besondere betekenis van die oorwinning by Magnesia hierdeur wou onderstreep.

(15) 38.51.4: In hulle klag teen Scipio Africanus in 187 beweer twee volkstribune verwytend dat 'unum hominem caput columenque imperii Romani[20] esse, sub umbra Scipionis *civitatem dominam orbis terrarum* latere'.

(16) 42.50.9: In 171 word koning Perseus van Macedonië deur sy raadgewers aangespoor 'ut liberet *orbem terrarum ab imperio Romano*'.

(17) 44.1.12: Twee jaar later praat consul Marcius Philippus van die Romeinse volk as 'iam *terrarum orbem* complectentis'.

Hierdie drie passasies kom uit die geskiedenis van die jare 187–169, d.w.s. tussen die oorloë teen Antiochus en teen Perseus. Die Romeinse wêreldheerskappy word telkens as 'n feit gekonstateer.

(18) 45.13.2: In 168 rapporteer Siriese gesante aan die senaat dat koning Antiochus IV die Romeinse gesant Popilius se bevel om uit Egipte terug te trek 'haud secus quam deorum imperio' gehoorsaam het.

(19) 45.13.5: Direk daarna verklaar die gesante van Ptolemaios en Kleopatra dat hulle die Romeinse senaat en volk 'plus quam diis immortalibus debere'!

Nadat Livius in sy verhaal van die oorlog teen Perseus van Macedonië geen enkele keer na die Romeinse wêreldheerskappy verwys het nie, en nie eens die betekenis van die slag by Pydna as belangrik uitgelig het nie, kom hierdie twee passasies eenvoudig as bevestiging van die lank reeds bestaande *status quo*: die Romeine is steeds die godgelyke heersers van die wêreld. Om die waarheid te sê: in passasie (19) word die Romeine amper nog op 'n hoër vlak ('*plus quam*') as die gode geplaas.

(20) 45.26.9: Laastens: Toe in 167 'n Romeinse leër 'n stadjie in Epirus bedreig, maak 'n jong adellike inwoner die verstandige voorstel: 'quin aperimus portas et imperium accipimus, quod *orbis terrarum* accepit?'

Dit is dus duidelik dat Livius reeds Rome se oorwinning oor koning Antiochus van Sirië as die daadwerklike begin van Rome se wêreldheerskappy beskou,[21] en dat hy in hierdie opsig klaarblyklik van sy bron Polybius verskil, wat in die behoue dele van sy werk herhaaldelik beweer dat dié stadium syns insiens eers met die einde van die Derde Macedoniese Oorlog bereik word en wat dit stellig ook in die verlore dele só sal voorgestel het. Livius het as Romein en 'n mens uit 'n latere era 'n ander perspektief op die geskiedenis van daardie jare as wat Polybius as tydgenoot daarvan kon hê. Waarskynlik was vir Livius en die lesers van sy tyd die oorwinning oor die groot Oosterse monarg Antiochus op die bodem van die derde vasteland,

Asië, 'n baie natuurliker en betekenisvoller historiese baken as 'n tweede oorwinning oor Macedonië.[22]

AANTEKENINGE

1. Pol.3.1.4; cf. 1.1.5; 3.3.9; 6.2.3; 8.2.3; 39.8.7; cf. ook F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. I, Oxford 1957, *ad* 1.1.5–6.
2. 1.3.6; 1.63.9; 3.2.6.
3. 1.1.5; 3.1.9; 3.4.2–3.
4. 33.10.10; cf. 30.45.5.
5. Cf. P.G. Walsh, *Livy. G&R New survey in the Classics no. 8*, Oxford 1974, 15; H. Tränkle, *Livius und Polybius*, Basel 1977, 14, 27–32; T.J. Luce, *Livy*, Princeton 1977, cap.5 *passim*. Ongelukkig is egter juis van daardie boeke van Polybius wat hierdie besondere tydperk, nl. ca. 200–168, behandel, slegs versamelings van uittreksels en aanhalings deur later skrywers behoue; cf. *Der Kleine Pauly. Lexikon der Antike*, München 1979, 4.990.54 sqq.
6. Aan die begin van boeke 2, 6, 21 en 31.
7. Daar is aansienlike lakunes in die laaste pentade, en van boek 41 is moontlik 'n 'prooemium', soortgelyk aan dié in boeke 21 en 31, verlore; cf. P.A. Stadter, 'The structure of Livy's History', *Historia* 21 (1972) 291.
8. Vir die opsporing is veral gesteun op D.W. Packard, *A Concordance to Livy*, Harvard U.P. 1968, *s.vv. dominus*, *gens*, *humanus*, *imperium*, *orbis*, *terra* en enkele ander.
9. W. Weissenborn–J.J. Müller, *Titi Livi Ab urbe condita libri*, Berlin 1962, *ad loc.*: 'Sitz ... der Weltherrschaft'.
10. Cf. Weissenborn–Müller (n.9 hierbo) *ad* 21.30.4.
11. Cf. Weissenborn–Müller (n.9 hierbo) *ad* 30.32.2.
12. Livius bedoel vermoedelik wat vandag as die 'Indiese Oseaan' bekend staan; cf. Weissenborn–Müller (n.9 hierbo) en J. Briscoe, *A Commentary on Livy Books 34–37*, Oxford 1981, *ad loc.*; ook *Der Kleine Pauly* (n.5 hierbo) 2.366–7.
13. Briscoe (n. 12 hierbo) *ad loc.*, noem hierdie sentimente tereg 'very much the language of Livy's own time' en vergelyk *RG* 26.6; Hor. *Carm.* 1.12.55; Tac. *Ann.* 1.9.5.
14. Vir die Augusteïese sentiment, cf. Verg. *Aen.* 6.853: 'parcere subiectis'.
15. Pol. 21.16–17; 21.22.5–23.13.
16. Pol. 21.16.8; 21.23.4.
17. Cf. Briscoe (n.12 hierbo) *ad* 37.45.8.
18. Walbank (n.1 hierbo) *ad* 1.2.7–8 meen dit kan wel wees dat die Griekse wêreld Rome ná die slag van Magnesia as heerser oor die *oikouméné* erken het.
19. Briscoe (n.12 hierbo) *ad* 37.45.9 praat weer van 'really extraordinary language, recalling some of the religious language of L.'s own time'.
20. Dis sover ek kan sien die eerste maal dat Livius 'imperium Romanum' in ons sin, d.w.s. as 'Romeinse Ryk', gebruik.
21. Cf. hiervoor ook K.E. Petzold, 'Die Entstehung der römischen Weltherrschaft im Spiegel der Historiographie. Bemerkungen zum *bellum iustum* bei Livius', in *Livius. Werk und Rezeption. Festschrift für E. Burck*, red. E. Lefèvre en E. Olshausen, München 1983, 256.
22. Vell.Pat. 1.6.6 is, sover ek kan sien, die enigste ander geskiedskrywer wat die begin van Rome se wêreldheerskappy uitdruklik vermeld. Hy haal uit Aemilius Sura se werk 'de annis populi Romani' aan: '... regibus Philippo et Antiocho ... devictis summa imperii ad populum Romanum pervenit'.

YOUNG MEN ON THE COUNCIL OF OSTIA

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During the Principate every Roman city in the West had a municipal council of varying size (depending on the size of the city), consisting of citizens of free birth, unblemished moral character, and wealth. The minimum age for entrance was twenty-five and magistracies must be held in ascending order and after the first office candidates for the next one had to wait for three or more years. This is all textbook-stuff, based upon legal texts prescribing the rules and repeated by specialists in the field of municipal élites.[1] Irregularities in municipal careers are noted by them, but they prefer to be on the safe side and call them exceptions.[2] Usually, the latter are identified with the Later Roman Empire, the period of 'crisis' of the municipal élites, when all rules were abandoned and exceptions turned out to have become the rule. This paper attempts to challenge that view by focusing on councillors younger than twenty-five in one city: Ostia. Ostia is not a random choice: the number of inscriptions is relatively large and has actually increased significantly over the last couple of years. Admittedly, no ancient municipal élite can be reconstructed fully for want of information, but Ostia is perhaps the most abundant source, not only for councillors in general, but especially for young councillors. Nine inscriptions record young councillors by age of death and there are others from which it can be estimated that the deceased were still relatively young.[3]

It is one of the drawbacks of ancient history that once an opinion is accepted it is hardly ever challenged. Every year new inscriptions of young councillors or magistrates are found, but still the commentary remains: 'poiché il titulo [of *decurio*] appare acquisito in un' età relativamente giovane, la carica deve aver avuto carattere di elezione onorifica, forse in segno di reconoscenza per particolari meriti del padre o della famiglia'.[4] In short, election to the council is called purely honorary or even exceptional. At this point we know of at least 50 of these 'exceptional' councillors and of 25 magistrates younger than 25 and a similar number of magistrates younger

than 32.[5] I refuse to believe that these were all exceptions. Indeed, the number of exceptions in Ostia might give a clue that they were not.

The flourishing harbour-city of Ostia knew its apogee in the first and second centuries of the Principate. In the early third century decline set in, resulting in the fourth century in the separate status of Portus, the harbour proper, as a *municipium* and the inevitably reduced importance of the town of Ostia.[6] During its bloom the municipal council consisted of 110 members,[7] some of them of respectable families proud of their long-standing membership, while others had only just acquired Roman citizenship. The number of descendants of freedmen on the council is quite impressive. Indeed, in the thirties Mary Gordon estimated that 33% of Ostian councillors were descended from freedmen.[8] This figure has never been questioned and it would be futile to do so, because the evidence to strengthen the theory has increased during the last 60 years.[9] That Ostian councillors including those of freedmen descent were very wealthy has always been assumed and the assumption gains strength from the fact that among the evidence we count thirty-two Roman knights.[10]

Irregularities were not uncommon in the Ostian council. At the end of the first century AD Cnaius Sentius Felix was adlected as *decurio* and he was the first to reach the quaestorship in the same year he was adlected as councillor and to be designated for the duovirate in the next year (apparently, after having been enlisted among the *aedilicii* in the meantime): 'hic primus omnium quo anno dec(urio) adl(ectus) est et q(uaestor) a(erarii) fact(us) est et in proxim(um) annum IIvir designat(us) est.[11] His rapid career can be explained from his prestigious economic status. He was either patron or a high magistrate of a great number of commercial guilds. Moreover, he was linked to the traditionally prestigious family of the Lucilii Gamalae. His honorary inscription was erected by his 'son' Cn. Sentius Lucilius Gamala Clodianus.[12] The latter is also on record in an inscription commemorating his 'father' P. Lucilius Gamala. Who adopted whom? The most logical solution would be that Clodianus was the son of P. Lucilius Gamala who was adopted by Cn. Sentius Felix.[13] The latter's rapid career must have benefited from this association. The origin of Felix's wealth can probably be found in the wine-trade and, since he was not originally a citizen of Ostia, he 'bought' political respectability by linking up with the Lucilii Gamalae.[14] His case shows that economic power could be supplemented with political power quite easily.

The minimum age of twenty-five was not strictly observed in Ostia. Although it is difficult to date the nine inscriptions mentioned above with any precision,[15] they all seem to date to before the 230's, the worst of the effects of the municipal crisis still in the future. As to freedmen or élite descent our little group shows a mixed character. Four of the youngsters could have belonged to newly created citizens of freedmen descent:[16] the

names Zosimianus and Zosimus definitely pertain to Greek origins. C. Baebius Marcianus' father is called Eucharistus. P. Celerius Amandus himself does seem to carry a Greek *cognomen*, while his freedmen descent is confirmed by another inscription where his father is on record as a freedman.[17] Finally, L. Sextius Agrippinus' father bears the *cognomen* Eros, a typical slave-name. Although a servile background cannot be confirmed in all cases, the Greek names and the attribution to the tribe Palatina point in that direction.

Only two youngsters can be placed as belonging with certainty to élite families. P. Lucilius Gamala, still active in Ostian politics after the deification of Antoninus Pius, was adlected as councillor as a child ('dec. adlecto d. d. infanti') and belonged to a family which had provided councillors and *duoviri* from at least the early first century BC.[18] M. Cornelius Valerianus Epagathianus had been very active in Ostia in spite of his early death at the age of twelve. His name occurs among the regular members on the *album* of the *ordo corporatorum lenuncularior. tabularior. auxiliar. Ostiensium* dedicated in 192, whereas in his funerary inscription he is called a patron of the same college. His father, M. Cornelius Valerianus, is mentioned among the equestrian patrons on the same *album*.[19] It is not certain, however, whether we are here dealing with the same persons; they could be homonymous members of the same family.[20] Nevertheless, Epagathianus' father is mentioned as *decurio* in his son's funerary inscription; therefore the latter was not a first-generation councillor. Possibly there is some relationship with the family of the M. Valerii, of which one member was a *duovir* in AD 20.[21] A third example is more ambiguous. Although in *CIL* 14, 4648 (dating from the early third century) Faustinus' *nomen* and *praenomen* have not been preserved, on the basis of the name of the dedicator he must have belonged to the family of the A. Egrilii. An A. Egrilius Rufus was *duovir* in AD 6, 34 and 36, presumably a father and son.[22] By emendation we find two other Egrilii Rufi as *duoviri* in AD 15 and 16, although no iteration of office is mentioned in the *Fasti*.

Seven of the nine youngsters seem to have started their careers with a priesthood, either the praetor- or aedileship of Vulcan or that of *flamen* of the imperial cult. Sometimes a combination of the two can be found. As to the priesthood of Vulcan, this was often awarded to mere children. L. Aurelius Fortunatianus had already been *praetor primus sacris Volkani faciundis* before he died at the age of four and a half.[23] Slightly older (died age five) was a young member of the family of the Caedicii.[24] M. Cornelius Valerianus Epagathianus, who died at the age of twelve, had been *praetor II sacra Volkani faciundis*. A. Fabius Felicianus, *aedilis sacris Volk. f.*, died at the age of nineteen.[25] To that can now be added the case of the twelve year-old Roman knight and *decurio* in *AE* 1988, 211. In other cases the priesthood of Vulcan was definitely held at the start of a career.[26]

The priesthood of the imperial cult was bestowed on the anonymous twelve year-old knight, *in casu quo* that of Severus and Pertinax. M. Canneius Zosimianus was designated *flamen* of the deified Vespasian before he died at the age of twenty-one. C. Baebius Marcianus (18) had been *flamen* of the same emperor, just like the 25 year-old M. Annius Proculus. (A. Egrilius?) Faustinus had been *flamen* of Pertinax.

The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that these young men were introduced into public life at an early age. First they were awarded an honorary function — although priesthoods were politically important, they did not require political experience[27] — before starting a career. It seems therefore incorrect to call their election to the council an honorary affair. On the contrary, their membership seems to have been a responsible choice based on a previous public appearance.

Admittedly, Ostia was a harbour-city where 'the main source of wealth must always have been trade',[28] and therefore possibly more open to wealthy individuals of servile background than an inland city. Obviously, in a city where the freedman was all-pervasive, there was less of a stigma on Greek origins. However, pressure on the wealthy to join the council because the traditional élite was short of cash or had died out, cannot be assumed.[29] Why some of the families, which were prevalent in the early first century BC, did not survive until the 230's is not known. Sometimes the 'disappearance' must be due to lack of evidence. C. Cartilius Poplicola who was *duovir* 8 times in the first century BC was assumed to have had no successor in the imperial period until Zevi found an inscription recording C. Cartilius Sabinus, presumably a Roman knight.[30] Of some families it can be confirmed that they retained their prominent role in municipal politics. The Lucilii Gamalae who had been prominent in the sixties and fifties of the first century BC had a very worthy successor in the Antonine Gamala who spent large amounts of money on public building, although it was spent on restoration rather than on new constructions.

Anyway, the top of the municipal élite of the Late Republic and the first century AD was quite different from that of the succeeding centuries — if we base our conclusions on the persons that are known to us. On the basis of the several iterations of offices (C. Cartilius Poplicola 8 times *duovir*) we may assume that office-holding was restricted to a small circle.[31] By comparison the second-century élite was more mixed in character, both on the level of *decuriones* proper and of the top echelons, including *novi homines* and members of traditional families. The same trend can be observed for other towns in the neighbourhood. The municipal council of Pompeii was invaded by *novi homines* in the years between 50 and 79,[32] whereas Puteoli witnessed the same phenomenon at the end of the first century.[33]

Whatever the reason for the inclusion of *novi homines* and youngsters below the age of twenty-five, the evidence should be taken at face value.

The major English-speaking scholar on Roman Ostia, Russel Meiggs, refrains from taking issue with Mary Gordon's estimates on freedmen descent for Ostain councillors. The article by Gordon is not even mentioned in the bibliography. Moreover, he seems to misinterpret the non-observance of the minimum age. The examples of P. Celerius Amandus, M. Cornelius Valerianus Epagathianus and the Antonine Gamala are called 'a dangerous symptom', although Meiggs acknowledges that they were co-opted in a period of prosperity.[34] Therefore, lack of funds or candidates could not have been a matter of concern. Still, Meiggs argues, 'it [the case of P. Celerius Amandus] was an unwise tribute to a family's public generosity'.[35] Meiggs here fails to specify what the danger exactly amounted to. Is there any reason to assume that the new councillors of more commercial background turned out to be worse administrators than those recruited from established families? Meiggs is certainly anachronistic here and implicitly identifies the presence of young councillors with the crisis of the fourth century and later and projects it back in time, although he knows perfectly well there was no such crisis in the 2nd century.

The majority of scholars identify young councillors with *praetextati* well known from the *album decurionum* of Canusium dating from the reign of Severus Alexander (223 AD).[36] There are several arguments against this identification. First of all, the youngsters are called *decuriones* and not *praetextati*. This is, of course, not a conclusive argument, but, although it seems to be rare, the title *praetextatus* occurs outside Canusium as well. One of the places where it is attested is Ostia, where a fragmentary inscription records a Sex. Flavius Bellicius, who might be identified as a *patronus* of the *collegium fontanorum*. The words *primo omnium* in the text must refer to a benefaction which is not specified.[37] Secondly, the basis for the identification seems to rest on the interpretation of a number of legal texts dealing with 'decuriones minores 25 annos'.[38] The general conclusion to be drawn from them is that, once elected, these youngsters were permitted to remain members, but that they were not allowed to vote and they were only to be admitted to top off the order. However, the *praetextati* in Canusium do not belong to the order proper, which consists of 100 members. That the number of *praetextati* is exactly twenty-five implies that they were recruited as a first reserve to fill vacancies.

On the basis of the evidence we can but assume that there was a difference between the *decuriones* 'minores 25 annos' and *praetextati*. The former were councillors in their full right, but were barred from the vote, whereas the latter were *decuriones*-in-training, perhaps also present at some of the meetings, but not in the seats, if we can rely on the evidence on senatorial *praetextati*.[39] Furthermore, the majority of *praetextati* in Canusium seems to have belonged to already established families, in some cases even major office-holding ones.[40] *Decuriones* younger than 25, however, could be of

freedmen descent, as the evidence from Ostia shows. This seems quite a paradox: *praetextati* of aristocratic background had to wait until the age of twenty-five to enter the council, whereas scions of new families could enter before that age. That seems to be completely out of line with oligarchic strategy, which was set on the rejection of outsiders and the preference for own sons.

That municipal élites in the ancient world do not fit this model can be explained by pointing out three factors beneficial to the inclusion of newcomers. Firstly, municipal élite-families were always threatened by extinction. Life-expectancy in the ancient world was very low, mainly because of the high percentage of young children dying. Family strategy was further endangered by the splitting of the inheritance among all the children. Greco-Roman families were confronted by the choice either to have many children, which would endanger the family fortune, or to have but a few and the resulting risk that they would not survive into adulthood.[41] Secondly, a large inheritance was necessary to comply with the census criterion and to hold office. Since magistrates were unpaid officials and were expected to do well, it seems extraordinary for a family to retain its position on the council for more than three generations.[42] Family planning and sound money-handling (safe investments in land, no economic risks) were of the utmost importance. The consequence resulting from these circumstances was that in every council consisting of 100 members every five years twenty vacant seats had to be filled, of which only ten could be filled by ex-magistrates. Thus, every fifth year ten *pedani* had to be appointed and it may have been questionable whether the traditional families could provide these.[43] Thirdly, a reduction of the number of council seats would, of course, have been a possible option. However, since the *ordo* as a whole was responsible for the performance of *munera*, a reduction of the number of members would have increased the burden on the remaining councillors. Therefore, the appointment of *pedani* to perform the *munera* was a necessity.

Still, the traditional members of the élite must have felt the need to distinguish themselves from plebeians (i.e. newcomers from non-established families). In my view, this could have been done by strict control of accession to offices and the speed of a municipal career. This option can be glimpsed from the *album* of Canusium where the ten *praetextati* allied to well-established families might have had better chances for a career than the majority of the 32 *pedani*.[44] This theory can be strengthened when we return to our Ostian evidence. The number of *pedani* descending from freedmen is an overwhelming majority within the Ostian evidence. The total number of *pedani* is 31, and of them 22 have either a wife or a parent with a Greek-sounding name or still bear a Greek *cognomen* themselves.[45] Some of the cases are unambiguous. That P. Celerius Amandus had a freed-

man father has already been referred to. Claudius Venidius Eupalius's wife was called Aurelia Elpis, which places the inscription in the third century and in a freedmen milieu. His own name is a Romanized form of the Greek Eupalos, a name frequently used for slaves.[46] Sex. Carminius Parthenopeus was married to Carminia Briseis.[47] There is a distinct possibility that they were both freed by the same master or that Parthenopeus married one of his own slaves. The *decurio* L. Valerius Eutyches was the son of a homonymous *sevir Augustalis*,[48] whereas L. Iulius Romanus was the son of Iulius Niceforus.[49] Admittedly, it is hard to determine for how long the families under discussion had been free, but the Greek names of either the *decuriones* themselves or of their relatives, together with the mentioning of the tribe Palatina, undoubtedly point to unfree descent. In only two cases could it be established that a *pedanus* was the second in line of the same family to obtain membership of the council. The rest of the *pedani* all seem to be first-generation councillors (see Appendix I and note 45). Although some identifications are not unambiguous, the frequency of Greek names among *pedani* is an indication that they did not belong to the topranking families of Ostia, although they possessed wealth. In bilingual Canusium the percentage of Greek names is highest among the *pedani*.[50] The *pedani* in any city must have consisted of different categories: impoverished councillors of former élite fame, who did not qualify for office holding, young members of élite families who had lost the competition for office, and plebeians who had only recently acquired membership and did not normally qualify for office holding.[51] In Canusium the number of councillors bearing a *nomen* that occurs only once (and therefore could refer to recent membership) is, once again, highest among the *pedani*. Jacques convincingly argues that the majority of *pedani* in Canusium would not start a municipal career.[52]

However, when we focus on the *duoviri* in the period of Meiggs' 'social revolution', the second century, we notice that a number of them may have been of freedmen descent, but that their number is not as prominent as among the pedani.[53] M. Aemilius Hilarianus is a clear case of one of servile background, confirmed by his wife's name Clodia Helpis.[54] The latter's tomb dates from the first half of the second century.[55] T. Antistius Favor, who became *duovir* at the end of the second century AD, was the son of T. Antistius Agathangelus, and therefore presumably of freedman descent.[56] Other texts, however, indicate that *duoviri* of assumedly plebeian descent were linked to prestigious families. M. Aemilius Vitalis Crepereianus is mentioned in an inscription from Portus dating to the end of the second century.[57] His first *cognomen* indicates a servile background, but his second one is derived from the *nomen* of a family which produced a *duovir* as early as AD 6.[58] Once again, as in the case of Cn. Sentius Felix at the end of the first century, respectability seems to have been achieved by an alliance (adoption?) with a family of long-standing reputa-

tion. This problem of either recent or long-standing respectability crops up once again when we discuss the case of the P. Aufidii Fortes. Meiggs lists P. Aufidius Fortis among the 'nouveaux riches', because as a patron of the cornmeasurers' guild and a *decurio* of Hippo Regius in Roman Africa, he must have achieved prominence in the second-century upsurge of Ostia.[59] In spite of his being new on the council, he was apparently appreciated for his financial abilities, for he was elected *quaestor aerarii* not less than five times.[60] Apart from that he was *duovir* and *patronus coloniae*, attested as such in 146. More important than the fact whether he was of servile background or not is that he achieved continuity of his high standing in that his homonymous son became *aedilis*, *IIvir*, *quaestor*, *flamen divi Titi* and *flamen Romae et Augustorum*.[61] Another case of continuity is C. Nasennius Marcellus, *duovir* in 166, perhaps the grandson of the *duovir III* and *patronus coloniae* at the beginning of the second century.[62] One D. Nonius Pompilianus was *duovir* in 110 and another in 146, either a son or, more probably, a grandson.[63] Thus, there was continuity in some of the leading office-holding families, either among newly arrived or long-standing ones, which is less notable among the *pedani*. The *nomina* of the *pedani* provide a good illustration.[64] Four of them remain anonymous, whereas the P. Nonii appear twice. That leaves us with twenty-one families producing *pedani*, of whom only seven have *nomina* which recur among the families which produced a *duovir* (Iunii, Licinii, Annii, Antistii, Nonii, Valerii, Iulii). Of course, no exact family relationship can be established in these cases. The only exception is T. Antistius Favor Proculeianus who was the son of a *duovir* c. 200.[65] Although this analysis certainly has its weaknesses — we do not know how many of our *pedani* really did have relatives in offices whose inscriptions have been lost —, the results, although perhaps distorted, are illustrative. *Pedani* and their families might have been less 'honourable' than the families which produced *duoviri*.

On the whole, 13 out of 43 *duoviri* may have been of plebeian background, that is close to 30% — and some of them were in a way allied to traditional families. The *real* social revolution took place among the non-office holding members of the *ordo*, since 71% (22 out of 31) may have been of plebeian background. Anyway, the whole idea of a social revolution may have to be toned down in this case, since we know next to nothing about councillors in the first century BC and the early imperial period. As we go back far enough, even the family most successful in the struggle for municipal survival, the Lucilii Gamalae, did not originally come from Ostia, and their background may have been as plebeian as that of any of the second-century pedani.[66]

If we want to call the phenomenon of outsiders (plebeians of whatever background) entering the council a social revolution, then Ostia must have experienced several waves of it. Perhaps it was never completely absent.

This does not mean that the municipal élite did not show signs of oligarchic behaviour, but that the field of competition changed: instead of the struggle to enter the *ordo* we get an increased division among the inner circle of the élite. Altogether, there seems to have been less continuity in the lower than in the upper echelons of the *ordo*. Families frequently returning to the duovirate in the second century are a good case in this argument. The exact rules remain, of course, elusive to us, but the evidence from Canusium can be helpful here. It points to a sort of internal exclusivity, a separation between office holding and non-office holding families. We can see the difference in social background reflected in the career possibilities of our Ostian youngsters.

Whereas the four descendants of freedmen are only *pedani* (although they had held one or two priesthoods as a precondition to entering the *ordo*), the three members of longer established families have already broached upon a municipal career. M. Cornelius Valerianus Epagathianus had been elected *decurio* of the Laurenti of the *vicus Augusti* and had been appointed *IIIIvir* as well, although, admittedly, this could have been more a reflection of his and his father's prestige than an actual office holding position.[67] A. Egrilius Faustinus had been *aedilis* and *quaestor aerarii* before he died at the age of twenty-five.[68] The Antonine Gamala's career is difficult to track chronologically — when was he elected as *decurio*?, at what age did he become *IIvir praefectus*? — but, with an eye to his illustrious background, we may conclude with confidence that his early entry into the *ordo* was done with a view to future office holding.[69]

NOTES

1. W. Liebenam, *Städteverwaltung im römischen Kaiserreich*, Leipzig 1900, 268 ff.; W. Langhammer, *Magistratus Municipales*, Wiesbaden 1973, 42–46.
2. See for instance F. Jacques, *Le privilège de liberté*, Paris 1984, 464 who acknowledges that a municipal career could start before the age of twenty-five, 'mais ce devait être exceptionel'. On the basis of an inscription from Nola (*AE* 1900, 180), which records a twenty-eight year-old who had held no municipal office, although he had performed a 'munus frumentaria ante legitimam aetatem', Jacques argues that in the majority of cases the *aetas minima* was observed (468, n. 120; 502). On p. 473, n. 139 he lists a number of examples of rapid careers but still in keeping with the age law: 'tout en restant dans les limites légales, des notables devaient se porter candidats aux magistratures aussi jeunes qu'il est possible', although one of his examples, an *aedilis* aged 22 in Fanum Fortunae, certainly does not fit his theory.
3. The nine inscriptions are:
   CIL 14, 292: 1st/2nd century.
   CIL 14, 321: 2nd century.
   CIL 14, 341: c. 200.
   CIL 14, 376: between 166 and 180.
   CIL 14, 414: 2nd century (?).

CIL 14, 4648: early 3rd century.
AE 1987, 204: first half 2nd century.
AE 1988, 182: 1st/2nd century.
AE 1988, 211: 3rd century.
A possible tenth example can be found in *CIL* 14, 5379: a *decurio allectus* and *sacerdos*, who died at the age of twelve.
Potentially young councillors can be found in: *CIL* 14, 5 (funerary inscription erected by a father for his son); *CIL* 14, 294 (son and grandson remembered); *CIL* 14, 353(=4642) (father burying a son); *CIL* 14, 374 (burial of grandsons); *CIL* 14, 390 (grandson); *CIL* 14, 400 (father/son); and the same person in *CIL* 14, 401 ('decessit superstitibus parentibus'); *CIL* 14, 412 (father/son); *CIL* 14, 4664 (father/son); *CIL* 14, 4671 (father/son); *AE* 1986, 113 (mother/son).

4. Z. Mari, 'Urna con iscrizione funeraria da Porto', *Archaeologica Classica* 36 (1984) 378= *AE* 1987, 204.
5. See the tables in M. Kleijwegt, *Ancient Youth*, Amsterdam 1991, 318/9, 325 and 333/4. To the first list must now be added: *AE* 1988, 182 and 211 (Ostia) and *AE* 1979, 451 (Risini).
6. According to R. Meiggs, *Roman Ostia*, Oxford 1973², 83 ff. the decline of Ostia started early in the third century after Septimius Severus: 'The confidence created by the strong rule of Septimius Severus was short-lived' (82). For the bloom in the first and second century see Meiggs, 51 ff.
7. The number of councillors can be deduced from *CIL* 14, 4642, where L. Fabius Sp. f. Euthychus is on record as having left the city HS 50.000; the annual interest (5% = HS 2.500) was divided among the councillors, the clerks and the lictors. The scribes receive HS 150, the *librarii* HS 50 and the lictors HS 100, which leaves HS 2.200 for the *decuriones*. In the same text it is stipulated that the *decuriones* will receive HS 20 each; therefore the total number of councillors amounts to the odd number of 110. The standard size of the *ordo was* 100; perhaps the number had been exceeded voluntarily and legitimately: R. Meiggs (note 6 above) 181. For the regular number of councillors for a middle-sized city see R.P. Duncan-Jones, *The Economy of the Roman Empire*, Cambridge 1982², 286 and more recently J. Nicols, 'On the standard size of the ordo decurionum', *ZSS* 105 (1988) 714–718.
8. M. Gordon, 'The freedman's son in municipal life', *JRS* 21 (1931) 65–77.
9. J.H. D'Arms, *Commerce and Social Standing in the Roman Empire*, Cambridge, Mass. 1981, 135 ff. points out the difficulties in identifying freedmen as parents of councillors, but he argues that 'on balance the results seem to suggest that the freedman's son and grandson in municipal life was a historical phenomenon of genuine importance in these imperial ports [Puteoli and Ostia], that the prospects for the sons of *Augustales* were especially favorable, and that the actual cases of such assimilation were far more numerous than are the surviving unambiguous examples which attest it' (139/140).
10. *CIL* 14, 171 (=446; 4457); 294 (2×: father and son); 298; 314; 335; 341; 353 (=4642); 354; 359; 373; 374 (the sons of M. Licinius Privatus, who calls himself 'patri et avo dec./patri eq. R.'); 378; 390 and 391 (the same person); 400 and 401 (the same person); 414; 444; 4143; 4452; 4632; 4648; 4653; 4671; 4680; 5376; 5378; *AE* 1982, 132; 1986, 113; 1988, 207; 208; 211; 214.
11. *CIL* 14, 409.
12. *CIL* 14, 377. Cn. Sentius Clodianus was *duovir* in 102 (*CIL* 14, 4538 add.). Both father and son occur again among the patrons of a *collegium* in an inscription dated to 135: *CIL* 14, 5374. See Meiggs (note 6 above) 201.
13. See Meiggs (note 6 above) 200/201.

14. For the assumption with regard to wealth from the wine trade: Meiggs (note 6 above) 203. The most commonly found tribes in Ostia are Voturia (for free citizens) and Palatina (for freedmen and their descendants). Felix's tribe, however, was Terentina (see *CIL* 14, 409).
15. See for the dates note 3 above.
16. *CIL* 14, 321 and 414; *AE* 1987, 204 and 1988, 182.
17. *AE* 1988, 196.
18. *CIL* 14, 375 has now been re-dated by F. Zevi to the 60's of the 1st century BC. The *bellum navale* mentioned in the text is the war waged by Pompey against the pirates in 67 BC: F. Zevi, 'P. Lucilio Gamala Senior e i quattro tempietti di Ostia', *MEFRA* 85 (1973) 555–581.
19. *CIL* 14, 251 VIII 25 (son) and I 8 (father).
20. J. H. D'Arms, 'Notes on municipal notables of imperial Ostia', *AJP* 97 (1976) 399–400 pointed out that identification of individual M. Cornelii is difficult and that the possibility of homonymous representatives of different branches of the same family is not to be excluded. Especially the circumstance that Epagathianus was a regular member of the *collegium* on the *album*, whereas he is called a *patronus* in his honorary inscription, besides considering his youthful age at death, might indicate that the two are not the same person.
21. *CIL* 14, 244.
22. Meiggs (note 6 above) 192 with note 4.
23. *CIL* 14, 306.
24. *AE* 1986, 112.
25. *CIL* 14, 351.
26. *CIL* 14, 349; 373; 390/1; 375; 376; 415; 432; 4625 (cf. now also *AE* 1988, 207).
27. D. Ladage, *Städtische Priester- und Kultämter im Lateinischen Westen des Imperium Romanum zur Kaiserzeit*, Köln 1971, 72 lists a number of young priests, among whom *augures* and *pontifices* 'die ja spezielle Kenntnisse in ihren Disziplinen und im Sakralrecht überhaupt besitzen mussten'. Although nothing is known about minimum ages for priesthoods, Ladage asserts that young priests were exceptional ('nicht die Regel gewesen'), and that only members of wealthy families were appointed at an early age. Whether these arguments are also valid for imperial priests is not known. Senatorial priests could be relatively young, see M. Kleijwegt, 'Praetextae positae causa pariterque resumptae', forthcoming in *Acta Classica* 35 (1992).
28. Meiggs (note 6 above) 196. M. Cornelius Valerianus, himself *decurio* and father of the 12 year-old Epagathianus, is known to have been the owner of a brick-factory (*CIL* 14, 4089, 12). Likewise, senators, although barred from participating directly in trade, are frequently encountered as builders-contractors. See Th. Schleich, 'Überlegungen zum Problem senatorischen Handelsaktivitäten', *MBAH* 3, 1 (1984), 37–76.
29. Four knights in the Ostian evidence are not recorded as participating in municipal politics, although they were Ostian citizens. *CIL* 14, 4144 is an honorary inscription for the Roman knight C. Veturius C. f. Testius Amandus (AD 147) who does not belong to the municipal élite. His *nomen*, however, points to a connection with Ostia, since her *tribus* was Veturia. T. Flavius Verus, another Roman knight, belongs to the tribe Palatina and is not involved in politics. The same argument can be applied to a certain [He]liodorus in *CIL* 14, 4454 and for Antonius Timocrates (*CIL* 14, 158/9) who is married to the Ostian lady Baebia Victoria.
30. F. Zevi, 'Brevi note Ostiensi', *Epigraphica* 30 (1968) 88 ff.
31. Beside those of C. Cartilius Poplicola (Meiggs, 476/7) we know of the following iterations:

P. Lucilius Gamala: Augustan or early Julio-Claudian (*AE* 1959, 254).
Q. Vitellius: 47 and 45 BC (Meiggs, 192).
Postumius Plotus: 1st century BC (*CIL* 14, 4670).
C Nasennius Marcellus: *duovir quinquennalis III*, attested as *duovir* in 111 (*CIL* 14, 171, 446 and 4457).
Cf. Meiggs (note 6 above) 191: 'The most striking feature of the early Empire is the strong hold on the duovirate of certain families and the persistent re-election of outstanding men'.

32. P. Castrén, *Ordo Populusque Pompeianus*, Rome 1975, 121; A. Los, 'Les affranchis dans la vie politique de Pompeii', *MEFRA* 99 (1987) 870 ff.
33. J.H. D'Arms, 'Puteoli in the second century of the Roman Empire: a social and economic study', *JRS* 64 (1974) 111.
34. Meiggs (note 6 above) 180.
35. *Ibidem.*
36. *CIL* 9, 338. For a study of the council of Canusium see Jacques (note 2 above) 456–496 and 508–526 and Kleijwegt (note 5 above) 279–283, 297–301. A council of 100 councillors and twenty-five *praetextati* has also been assumed for Sufes and Gor: R.P. Duncan-Jones, 'Costs, outlays and *summae honorariae* from Roman Africa', *PBSR* 30 (1962) 71/2.
37. *CIL* 14, 4649.
38. *Dig.* L 4.8; *Dig.* L 2.6.1. For the identification see for instance Langhammer (note 1 above) 200 and Castrén (note 32 above) 133 (M. Alleius Libella) and 208 (N. Popidius Celsinus). See also G. Rupprecht, *Untersuchungen zum Dekurionenstand in den nordwestlichen Provinzen des römischen Reiches*, Kallmünz 1975, 173/4 on *CIL* 13, 1910 from Lyon: 'Da man nun in so jungen Jahren [13] die Stelle eines Dekurio nur als 'praetextatus' innehaben konnte (...)'. For a different argument which I have followed see Jacques (note 2 above) 486–489.
39. Pliny the Younger, *Ep.* 8.14.5. See A.N. Sherwin-White, *The Letters of Pliny: a Historical and Social Commentary*, Oxford 1966, 462 where he refers to Suet. *Aug.* 38.2.
40. *CIL* 9, 338: *praetextati* nrs. 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 14, 19, 20, 22, 24.
41. This argument was used for preindustrial society by E.A. Wrigley, 'Fertility strategy for the individual and the group', in: Ch. Tilly (ed.) *Historical Studies in Changing Fertility*, Cambridge 1978, 135–155.
42. This is confirmed by D'Arms' study on second-century Puteoli (note 33 above) 117: 'These various considerations, then, require us seriously to entertain the possibility that at least some members of the municipal aristocracy at the outset of the Severan age (...) continued to consist of direct descendants of the late Republican and early imperial *domi nobiles*: that is the best explanation of the tenacity of the same nomenclature among the members of the *ordo*'. For other regions see M. Wörrle, *Stadt und Fest im kaiserzeitlichen Kleinasien*, München 1988, 55–69 on the prominence of some Lycian families between the first and the third century AD. For the same trend to tenacity in Syrian Antioch see P. Petit, *Libanius et la vie municipale à Antioche*, Paris 1955, 33 and 330.
43. The figures are based on Jacques' estimates taken from the fourth century jurist Aemilius Macer (note 2) 478/9. Cf. more recently R.P. Duncan-Jones, *Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy*, Cambridge 1990, 93–104. The last ten *pedani* in Canusium should have been the last ten enrolled in the council after the *census*. Among them I count four bearing names which are only recorded once on the *album*. This might point to plebeian descent. In this study the term plebeian is strictly used to indicate members of non-élite families.

44. See Jacques (note 2 above) 489, who points to the five *praetextati* allied to *quinquennalicii*: nrs. 3, 5, 9, 14, 19.
45. See Appendix I. The whole discussion about councillors of freedman descent is an intricate one, especially when it comes to identifying them in cities, such as Ostia, where Greek names bear less of a stigma. The argument put forward by W. Jongman, *The Economy and Society of Pompeii*, Amsterdam 1988, 277, n. 2: '(...) available samples are small and of dubious quality. The more distant the descent is, the more likely it is to be libertine, but equally the more uncertain and irrelevant: what counts as social mobility?' is stimulating, but generally too negative. In order to evade further complications, as signalled by Jongman, I have chosen to regard only those cases as products of social mobility where an individual obtained membership of the council as the first of his family. If his son also obtained membership, he is not considered as socially mobile, sometimes in spite of his Greek *cognomen*. This argument affects the data in the appendices, but in most cases it can be established with reasonable certainty whether the *pedani* were first-generation councillors or not. In spite of this complication, it does not affect the big difference in background between *pedani* and *duoviri*, as is visible in the parental relations and in the absence of familiy ties with high magistrates in the case of the *pedani*.
46. *CIL* 14, 4632.
47. *CIL* 14, 314.
48. *CIL* 14, 4671.
49. *CIL* 14, 5378.
50. See W. Jongman (note 45) 327 with figure XXVI, based on Jacques (note 2 above) 525. For the *duoviralicii* their estimates are, however, not correct, see Kleijwegt (note 5 above) 299, n. 103.
51. See *Dig.* L 4. 6. Cf. Kleijwegt (note 5 above) 300/1.
52. Jacques (note 2 above) 478–483, esp. 480: '(...) la majorité d'entre eux, même tenu compte de dècés, n'avait pas d'espoir de faire une carrière dans un avenir proche'.
53. See Appendix II.
54. *CIL* 14, 332.
55. See Meiggs (note 6 above) 204 on the basis of the brickwork and the form of the tomb.
56. *CIL* 14, 294.
57. *CIL* 14, 47.
58. Meiggs (note 6 above) 209.
59. Meiggs (note 6 above) 203 and 206. *CIL* 14, 303 is similar to *CIL* 14, 4620 in wording and in offices listed and should therefore not be attributed to P. Aufidius Faustianus, Fortis' freedman (as is done by the editors in *CIL*), but to P. Aufidius Fortis sen. himself.
60. *CIL* 14, 4621 (the year 146 is given by Meiggs 203 on the basis of the *Fasti*).
61. *CIL* 14, 4622: *p(atroni) c(oloniae) fil.* and only *quaestor* once.
62. *CIL* 14, 4148. For the father (or grandfather) see *CIL* 14, 171 and Meiggs (note 6 above) 511. For the family of the Nasennii see Meiggs 509/10.
63. See Meiggs (note 6 above) 206 and 511/2.
64. See Appendix III.
65. *CIL* 14, 294 and Meiggs (note 6 above) 210.
66. On the basis of Mommsen's argument (comm. *Eph. Epigr.*) it had been accepted for a long time that the Lucilii Gamalae derived from a small town in Galilee called Gamala, but it is now more plausibly argued that the *cognomen* derives from Liguria or a neighbouring district, as argued by M. Cébeillac, 'Octavie, épouse de Gamala et la *Bona Dea*', *MEFRA* 85 (1973) 517–553 and accepted by F. Zevi (note 18)

555, n. 2: 'mi trovano pienamente consenziente'. Cf. Meiggs (note 6) 194. The identification is based on a letter by Cicero (*ad Att.* 12 23.3) where the *cognomen* Ligus is mentioned for the father of a Gamala. According to Meiggs (502): 'there is no evidence connecting them with trade, and their freedmen are not found in the guild rolls. They were probably landed gentry'. R. Chevallier, *Ostie antique, ville et port*, Paris 1986, 170, still retains the Semitic background.

67. *CIL* 14, 341. The *vicus Augustanorum* may be identified with a village to the south of Ostia, a district already popular among men of substance in the Late Republic (Meiggs 69). The site can be identified on the basis of *CIL* 14, 2045 recording a *patronus* of the *vicus*. See for other *decuriones* and *IIIIviri* of the *vicus*: *AE* 1986, 132; *AE* 1988, 207; *CIL* 14, 301; 347; 352; 359; 431; 4680.
68. *CIL* 14, 4648.
69. *CIL* 14, 376.

APPENDIX I

PEDANI OF POSSIBLY PLEBEIAN DESCENT

TEXT	*PEDANUS'* NAME
AE 1988, 182	M. Canneius Zosimianus (name of the father is Zosimus).
AE 1988, 183	P. Nonius Iustus (he is honoured by freedmen, although it is impossible to establish whether there was a family relationship or not).
AE 1988, 184	[C?] Cassius Augustalis.
AE 1988, 207	D. Iunius Bubalus Impetratus (first *cognomen* is taken from the name of an animal, cf. H. Solin, *Die griechischen Personennamen in Rom*, Berlin/New York 1982, three volumes, vol. 2, 1045).
AE 1988, 209	M. Orbius [...] (son of M. Orbius Protogenes).
CIL 14, 5	P. Cornelius Architectianus (son of P. Cornelius Thallus).
CIL 14, 292	M. Annius Proculus (see D'Arms [note 20] 396).
CIL 14, 314	Sex. Carminius Parthenopeus (wife: Carminia Briseis).
CIL 14, 321	P. Celerius Amandus (son of a *libertus*).
CIL 14, 374	Sons of M. Licinius Privatus, who himself received the *ornamenta decurionalia*.
CIL 14, 378	D. Lutatius Charitonianus.
CIL 14, 391	P. Nonius Livius Anterotianus (see D'Arms [note 9 above] 138).
CIL 14, 398	Anonymus is honoured by L. Ostiens. [..] *contubernalis*.
CIL 14, 414	L. Sextius Agrippinus (son of L. Sextius Eros).
CIL 14, 431	Q. Veturius Felix Socrates.
CIL 14, 432	Q. Veturius Firmius Felix Socrates.
CIL 14, 4143	Sex. Publicius Maior.
AE 1987, 204	C. Baebius Marcianus (son of C. Baebius Eucharistus).

CIL 14, 4623	Sex. Avienius Livianus (brother of Sex. Avienius Agathursos).
CIL 14, 4632	Cl. Venidius Eupalius (wife: Aurelia Elpis).
CIL 14, 4671	L. Valerius Eutyches (son of hom. *sevir Aug.*).
CIL 14, 5378	L. Iulius Romulus (son of Iulius Niceforus).

No certainty could be established on the background of L. Licinius M. (*AE* 1988, 208) and of M. Cornelius Valerianus (*CIL* 14, 341) and on that of ... Agrippa (*CIL* 14, 350). The same goes for the anonymi recorded in *AE* 1988, 211 and 212 and *CIL* 14, 444 and 4680. M. Cornelius Valerianus Epagathianus (*CIL* 14, 341) was the son of a *decurio* and therefore, technically speaking not a plebeian. T. Antistius Favor Proculeianus (*CIL* 14, 294) was the grandson of T. Antistius Agathangelus, but his father, T. Antistius Favor, had already held all offices. Therefore his son is not included in this list.

The total number of *pedani* is 31, of which 22 are presumably of plebeian origin. Only one of them mentions a family relationship with a magistrate and only two *pedani* (P. Nonius Iustus and P. Nonius Livius Anterotianus) might be relatives. Therefore the majority must be considered as first-generation councillors.

APPENDIX II

DUOVIRAL BACKGROUND IN THE SECOND CENTURY AD

PLEBEIAN BACKGROUND

A. BASED ON THE *FASTI.*

A. Manlius Augustalis.
C. Iulius Proculus (according to Meiggs (204) he was descended from an imperial freedman, although as far as I can see, there is no evidence either for or against it). M. Valerius Euphemianus.
M. Antistius Flavianus (according to Meiggs (204) he was a descendant of a Flavian freedman).
[L?] Plinius Nigrinus.
C. Mamilius Martia[lis].

B. BASED ON INDIVIDUAL TEXTS.

Text	**Name of the *duovir***
AE 1988, 201	C. Aemilius A[dauctus] (see D'Arms 1976).
CIL 14, 47	Q. Lollius Rufus Chrysidianus (see Meiggs 209).
CIL 14, 47	M. Aemilius Vitalis Crepereianus.

CIL 14, 294	T. Antistius Favor (his father is called Agathangelus). Favor is also suspiciously Greek. The name is used for archimimes, cf. Suet., Vesp. 19 and *CIL* 14, 2408.
CIL 14, 332	M. Aemilius Hilarianus.
CIL 14, 409	Cn. Sentius Felix.
CIL 14, 4142	M. Iunius Faustus (see Meiggs (209) on the basis of the tribe and the cognomen ; are they conclusive?).

The total number of *duoviri* and *omnibus honoribus functi* for the second century is 43, of which 26 are known from the *Fasti* and 17 from individual inscriptions. Only thirteen of them can be said to have been of plebeian background. Both Q. Plotius Romanus (*CIL* 14, 400 and 401) and M. Modius Sucessianus (*AE* 1988, 188) are not included in this list, since they are recorded as *honoribus functus*, which implies that they had not yet reached the duovirate (cf. J.H. D'Arms [note 20], 410).

NON-PLEBEIAN BACKGROUND

The first list is based on the Fasti, the second one on individual inscriptions.

A.

C. Valerius Iustus.
P. Naevius Severus.
D. Nonius Pompilianus.
C. Nasennius Marcellus III, *p.c.*
C. Valerius Iustus II.
[L]ongus Grattianus Caninianus (there is some connection with the important families of the Fabii and the Acilii).
[F]adius Probianus.
L. Valeriu[s. . .].
P. Turranius Aemilianus fil.
L. Pomponius Pri[. . .].
A. Egrilius Agricola.
D. Nonius Pompilianus.
M. Iulius Sever[us].
C. Nasennius Marcellus.
A. Livius Proculus.
P. Lucilius Gamala.

B.

Text	**Name of the *duovir***
AE 1988, 214	P. Calpurnius Princeps.
CIL 14, 354	L. Fabricius Caesennius Gallus.

CIL 14, 171 P. Aufidius Fortis.
CIL 14, 4653 L. Iulius Crescens.
AE 1968, 83 C. Cartilius Sabinus.
CIL 14, 298 M. Antonius Severus.
CIL 14, 349 C. Fabius Agrippa.
CIL 14, 364 C. Granius Maturus.
CIL 14, 92 Ti. Claudius Pomponius.
CIL 14, 415 C. Silius Nerva.

The background could not be established in the cases of P. Annius Annianus, ... Fortis and L[...] (*Fasti*) and of P. Calpurnius [...] (*AE* 1988, 181).

APPENDIX III

FAMILIES PRODUCING *PEDANI*

M. Canneii C(?) Cassii
M. Orbii P. Cornelii
Sex. Carminii P. Celerii
M. Cornelii D. Lutatii
L. Sextii Q. Veturii
Sex Publicii Sex. Avienii
Cl. Venidii C. Baebii

None of these families produced any magistrates. The following families which produced *pedani* might have had some connection with office holding families:

D. Iunii (a M. Iunius Faustus who had been *quaestor aerarii*, *flamen Romae et Aug.*, *flamen divi Titi* and *duovir*, recorded in an inscription from AD 173).
L. Licinii (a L. Licinius Herodes who was a *duovir* and *quinquennalis* in the early third century).
M. Annii (a P. Annius Annianus was *duovir* in 147).
T. Antistii (the father of the *pedanus* had performed all offices).
P. Nonii (two D. Nonii Pompiliani had been *duovir* in 110 and 146).
L. Valerii (a M. Valerius had been a *duovir* already in AD 20; M. Valerius Euphemianus was *duovir* in 109; L. Valerius [...], *duovir* in 127 and C. Valerius Iustus, *duovir* in 109 and 111).
C. Iulii (a C. Iulius Proculus was *duovir* in 108).

GOOD RULERS AND BAD: SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN SENECA, *DE CLEMENTIA* 1.8.2–7

by Gottfried Mader

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Seneca's treatise to the youthful Nero represents an attempt to provide the new principate with a comprehensive ideological infrastructure; through a skilful blend of exhortation and admonition, often disguised as imperial panegyric, the philosopher, in the manner of the Hellenistic 'Fürstenspiegel' ('ut quodam modo speculi vice fungerer et te tibi ostenderem', *Clem.* 1.1.1), directs Nero towards the ideal of the good ruler whose beneficent government secures the support and goodwill of his subjects.[1] The 'didactic' method employed throughout the *Clem.*, with its protreptic and apotreptic components, is essentially an extension of the principle outlined at *Ira* 2.21.3, 'itaque sic inter utrumque regendus est, ut modo frenis utamur modo stimulis'. Seneca's model of the good ruler is consistently defined and articulated in pointed opposition to its negative counterpart: this procedure is best illustrated in the elaborate synkrisis *rex/tyrannus* at *Clem.* 1.11.4–13.5, where the tyrant is introduced as contrastive foil to enhance the specific characteristics of the good king. Seneca's lurid outline of the evil ruler in that passage — a perversion of all the positive ideals urged on Nero — orientates itself on the figure of the literary or rhetorical tyrant.[2] A few thematic parallels will demonstrate the close link between the tyrant in our text and his kindred spirits in Seneca's tragedies and elsewhere:

Clem. 1.11.4: 'Quid interest inter tyrannum ac regem ... nisi quod tyranni in voluptatem saeviunt, reges non nisi ex causa ac necessitate?'[3] 1.12.1: 'tyrannis saevitia cordi est'.

Plato *Resp.* 8.565^{d}, 9.574^{a}–575^{a}; Xen. *Hieron* 3.8, 7.12; Polyb. 7.7; Cic. *Off.* 3.32, *Rep.* 2.48; Sen. *Clem.* 1.26.3–4, 2.4.3, *HF* 511–12, *Oed.* 518–19, *Ag.* 994–96, *Thy.* 246–47, *QNat* 4A *praef.* 17; Tac. *Ann.* 6.6.2; Suet. *Tib.* 61.

1.12.3: 'sed alter [= rex] arma habet, quibus in munimentum pacis utitur, alter [= tyrannus], ut magno timore magna odia compescat,	Xen. *Hieron* 2.8, 4.11, 6.8, 6.14; Arist. *Pol.* 3.1285^{a}27–30, 5.1312^{b}20; Cic. *Off.* 2.23–24, 3.84; Sen. *Ira* 2.11.3, *HF* 352–53, *Phoen.* 654–67, *Oed.* 703–06.
nec illas ipsas manus, quibus se commisit, securus adspicit.	Xen. *Hieron* 6.4; Cic. *Tusc.* 5.60; Sen. *Clem.* 1.26.1, 'aliquando sua praesidia in ipsos consurrexerunt perfidiamque et impietatem et feritatem et, quidquid ab illis didicerant, in ipsos exercuerunt'.
Contrariis in contraria agitur; nam cum invisus sit, quia timetur, timeri vult, quia invisus est, et illo exsecrabili versu, qui multos praecipites dedit utitur: "Oderint, dum metuant", ignarus, quanta rabies oriatur, ubi supra modum odia creverunt'.	Xen. *Hieron* 6.15; Cic. *Tusc.* 5.60, *Off.* 2.24, *Rep.* 2.45; Sen. *Clem.* 1.13.3; *Ag.* 73, 'metui cupiunt metuique timent';[4] Dio Chrys. *Or.* 6.35–62.

Rex and *tyrannus* are thus the two poles in the discussion, corresponding respectively to its protreptic and apotreptic tendencies — or so at least it would appear at first glance. Closer inspection however reveals that this scheme is not quite as clear-cut, and that at one point the tyrant paradigm is even used with its normal function exactly reversed.

The opposition *privatus/rex*, which appears more than once in the course of the argument, is first introduced at *Clem.* 1.7.3–4: 'facilius *privatis* ignoscitur pertinaciter se vindicantibus ... at cui ultio in facili est, is [= rex] omissa ea certam laudem mansuetudinis consequitur. *Humili loco positis* exercere manum, litigare, in rixam procurrere ac morem irae suae gerere liberius est; leves *inter paria* ictus sunt; *regi* vociferatio quoque verborumque intemperantia non ex maiestate est'. 'Noblesse oblige', or as Seneca puts it, 'magnam fortunam magnus animus decet' (1.5.5): in this context the antithesis, with its unmistakable paraenetic overtones, is perfectly intelligible, but as the argument unfolds it acquires a slightly different nuance. In 1.8 the 'noblesse oblige' argument is pushed to its paradoxical conclusions. The ruler's position, in relation to his subjects, is first defined as a *nobilis servitus* with intrinsic constraints and obligations:

> Grave putas eripi loquendi arbitrium regibus, quod humillimi habent. 'Ista' inquis 'servitus est, non imperium'. Quid? tu non experiris istud nobilem esse tibi[5] servitutem? Alia condicio est eorum, qui in

> turba, quam non excedunt, latent, quorum et virtutes, ut appareant, diu luctantur et vitia tenebras habent; vestra facta dictaque rumor excipit, et ideo nullis magis curandum est, qualem famam habeant, quam qui, qualemcumque meruerint, magnam habituri sunt.
>
> (*Clem.* 1.8.1)

The paradox inherent in this proposition is fully explored in the rest of the chapter, which is our immediate concern.

> (2) Quam multa tibi non licent, quae nobis beneficio tuo licent! Possum in qualibet parte urbis solus incedere sine timore, quamvis nullus sequatur comes, nullus sit domi, nullus ad latus gladius; tibi in tua pace armato vivendum est. Aberrare a fortuna tua non potes; obsidet te et, quocumque descendis, magno apparatu sequitur. (3) Est haec summae magnitudinis servitus non posse fieri minorem; sed cum dis ista tibi communis ipsa necessitas est. Nam illos quoque caelum adligatos tenet, nec magis illis descendere datum est quam tibi tutum; fastigio tuo adfixus es. (4) Nostros motus pauci sentiunt, prodire nobis ac recedere et mutare habitum sine sensu publico licet; tibi non magis quam soli latere contingit. Multa contra[6] te lux est, omnium in istam conversi oculi sunt; prodire te putes, oreris. (5) Loqui non potes, nisi ut vocem tuam, quae ubique sunt, gentes excipiant; irasci non potes, nisi ut omnia tremant, quia neminem adfligere, nisi ut, quidquid circa fuerit, quatiatur. Ut fulmina paucorum periculo cadunt, omnium metu, sic animadversiones magnarum potestatum terrent latius quam nocent, non sine causa: non enim, quantum fecerit, sed quantum facturus sit, cogitatur in eo, qui omnia potest.
>
> (*Clem.* 1.8.2–7)

'Quam multa tibi non licent, quae nobis ... licent' develops the initial contrast — the ruler himself, because his exalted station subjects him to constant scrutiny, has fewer liberties that the *privati* who are his subjects[7] and who are shielded by their very obscurity and anonymity — and this paradoxical tendency culminates in a cluster of pointed contrapositions in 1.8.2–7. The sustained emphasis on the *rex/privatus* syzygy inevitably recalls the parallel opposition in the tyrant paradigm,[8] and subsequent details will confirm that this is in fact the framework of reference that Seneca has in mind. In that paradigm the ordinary citizen is contrasted with the tyrant, to the disadvantage of the latter. Seneca retains the basic scheme but strips it of its negative connotations — for he is representing Nero not as tyrant but as ideal ruler: thus he predicates the liberties of the *privati* on the *beneficium* of the princeps, 'quam multa tibi non licent, quae nobis *beneficio tuo* licent!' The addition of 'beneficio tuo' brings the two propositions into a causal relationship and thus effectively transforms the hostile tendency into panegyric. Generalizing 'quam multa' is followed

by a specific example: 'possum in qualibet parte urbis solus incedere sine timore, quamvis nullus sequatur comes, nullus sit domi, nullus ad latus gladius; tibi in tua pace armato vivendum est'. Freedom of movement and untroubled, unarmed safety as advantages enjoyed by the private citizen over the tyrant have an exact parallel in Xenophon:

> εὐθὺς γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἰδιώταις, ἂν μὴ ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν κοινὸν πόλεμον πολεμῇ, ἔξεστιν ὅποι ἂν βούλωνται πορεύεσθαι μηδὲν φοβουμένους, μή τις αὐτοὺς ἀποκτείνῃ, οἱ δὲ τύραννοι πάντες πανταχῇ ὡς διὰ πολεμίας πορεύονται. αὐτοί τε γοῦν ὡπλισμένοι οἴονται ἀνάγκην εἶναι διάγειν καὶ ἄλλους ὁπλόφορους ἀεὶ συμπεριάγεσθαι (*Hieron* 2.8).[9]

But there is a patent disparity between the two sections in Seneca's contrast, with the first ('possum in qualibet parte ...') substantially outweighing the second ('tibi in tua pace ...'). Significantly 'sine timore', of the *privatus*, has no thematic counterpoise in the second part. Xenophon makes it clear why the tyrant lives in constant terror: he is perpetually menaced and surrounded by enemies and potential assassins, an anxiety from which the *privatus* is exempt. Clearly this negative element has no place within the panegyric context. The formal *tertium comparationis* in Seneca is consequently reduced to the weapon only ('nullus ... gladius' — 'tibi ... armato vivendum') — but the presence in the first part of the antithesis of the phrase 'sine timore' strongly suggests that the traditional paradigm was at the back of his mind. 'Tibi in tua pace *armato* vivendum est' makes good sense when used of a suspicious and alienated *tyrant* (cf. below, n. 9), but the presence of the *armatus* motif in the *Clem.* requires a more flattering explanation. The good ruler employs arms 'in munimentum pacis' (1.12.3), or again, 'hic princeps suo beneficio tutus nihil praesidiis eget, arma ornamenti causa habet' (1.13.4). A further possibility is suggested by reference to an earlier remark:

> Illius demum magnitudo stabilis fundataque est, quem omnes tam supra se esse quam pro se sciunt, cuius curam excubare pro salute singulorum atque universorum cottidie experiuntur, quo procedente non, tamquam malum aliquod aut noxium animal e cubili prosilierit, diffugiunt, sed tamquam ad clarum ac beneficum sidus certatim advolant. Obicere se pro illo mucronibus insidiantium paratissimi et substernere corpora sua, si per stragem illi humanam iter ad salutem struendum sit, *somnum eius nocturnis excubiis muniunt,*[10] *latera obiecti circumfusique defendunt, incurrentibus periculis se opponunt.* (*Clem.* 1.3.3)

Against this background, 'tibi ... *armato* vivendum est' might even be interpreted as referring to the weapons not of Nero himself but of his protective *subjects*, zealous and ready to sacrifice themselves for the safety of

their princeps, i.e. the traditionally critical motif is here inverted to become a symptom not of the *hostility* of repressed subjects but rather an expression of their *goodwill*. However we understand 'armato', the flattery is grotesque precisely because it presupposes the traditional paradigm but reverses its traditional thrust — which results in a perceptible tension between surface panegyric and the original typological allusion.[11]

'Aberrare a fortuna tuo non potes; obsidet te et, quocumque descendis, magno apparatu sequitur': here again the negative paradigm is transformed into imperial panegyric, as a comparison with Xenophon will demonstrate. After Hieron has catalogued the disadvantages of tyranny, his interlocutor Simonides proposes that the logical solution would be for him to relinquish his despotic powers (*Hieron* 7.11). The tyrant's reply provides the necessary background to Seneca's sentence:

> Ὅτι, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμωνίδη, καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθλιώτατόν ἐστιν ἡ τυραννίς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπαλλαγήναι δυνατὸν αὐτῆς ἐστι. πῶς γὰρ ἄν τίς ποτε ἐξαρκέσειε τύραννος ἢ χρήματα ἐκτίνων ὅσους ἀφείλετο ἢ δεσμοὺς ἀντιπάσχοι ὅσους δὴ ἐδέσμευσεν ἢ ὅσους κατέκανε πῶς ἂν ἱκανὰς ψυχὰς ἀντιπαράσχοιτο ἀποθανουμένας; ἀλλ' εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ, ὦ Σιμωνίδη, λυσιτελεῖ ἀπάγξασθαι, ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι τυράννῳ ἔγωγε εὑρίσκω μάλιστα τοῦτο λυσιτελοῦν ποιῆσαι. μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ οὔτε ἔχειν οὔτε καταθέσθαι τὰ κακὰ λυσιτελεῖ. (*Hieron* 7.12–13)

Hieron is paradoxically and against his will captive to his own station. A passage from *Clem.* is also relevant in this regard. Contrasting king and tyrant, Seneca argues that the latter becomes locked into a particular pattern of behaviour from which there is no escape:

> Non potest habere quisquam bonae ac fidae voluntatis ministros, quibus in tormentis ut eculeo et ferramentis ad mortem paratis utitur, quibus non aliter quam bestiis homines obiectat, omnibus reis aerumnosior ac sollicitior, ut qui homines deosque testes facinorum ac vindices timeat, eo perductus, ut non liceat illi mutare mores. Hoc etiam inter cetera vel pessimum habet crudelitas: perseverandum est nec ad meliora patet regressus; scelera enim sceleribus tuenda sunt. Quid autem eo infelicius, cui iam esse malo necesse est? (*Clem.* 1.13.2)

The same idea is found also in Seneca's *Oedipus* when Creon argues for the advantages of private station:

> CR. Liceat hoc tuto tibi
> exuere pondus nec recedentem opprimat:
> iam te minore tutior pones loco.
> OE. Hortaris etiam, sponte deponam ut mea
> tam gravia regna? CR. Suadeam hoc illis ego,
> in utrumque quis est liber etiamnunc status:

> tibi iam necesse est ferre fortunam tuam.
>
> (Oed. 675–81)

This is clearly the model on which *Clem.* 1.8.2 is based[13] — but while *necessitas* in that paradigm has a negative sense (the tyrant's acts of violence make it impossible for him to relinquish his position in safety), in *Clem.* it is the princeps' very magnificence which rivets him to his station, '[fortuna] obsidet te et, quocumque descendis, magno apparatu sequitur'.

These brief evocations of the literary paradigm are momentarily eclipsed by the explicit panegyric emphasis on Nero's exalted station (all this in conscious inversion of the model's original sense):

> Est haec *summae magnitudinis* servitus non posse fieri minorem; sed *cum dis* tibi communis ipsa necessitas est. Nam illos quoque caelum adligatos tenet, nec magis illis descendere datum est quam tibi tutum; fastigio tuo adfixus es.

The analogy princeps-gods (cf. also 1.5.7, 1.7.1–3), a conventional motif in imperial panegyric,[14] is followed by a related auxesis in which Nero is equated with the sun:

> Nostros motus pauci sentiunt, prodire nobis ac recedere et mutare habitum sine sensu publico licet; tibi non magis quam soli latere contingit. Multa contra te lux est, omnium in istam conversi oculi sunt; prodire te putes, oreris.

This again is traditional panegyric,[15] but it has a more specific contextual relevance to the extent that it probably alludes to Neronian solar symbolism[16] and also suggests the specifically Stoic slant of Seneca's protreptic.[17] From here it is an easy step to the cognate analogy of the thunderbolt, 'ut fulmina ... qui omnia potest'.[18]

All this cosmic imagery underlines Seneca's close formal affinity to the Hellenistic πανηγυρικὸς λόγος. His argument seems to have veered away from the tyrant paradigm — until at 1.8.7 he urges the princeps to exercise restraint in venting his rage:

> Voluntas oportet ante saeviendi quam causa deficiat; alioqui, quemadmodum praecisae arbores plurimis ramis repullulant et multa satorum genera, ut densiora surgant, reciduntur, ita regia crudelitas auget inimicorum numerum tollendo; parentes enim liberique eorum, qui interfecti sunt, et propinqui et amici in locum singulorum succedunt.
>
> (*Clem.* 1.8.7)

The paradoxical formulation 'ita regia crudelitas *auget* inimicorum numerum *tollendo*' — stressing the futility and counter-productivity of repressing subjects in a reign of terror — articulates more pointedly a thought found also in Cicero's tirade against tyranny:

> Multorum autem odiis nullas opes posse obsistere, si antea fuit ignotum, nuper est cognitum .... Malus enim est custos diuturnitatis metus contraque benivolentia fidelis vel ad perpetuitatem. Sed iis, qui vi oppressos imperio coercent, sit sane adhibenda saevitia, ut eris in famulos, si aliter teneri non possunt; qui vero in libera civitate ita se instruunt, ut metuantur, iis nihil potest esse dementius. Quamvis enim sint demersae leges alicuius opibus, quamvis timefacta libertas, emergunt tamen haec aliquando aut iudiciis tacitis aut occultis de honore suffragiis. Acriores autem morsus sunt intermissae libertatis quam retentae. (*Off.* 2.23–24)[19]

This brings us back to the tyrant paradigm with its original, hostile tendency — a veiled warning of the inevitable consequences of unrestrained cruelty. Ὁ ἔχων ὦτα ἀκούειν ἀκουέτω.

Seneca's incorporation of motifs from Hellenistic imperial panegyric (equation of ruler with gods and sun) continues a tradition which had been used in Latin literature by Horace and Ovid with reference to Augustus, and it is not this which gives the section 1.8.2–7 its distinctive complexion. More intresting — though less obvious — is the manner in which Seneca evokes the traditional tyrant paradigm, eliminates its hostile tendency and transforms it into a vehicle to exalt the princeps. In their original form, the topoi that characterize the literary tyrant underline the superlative misery of that individual: this is demonstrated most fully in Plato *Republic* 9 and in Xenophon's *Hieron*. By a symmetrical procedure Seneca uses the model as a point of reference to enhance the singular *virtues* of his addressee, thereby exactly reversing its conventional thrust.

The procedure is not without parallel; examples of analogous paradigm shifts are well documented in Seneca's tragedies. His tragic criminals, as is well known, typically orientate themselves on their infamous ancestors in a manner that recalls — and inverts — the 'genealogical protreptic' inherent in the *mos maiorum*,[20] thereby transforming a *certamen virtutis* into a *certamen nequitiae*: thus e.g. 'soror ista fecit: te *decet* maius nefas' (*Ag.* 124), 'Tantalum et Pelopem aspice;/ ad haec manus *exempla* poscuntur meae' (*Thy.* 242–43).[21] In a related vein, Atreus' slaughter of his nephews is meticulously described as a ritual sacrifice in which the butcher plays the officiating priest (*Thy.* 687–95, 713–17), subsequently usurping the role of the gods themselves (885–88);[22] by a perverse paradox Atreus comes close to personifying the chorus' positive ideal of philosophical kingship (388–90), 'for he embodies the virtues they proclaim albeit in ways they cannot comprehend'.[23] In these cases a positive paradigm is turned on its head and applied to define a criminal act; in *Clem.* we witness the reverse procedure.

The eulogy which results from the latter paradigm shift has a pronounced

paraenetic tendency — for our passage is less a description of Nero's actual comportment than an exhortation to the role to which he should aspire. As such, Seneca's technique bears comparison with the exiled Ovid's panegyric of Augustus.[24] Ovid too had built into his fawning appeals the contrast between princeps and archetypal tyrants,[25] but in Seneca the process is taken a step further and used with greater subtlety. To the reader with the benefit of historical hindsight, our passage might not unreasonably be taken as a slightly ominous premonition of the shape of things to come: the pseudo-Senecan *Octavia* mercilessly exposes the other side of the absolute power which it taken for granted throughout the *Clem.*, and it is instructive to read the two texts side by side. From this perspective Seneca's shifting paradigms, entailing as they do a certain convergence of opposites, might at least imply that the ideal and its perversion are separated by only the narrowest of dividing lines. Perhaps Seneca too — for all his overt panegyric — was, even at this early stage, not entirely free of misgivings: where there is the power there is also the potential (not to say the temptation) to abuse it.

NOTES

1. For detailed treatment of these aspects, see T. Adam, *Clementia Principis*, Stuttgart 1970, *passim*; E. Cizek, *L'époque de Néron et ses controverses idéologiques*, Leiden 1972, 96–105; *id.*, *Néron*, Paris 1982, 104–12; P. Hadot, s.v. 'Fürstenspiegel', *RAC* 8 (1972) 555ff. (on Seneca: 594–95); M.T. Griffin, *Seneca. A Philosopher in Politics*, Oxford 1976, 129–71; P. Grimal, *Seneca. Macht und Ohnmacht des Geistes*, Darmstadt 1978, 82–90.
2. On which see F.K. Springer, *Tyrannus. Untersuchungen zur politischen Ideologie der Römer*, Diss. Köln 1952, esp. 33–49; I. Opelt, *Der Tyrann als Unmensch in der Tragödie des L. Annaeus Seneca*, Diss. Freiburg 1951, *passim*; H. Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen*, Darmstadt 1967, esp. I.482–509, II.740–53; J.R. Dunkle, 'The rhetorical tyrant in Roman historiography: Sallust, Livy and Tacitus', *CW* 65 (1971) 12–20; D. Pasini, *Tirannide e paura in Platone Senofonte e Aristotele*, Napoli 1975, *passim*; D. Lanza, *Il tiranno e il suo pubblico*, Torino 1977, *passim*; E.A. Schmidt, 'Die Angst der Mächtigen in den Annalen des Tacitus', *WS* 95 (1982) 274–87; R. Tabacco, 'Il tiranno nelle declamazioni di scuola in lingua latina', *MAT* 9 (1988) 1–141; M. Baar, *Das Bild des Kaisers Tiberius bei Tacitus, Sueton und Cassius Dio*, Stuttgart 1990, 188–200.
3. Cf. further C. Favez, 'Le roi et le tyran chez Sénèque', in *Hommages à Léon Herrmann* (= Collection Latomus 44), Bruxelles 1960, 346–49. On the psychological background, see A. Bäumer, *Die Bestie Mensch*, Frankfurt 1982, *passim*.
4. Cf. R.J. Tarrant (ed.), Seneca, *Agamemnon*, Cambridge 1976, *ad loc.*
5. 'Nobilem esse tibi' is Wilamowitz' conjecture (*Hermes* 37 [1902] 307), accepted by F. Préchac in his 1961 Budé edition. *Nobilis servitus* in relation to *clementia* is discussed by Adam (above, n. 1) 27–31. The reading of N, 'experiris istud nobis esse, tibi servitutem', presents serious difficulties in interpretation: see P. Faider, C. Favez, P. van de Woestijne (edd.), *Sénèque De la Clémence*, Deuxième Partie (Commentaire), Brugge 1950, 66.

6. P. Grimal, 'Le *De clementia* et la royauté solaire de Néron', *REL* 49 (1971) 208–10 argues for the retention of the MS reading *contra* (against Lipsius' emendation *circa*) on the grounds that this is a conscious allusion to an Egyptian iconographic formula: 'le roi fait toujours face au dieu'.
7. For the topos, cf. Xen. *Ages.* 5.6; Sall. *Cat.* 51.12–14; Pliny *Pan.* 83.1; Sen. *Pol.* 6.4–5, 'multa tibi non licent, quae humillimis et in angulo iacentibus licent. Magna servitus est magna fortuna; non licet tibi quicquam arbitrio tuo facere', *ibid.* 7.2, 'Caesari quoque ipsi, cui omnia licent, propter hoc ipsum multa non licent'; [Sen.] *Oct.* 574–75, 'NER. Prohibeor unus, facere quod cunctis licet? / SEN. Maiora populus semper a summo exigit'.
8. The classic statement of this opposition is in Xen. *Hieron*, *passim*. Further Soph. *OT* 583–602; Plato *Resp.* 9.571^{a}–580^{c}; Hor. *Sat.* 1.3.142; Sen. *Oed.* 671–75, 687–93.
9. Similarly at Hieron 2.11, 4.11, 6.1–6; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 6.60, ἐγὼ δὲ βαδίζω μὲν ὅποι βούλομαι, φησί, νύκτωρ, βαδίζω δὲ μεθ' ἡμέραν μόνος, θαρρῶ δέ εἰ δέοι, καὶ διὰ στρατοπέδου πορευόμενος ἄνευ κηρυκείου καὶ διὰ λῃστῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐμοὶ πολέμιος οὐδὲ ἐχθρός ἐστι βαδίζοντι. The contrasting perspectives appear also at Sen. *Thy.* 447–51, 'dum excelsus steti,/ numquam pavere destiti atque ipsum mei/ ferrum timere lateris. O quantum bonum est/ obstare nulli, capere securas dapes/ humi iacentem!'.
10. 'Somnum eius nocturnis excubiis muniunt', here a spontaneous expression of the subjects' *concern and goodwill* towards their ruler, reverses the traditional terms of the picture: because the hated tyrant is especially vulnerable in sleep (cf. Xen. *Hieron* 6.3, μέθην δὲ καὶ ὕπνον ὁμοίως ἐνέδρᾳ φυλάττομαι; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 6.37, ἔτι δὲ ἐγρηγορότα μὲν εὔχεσθαι καθυπνῶσαι ὅπως ἐπιλάθηται τῶν φόβων, κοιμώμενον δὲ ἀναστῆναι τὴν ταχίστην, ἅτε ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἐνυπνίων ἀπολλύμενον), he requires guards to shield him from his enemies — a motif alluded to at Sen. *Thy.* 458, 'somnosque non defendit excubitor meos'.
11. Cf. Faider, Favez, van de Woestijne (above, n. 5) 67 (on 'tibi ... armato vivendum est'): 'Ces mots ne constituent-ils pas une critique, involontaire certes, du régime?' The tyrant paradigm shimmers through the overt panegyric — in spite of Seneca's studied attempts to strip the *armatus* motif of its sinister connotations.
12. This motif is without parallel in Sophocles: Seneca casts his Oedipus in the mould of the tyrant.
13. Cf. also Sen. *Brev.* 4.1, 'cupiunt [potentissimi] interim ex illo fastigio suo, si tuto liceat, descendere'. As with individuals, so also with states: Thucydides applies this idea to the Athenian empire when it has developed into a tyranny (2.63.1–2).
14. E.g. Hor. *C.* 1.12.49, 3.5.1–4; Ov. *Tr.* 2.39–40, *Fast.* 2.131–32. Further M. Fuhrmann, *Untersuchungen zur Religiosität des Horaz*, Diss. Freiburg 1952, 61–74; W. Theiler, 'Das Musengedicht des Horaz', in *Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur*, Berlin 1970, 412–13; and my 'Panegyric and persuasion in Ovid, *Tr.* 2.317–336', *Latomus* 50 (1991) 145 n. 18.
15. See E. Doblhofer, *Die Augustuspanegyrik des Horaz in formalhistorischer Sicht*, Heidelberg 1966, 86–91.
16. On which see Sen. *Apocol.* 4.27ff.; H.-P. L'Orange, 'Domus Aurea. Der Sonnenpalast', in *Serta Eitremiana*, Oslo 1942, 68–100; *id.*, *Apotheosis in Ancient Portraiture*, Oslo 1947, 61ff. (coins struck after 64 emphasize the solar character of Nero's principate); P. Grimal, 'Le *De clementia* ...' (above, n. 6) 205–17; *id.*, *Seneca* (above, n. 1) 88–89.
17. Ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Κλεάνθει μὲν ἤρεσε τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἄστρων ὑπάρχειν καὶ πλεῖστα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων διοίκησιν (*SVF* 1.499) — a cosmic analogy to human order, as in Cic. *Rep.* 6.17, 'sol ... , dux et

princeps et moderator luminum reliquorum, mens mundi et temperatio'. Cf. Grimal, 'Le *De clementia* ...' (above, n. 6), 216; K. Büchner (ed.), Cicero, *De Re Publica*, Heidelberg 1984, 474f.

18. For this analogy, cf. also Ov. *Tr.* 1.1.72, 2.179, 4.3.69–70, 5.2.53–54.
19. Cf. Mucius' words to Lars Porsenna (Livy 2.12.9–10), 'hostis hostem occidere volui, nec ad mortem minus animi est, quam fuit ad caedem ... Nec unus in te ego hos animos gessi; longus post me ordo est idem petentium decus'.
20. E.g. Sall. *Jug.* 4.5, 'cum maiorum imagines intuerentur, vehementissume sibi animum ad virtutem accendi'; and conversely Cic. *Fin.* 1.24. Cf. J. Vogt, *Ciceros Glaube an Rom*, repr. Darmstadt 1963, 2ff.
21. Cf. Tarrant (above, n. 4) *ad Ag.* 26–27 and 124; B. Seidensticker, 'Maius solito. Senecas Thyestes und die tragoedia rhetorica', *A&A* 31 (1985) 125–26.
22. Cf. S. Walter, *Interpretationen zum Römischen in Senecas Tragödien*, Zürich 1975, 46–49; E. Lefèvre, 'A cult without god or the unfreedom of freedom in Seneca tragicus', *CJ* 77 (1981) 32–36.
23. P.J. Davis, 'The chorus in Seneca's *Thyestes*', *CQ* 39 (1989) 428, where the bizarre analogy is further discussed.
24. On which cf. my 'Panegyric and persuasion ...' (above, n. 14) 139–49. That eulogy can be used as exhortation is recognized by Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1367^{b}.
25. E.g. *Pont.* 1.2.119–26, 3.6.39–42.

MARC AUREL UND DIE CHRISTLICHE APOKALYPTIK IM ZWEITEN JAHRHUNDERT (*HISTORIA AUGUSTA*, *VITA MARCI* 13.6)

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Wie nahe Glück und Unglück beieinander liegen können, haben die Römer oft erfahren. Selten aber folgten einem Sieg so viele Katastrophen wie dem siegreichen Feldzug, den Marc Aurel und Lucius Verus 162–166 gegen die Parther führten. Kaum hatten die beiden Brüder am 12. Oktober 166 in Rom den Triumph über den Erbfeind gefeiert, da begann in Italien die Pest zu wüten, die von den heimkehrenden Truppen aus dem Osten eingeschleppt worden war. Mit der Seuche kam der Hunger und verschärfte die Versorgungskrise, die Teile des Reiches schon eine Weile heimgesucht hatte. Zur gleichen Zeit durchbrachen an der Donau Markomannen und Quaden die Grenze und ließen Marc Aurel bis zu seinem Tode 180 kaum mehr zur Ruhe kommen.

Die *Historia Augusta* zählt in der *Vita Marci* 12.13–13.5 knapp die Schläge auf, die das Imperium damals trafen. Bevor sie dann näher auf den Markomannenkrieg eingeht und den Abmarsch der Kaiser aus Rom berichtet, schiebt sie 13.6 eine Geschichte ein, die sich dort kurz vor ihrem Aufbruch zugetragen hat: Ein Mann, der die Gelegenheit suchte, um mit einigen Mitwissern die Stadt zu plündern, bestieg einen Feigenbaum auf dem Marsfeld und verkündete, Feuer werde vom Himmel fallen und das Ende der Welt werde kommen, wenn er vom Baum herabgleite und sich in einen Storch verwandle. Zu einer festgesetzten Zeit fiel er herab und ließ aus seinem Gewandbausch einen Storch fliegen. Daraufhin führte man ihn Marc Aurel vor, aber der Kaiser verzieh ihm, nachdem er ein Geständnis abgelegt hatte. Es ist dieser Ausgang, der die *Historia Augusta* veranlaßt, die Geschichte in die Biographie aufzunehmen: Der Kaiser zeigte einmal mehr seine Milde, die er schon vorher dadurch bewiesen hatte, daß er Tausende von Armen, die an der Pest gestorben waren, auf Staatskosten beerdigen ließ. Beide Beispiele vereinigt der Biograph unter dem Thema

'clementia principis', das ihm bei der Ausführung zu einem regelrechten Bandwurmsatz gerät; 13.6 ist sicher einer der längsten Sätze der *Historia Augusta*:

> tantaque clementia fuit, ut et sumptu publico vulgaria funera iuberet ecferri et vano cuidam, qui diripiendae urbis occasionem cum quibusdam consciis requirens de caprifici arbore in campo Martio contionabundus ignem de caelo lapsurum finemque mundi affore diceret, si ipse lapsus ex arbore in ciconiam verteretur, cum statuto tempore decidisset atque ex sinu ciconiam emisisset, perducto ad se atque confesso veniam daret.

Die Grundfrage, die sich durchgehend an die *Historia Augusta* richtet, stellt sich auch hier: Ist die Anekdote historisch, oder hat sie der Biograph, beziehungsweise seine Quelle erfunden? Gelegentlich äußerte K. Latte Zweifel, ob 'auf die Geschichte Verlaß ist'.[1] L. Herrmann, der die Erzählung ausführlich untersuchte, sah in ihr einen versprengten Einschub, der aus der *Vita Antonini Pii* in die *Vita Marci* gelangt sei.[2] Dort werden 8.10–11 zwei Fälle aufgezählt, wo Marcus' Vorgänger Milde walten ließen. Zu ihnen gehöre auch, daß Antoninus Pius die Begräbniskosten für Arme übernommen und dem Schwindelpropheten verziehen habe. Doch gegen Herrmanns Vorschlag spricht nicht nur, daß die *Historia Augusta* in Marcus fast mehr noch als in Pius das Musterbild eines milden Princeps sieht und immer wieder seine 'clementia' rühmt. Die beiden Beispiele für 'clementia' passen auch besser in den historischen Zusammenhang, in den sie der Biograph in der Marcusvita stellt.

Für die Frage, ob sich die Geschichte vom Mann mit dem Storch tatsächlich zugetragen hat, ergibt sich daraus ein erstes Indiz: Die Pest bot zu allen Zeiten düsteren Weissagungen Nahrung, vor allem wenn sie mit Hungersnot und Krieg einherging, wie es unter Marc Aurel der Fall war. Die Orakelsprüche, die zu Beginn des Peloponnesischen Krieges über λοιμός und λιμός umliefen (Thuc. 2.54), eröffnen eine lange Reihe von Zeugnissen, die die Antike durchziehen und sich im Mittelalter fortsetzen.[3] 166/167 zogen Gesandtschaften kleinasiatischer Städte zum Apollo von Klaros und baten ihn um Hilfe gegen die Seuche.[4] Dem Gott machte Alexander von Abonuteichos Konkurrenz, der durch Mittelsmänner seine apotropäischen Sprüche gegen die Pest im ganzen Reich vertrieb. Lukian hielt ihn für einen Scharlatan, zumal er den Römern einen großen Sieg voraussagte und sich nach deren schwerer Niederlage an der Donau nach Art des Kroisosorakels herausredete (*Alex. pseudom.* 36; 48).[5] Aber Lukian gehörte zu einer Minderheit. Die von der Pest bedrohten Zeitgenossen dachten anders.

Sicher fand unter diesen Umständen auch der Unbekannte Aufmerksamkeit, der auf dem Marsfeld von einem Feigenbaum herab das nahende Ende der Welt ankündigte. Allerdings verschaffte ihm sein unrühmlicher

Abgang keinen Platz in der ernsthaften historischen Literatur. Man kann von vornherein vermuten, daß der ephemere Vorfall nicht aus der Hauptquelle der *Historia Augusta* stammt, die den sogenannten Hauptviten von Hadrian bis Caracalla zugrundeliegt, mag es sich bei dieser Quelle um 'den letzten großen Historiker Roms' handeln (Kornemann) oder um 'Ignotus, the good biographer' (Syme). Die Hauptquelle lieferte die vorhergehenden Angaben über Markomannenkrieg, Hungersnot und Pest und über die Maßnahmen, mit denen Marc Aurel auf diese Herausforderungen antwortete. Hier ging es um hohe Politik. Dagegen war das Auftreten eines 'vanus quidam' und sein glimpflicher Abgang ein unbedeutender Zwischenfall, über den man je nach Einstellung schmunzeln oder sich ärgern konnte. An derartigen 'varia' lag der Nebenüberlieferung, die sich aus verschiedenen Strängen zusammensetzte. Die *Historia Augusta* zog sie in den Hauptviten immer wieder zusätzlich heran und verwertete sie später in den Nebenviten ausgiebig für ihr phantasievolles Spiel. Wenn sich in den Hauptviten amüsante Details zu anekdotischen Digressionen ausweiten, liegt erst recht der Verdacht nahe, daß dahinter die Nebenüberlieferung steht. Solche Digressionen fehlen in der *Vita Antonini Pii* fast ganz. Sie ist straffer als alle anderen Hauptviten gebaut — ein weiteres Argument gegen Herrmanns Umstellung. Dagegen ist die Marcusvita auch außerhalb des großen Einschubs 15.3–19.12 nicht so streng.

13.6 läßt sich sogar am Oberthema der 'clementia' und an der Satzform noch die Fuge erkennen, wo die beiden Überlieferungsstränge aufeinanderstoßen: Nach dem knappen Hauptsatz 'tantaque clementia fuit' folgt ebenso knapp der erste Konsekutivsatz, Marc Aurel habe die Armen unter den Pesttoten auf Staatskosten beerdigen lassen. Der Nebensatz fügt dem vorangegangenen nüchternen Bericht über die verschärften 'leges sepeliendi' ein wesentliches Detail hinzu. Davon sticht der überlange zweite Konsekutivsatz ab. Mit der Pest steht er in keiner direkten Beziehung mehr, aber sein Inhalt schließt besser als der erste Konsekutivsatz an die 'clementia' des Hauptsatzes an. Denn Marc Aurels Großmut gegenüber dem entlarvten Propheten entspricht genau dem Wesen der 'clementia', die Seneca so definiert: 'clementia est temperantia animi in potestate ulciscendi vel lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem in constituendis poenis ... ; itaque dici potest et inclinatio animi ad lenitatem in poena exigenda' (*de clem.* 2.3.1). An allen Stellen, wo die *Historia Augusta* 'clementia' oder 'clemens' verwendet und etwas zu ihrem Inhalt sagt, haben Substantiv und Adjektiv die gängige Bedeutung. Dagegen sind Aufwendungen für die Armen weder in der *Historia Augusta* noch bei einem anderen Autor Zeichen der 'clementia'. Bei ihnen handelt es sich um 'beneficia' oder 'largitiones', die der 'liberalitas' entspringen, Begriffe, die die *Historia Augusta* sonst für Großzügigkeiten dieser Art benutzt. Auch Seneca unterscheidet einmal ausdrücklich 'clementia' und 'liberalitas' (*de clem.* 1.20.3). Der

Quellenwechsel war der Anlaß, daß die *Historia Augusta* den Unterschied vernachlässigte. Da sie durchgehend Marc Aurel als den idealen Princeps darstellen wollte, kam ihr die Anekdote gelegen, die die Nebenquelle zum Jahr 167 bot und die vorzüglich die Milde des Kaisers illustrierte. Deren Kerngedanken 'tantaque clementia fuit' setzte der Verfasser als Hauptsatz dem zuletzt genannten Faktum der Hauptquelle voran, der Übernahme der Begräbniskosten. Obwohl sie eigentlich für die 'liberalitas' des Kaisers stand, ordnete er sie im ersten Konsekutivsatz der 'clementia' unter und verklammerte so die beiden Überlieferungen.

Die Nebenquelle, die Biographie, Exemplasammlung oder Geschichtswerk gewesen sein mag, hat die Vorgänge auf dem Marsfeld und das Verhör im Kaiserpalast ausführlicher dargestellt. Gekürzt hat die *Historia Augusta* offensichtlich bei dem verbrecherischen Plan des angeblichen Propheten. Denn es ist einerseits nicht recht einzusehen, wie die Ankündigung des bevorstehenden Weltuntergangs und der Trick mit dem Storch dem 'vanus' und seinen 'conscii' 'die Gelegenheit zum Plündern der Stadt' liefern sollten. Andererseits hätte Marc Aurel solche 'catilinarischen Existenzen' trotz seiner 'clementia' kaum laufen lassen, zumal nicht in einer so angespannten Lage wie 167. Das hätte aller politischen Klugheit widersprochen. Wie aber kam der 'vanus' überhaupt in den Verdacht, Kopf einer Räuberbande zu sein? Die Frage führt zum Hintergrund der Episode. Stimmen, die den Untergang der Welt verkündeten, verbanden mit ihrer Weissagung nicht selten Kritik an den sozialen Verhältnissen. Die Johannesapokalypse hatte die reichen Römer vor Augen, als sie den Sturz der Kaufleute von Babylon beschrieb, die einmal die Magnaten der Erde gewesen waren (18.10–24). Ein Zeitgenosse des 'vanus', der Dichter des achten Buches der 'Oracula Sibyllina', prophezeite, Feuer werde alles vernichten und schuld daran sei die φιλοχρημοσύνη. Gegen die πλουτοῦντες stellte er sich auf die Seite der πτωχοί und drohte der Hauptstadt, die ebenfalls untergehen werde: 'Roma, die du den Kopf so hoch trägst, einmal wird auf dich vom Himmel herab der gleiche Schlag fallen und wird zum ersten Mal deinen Nacken beugen; du wirst niedergeschmettert und Feuer wird dich, auf eigenem Boden kauernd, völlig verzehren; Reichtum wird vernichtet, und in deinen Fundamenten werden Wölfe und Füchse hausen' (8.15–41). Es war nicht verwunderlich, wenn ein Visionär, der den Römern ein solches Schreckensende ausmalte, in den Geruch kam, selbst Brand an Rom anlegen und einen Umsturz herbeiführen zu wollen. Das Sibyllinum greift wenig später Hadrian an und bleibt schließlich bei Marc Aurel stehen. Er ist 'der Unglückskönig, der alle Schätze der Welt in seinen Palästen einschließen wird, um sie, wenn der flüchtige Muttermörder von den Enden der Erde im Feuerbrand zurückkehrt, allen zu verteilen und großen Reichtum nach Asien zu bringen' (8.69–72). Das achte Buch der Sibyllinen datiert man gewöhnlich in die Zeit um 180, kurz vor Marc Aurels Tod. Aber nichts hindert daran,

es näher an das Jahr 167 zu rücken, als sich die apokalyptischen Plagen häuften und der 'vanus' auf dem Marsfeld auftrat.

Der Verfasser des achten Sibyllinum war ein Christ, der ältere jüdische Sibyllinen verarbeitete.[6] Die Schwierigkeiten, die das Reich damals erlebte, könnten auch mit dazu beigetragen haben, daß sich die christliche Apokalyptik in der zweiten Hälfte des zweiten Jahrhunderts verstärkte. War das Zusammentreffen von Pest, Hunger und Krieg nicht die μεγάλη θλῖψις, von der Jesus in seiner Rede über die Letzten Dinge gesprochen (Mt. 24.21) und die vor ihm schon Daniel als Vorbotin der Endzeit angesagt hatte (LXX *Dan.* 12.1)? Der 'vanus', der den bevorstehenden Weltenbrand verkündete, hatte noch weitere christliche Vorläufer und Zeitgenossen: Zu Beginn des zweiten Jahrhunderts war der Verfasser des Schlußkapitels der Didache überzeugt, daß 'die Menschenwelt in das Feuer der Bewährung kommen werde' (16.5). Um 135 beschrieb die Petrusapokalypse, wie am Tag des Jüngsten Gerichts Feuerkatarakte losgelassen würden.[7] Unter Marc Aurel verfaßte Melito von Sardes nicht nur seine Apologie des Christentums für den Kaiser, sondern auch eine Abhandlung Περὶ τοῦ διαβόλου καὶ τῆς Ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰωάννου (Eus. *hist. eccl.* 4.26.2). Es wäre nicht verwunderlich, wenn der Bischof, von der in Kleinasien wütenden Pest beeindruckt, zu der Erkenntnis gekommen wäre, die Visionen des Apostels würden sich demnächst erfüllen. Die apokalyptische Himmelfahrt des Jesaja sowie das fünfte und sechste Buch Esra fallen in dieselbe Zeit,[8] ebenso die apokryphen Paulusakten, nach denen der Völkerapostel Kaiser Nero ins Gesicht geschleudert habe, Gott werde die Welt an einem Tag im Feuer vernichten.[9] Wie verbreitet solche Stimmen damals waren, zeigt die Reihe apokalyptischer Autoren, mit denen sich Plotin später auseinandersetzte (Porph. *vita Plot.* 16). Auch der frühe Montanismus predigte das Nahen des Weltendes. Entstanden um die Mitte des zweiten Jahrhunderts in Kleinasien, hatte er bald Anhänger und Gegner in Rom und Südgallien.[10] Vor allem christliche Gemeinden im Osten des Reiches waren für Prophezeiungen vom bevorstehenden Weltuntergang empfänglich, und mancher Bischof fühlte sich dort zum Propheten berufen. Hippolytos berichtet zwei Fälle aus Syrien und aus dem Pontos, die kaum die einzigen waren (*in Dan.* 4.18–19). Der Kirchenvater verschweigt auch nicht die schlimmen sozialen Folgen, die damit verbunden waren. Die syrische Gemeinde, die ihrem Bischof in die Wüste folgte, um dort die Wiederkunft Christi zu erwarten, geriet wie der 'vanus' und seine 'conscii' in den Verdacht, eine Räuberbande zu sein. Beinahe hätte sie der Statthalter verhaften und hinrichten lassen, wenn ihn seine christliche Gemahlin nicht zurückgehalten hätte.

Jüdisches und christliches, häretisches und heidnisches Gedankengut vermischte sich in den Apokalypsen, die als literarisches Genus schwer zu bestimmen sind und hier auf einen Grundzug, die Endzeitvision, verkürzt

werden.[11] Wo sie entstanden sind, läßt sich oft nicht genau sagen. Neben Ägypten und Palästina war das hellenistische Kleinasien ihre Heimat. Dort gab es eine lange chiliastische Tradition, die zum Teil persische Wurzeln hatte.[12] Auch der lateinische Westen blieb davon nicht unberührt. Vermittler waren wohl vor allem jüdische und christliche Gemeinden. Allerdings räumte die gegenwartsbezogene jüdische Apokalyptik nach dem Scheitern des Bar-Kochba-Aufstandes 135 mehr und mehr der christlichen Apokalyptik das Feld.[13] Schon heidnische Weissagungsliteratur hatte trotz kaiserlicher Verbote ein aufmerksames Publikum gefunden, wie Justinus Martyr, vielleicht gerade mit Blick auf Rom, feststellte (*apol.* 1.44.12). Mit den christlichen Apokalypsen war es nicht anders.

In den Umkreis der Apokalyptik gehörte der Unbekannte, der 167 auf dem Marsfeld den Römern prophezeite, 'ignem de caelo lapsurum finemque mundi affore'. Ihn hier einzuordnen liegt näher, als ihn zu einem Anhänger der Stoa zu machen, die seit ihren Anfängen über die ἐκπύρωσις spekulierte. Mit ihrer Theorie fand sie im Rom der Kaiserzeit manchen Anhänger; der Anfang von Ovids *Metamorphosen* (1.253–259) und der Schluß von Senecas *Consolatio ad Marciam* (26.6) belegen es. Die Umstände, unter denen der 'vanus' auftrat, trennten ihn auch von gebildeten Rednern wie Dio Chrysostomus, der in seinem Βορυσθενιτικός (*or.* 36.39–60) platonisches, stoisches und iranisches Gedankengut über ἐκπύρωσις und κατακλυσμός vortrug.[14] Die Stoa rechnete mit periodischen Katastrophen des Kosmos, die nach einem festen Naturgesetz und unabhängig von den Mißständen der Welt eintreten. Sie aber waren gerade der Anstoß für den 'vanus', wie die *Historia Augusta* durch die Einordnung der Anekdote andeutet. Ihre Vorlage dürfte den Zusammenhang noch deutlicher hervorgehoben und dabei auch auf die Beziehung zur jüdisch-christlichen Apokalypse verwiesen haben.

Die *Historia Augusta* überging den religiösen Hintergrund, zumal sie auch in den bisherigen Viten vom Christentum bewußt geschwiegen hatte. Unter den späteren Hauptviten enthält lediglich die des Septimius Severus einen vereinzelten — und unhistorischen — Hinweis auf die Christen, denen der Kaiser die Mission verboten haben soll. Weitere zehn Stellen über das Christentum, deren Historizität zum Teil ebenfalls zweifelhaft ist, finden sich in den Nebenviten.[15] Doch die *Historia Augusta* vergaß nicht, daß sie gelesen hatte, das Christentum sei im Spiel gewesen, als der 'vanus' unter Marc Aurel auftrat. Sie verwertete ihre Erinnerung später, wie sie es auch bei anderen Themen oft tat. Einen Hinweis dafür bietet der Begriff 'vanus', mit dem sie den unbekannten Propheten charakterisierte und der offensichtlich ausführlichere Angaben der Nebenquelle zusammenfaßte: Das Adjektiv verwendet die *Historia Augusta* noch zweimal kurz hintereinander in den *Quadrigae tyrannorum*, einer Nebenvita, die sie weitgehend erdichtet hat. In die Vita schiebt sie einen religionsgeschichtlichen Exkurs über den

ägyptischen Synkretismus ein. Verschiedene Entlehnungen aus der zeitgenössischen heidnischen und christlichen Literatur hat man in dem Exkurs gefunden.[16] Dazu kommt die Binnenreminiszenz aus der Marcusvita: In einer Kette von beinahe synonymen Epitheta bezeichnet die *Historia Augusta* die Ägypter als 'vani' und legt ihnen Berufe bei, die ihr zu dieser Eigenschaft zu passen scheinen, nämlich 'versificatores, epigrammatarii, mathematici, haruspices, medici' (7.4). Bei den 'medici', die mit den 'mathematici' und 'haruspices' in einer Reihe stehen, denkt der Verfasser an solche Ärzte, die ihre Kranken durch Zauberei und Exorzismus heilen (Dig. 50.13.1.3).[17] Entsprechend handelt es sich bei den Verseschmieden und Epigrammdichtern um Autoren von Orakeln und prophetischer Spruchdichtung nach Art der Sibyllinen. Denn der folgende Satz erklärt dazu: 'nam ⟨in⟩ eis C⟨h⟩ristiani, Samaritae et quibus praesentia semper tempora cum enormi libertate displiceant' (7.5). Mit dem Relativsatz versetzt die *Historia Augusta* der jüdischen und christlichen Apokalyptik einen spöttischen Hieb. Nach der Marcusvita ist es das zweite Mal, daß sie in der Sammlung auf die Apokalyptik zu sprechen kommt. Auch dort hatte sie den Propheten, dem die Gegenwart mit ihrer unter Marc Aurel noch größeren Freiheit mißfiel, als 'vanus' verspottet und dementsprechend das ausgefallene Partizip 'contionabundus' gewählt, das meistens *in malam partem* verwendet wird.[18]

Aus den *Quadrigae tyrannorum* kann man also nachträglich schließen, daß der 'quidam' der Marcusvita in der Vorlage als 'Aegyptus' bezeichnet wurde. 'Campus Martius' und 'ciconia' passen dazu; auf dem Marsfeld befanden sich nämlich ein Isaeum und ein Serapeum.[19] In ihrer Nähe könnte der wilde Feigenbaum gestanden haben, den der Prophet bestieg. Der Baum ersetzte ihm den Berg, von dem herab Propheten gerne ihre Lehren verkündeten. Der spätantike Kirchenschriftsteller Epiphanius überliefert, daß alle Ägypter am Osterfest Tiere und Bäume, darunter Feigenbäume, mit Rötel bestrichen, weil einst an dem Tag Feuer die Erde entzündet habe und die rote Farbe ein Abwehrmittel gegen ein solches Unglück sei (*adv. octog. haeres.* 1.38). Für die Christen war der Feigenbaum ein apokalyptisches Symbol, weil Jesus ihn in seiner Rede von den Letzten Dingen als Gleichnis gewählt hatte (Mt. 24.32). Die Petrusapokalypse, die wahrscheinlich um 135 in Ägypten entstand, gestaltet das Gleichnis weiter aus.[20] Der Storch, in den der 'vanus' sich verwandeln wollte, galt in der Kaiserzeit als ein heiliges Tier der Ägypter (Ael. *nat. an.* 10.16; Horap. 2.58).[21] Zum prophetischen Vogel eignete er sich auch deshalb, weil die Römer seine regelmäßige Ankunft erwarteten und ihn als Boten einer neuen Jahreszeit begrüßten (Verg. *georg.* 2. 319–320, Sidon. *ep.* 2.14.2). Darüber hinaus hatte der Zugvogel in ihren Augen etwas Geheimnisvolles, da man nicht wußte, woher er kam und wohin er flog (Plin. *HN* 10.61; 18.314). Christen mochten sich an den Propheten Jeremias erinnern: 'turtur ... et ciconia

custodierunt tempus adventus sui' (8.7). Stelzvögel, die Störchen ähnelten, waren in den ägyptisierenden Wandmalereien der frühen Kaiserzeit ein beliebtes Motiv.[22]

Doch wie stand es mit dem christlichen oder jüdischen Glauben des ägyptischen 'vanus', der seine apokalyptische Prophezeiung an ein Verwandlungswunder knüpfte, wie man es sich sonst nur von heidnischen Zauberern erzählte? Das sei für einen Ägypter kein Widerspruch gewesen, will die *Historia Augusta* sagen und spinnt in den *Quadrigae tyrannorum* den Faden weiter. Sie zitiert den Ägyptenreisenden Hadrian, der das 'genus hominum seditiosissimum, vanissimum, iniuriosissimum' (8.5) aus eigener Erfahrung beurteilen konnte. Nur ein solcher Menschenschlag sei fähig, heidnische Religion, Judentum und Christentum zu verbinden. Die *Historia Augusta* fügt einen fiktiven Brief des Kaisers an, der drastisch den ägyptischen Synkretismus beschreibt: 'illic qui Serapem colunt, C⟨h⟩ristiani sunt et devoti sunt Serapi, qui se C⟨h⟩risti episcopos dicunt, nemo illic archisynagogus Iud⟨a⟩eorum, nemo Samarites, nemo C⟨h⟩ristianorum presbyter non mathematicus, non haruspex, non aliptes' (8.2–3).[23]

In einem solchen Milieu konnten sich Christentum und Magie leicht verschwistern. Die Kirche wehrte sich gegen die unheilige Allianz, die nicht nur bei den Ägyptern, sondern in allen Teilen des Reiches zu finden war. Ihren Kampf spiegeln die apokryphen Apostelakten, in denen sich angebliche Propheten durch allerlei Wunder zu legitimieren suchten. An den 'vanus' aus Ägypten erinnern die Flugkünste, die die *Acta Petri* dem aus Samaria stammenden Magier Simon zuschreiben. Simon kam auch nach Rom und erregte dort durch seine Wundertaten großes Aufsehen. Einmal kündigte er an, er werde am nächsten Tag, etwa um die siebte Stunde, in seiner natürlichen Gestalt über das Stadttor fliegen. Als die Menschen zur angegebenen Zeit zusammenliefen, erblickten sie in der Ferne eine von Blitzen durchzuckte Staubwolke, die sich dem Stadttor näherte. Plötzlich verschwand die Wolke und Simon trat unter das ehrfürchtige Volk (4, p. 48–49 Lipsius). Die *Acta Petri* oder die *Passio Sanctorum Petri et Pauli*, die Simon ebenfalls als Aerobaten darstellt (11–13, p. 130 Lipsius), zweifeln nicht an seinen magischen Kräften. Wenn sie ihm trotzdem ἀπάτη vorwerfen, so deswegen, weil er mit seiner Magie die Christen vom wahren Glauben und von der Gefolgschaft der Apostel abtrünnig machte. Ihre γόητος φώρα will keine billigen Tricks wie den mit dem Storch entlarven, sondern zeigen, daß die Magie der göttlichen Kraft unterlegen ist, über die die Apostel verfügen. Daher kommt Simon Magus nicht so glimpflich davon wie der 'vanus': Als er zum Schluß prophezeit, er werde am nächsten Tag zu Gott fliegen, und sich tatsächlich in die Luft erhebt, läßt ihn Petrus kraft seines Gebetes herabstürzen, und die Zuschauer steinigen ihn zu Tode (*Acta Petri* 31–32, p. 80–83 Lipsius). Der 'vanus' der Marcusvita belegt,

daß die Apostelakten in solchen Erzählungen nicht lediglich literarische Motive verarbeiteten, sondern auch an historische Ereignisse anknüpften. Die älteste Version der *Acta Petri* hat man auf das Jahrzehnt zwischen 180 und 190 datiert.[24] Aber sie könnte durchaus schon bald nach 167 abgefaßt worden sein, und wenn nicht in Rom, wie vermutet wurde, so doch im Anschluß an Nachrichten, die aus der Hauptstadt kamen.

In den Augen der Christen war der 'vanus', der auf dem Marsfeld vom Feigenbaum fiel und einen Storch aus seinem Gewand fliegen ließ, noch nicht einmal ein Pseudoprophet wie Simon Magus. Denn von den 'echten' Pseudopropheten hatte Jesus gesagt, sie würden Zeichen und Wunder wirken, um die Auserwählten zu verführen (Mc. 13.22). Der Betrug des 'vanus' bestätigte im Grunde diejenigen Christen, die die Hoffnung aufgegeben hatten, daß sie selbst noch das Ende der Welt und mit ihm die zweite Wiederkunft Christi erleben würden. Als Bischof Hippolytus von Rom einige Jahrzehnte später seine *Refutatio omnium haeresium* schrieb, schob er einen Exkurs ein, in dem er einige der Kniffe enthüllte, mit denen sogenannte Magier ihr Publikum hinters Licht führten (4.28–42).[25] Um den Eindruck übernatürlicher Fähigkeiten zu erwecken, arbeiteten sie mit verborgenen Helfern zusammen. Solche συμπαίκται waren auch die 'conscii' des 'vanus'. Sie hatten wohl die Aufgabe, den sich leblos Stellenden wegzutragen und zu verbreiten, seine Seele habe sich in den auffliegenden Storch verwandelt. Die gängige Vorstellung vom Seelenvogel sollte ihre Aussage glaubwürdig machen. Nachdem der Philosoph Peregrinus Proteus zwei Jahre zuvor in Olympia einen Scheiterhaufen bestiegen und sich selbst verbrannt hatte, ging das Gerücht um, seine Seele sei in Gestalt eines Geiers aus den Flammen aufgestiegen und habe laut gesagt, sie verlasse die Erde und fliege zum Olymp (Luc. *de morte Peregr.* 39).

Heidnische Beobachter konnten gegenüber den Christen noch weiter gehen: Der Religionsstifter Jesus mochte über magische Kräfte verfügt und Wunder vollbracht haben. Hatte er doch seine Kunst von ägyptischen Magiern gelernt, wie Celsus 178 in seinem Ἀληθὴς λόγος älteren Gegnern des Christentums nachsprach (Orig. *c. Cels.* 1.68; vgl. Iust. *apol.* 1.30). Aber seine Anhänger, die sich als Propheten ausgaben, waren Scharlatane, und ihre Weissagungen vom nahen Weltende waren Hirngespinste. Oder sollte der Storch die Kaiserapotheose und den Adler parodieren, den man als Symbol der Seele fliegen ließ, wenn der tote Herrscher auf dem Forum verbrannt wurde?[26]

Der Verfasser der Marcusvita gesellte sich zu denen, die belustigt oder befriedigt verfolgten, wie sich der Pseudoprophet diskreditierte. In seinen Augen bedienten sich die Anhänger fremder Religionen, etwa die Mithraspriester, gerne unlauterer Mittel, um Seelen zu gewinnen. An der einzigen Stelle, wo er den Mithraskult erwähnt, in der *Vita Commodi* 9.6, kann er sich einen entsprechenden Tadel nicht verkneifen. Mit der Anekdote

vom 'vanus' wollte er nicht nur Marcus' 'clementia' zeigen, sondern auch einen Beitrag zur γοήτων φώρα leisten. Der kynische Philosoph Oinomaos von Gadara hatte unter Hadrian ein Werk mit diesem Titel geschrieben. Lukian griff das Thema in seinem 'Αλέξανδρος ἢ ψευδόμαντις auf. Er ließ die kritische Biographie des angeblichen Wundermannes kurz nach Marc Aurels Tod erscheinen, über dessen Markomannenkrieg Alexander sein zwiespältiges Orakel verbreitet und damit auch den Kaiser enttäuscht hatte (vgl. oben S.74). Lukian widmete die Schrift seinem Freund Celsus, einem Epikureer, der Verfasser eines Traktates Κατὰ μάγων war (21). Im Φιλοψευδὴς ἢ ἀπιστῶν, einem Dialog über Wunderheiler und Zauberer, empfahl Lukian als bestes Mittel gegen die Geschichten, die man sich von ihnen erzähle, τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι λόγον ὀρθόν (40).

Bei Marc Aurel hätte Lukian mit solchem Rat offene Ohren gefunden. Im autobiographischen Eingangsbuch der Selbstbetrachtungen dankte der Kaiser seinem Lehrer Diognet, daß er ihm in seiner Jugend Skepsis eingeflößt habe 'gegenüber dem, was von Wundertätern und Zauberern über Beschwörungen, Dämonenaustreibung und dergleichen behauptet wird' (1.6.2). Sein Vorbild Antoninus Pius lobte er im selben Buch dafür, 'daß er bezüglich der Götter nicht abergläubisch war' (1.16.15). Nüchtern stellte er später einmal fest, daß die Weissager — er nennt sie Chaldäer — 'den Tod vieler Menschen vorausgesagt haben, und sie dann auch selbst das Verhängnis ereilt habe' (3.3.2). Aus dieser Bemerkung könnte die Nebenüberlieferung der Marcusvita die absonderliche Behauptung herausgesponnen haben, der Kaiser habe die Chaldäer befragt, nachdem sich seine Frau rettungslos in einen Gladiator verliebt hatte (19.3). Was immer dem Philosophen bisher von der jüdisch-christlichen Apokalyptik zu Ohren gekommen sein mochte, für ihn war es Aberglaube. Ein ägyptischer 'vanus', der in Rom eine so einfältige Vorstellung bot, konnte ihn erst recht nicht überzeugen. Er war ja nur einer der vielen selbsternannten Propheten aus dem Osten, die behaupteten, sie seien von göttlichem Geist erfüllt oder Gottessohn oder selbst ein Gott, und sie würden Feuer auf die Welt herabschicken, wenn man nicht auf sie höre. Celsus karikierte wenige Jahre später mit solchen Worten einen Menschenschlag, der in Phönizien und Palästina sein Unwesen trieb (Orig. *c. Cels.* 7.9). So mancher dieser Propheten und Magier sah sein höchstes Ziel darin, sich in der Hauptstadt oder gar am Kaiserhof einen Namen zu machen. Der 'vanus' teilte diesen Ehrgeiz mit Alexander von Abonuteichos (Luc. *Alex. pseudom.* 30; 36; 48), mit Peregrinus Proteus, der sich in Ägypten hatte ausbilden lassen (Luc. *de morte Peregr.* 17–18), und mit dem Simon Magus der Legende, der aus Samaria nach Rom kam.

Für Marcus' Entschluß, den 'vanus' und seine 'conscii' laufen zu lassen, war der Hauptgrund, daß das Verhör klar den Vorwurf entkräftet hatte, sie wollten die Stadt ausplündern. Die Männer waren keine politischen

'vani', wie es die Catilinarier gewesen waren (Sall. *Cat.* 20.2; 23.2). Unter den Christen in Rom lief damals eine Geschichte um, die eine ähnliche Anklage mit ähnlichem Verlauf erzählte. Eusebius überliefert sie nach dem Apologeten Hegesippus (*hist. eccl.* 3.20): Einige Häretiker verklagten beim Kaiser Domitian Verwandte von Jesus, Enkel seines Bruders Judas. Sie seien aus dem Geschlechte Davids und wollten das Königreich errichten, das Jesus angekündigt habe. Der Kaiser, der sich wie Herodes vor diesem Prätendenten fürchtete, ließ sie verhaften und verhörte sie. Zu ihrer Verteidigung zeigten sie ihre schrundigen Hände vor, die sie als Bauern auswiesen, und erklärten, sie würden kein irdisches, sondern ein himmlisches Reich am Ende der Zeiten erwarten. Als Domitian das hörte, hielt er sie für εὐτελεῖς, für 'vani', ließ sie frei und beendete durch ein Edikt die bisherige Christenverfolgung. Die Geschichte lief schon einige Zeit um (3.19), und die Christen wollten mit ihr nicht nur eine lokale Verbindung zu Angehörigen ihres Herrn herstellen, sondern sich auch in der Erwartung an die bevorstehende Endzeit stärken. Eusebius' Gewährsmann Hegesippus erfuhr sie in Rom selbst, wo er zur Zeit Marc Aurels lebte. Es ist gut möglich, daß er 167 noch das Auftreten des Pseudopropheten beobachtete und aus erster Hand von Marc Aurels 'clementia' erfuhr. Wenn dieser Kaiser den 'vanus' freiließ, war das eine Bestätigung für den Akt der Milde, den man sich von Domitian erzählte.

Aber der 'vanus' war nicht nur wie Jesu Verwandte politisch harmlos. Seine Prophezeiung hatte bei der Bevölkerung Roms auch keinen Schaden angerichtet. Hier lag der zweite Grund für Marcus' 'clementia'. Er verhielt sich so, wie er es sich für einen solchen Fall in den Selbstbetrachtungen vorgenommen hatte: 'Was für die Stadt nicht schädlich ist, schadet auch dem Bürger nicht. Bei jedem Verdacht, Schaden sei angerichtet worden, halte dir diesen Grundsatz vor Augen. Wenn die Stadt von diesem Menschen nicht geschädigt wird, bin auch ich nicht geschädigt' (5.22). Marcus fährt fort: 'Wenn jedoch die Stadt geschädigt wird, darf man nicht zürnen, sondern muß dem, der die Stadt schädigt, zeigen, worin sein Vergehen besteht'. Man darf allerdings zweifeln, ob der Kaiser sich mit Aufklärung und Ermahnung begnügt hätte, wenn der 'vanus' wirklich das Verbrechen im Schilde geführt hätte, dessen man ihn verdächtigte. Denn die Digesten überliefern, daß Marcus mit Verbannung drohte, 'si quis aliquid fecerit, quo leves hominum animi superstitione numinis terrentur' (48.19.30). Zu solcher Strenge griff er nicht erst nach dem Aufstand des Avidius Cassius 175, als er jeden verbannte, 'qui motu Cassiano vaticinatus erat et multa quasi instinctu deorum dixerat' (*Coll. leg.* 15.2.5). Die beiden Verordnungen widerlegen das Bild vom stoischen Fatalisten Marc Aurel, der sich um Prophezeiungen bei seinen Untertanen nicht gekümmert habe, da die Zukunft ja doch festliege.[27]

Der 'vanus' hatte sich in der römischen Öffentlichkeit, vor Heiden und

Christen, lächerlich gemacht und damit allen Kredit verspielt. Der Kaiser hätte sich in dieser schweren Zeit gar kein besseres Mittel wünschen können, um dem Spintisieren über eine unmittelbar bevorstehende Weltkatastrophe zu begegnen. Strafe hätte genau das Gegenteil bewirkt. Marc Aurel wäre in den Verdacht geraten, eine schlechte Nachricht mit dem üblichen Mittel der Despoten zu beantworten und den Boten die Wahrheit der Botschaft büßen zu lassen. Augustus war empfindlicher, als man wagte, Zweifel an der Ewigkeit der römischen Herrschaft zu äußern. Kaum Pontifex maximus geworden, ließ er die griechischen und lateinischen 'libri fatidici', die im Volk zirkulierten, einziehen und verbrennen. Zweitausend Schriften fielen dem Autodafé zum Opfer, dazu ein Teil der Sibyllinischen Bücher (Suet. *Aug.* 31.1). Ausgesondert wurden gewiß diejenigen Sibyllinen, die von der Weltkatastrophe, der ἐκπύρωσις oder dem κατακλυσμός, orakelten und damit dem Glauben an die *Roma aeterna* abschworen. Mancher von Augustus' Nachfolgern hätte die Prophezeiung vom Weltuntergang als Verbrechen *de summa rei publicae* eingestuft und den 'vanus' mit dem Tode bestraft, gedeckt durch ein Gesetz, das bestimmte: 'qui de salute principis vel summa rei publicae mathematicos, hariolos, haruspices, vaticinatores consulit, cum eo qui responderit capite punitur' (Paulus *Sent.* 5.21.3). Justin hielt in seiner Apologie Antoninus Pius vor, die Kaiser hätten zur Abschreckung Leute hingerichtet, die die Weissagungen des Hystaspes, der Sibylle oder der Propheten lasen. Sie hätten allerdings mit solcher Strenge vergeblich versucht, Menschen von der Erkenntnis fernzuhalten und sie in sklavischer Unterwürfigkeit zu beherrschen (1.44.12).

Marc Aurel brach mit der Politik seiner Vorgänger. Er sah darüber hinweg, daß die Prophezeiung des 'vanus' unmittelbar seine Herrschaft in Frage gestellt hatte. Die *Historia Augusta* lobt mehrmals die 'patientia', mit der der Kaiser vergleichbare Angriffe ertrug, Gedichte, die gegen ihn verbreitet wurden, oder Scherze und Persiflagen, die er sich gelassen anhörte (8.1; 12.3; 15.1; 29.1–3). Das Geheimnis seiner Toleranz lüftete er selbst zu Beginn des zweiten Buches der *Selbstbetrachtungen*: 'Morgens sich vorsagen: Ich werde mit einem Aufdringlichen, mit einem Unverschämten, mit einem Aufgeblasenen, mit einem Hinterlistigen, mit einem Verleumder, mit einem Eigenbrötler zusammentreffen. Alle diese Züge haben sie, weil sie nicht wissen, was gut und schlecht ist'. Diesem Eigenappell folgte er auch gegenüber dem 'vanus'. Es war der dritte, persönliche Grund für seine 'clementia', und er lag weit hinter den beiden anderen Gründen, die von der 'prudentia' des Herrschers bestimmt wurden. Daß die Pflichten gegenüber dem Staat in jedem Fall vorzugehen haben, sagte er sich in den *Selbstbetrachtungen* oft genug. Sie wurden nicht berührt, wenn er einem Manne verzieh, der in lächerlicher Weise für eine verschrobene Idee warb.

Der Fall des 'vanus' spiegelt Marc Aurels Verhältnis zu den Christen. Für den Philosophen, der die Welt und das Treiben der Menschen be-

trachtete, waren sie eine skurrile Sekte. An der einzigen Stelle, wo er in den *Selbstbetrachtungen* von den Christen spricht, verurteilt er ihr Verlangen, den Märtyrertod zu erleiden. Ihr Todesdrang sei gleichsam mechanisch, ihm fehle die wohlüberlegte persönliche Entscheidung, die dem Freitod seine Würde gebe (11.3).[28] Marcus' kopfschüttelnde Verachtung wird bei Lukian zum Spott über die 'wundersame Weisheit' der Christen, deren Einfalt und Nächstenliebe es jedem hergelaufenen γόης καὶ τεχνίτης ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράγμασιν χρῆσθαι δυνάμενος ermögliche, ein Vermögen aus ihnen herauszuholen (*de morte Peregr.* 11–13; 16). Unter den Gebildeten des zweiten Jahrhunderts waren Verachtung und Spott über die neue Religion verbreitet, aber Lebensgefahr kam für die Christen von anderer Seite. Lukian gibt auch dazu einen Hinweis, wenn er schildert, wie die Massen in den Städten gegen ihre christlichen Mitbürger aufgehetzt wurden (*Alex. pseudom.* 25; 38). Hier stand die öffentliche Ordnung auf dem Spiel, und nicht der Philosoph, sondern der Kaiser Marc Aurel war in solchen Fällen gefordert. Über den 'vanus' durfte er mit seinen Römern lachen. Daß gegebenenfalls aus dem Spaß rasch Ernst werden konnte, bewies die wachsende Zahl von Prozessen, die während seiner Regierungszeit gegen Christen geführt wurden. Marc Aurel verschloß sich fremden Göttern nicht, wenn sie in den Nöten des Reiches Rettung versprachen. Die Marcusvita berichtet, der 'timor belli Marcomannici' habe ihn veranlaßt, 'ut undique sacerdotes ... acciverit, peregrinos ritus impleverit' (13.1). Das Regenwunder, das sein Heer im Quadenland vor dem Verdursten bewahrte, schrieben heidnische Zeitgenossen dem ägyptischen Magier Arnuphis zu, der sich in seinem Gefolge befand (Cass. Dio 71.8.4). Aber der Christengott war für Marc Aurel kein ernstzunehmender Helfer, zu dem man 'pro salute imperii' beten konnte, auch wenn christliche Apologeten ihn davon zu überzeugen suchten. Es sollte noch eineinhalb Jahrhunderte dauern, bis sich ein römischer Kaiser eines Besseren belehren ließ.

Anmerkungen

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18. *ThLL* s.v.
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PREPARING TO BECOME ROMAN — THE 'ROMANIZATION' OF DEIOTARUS IN CICERO

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It is a great honour to be invited to contribute to a *Festschrift* for Professor Naudé. Many years ago I had the privilege of being one of his students in the University of the Witwatersrand and will always remember his meticulous analysis of the sources and his judicious assessment of modern opinion as he guided us through problems in ancient history. In 1960 he delivered a lecture on 'The Romanization of the Less-Advanced Peoples in the Roman Empire'.[1] I hope that this small contribution to the theme will be of interest to him.

Sir Ronald Syme[2] once remarked on the irony of 'a man of Pergamum leading the armies of the Roman people four generations after the vaunted victory of the West at Actium'. He had a cousin with the innocuous Latin name of C. Julius Severus[3] (although the element *C. Julius* points to an ancestor receiving citizenship from Caesar or Augustus). However, suspicion is aroused when we are told that Severus had a cousin called King Alexander[4] and that his brother was Julius Amyntianus: Amyntas was a famous name in Galatia. In fact Julius Severus, a consul at Rome and a governor of Lower Germany under Antoninus Pius, used the title 'first of the Greeks' and specified that he was a descendant of King Deiotarus and of two tetrarchs, both named Amyntas.

Who these were appears not to have been established. But the son of a King Brigatus (whose name has not survived) and a certain Pylaemenes, son of King Amyntas, are recorded as participating in the imperial cult a century earlier under Tiberius in Ancyra (Ankara) in Galatia.[5]

Members of Galatian royal families were among the chief officiants at the Augusteum in Ancyra at the beginning of the imperial period: their descendants are the equals of Westerners or Italians in the upper echelons of the empire a century later. Little survives about such families apart from lists of offices and honours on inscriptions. The family of the Herods in Judaea affords an exception, due to the survival of Josephus (although

it does not appear to have featured significantly in the second century A.D.). But for the beginnings of the rise of royal families into the Roman hierarchy there is a unique document, Cicero's speech for Julius Severus' ancestor, Deiotarus: it was delivered nearly a century before members of the Galatian royal families are recorded as officiating at the Sebasteum in Ancyra.

The trial of Deiotarus has not been regarded as of any great importance in the context of Rome's civil wars and has not received much attention in standard histories of the fall of the republic. Even Cicero referred to his speech in defence of the Galatian client king rather disparagingly; he described it as a small gift, homespun, rather like the presents the king used to give himself.[6] However, the great interest of the speech to modern ears is that it shows how a prominent Roman in the closing years of the first century B.C. regarded a foreign king enjoying a client relationship with Rome. In this article the way in which Cicero refers to the king in the *Pro Rege Deiotaro* will be studied as an early example of the Roman attitude to certain foreign rulers which made their inclusion in the Roman *res publica* as regular as it became in the early imperial period. Before Cicero's actual descriptions of Deiotarus are analysed it is necessary to understand the precise issue at stake in the trial so that it can be placed in its proper historical perspective.

When Caesar left Alexandria in 47 B.C. he went to Asia Minor, where Mithridates' son, Pharnaces, had defeated his legate, Domitius Calvinus, who was supported by Deiotarus, tetrarch in Galatia and king of Armenia Minor. In the civil war Deiotarus had fought for Pompey, but after Pharsalus he had returned to his kingdom and actively assisted the cause of Caesar. He had lent Calvinus two legions (*BAlex.* 34. 4), but was afraid that Caesar might take reprisals for his loyalty to Pompeius when he arrived from Egypt. Accordingly, when Caesar reached the border of Galatia, Deiotarus met him there in the the garb of a suppliant (67. 1). Caesar pardoned him, hurrying on to deal with Pharnaces, taking a legion of the king's and all his cavalry with him (68. 2). After his famous victory over Pharnaces at Zela in August 47, Caesar returned through Galatia where he accepted hospitality from Deiotarus. This was when Deiotarus was alleged to have attempted the murder of Caesar. And it was at this time that Caesar made a redistribution of some of the kingdoms of Asia Minor, depriving Deiotarus of some territory in the process (78. 3).

The trial of Deiotarus did not take place till two years later. Its immediate occasion can be found in dynastic disputes between the tetrarchs of Galatia. But why should Caesar have consented to try the case? In 45 he was engaged in an exceedingly heavy postwar programme, and it would have been easy for him to have brushed the whole affair aside. The defence, too, was handled by Cicero, the acknowledged chief orator of the day. Var-

ious proposals have been put forward. Heitland[7] suggests that Deiotarus was suspected of disloyal intentions during the war in Africa. 'This was probably the reason why the present charge was brought to a hearing. The real danger of Deiotarus was that Caesar wanted an excuse to get rid of a chieftain whom he mistrusted.' Niese[8] proposed the view that in 45 Caesar was less favourably disposed to Deiotarus than before. Petersson[9] states that 'the real difficulty for the defence consisted in Caesar's well-known hostility to the old Pompeian and in the fact that Deiotarus could hardly have been expected to love the man who had shorn him of power'.

In the conditions of 45 Heitland's suggestion of revenge for disloyalty does not carry much conviction. It is not so much that Caesar was above such considerations, as that there was no advantage to be gained from indulging them. Niese's proposal is similarly personal and does not explain much. Even Petersson advances a personal factor, the hatred the two men felt for each other. No doubt this element in the situation must be taken into account,[10] but if it is to be regarded as the main motive behind the trial, the only outcome which could have satisfied Caesar would have been the condemnation of Deiotarus. Should the king have been condemned and put to death Galatia would have been left in a very unsettled position. Internal dissension among minor tetrarchs would have broken out in an important eastern region at the very time that Caesar was planning an expedition against Parthia.[11]

It is in fact in the situation in Galatia and in the East as a whole that the explanation for the holding of the trial is to be found. Cicero[12] had experienced the value of Deiotarus' assistance during his governorship of Cilicia when there was a threat of a Parthian invasion. The king's domains formed a vital link in the chain of Rome's defence of the East. His power had spread — by what means it is unnecessary to inquire — until he was virtually in sole control of Galatia.[13]

Caesar's intentions towards Deiotarus in 45 and the object of the trial can be further illuminated by the way in which Caesar had dealt with the king in 47. At their interview before Zela[14] Caesar had censured Deiotarus' support for Pompey at Pharsalus.[15] Deiotarus replied with an ingenious plea of humility. Who was he to decide in the civil dissensions of the Roman people?[15] Caesar made a typical answer. Deiotarus was in the wrong, but he was prepared to forgive him. Caesar's magnanimity was rarely displayed without producing material advantage to himself. At this particular juncture Pharnaces and a difficult battle lay ahead. 'Clementia' would gain a much-needed and a useful auxiliary in a situation calling for speed and military resourcefulness. It was in this way that Caesar saw fit to handle Deiotarus when the king was in his power and revenge would have been easy. Policy prevailed, and Deiotarus had been cowed into loyalty. The situation in 45 was not entirely dissimilar. Heitland indeed refers to it: 'The

real danger of Deiotarus was that Caesar wanted an excuse to get rid of a chieftain whom he mistrusted and (we may add) whose dominions might form the centre of a rebellion while he was himself engaged in the Parthian War'.[17] While Caesar had been making preparations for his expedition against Dacia and Parthia, a report of a revolt against Caesar in Syria had reached Rome. The Pompeian Q. Caecilius Bassus had taken control of the province and was even said to have invited Parthian intervention.[18] Cicero informs us that one of the charges laid against Deiotarus at his trial was that he had sent assistance to Bassus.[19] Cicero played this allegation down and attempted to brush it aside. But Caesar could well have believed that Deiotarus was assisting Bassus.[20] What happened to the king personally was of far less importance than the securing of a settled Galatia and Armenia Minor before the expedition. The trial in 45 was being used to deal with this threat to Caesar's interest in the East.

Further light on the matter would have been provided by the verdict. Unfortunately this is not known. The possibility of condemnation cannot be ruled out. However, most scholars have felt that judgement was deferred. The inference is based on a passage in the *Second Philippic*, where Antony is being alleged to have forged 'acta' of Caesar's. In it Cicero accused Antony of having accepted a bribe from Deiotarus to produce an enactment of Caesar confirming Deiotarus' possession of the territories which Caesar had taken from him in 47, but which the king had later reoccupied.[21] Cicero pointed out how very unlikely such an enactment on the part of Caesar was. Caesar had never considered any request made on behalf of Deiotarus fair.[22] If this particular statement and the whole tenor of the context can be taken to include a reference to the trial of 45, it is clear that Deiotarus was not fully rehabilitated. At the least Caesar must have expressed strong disapproval of the king.[23] The best solution is that Caesar postponed his decision. He would have done this in such terms as to make it clear to Deiotarus that the slightest cause for suspicion would immediately result in his downfall. Caesar would then be able to assess the situation on the spot as he passed through to Parthia, and make his arrangements as best suited him.

These were the main considerations which Cicero would have to bear in mind as he spoke for the defence — the suspicion of disloyalty to Caesar and the pro-republican leanings being exhibited by Deiotarus. A further factor requiring discussion before Cicero's presentation of the king can be examined is Cicero's alleged use of 'rex' as a criticism of Caesar. Petersson[24] is of the opinion that many passages in the *Pro Rege Deiotaro* 'read like an indictment of the great dictator'. The introduction 'by implication condemns Caesar both for conducting the trial under the circumstances described and for holding the trial at all'. Cicero does indeed state that he is disturbed by the holding of the trial in the dictator's house (2. 5). But the real point

of his criticism is that his oratory could not soar in such circumstances: it needed the enthusiasm of the crowds of the forum. Now everything depended upon Caesar's impartiality (2. 7). No doubt Cicero was inwardly angry at the humilitation of having to plead in Caesar's house, but his words do not show this. On the contrary he uses the circumstance to flatter Caesar by declaring that he knew that he would be a fair judge, even in his own cause (2. 4). Cicero's 'implicit condemnation' of Caesar becomes a compliment placing the dictator in a morally superior position. In discussing 3. 8–10, Petersson states that 'Cicero's criticism of the dictator's rule is again visible through the compliments of the pleader'. The compliments concern Caesar's 'fidem et constantiam et clementiam', and there is high praise of his military achievements (4. 12). These compliments can be paralleled in Cicero's other Caesarian speeches,[25] and in fact there is scant relevance to 'the dictator's rule'. Referring to 12. 33–34, Petersson argues that the contents of the reports concerning Caesar's unpopularity at Rome which Blesamius, a member of the king's embassy, was sending to Galatia could not be charged to Deiotarus, and might readily have been omitted by Cicero. They contain in a few lines a description of the very circumstances that caused the assassination of Caesar. The fact is that Cicero not only repeats the reports but professes in an exceedingly weak manner to explain away their disparaging character. It must be admitted that Caesar's unpopularity was a very delicate topic to discuss before Caesar himself. Cicero brushes the charges[26] aside as malicious town gossip.[27] He then demolishes the charge that Caesar was a tyrant with great energy. It is true that Cicero evades the real point concerning the statue, that it pointed to regal pretensions on the part of Caesar. But what else could he have done? We do indeed know from other sources that Cicero was greatly delighted by these signs of Caesar's unpopularity.[28] But this must not be taken to interpret the discussion in the speech. In it Caesar is justified completely once again.

Petersson regards the stress on the term 'rex' throughout the *Pro Rege Deiotaro* as the final criticism of Caesar. ' "King." The word permeates the speech, contrasting Caesar and Deiotarus, to be sure, and yet Caesar was publicly addressed as king, regal intentions were attributed to him, and it was because of them, whether genuine or not, that he was to die.' Again this reference to the circumstances of Caesar's murder must not be allowed to interpret Cicero's present language in an unwarranted sense. It must be understood within the context of the trial itself. Cicero was defending a client prince. It was a primary object of such dependants upon the Roman state to become legally recognized as kings. The title of 'rex' gave them increased standing among their neighbours, and was in itself regarded as a great honour.[29] It was at Rome that the name of king was hated, but not elsewhere.[30] The emphasis on Deiotarus' regal status

was intended to underline his honourable position, not to criticize Caesar indirectly. Caesar and Cicero knew each other well, and Caesar would have been the first to detect such innuendos. They would have aroused a resentment unfavourable to the cause Cicero was pleading, a risk Cicero was hardly likely to take in the face of Caesar's known dislike of Deiotarus. 'Rex' in the *Pro Rege Deiotaro* is to be understood in its technical, non-Roman associations.

The political background of the trial is now clear. Cicero was defending Deiotarus before a judge who was personally hostile to him and who had strong reason to suspect that he was engaged in subversive activities in an important war area. Cicero had to establish his client's innocence on the last charge, and attempt to persuade Caesar that Deiotarus would be loyal to him. Accordingly he presents the king in the best possible light to win over Caesar's sympathy.[31] It is the way in which he does this that is so significant. In himself Deiotarus was certainly not a sympathetic character, nor could he be plausibly credited with laudable qualities. As ruler of a not completely Hellenized area of central Asia Minor he had extended his influence by the methods of naked aggression, not even scrupling to murder his own daughter and son-in-law. Niese is kind to Deiotarus' record when he states that he was superior to the surrounding tetrarchs only in energy and cunning.[32]

Yet in spite of all this Cicero praises Deiotarus as if he were a true Roman. 'Nota tibi est hominis probitas, C. Caesar, noti mores, nota constantia. Cui porro, qui modo populi Romani nomen audiuit, Deiotari integritas, grauitas, uirtus, fides non audita est?' (6. 16). Cato could easily be substituted for the client prince. Deiotarus was incapable of thinking barbarously (9. 25). The king is a model of all the virtues, even one not normally associated with kings, but with ordinary citizens: 'omnes sunt in illo rege uirtutes, quod te, Caesar, ignorare non arbitror, sed praecipue singularis et admiranda frugalitas: etsi hoc uerbo scio laudari regem non solere' (9. 26).[33] Deiotarus exhibits the proper pride of a Roman nobleman.[34] His character is such that it merits approval from even the philosophically minded Roman: 'Quid de uirtute eius dicam, de magnitudine animi, grauitate, constantia? quae omnes docti atque sapientes summa, quidam etiam bona sola esse dixerunt . . . ' (13. 37).

Deiotarus is the thorough Roman not only on account of his excellent character. His way of life is Roman. Due allowance must be made for the Roman habit of describing foreign institutions in Roman terms, but the effect in this instance is cumulative. A Roman legal phrase appears right at the beginning of the speech: 'Dico pro capite fortunisque regis' (1. 1; cf. *Lig.* 11. 33). Deiotarus' home is made to sound very Roman.[35] It was unthinkable that he could commit so un-Roman an act as dance naked at a banquet.[36] In fact the Romans living in Asia Minor regarded him as a

typical Roman householder: 'sed tamen quicquid a bellis populi Romani uacabat, cum hominibus nostris consuetudines, amicitias, res rationesque iungebat, ut non solum tetrarches nobilis, sed etiam optimus pater familias et diligentissimus agricola et pecuarius haberetur' (9. 27).

Deiotarus' friendship with many prominent Romans is stressed throughout the speech. His lavish hospitality is an aspect of this. Cicero can appeal to Caesar as Deiotarus' 'hospes':[37] in this respect Caesar and Deiotarus are placed on equal terms. The king's connection with Pompey is described as most intimate,[38] and Cicero shows no restraint when listing the grounds of his friendship with him. 'Laboro equidem regis Deiotari causa, quocum mihi amicitiam res publica conciliauit, hospitium uoluntas utriusque coniunxit, familiaritatem consuetudo attulit, summam uero necessitudinem magna eius officia in me et in exercitum meum effecerunt' (14. 39). Cicero finds it quite natural to accept Deiotarus as a friend of the great at Rome.[39] There is no suggestion of apology for a pardonable fondness for an inferior foreigner.

Most revealing is Cicero's handling of the political side of Deiotarus' actions. The king, if no less, is no more guilty than the Pompeians at Rome. 'Errore communi lapsus est' (3. 10).[40] 'Error' is the word which Cicero applies to Ligarius.[41] Cicero quotes a letter which Caesar had sent to Deiotarus to reassure him of his goodwill after the civil war (14. 38). He then hastens to add that he had also received one in almost identical language: 'Memini enim isdem fere uerbis ad me te scribere meque tuis litteris bene sperare non frustra esse iussum'.[42] In fact Deiotarus' choice of side in the civil war is classed with that of the most prominent Romans of his day. It is not regarded as a misjudgement on the part of a foreign adherent, who had sent aid to the wrong master. It is important to note that Deiotarus' foreign nationality is alluded to only once in this connection, to show that his action was actually even less reprehensible from Caesar's point of view than that of the Roman Pompeians. The king could at least plead faulty information. 'Is rex ... isdem rebus est perturbatus, homo longinquus et alienigena, quibus nos in media re publica nati semperque uersati' (3. 10). It is in this connection, as has already been shown,[43] that the stress on Deiotarus' title of 'rex' is to be understood as a mark of Roman approval and favour for the king. The title had been ratified both by the senate and by Caesar,[44] and Cicero regards this as an important element in a correct estimate of the king's worth.

All these aspects give an overwhelming impression of Deiotarus as a Roman. Cicero endows him not merely with Roman qualities, but even with those of the best type of Roman.[45] Due allowance must be made for exaggeration and rhetoric. But Cicero's characterization of Deiotarus in the *Pro Rege Deiotaro* cannot be dismissed as a mere oratorical device. Far from contradicting it, Cicero's references to Deiotarus in other works

greatly enforce it. The terminology used in other speeches probably reflects current 'officialese', as *Har. Resp.* 13. 29: 'quem unum habemus in orbe terrarum fidelissimum huic imperio atque amantissimum nostri nominis'.[46] This official style of address appears in a letter to the senate,[47] and notably in one to Cato: 'Deiotarus, cui non sine causa plurimum semper et meo et tuo et senatus iudicio tributum est, uir cum benevolentia et fide erga populum Romanum singulari tum praesenti magnitudine et animi et consili ...' (*Fam.* 15. 4. 5). How natural it was for Cicero to accept Deiotarus' friendship is seen especially in certain letters to Atticus (*Att.* 5. 17. 3; 18. 4; 20. 9). From these we learn that Cicero had left his son and nephew in Deiotarus' care during his governoship of Cilicia when there was a threat of a Parthian invasion. We also find Deiotarus caring for a certain Pinarius, who was ill, and whom Atticus had commended to Cicero (6. 1. 23). The note of extravagant praise is absent from these letters, but the reality of the friendship is no less apparent. A most revealing incident in Cicero's friendship with Deiotarus is reported in *Div.* 2. 37. 78–79, where Cicero and his brother are talking about augury. At this particular point they argue about Deiotarus' views. They must obviously have discussed the subject with the king at some time or other. Cicero cannot be accused of having an axe to grind here: the incident shows that his friendship with the king embraced their intellectual interests and that he accepted his views as being of equal value with his own.[48]

These references from Cicero's other works, though naturally quieter than the language of the *Pro Rege Deiotaro*, strengthen the impression which the speech makes on the modern reader. Unfortunately no other work of Cicero's is closely parallel to this one. The *Pro Archia* and the *Pro Balbo* do not fall into quite the same category. Works by other Romans would have been instructive. How, for example, did Brutus describe Deiotarus in his speech on the king's behalf before Caesar?[49] Only its oratorical qualities have been noted by the ancients.[50] Cicero's speech is the only surviving one of its kind. Whether it gives a correct or objective portrait of the king is not the point at issue here. What is of interest is that a notable Roman could so describe a foreign princeling at all. As described by a modern statesman Deiotarus would have appeared in quite different dress. But at Rome things were otherwise. Under the empire client kings were drawn into close contact with Roman imperial circles.[51] Many received Roman citizenship, and some even sat in the senate, becoming virtually indistinguishable from Italians and provincials. The interest of Cicero's *Pro Rege Deiotaro* is that it shows the beginning of this process under the late republic and provides evidence of the extent to which an 'alienigena' could be regarded as a Roman even then.

NOTES

1. Published in *Kulturele Kontaksituasies* (Communications of the University of South Africa B 11 [1960]), 5–17.
2. *Greeks Invading the Roman Government, 7th Brademas Lecture* [1982], 19 = *Roman Papers* 4 (1988), 11. Cf. *Tacitus* (1958), 510ff. He was referring to C. Julius Quadratus Bassus (*AE* '34, 176; *PIR*^{2} I 508) commanding an army in Dacia under Trajan.
3. *IGR* 3, 173ff.; *ILS* 8826; *PIR*^{2} I 573.
4. *PIR*^{2} A 500 = I 136. R.D. Sullivan, *ANRW* 2, 8 (1977), 937, suggests that he was a king in Cilicia.
5. *OGIS* 533.
6. 'Sed ego hospiti ueteri et amico munusculum mittere uolui leuidense crasso filo, cuius modi ipsius solent esse munera.' Although, as M. Gelzer (*RE* 7A [1939], 1026), points out, the depreciation may not have been entirely unintentional, since the letter (*Fam.* 9. 12) was written to a noted Caesarian — Dolabella.
7. W.E. Heitland, *The Roman Republic* 3 (1909), 361.
8. *RE* 4 (1903), 2401ff.
9. T. Petersson, *Cicero: A Biography* (1920), 508.
10. Even Cicero admits Caesar's anger with Deiotarus (cf. *Deiot.* 3. 8).
11. Suet. *Jul.* 44. 3.
12. Cf. e.g. *Fam.* 15. 1. 6; *Att.* 5. 18. 2; *Deiot.* 14. 39.
13. *BAlex.* 67. 1. Strabo 12. 5. 1, *par.* 567 refers to the period after Caesar's death, but is still relevant. For the earlier period and Deiotarus' acquisition of Lesser Armenia, cf. F.E. Adcock, *JRS* 27 (1937) 12 ff. Cf. generally D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (1950), 373f; 1237; 413; 1267; H.-W. Ritter, *Historia* 19 (1970) 124ff.; A.N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East* (1984), 228; 299ff.
14. Cf. above, page 88.
15. On Deiotarus' legal obligations, cf. P.C. Sands, *The Client Princes of the Roman Empire under the Republic* (1908), 18f. There was no binding alliance — the senate 'requested' assistance from the king (Cic. *Phil.* 11. 12. 31) in 43 against Antony. At Pharsalus Deiotarus had acted as an 'amicus' (*Deiot.* 5. 13), and was not under compulsion.
16. *BAlex.* 67. 2.
17. *o.c.* (n.7), 361.
18. Cic. *Att.* 14. 9. 3.
19. 'At misit ad Caecilium nescio quem; sed eos, quos misit, quod ire noluerunt, in uincla coniecit' (*Deiot.* 8. 23).
20. Deiotarus' client relationships with individual Romans fall outside the scope of this article. He had established connections with nearly all the generals sent to the East from Sulla onwards (Cic. *Phil.* 11. 13. 33). Naturally the most important of these was Pompey, but other figures like Cicero and Brutus (Magie, *o.c.* [n.13], 396; 413; 1267) must not be disregarded. Deiotarus was also prepared to act the client to Caesar at times, a fact which Cicero emphasises in *Deiot.* 5. 13f. Nothing definite is known of his connections with Bassus, though the latter may have been able to persuade the King that the old 'Pompeian' cause had re-asserted itself in the East, and that Caesar's power was on the wane. One might even ask whether the juxtaposition of the names of Bassus and Deiotarus in *Phil.* 11. 13. 32–3 is entirely accidental. *Phil.* 2. 37. 94 may also be noted, where Cicero includes Deiotarus among the 'republican' foes of Caesar like the Massiliots and others 'quibus rem publicam

populi Romani caram esse'. But this is conjecture. Obviously the situation was very complex.

21. Cic. *Phil.* 2. 37. 94. Cf. Magie, *o.c.* (n.13), 425–6; 1275f.
22. Cic. *ibid.* 95: 'At ille' (Caesar) 'numquam — semper enim absenti adfui Deiotaro — quicquam sibi, quod nos pro illo' (D.) 'postularemus, aequum dixit uideri.'
23. *BAlex.* 68. 1 may be compared for Caesar's censure of Deiotarus in 47 B.C. Cf. further on the trial, D. Braund, *Rome and the Friendly King* (1984), 166; K. Bringmann, *Hermes* 114 (1986) 72ff.
24. This and the following quotations are taken from Petersson, *o.c.* (n.9), 507ff. The theme of the criticism of Caesar's position in Rome as tyrannical is explored with subtlety by E. Olshausen, 'Die Zielsetzung der Deiotariana', in *Monumentum Chilionese ... Festschrift für E. Burck*, ed. E. Lefevre (1975) 115ff.
25. Cf. e.g. *Marc.* 2. 4; *Lig.* 3. 6ff.
26. *Deiot.* 12. 33: 'te ... statua posita animos hominum uehementer offensos, plaudi tibi non solere.' cf. Gelzer, *l.c.* (n.6), 1027. H. Boterman, *Gymnasium* 99 (1992) 340ff., lays great weight on Cicero's references to Caesar's unpopularity in Rome and to his tyrannical tendencies.
27. 'ex urbanis maleuolorum sermunculis haec ... esse collecta'.
28. *Att.* 12. 47. 3; 45, 2; 13. 37. 2; 44. 1.
29. *Deiot.* 3. 10: 'is rex, quem senatus hoc nomine saepe honorificentissimis decretis appellauisset ...' Cf. 14. 40; Sands, *o.c.* (n.15), 140ff.
30. The distinction is drawn by Scipio in Livy 27. 19. 5; cf. A. Erskine, *CQ* 41 (1991) 106ff.
31. Cf. Cic. *Deiot.* 13. 35.
32. *l.c.* (n.8), 2401.
33. Cicero goes on to define it as a form of self-control: 'ego tamen frugalitatem, id est modestiam et temperantiam, uirtutem maximam iudico' (*ibid.*). Boterman, l.c. (n.26), 331, has shown that Cicero's emphasis on Deiotarus' 'frugalitas' and other virtues is influenced by his philosophical interest in defining the Roman *sapiens*.
34. 'Magno animo et erecto est, nec umquam succumbet inimicis, ne fortunae quidem' (13. 36).
35. 'Te eius di penates acceperunt, te amicum et placatum Deiotari regis arae focique uiderunt' (3. 8).
36. 9. 26; cf. 10. 28, where Deiotarus had had the right kind of military education, so useful in a client prince. In this connection naturally Cicero makes no reference to Deiotarus' Greek education (Niese, *l.c.* [n.8], 2401; cf. Magie, *o.c.* [n.13], 1238). With 10. 28 *BAlex.* (34. 4) should be compared, where the author notes the Roman character of the king's army. Is it pressing 6. 18 too far to suggest that by his reference to 'Iouis illius hospitalis' Cicero implies that Deiotarus was Roman enough to feel a deep Roman scruple?
37. 'Per dexteram istam te oro, quam regi Deiotaro hospes hospiti porrexisti ...' (3. 8).
38. 'quocum erat non hospitio solum uerum etiam familiaritate coniunctus' (5. 13).
39. Of course these 'friendships' were not disinterested. Services were rendered on both sides. In the speech we learn that Deiotarus had long served the interests of Rome (9. 27; cf. 1. 2; 2. 6; 8. 22), as well as those of individual Romans like Pompey (5. 13) and Cicero (14. 39) and especially Caesar (5. 13–14). Much is made of the last point — cf. above p. 95, n. 20.
40. Note 'error' in 13. 36 and *Phil.* 11. 13. 34.
41. *Lig.* 6. 17.
42. Cicero refers to the letter in *Lig.* 3. 7.

43. Cf. above, p. 91f.
44. Note the tone of 3. 10; 5. 14. There is nothing discreditable in the phrase 'regio animo et more' of 7. 19.
45. Cf. Fausset's comment on 9. 27: 'Observe that Deiotarus is invested with the national virtues of the old Roman'.
46. Similar phraseology occurs in *Phil.* 2. 37. 93; 11. 13. 33–34, a glowing account of Deiotarus' many services to Rome.
47. *Fam.* 15. 2. 2. Cf. 15. 1. 6.
48. Cicero's censure of Caesar's treatment of Deiotarus may be noted in passing: 'Caesarem eodem tempore hostem et hospitem uidit — quid hoc tristius? ... spoliatum reliquit (Caesar) et hospitem et regem'. Cf. too the description in 1. 15. 26.
49. *Att.* 14. 1. 2.
50. Cicero, *Brut.* 5. 21; Tac. *Dial.* 21.
51. Cf. e.g. Suet. *Aug.* 48; Sands, *o.c.* (n.15), 142.

HISTORIA AUGUSTA: THE 'NOMEN ANTONINORUM' THEME

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In AD 138 Antoninus Pius became emperor, a man 'in cunctis postremo laudabilis et qui merito Numae Pompilio ex bonorum sententia comparatur'.[1] This was the beginning of the 'Golden Age of the Antonines'.[2] He was succeeded by Marcus Antoninus, 'qui sanctitate vitae omnibus principibus antecellit',[3] and Verus, who 'neque inter bonos, neque inter malos principes ponitur'[4] — the first time that the Roman Empire was ruled jointly by two emperors.[5] Marcus Aurelius, in turn, was succeeded by his son Commodus, who 'turpis, improbus, crudelis, libidinosus, ore quoque pollutus et constupratus fuit.'[6] 'Thus in the darkness of disillusionment ended the enlightened monarchy of the Antonines'.[7] According to Mason Hammond,[8] the Antonine dynasty ends with Severus Alexander in 235; according to the *HA*, it ends with Heliogabalus, 'ultimus Antoninus'.[9]

According to the *HA* there were eight Antonines, whom the author divides into two groups:[10] firstly the 'Antonini veri',[11] that is Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, Lucius Verus,[12] and Antoninus Commodus, those who had the 'nomen Antonini' as a 'verum' (or 'proprium') 'nomen',[13] and secondly the pseudo-Antonines,[14] that is Antoninus Caracallus, Antoninus Geta, Antoninus Diadumenus, and Antoninus Heliogabalus, who had the 'nomen' only as a 'praenomen'.[15] The 'nomen Antoninorum' theme is the most conspicuous single theme in the *Historia Augusta*, and it turns specifically upon these pseudo-Antonines. The 'extravagant play'[16] with the Antonines appears in the series of lives from Septimius Severus to Severus Alexander. It will be worthwhile to have a closer look at the references to the theme.

In the *vita Severi* there are seven references to the 'nomen Antonini': 10.3–6; 14.3; 16.4; 19.2–3; 22.2 and 24.2.

In 10.3 the author relates that Severus gave his eldest son, Bassianus, the name Aurelius Antoninus and the title of Caesar, in order to foil his brother

Geta's aspirations to the throne. This idea is then pursued further in 14.3: Severus caused the senate to give Bassianus Antoninus the title of Caesar and grant him the imperial insignia.[17] In 10.4 it is stated that Severus had dreamed that he would be succeeded by an Antoninus. Because of this dream, according to some people ('quidam ... putant'), Geta was also called Antoninus, in order that he, too, might succeed to the throne (10.5–6).[18] According to other people ('aliqui ... putant'), however, Bassianus was given the name Antoninus because Severus himself wished to change over to the family of Marcus Aurelius.[19] This statement is repeated in 19.2–3, with the additional suggestion that Severus thought that all emperors should in future assume the name Antoninus just as their predecessors had adopted that of Augustus. This explanation of how Geta got the Antoninus name clashes with the claim in 16.4 that the soldiers gave Geta the name Caesar and also called him Antoninus. This statement is repeated in the *vita Caracalli* (1.1) and explains some of the soldiers' anger at Geta's murder (*Cc* 2.4–8; *G* 6).

The assertion that Severus himself gave Geta the name Antoninus (*S.* 10.5–6; 19.2–3) is continued in the *vita Getae* (1.3–2.5). Several reasons are adduced: 'Ex paterna cogitatione', or because his wife, Julia, desired it (*G* 1.3). Further reasons link up with the two above-mentioned passages from the *vita Severi*: because Severus purposed that every emperor from that time onwards should be called Antoninus, just as they had previously been called Augustus (in other words, he had in mind that Geta should succeed him — *cf. S* 10.5 and 19.3); out of love for Marcus Aurelius (*cf. S* 10.6 and 19.3). Then the author develops a new idea: perhaps ('dicunt aliqui') the use of the name was not so much in honour of Marcus Aurelius, but rather in honour of Antoninus Pius, who had granted Severus his first opportunity in public life, and at the same time because no emperor seemed to him more auspicious for lending his name than one whose personal name had now been borne by four of the emperors (*G* 2.3–5). Thus the author suddenly struck on the idea to make Severus a second Pius:[20] just as Pius had left two Antonini to rule the empire jointly after his death, so Severus should also leave two Antonini to rule the empire jointly. This links up with the long *excursus* in the *vita Severi* (*S* 20–21)[21] that Severus was very delighted at the time of his death because he was leaving two Antonini to rule the state with equal powers, herein following the example of Pius, but that he rejoiced so much the more because Pius had left only two adopted sons while he was leaving sons of his own blood; he was, however, grievously deceived in these hopes because practically no great man ever left a son who was of any value to the state.

There are two more references in the *vita Getae* to the fact that Geta himself was called Antoninus by his father: 5.3: 'Post Parthicum bellum ... Geta quoque Caesaris et Antonini, ut quidam dicunt, nomen accepit',

and 3.5: one of the omens reported after Geta's birth portended his future rule: a lamb was born on the same day and time as Geta, with purple wool on his forehead, on the farm of a plebeian called Antoninus. The whole *vita*, however, gives the impression of an afterthought, hastily composed, patched together with material taken mainly from the *vitae* of Severus and Caracallus, and it never becomes a real biography.[22] This *vita* was probably written after completion of the whole series Septimius Severus to Severus Alexander, and then inserted into the group. One gains the strong impression that this whole idea gradually took shape while the author was composing the series. At some stage he came upon the idea of composing the history of the pseudo-Antonine dynasty in the same way as that of the original Antonine dynasty: Severus would be a second Pius and founder of another Antonine dynasty, who left two sons, Antonini, to rule the empire with equal powers. And, as he had composed the *vitae* of Pius' two successors, Marcus and Verus, he had to compose the *vitae* of Caracallus and Geta, the successors of Severus, the second Pius, as well: Caracallus as a second Marcus and Geta as a second Verus.[23] The author, however, was in too much of a hurry, or too careless (or simply lost interest) to round off the *vita* completely. This life was written primarily for the sake of the theme.[24]

There are three references to the 'nomen' in the *vita Caracalli*: *Cc* 8.3: Papinianus had been entrusted by Severus with the specific care of the two sons and thus always tried to reconcile them; *Cc* 9.2: Heliogabalus was called Antoninus because the name had become so dear to the people; *Cc* 8.10: Macrinus gave the name Antoninus to his son Diadumenus because the praetorian guard desired an Antoninus as emperor.

In the *vitae Severi, Caracalli* and *Getae*, there are two distinct lines with regard to the 'nomen Antoninorum' theme. One, historically correct, concerns Bassianus, the other one, fictitious, concerns Geta, and there are discrepancies between these two lines which represent two phases in the composition of the series.

The composition of the series might then be reconstructed as follows. When the author reached Septimius Severus he was very well aware of the fact that Bassianus had been given the name Antoninus by his father. This fact must have struck him, and because the Antonine dynasty was so famous he decided to let it play a key role in the biography. *S* 10.1–6, the passage in which the event is described when Severus named his son Bassianus Antoninus — after the war against Niger, just when he had received the disconcerting news that Albinus had also rebelled against his rule — became the focal point of the life of Severus. 10.3 belongs to the original conception of the *vita*. This is the only instance where the fact is mentioned that Severus gave his son Bassianus the name Antoninus. This idea is developed further in 14.3 where it is stated that Severus forced the

senate to give Bassianus Antoninus the title of Caesar and to grant him the imperial insignia. The fact that Bassianus was an Antoninus is mentioned here without any further explanation, and was also part of the original conception. 10.4 and 10.6 can also be regarded as belonging to the original conception. 10.5, however, breaks the train of thought in the passage 10.1–6. If this sentence is taken out of the text, 'illum' in 10.6 refers to Bassianus, and it then links up with the statement in 19.3 (that all emperors should in future be called Antoninus) and concurs with Aurelius Victor 19.30. Syme[25] also regards 10.5 as a later insertion.

S 16.4 states that the soldiers gave Geta the name Caesar and furthermore called him Antoninus. This statement contradicts *vita Getae* 1.3–2.5, where it is argued that Severus himself gave Geta the name, and also *S* 10.5. It is repeated in *Cc* 1.1. Therefore this can also be regarded as belonging to the original conception. It is quite possible that the author could have found it in one of his (now lost) sources: 'ut plerique in litteras tradunt' (16.4). Syme's assertion[26] that this is also a later insertion is therefore probably not correct. It is unlikely that the author would have made contradictory insertions. It is more probable that the author found this statement in one of his sources and that it gave him the idea to make Geta an Antoninus.

S 19.2–3 also belongs to the original conception, with the exclusion of the words 'cui et ipsi in honorem Marci Antonini nomen imposuit' (*S* 19.2b). This phrase corresponds with *S* 10.5 ('unde Getam etiam quidam Antoninum putant dictum'), which is clearly an insertion and is repeated in *G* 2.1.[27]

In 22.2, as one of Severus' 'omina mortis', it is related that Severus had a vision that he was placed between the Antonines by Jupiter, and in 24,2 it is stated that he was buried in the tomb of the Antonines. It is possible that these two references also belong to the original conception, and may have contributed to the author's idea of a second Antonine dynasty.

After completion of the *vita Severi*, the author immediately proceeded with the *vita Caracalli*. In *Cc* 1.1 it is briefly stated why Caracallus was called Antoninus: 'alterum pater dixit', agreeing with *S* 10.3, and why Geta was named Antoninus: 'unum Antoninum exercitus ... dixit', in agreement with *S* 16.4. *Cc* 1.1 thus links up directly with the original conception of the *vita Severi*.[28] There are two further references to the 'nomen' in the life of Caracallus: 8.9–10: Macrinus called his son Diadumenus Antoninus because the praetorian guard wanted an Antoninus as emperor,[29] and 9.2: Caracallus' son Heliogabalus was called Antoninus because the name had taken root in the hearts of all, even as had the name of Augustus. Syme,[30] probably correctly, suggests that these two references are additions, inserted after a revision of the series at a later stage.

In the *vita Macrini* there are many more references to the 'nomen Antoninorum' theme, and it seems that, at this stage of the composition of the series, the idea had more or less taken on a final form. The author wanted to point out that Macrinus' rule depended, just as had that of Severus, on the 'nomen Antoninorum'. First he called himself Antoninus (*OM* 2.1),[31] and thereafter, like Severus, he gave the name to his son (*OM* 2.5).[32] In a long *excursus* (*OM* 2.5–3.9) the author lists the reasons why Macrinus named his son Antoninus, and at the same time he explains the origin of this obsession with the name: the priestess Caelestis at Carthage, when consulted, uttered the name Antoninus eight times, and, says the author, if all who bore the name Antoninus were to be counted, this would be the number; another possible reason: to remove the soldiers' suspicion that he (Macrinus) had slain Antoninus (that is Caracallus); and a third reason: the love for this name was so great among the people and soldiers that they would not deem a man worthy of the imperial power if he were not called Antoninus. In *OM* 5.1 it is repeated that Macrinus ordered the soldiers to give him the name Antoninus and *OM* 6 consists of a letter to the senate in which Macrinus deplores the death of Caracallus and attempts to compensate for this loss by naming his son Antoninus 'ne vobis desit Antoninorum nomen, quod maxime diligitis' (6.7). *OM* 7.5–8 is another *excursus* on the 'nomen' theme: the Antonini in fact gradually degenerated and the whole obsession with the name actually became senseless. *OM* 9.1–6 relates how Heliogabalus got the name: his mother spread the story that he was the son of Caracallus. In *OM* 10.6 the author says of Diadumenus: 'non enim aliquid dignum in eius vita erit, quod dicatur, praeter hoc quod Antoninorum nomini est velut nothus appositus' — an indication that a *vita* of Diadumenus will also be written and an explanation why this *vita* would be unsatisfactory. And lastly, in *OM* 14.1, it is stated that Diadumenus was an Antoninus only in his dreams.

It seems then that the *vita Macrini*, with the exception of the *excursus* *OM* 2.5–3.9, was written immediately after the *vita Caracalli*, but before the *vita Getae*. This *excursus* was added later, after the complete development of the theme, that is after the *vita Alexandri*, and after the *vita Getae* had been added to the series. It is quite possible that it replaced a short paragraph, or perhaps only a sentence, which stated that Diadumenus was called Antoninus because of the obsession with the name. The *excursus* *OM* 7.5–8 could also have been added to the *vita* at a later stage, but since the name of Geta does not appear in this list of Antonini, it is possible that it was part of the original conception of the *vita*. In any case, it must have been written before the *vita Getae* was added to the series.

Since the author had already written a *vita* of Caracallus, as the Antoninus son of Septimius Severus, he was obliged to write a *vita Diadumeni* as well, as the Antoninus son of Macrinus.[33] He does apologise, however:

'Antonini Diadumeni pueri ... nihil habet vita memorabile, nisi quod Antoninus dictus est et quod ei stupenda omina sunt facta imperii non diutini' (*Dd* 1.1). Compare this with the statement in *Dd* 6.1: 'Haec sunt quae digna memoratu in Antonino Diadumeno esse videantur. cuius vitam iunxissem patris gestis, nisi Antoninorum nomen me ad edendam pueruli specialem expositionem vitae coegisset'. In *Dd* 1.2–8 a careful explanation is supplied why and how Diadumenus became an Antoninus. In *Dd* 2.3–4 Diadumenus undertakes to act in a manner which is worthy of the 'nomen Antoninorum'. *Dd* 6.2–8.1 is another long *excursus* on the theme: the 'Antonini veri' had the name as a 'nomen proprium' while the pseudo-Antonini, that is Caracallus, Geta and Diadumenus (Heliogabalus is not listed here) bore the name as 'praenomen'. This *excursus* is an expansion on the first *excursus* (or both) in the *vita Macrini*. It looks like a passage that had been added to the *vita* at a later stage, probably together with the *excursus* in the *vita Macrini*, to round off the theme.

At this stage of composition the author could have conceived the idea to write a *vita Getae* as well. This would enable him to compose a series on the pseudo-Antonini similar to that on the real Antonini, as a group of four, with Heliogabalus as the last Antoninus. This would at the same time enable him to set Severus Alexander, in his opinion an ideal emperor and an antitype to Heliogabalus,[34] apart from the rest. Alexander would then refuse to be an Antoninus although he was entitled to the 'nomen' and although the senate urged him to assume it.[35]

All the references to the 'nomen' in the *vita Heliogabali* point to the fact that Heliogabalus was the last (and the worst) of the Antonini; that he was not really an Antoninus, but rather a Varius or Heliogabalus. After a short introduction (*Hel* 1.1–3), there follows a long explanation on Heliogabalus' names (1.4–3,3). It is stated that he became emperor simply because he was regarded as the son of Caracallus, and that he assumed the 'nomen Antoninorum' 'vel in argumentum generis vel quod id nomen usque adeo carum esse cognoverat gentibus, ut etiam parricida Bassianus causa nominis amaretur' (1.4–5).[36] His real name, however, was Varius, probably 'quod vario semine, de meretrice utpote, conceptus videretur' (2.2). Later on he got the name Heliogabalus because he was a priest of the sun (1.5). He was the last of the Antonines (1.7) and a smirch on the 'nomen' (2.4). Yet everybody was excited about this new Antoninus, because he had the name 'quod non solum titulo, ut in Diadumeno fuerat, sed etiam in sanguine redditum videbatur' (3.1). The people, however, were soon disappointed in their high expectations (3.3 ff.).

In *Hel* 8.4–5 a vicious attack is launched on the reputation of Macrinus, and Diadumenus is called a pseudo-Antoninus. This paragraph is out of context and, therefore, probably a later insertion.

In *Hel* 9 it is related that Heliogabalus associated himself with Mar-

cus Aurelius, although 'hic Varius et Heliogabalus et ludibrium publicum diceretur, nomen autem Antonini pollueret, in quod invaserat' (9.2). After his death, 'nomen eius, id est Antonini, erasum est senatu iubente remansitque Varii Heliogabali, si quidem illud adfectato retinuerat, cum vult videri filius Antonini' (17.4).[37] In 18.9 the author repeats that he was the last of the Antonini and that the senate took the name away from him, and then proceeds: 'quem nec ego Antoninum vocassem nisi causa cognitionis, quae cogit plerumque dici ea etiam nomina, quae sunt abolita' (18.2). And instead of the name Antoninus, a number of abusive names are attributed to him (17.5). *Hel* 33.8 concludes the *vita Heliogabali*: 'hic finis Antoninorum nomini in re p. fuit, scientibus cunctis istum Antoninum tam vita falsum fuisse quam nomine.'

The whole passage *Hel* 34 and 35 is an appendage, probably added to the *vita* when *S* 20 and 21 were written. In *Hel* 34.6 it is stressed once more that Heliogabalus was the last of the Antonines and that this name was never again used by an emperor, not even by the Gordiani, for they were definitely not Antonini.

In the biography of Severus Alexander it is emphasized that Heliogabalus should rather not be called Antoninus (*SA* 1.1–2); in fact, he not only sullied the name of the Antonines but also brought shame on the Roman Empire (*SA* 2.1). Severus Alexander, on the other hand, had more right to the name than Heliogabalus, and therefore the senate urged him to accept it. He refused, however (*SA* 5.3). Alexander's refusal was of great importance to the author of the *HA*, and therefore he devoted much attention to it — six chapters (*SA* 6–12). In this way he stressed the fact that the Antonine dynasty was past and that a new era had started with Alexander.[38] Alexander had just as much right to the name as had Heliogabalus, but since the Antonine dynasty was a degenerating dynasty, and Alexander was an ideal emperor, he had to refuse the 'nomen'.

In chapters 6 to 12 of the *vita Alexandri* the author writes elaborately on the matter. The senate was adamant that Alexander should accept the 'nomen' so that he might restore its reputation which had been disgraced by Heliogabalus, and also to avenge the wrongs against the good Antonines (*SA* 7 and 8.3).[39] Alexander was not willing to take such a burden on himself, since he would not be able to do justice to so great a name (*SA* 8.3–4).[40] The senate, however, insisted. They reminded him of the 'pietas' of Pius, the 'doctrina' of Marcus, the 'innocentia' of Verus and the 'fortitudo' of Bassianus;[41] Commodus was rejected because of his depravity and Diadumenus had been too young and moreover never had had the opportunity to demonstrate his attitude towards the 'nomen' (*SA* 9.1–3).[42] Alexander reminded the senate of the fact that the previous bearer of the 'nomen' had been 'non solum bipedum sed etiam quadrupedum spurcissimus' (*SA* 9.4); not that he himself expected to become like him (*SA* 9.7)

— the senate did not expect it either (*SA* 9.4–5) — but he did not want the 'nomen' in any case (*SA* 9.7), since Pius, Marcus, and Verus had received the name through adoption, Commodus had inherited it, Diadumenus had assumed it, Bassianus had pretended it, and in the case of Varius (that is Heliogabalus) it had been a mere mockery (*SA* 10.3–6).[43] He would rather endeavour to make the name which he brought to the office a name coveted by future emperors (*SA* 11.1). Thus the author stresses again that a new era in the history of Rome starts with Severus Alexander.

The 'nomen Antoninorum' had become the name of a dynasty. This was one of the reasons why Heliogabalus was given the name (*Hel* 1.4) and also the reason why the senate urged Alexander to assume it (*SA* 5.4). It is this idea the author wanted to emphasise. And this is also the reason why he put forward the idea that the next line of hereditary rulers in Roman imperial history, the Gordiani, were also regarded as Antonini.[44] This 'fact' is then used to lend weight to his opinion that Heliogabalus was the last Antoninus, whatever other people might think. This idea occurs for the first time in *Hel* 18.1 and again in *Hel* 24.6. These were probably later insertions into the text, when the author made certain adaptations to round off his theme. It appears also in the *excursus* in *OM* 2.5–3.9 and is repeated in the *Gordiani Tres* 4.7 and 17.1.

To conclude: the development of the theme can be reconstructed as follows. The *vita Severi* was written first, without 10.5,[45] 19.2–3, and 20–21. Then followed the *vita Caracalli*; then the *vita Macrini*, without at least the *excursus OM* 2.5–3.9, instead of which there might have been a single statement that Macrinus called his son Antoninus.[46] Then followed the *vita Diadumeni* without the long *excursus Dd* 6.2–8.1. Upon this followed the *vita Heliogabali*, without 24, 25, and 28.1. Chapter 8.4 may also be a later insertion.

It seems that, at this stage of the composition, the theme became clear to the author. To round it off, he went back and added certain parts to the already composed lives. First he wrote a *vita Getae*. In this way he was able to elaborate his idea of a second Antonine dynasty, consisting of four Antonini. The logical corollary to this idea, namely that Severus emulated Pius and left two sons (but not adopted sons) to jointly rule the empire, necessitated certain additions to the *vita Severi*, *S* 10.5 and 19.2–3, as well as the long *excursus S* 20–21.

A synthesis of the whole theme became necessary at this stage. This was effected by means of two long *excursus* in the *vitae* of Macrinus and Diadumenus (*OM* 2.5–3.9; *Dd* 6.2–8.1), cleverly done in such a way that these two *vitae* give the impression of having been composed around these *excursus*. More or less at the same time the additions to the *vita Heliogabali* (14–15, 18.1 and possibly also 8.4) were added.

With skilful manipulation of historical data and strategically placed references to the 'nomen Antoninorum', the author succeeded in joining together the *vitae* of nine emperors into a separate theme within the corpus of 30 biographies, constructed ingeniously as a ring composition. The theme begins with Septimius Severus, the first person to make use of the 'nomen Antoninorum' as a political instrument to safeguard his own rule and to found a dynasty. The theme ends with Severus Alexander who was fully entitled to use the 'nomen' as well, but who refused it and preferred to be emperor in his own right and under his own name. The pivotal point of the composition is the *vitae* of Macrinus and Diadumenus. Their rules represent an historical interlude, and the author made their *vitae* a literary interlude. These *vitae* contain the synthesis of all the different threads of the theme. The Lives of Caracallus/Geta and Heliogabalus, the first and last emperors of the pseudo-Antonine dynasty, form a parallel pair on both sides of the interlude.

Schematically this can be represented as follows:

Septimius Severus	not an Antoninus, but the first man who made use of the 'nomen' as a political instrument.
Caracallus/Geta	the first Antonini of the pseudo-Antonine dynasty; Antonini for political reasons; 'bad' emperors.
Macrinus/Diadumenus	historical and literary interlude; contains the synthesis of the theme.
Heliogabalus	last Antoninus of the pseudo-Antonine dynasty; Antoninus for political reasons; a 'bad' emperor.
Severus Alexander	could have been Antoninus by precedent; refused to abuse the 'nomen' for political reasons; beginning of a new era.

From the reconstructed development of the theme it is clear that the author did not have a clear conception of the theme at the outset, but that it gradually took shape while he was at work. After completion, however, it presented at least a sensible structure: seven biographies had been ingeniously structured around a single theme, the 'nomen Antoninorum'. One gains the impression that these *vitae* were written in the first instance for the sake of this theme, the most conspicuous single theme in the whole corpus. But it is not an isolated, detached theme; it is the synthesis of an idea that runs like golden threads throughout the *Historia Augusta*: the author's views on hereditary succession.

Hereditary succession is an undesirable practice and it is detrimental to the state, because it is a 'historical fact' that practically no great man has ever left the world a son of real excellence or value.[47] A name or reputation does not guarantee good government. Therefore it is just as undesirable for a person to try to attach himself in an artificial way to a dynasty. A dynasty degenerates of necessity; even an adoptive dynasty: neither Augustus not Trajan could find suitable adoptive successors.[48]

The most obvious disadvantage of a dynasty is that it reduces 'imperium' to a personal possession. Hadrian realised it when he undertook to administer the 'res publica' in such a way that men would know that it was not his own property, but that it belonged to the people.[49] With regard to the adoption of Aelius, Hadrian stated expressly that he was looking for an heir, not for his personal belongings, but for the 'res publica'.[50] When Tacitus was made emperor he was warned 'ne parvulos tuos, si te citius fata praevenerint, facias Romani heredes imperii, ne sic rem p. patresque conscriptos populumque Romanum ut villulam tuam, ut colonos tuos, ut servos relinquas. quare circumspice, imitare Nervas, Traianos, Hadrianos. ingens est gloria morientis principis rem p. magis amare quam filios'.[51] And Florianus is reproached for seizing the imperial power after the death of Tacitus 'quasi hereditarium esset imperium'.[52]

Commodus became emperor for the sole reason that he was Marcus Aurelius' son. And what could have been more fortunate for Marcus than not to have left Commodus as his heir?[53] And Marcus should have known better, for he had been concerned about his son's behaviour.[54] When Verus warned Marcus against Avidius Cassius, he replied, 'plane liberi mei pereant, si magis amari merebitur Avidius quam illi, et si rei publicae expediet, Cassium vivere quam liberos Marci.'[55] And still he bequeathed the 'imperium' to Commodus — with tragic results. Valerianus was an excellent emperor, but his son Gallienus, who *inherited* the 'imperium', was an evil man who 'moribus rem p. perdiderat.'[56] And the result of his evil rule was the period of the *Tyranni Triginta*, as stated over and over again.[57] Carus can be regarded as a good rather than a bad emperor, but he would have been much better, had he not left Carinus to be his heir.[58]

Adoptive succession is preferable: Marcus Aurelius is proof of that.[59] In the *vita Aureliani* the advantages of adoption are listed.[60] But since it primarily concerns the 'gloria' of a family, it is not infallible,[61] as several examples show. In his choice of a successor, Hadrian was influenced by personal considerations. Aelius' sole recommendation was his beauty,[62] and Hadrian was concerned about him.[63] Fortunately Aelius died an early death.[64] Even Marcus Aurelius, an adopted successor and excellent emperor, could not act against his wife's immorality, for then he would also have lost his dowry, the 'imperium'.[65]

This brings us to two other *vitae* within the ambit of the theme, those

of Pescennius Niger and Clodius Albinus.[66] Since these *vitae* are of very little value to an historian,[67] their inclusion in the series must be for a literary purpose,[68] in contrast with the *vitae Caracalli* and *Getae*. The clue is to be found in *S* 20–21: Severus thought that he had improved on Pius in that he had left two natural sons as successors, whereas Pius had but left two adopted sons. The implication is that Severus would have done better, had he left two adopted sons. Pescennius Niger, the model militarist and exponent of military discipline,[69] and Clodius Albinus, protagonist of the authority of the senate,[70] represent two important attributes of the 'princeps optimus' and illustrate the statesmanship of the good emperors in the *HA*, viz. Severus Alexander,[71] Claudius,[72] Tacitus,[73] and Probus.[74] Furthermore, both had an excellent reputation,[75] were popular,[76] and had already given proof of their statesmanlike ability.[77] Severus at one time even seriously considered adopting them as successors.[78]

The author of the *HA* was no genius; he was inaccurate, careless, hasty, and definitely not interested in finishing touches. But he was no fool either. Despite his failings, he succeeded in composing nine *vitae* around a central theme, which represents the synthesis of his ideas on the appointment of emperors, spread throughout the corpus. This is not history. History to him was merely a means to a literary end. And to attain that end, he had no scruples about inventing or distorting facts.[79] Even his choice of genre was in fact not determined by his intention to write biographies as such: these were actually only a handy instrument for his purpose. 'Scribe ut libet' was, after all, the advice he had allegedly received from Iunius Tiberianus.[80]

NOTES

1. *HA*, *AP* 2.2. All references to the *Historia Augusta* are according to the abbreviations of Carolus Lessing, *Scriptores Historiae Augustae Lexicon*, Leipzig 1901–1906.
2. Cf. H.M.D. Parker, *A History of the Roman World, AD 138–337*, London 1969, ix, and Wolfgang Seyfarth, *Römische Geschichte, Kaiserzeit I*, Darmstadt 1974, 174.
3. *MA* 1.1.
4. *V* 1.3.
5. *MA* 7.5–6; cf. also Mason Hammond, *The Antonine Monarchy*, American Academy at Rome 1959, 2–3.
6. *C* 1.7.
7. Parker, *op. cit.* (n.2) 35.
8. *Op. cit.*
9. *OM* 8.8. Cf. also *Hel* 1.7; 18.1 and 34.6.
10. *OM* 3.3–4; 7.5–8; *Dd* 6.2–10.
11. *OM* 3.7.
12. Verus, of course, was no historical Antonine (cf. Ronald Syme, *Emperors and Biography*, Oxford 1971, 79), but the *HA* calls him Antoninus several times: *AP* 4.5; 6.10; 10.3; *MA* 6.7 and *V* 1.3. It is possible that the author got the idea from

Eutropius (8.9.1); on the other hand, it suited his theme to regard Lucius Verus as an Antoninus. It seems that the theme gradually took shape while the author was writing and it is possible that, when the theme was fully developed, the author returned to the lives of Pius and Marcus to add these references. Syme (*op. cit.* 87) argues that the references to Verus in the lives of Pius and Marcus are later insertions. It is, of course, also possible that the author found this in his lost sources and initially got the idea for the theme from them.

13. *Dd* 6.4–8.
14. Cf. *Hel* 8.4.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Syme, *op. cit.* (n.12) 84.
17. Henceforth he was officially called Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Caesar. Cf. Dessau, *ILS* 419.
18. There exists no inscriptional or numismatic evidence that Geta was ever called Antoninus.
19. See also Dio Cassius 75.7.4 and 76.9.4.
20. The impression is strong that the author developed the idea while writing, but that he was too careless in the end to carry it through completely and to iron out all the inconsistencies which had inevitably arisen.
21. It probably prompted the writing of this long *excursus* which was then added to the life of Severus after completion of the life of Geta.
22. Or dictated, cf. *T* 33.8.
23. As a contrasting pair, as well.
24. Just as the life of Diadumenus, equally inadequate as a biography.
25. *Op. cit.* 82.
26. *Loc. cit.*
27. Syme, *loc. cit.*; 'In honorem Marci' refers to Bassianus.
28. Syme (*op. cit.* 86), however, regards this also as a later insertion.
29. Note the interesting resemblance to Aurelius Victor 22.2.
30. *Op. cit.* 86.
31. On inscriptions he was called 'imp. Caes. M. Opellius Severus Macrinus Pius Felix Aug.' He never had the name Antoninus; cf. Dessau, *ILS* 462,463,464,465.
32. His official names were M. Opellius Antoninus Diadumenianus Caesar; cf. Dessau, *ILS* 465.
33. As he has already stated in *OM* 10.6.
34. Cf. Werner Hartke, *Römische Kinderkaiser*, Darmstadt 1972, 3–4, 304 ff.
35. *SA* 5.3.
36. On inscriptions (Dessau, *ILS* 466,367,467 et al.) he was called 'imp. Caes. M. Aurelius Antoninus Pius'.
37. On several inscriptions the name Antoninus has been erased; cf. Dessau *ILS* 466,468, et al.
38. One gets the impression that the author is polemising against an idea that Severus Alexander was also an Antoninus. While Heliogabalus was still alive Severus Alexander was called 'Antonini filius' (cf. Dessau *ILS* 466,474: 'imp. Caes. M. Au[rell. An]tonini Pii Felicis Aug. fil.'), but he was indeed never called Antoninus. As emperor his official title was 'imp. Caes. Aurelius Severus Alexander Pius Felix Aug.' (cf. Dessau *ILS* 375, 479, 480 et al.).
39. It is rather odd that Bassianus is mentioned here among the good Antonini. This is contrary to the tenor of the *vita Caracalli* and the *excursus* in the biographies of Macrinus and Diadumenus.

40. Diadumenus, on the other hand, accepted the 'nomen' and expressed the hope that he would be able to do justice to it: *Dd* 2.3.
41. The same idea is expressed in *Dd* 7.4, but Bassianus is not mentioned there.
42. On Commodus, cf. *Dd* 7.1–4.
43. Cf. also *Dd* 6.1–10 as an extension on *OM* 3.7.
44. The idea of the Gordiani as Antonini was probably fictitious, or the author may have got the idea from Aurelius Victor's (26.1) *Antonius* Gordianus. The similarity between Antoninus and Antonius could have induced him to make use of it in order to stress the idea of a continuing dynasty.
45. Possibly 10.4–6.
46. The second *excursus* in the *vita Macrini* (7.5–8) may also be a later insertion, but since the name of Geta is absent in the list of Antonini there, I would rather regard it as part of the original conception.
47. *S* 20.4.
48. *S* 20.3.
49. *H* 8.3.
50. *Ael* 4.5.
51. *Tac* 6.8–9.
52. *Tac* 14.1; cf. also *Cl* 12.2–3 with regard to Quintilius.
53. *S* 21.5; cf. also *MA* 28.4.
54. *MA* 17.1–12; 18.10.
55. *AC* 1.7–9 and 2.8.
56. *Gall* 1.1.
57. E.g. *Gall* 21.3: 'nunc transeamus ad viginti tyrannos qui Gallieni temporibus *contemptu* mali principis exstiterunt'. Also *T* 3.3–4; 5.1–7; 8.9; 9.1–4; 10.1–2; 11.1; 12.1–2; 22.5; 23.2; 26.1; 29.1; 30.1; 31.1.
58. *Car* 3.8.
59. Cf. the request to Tacitus, *Tac* 6.9.
60. *A* 14.5–7.
61. *A* 14.5.
62. *H* 23.10–12.
63. *H* 23.14; *Ael* 3.7–4.6.
64. *Ael* 4.1–8; *H* 23.16. It is possible that the *vita Aelii* was written specifically to illustrate what could happen in the case of an injudicious adoption.
65. *MA* 19.8–9.
66. They have been classified as secondary or ancillary lives, 'Nebenviten' (cf. Mommsen, *Hermes* 25 [1890] 243 ff. = *Ges. Schr.* 7 [1909] 316 sqq.) a somewhat unfortunate misnomer since it often causes these lives to be studied as a separate group (cf. Ronald Syme, *op. cit.* 54) without regard for their connection with the so-called main lives.
67. Johannes Hasebroek, *Die Fälschung der Vita Nigri und Vita Albini in den Scriptores Historiae Augustae*, Berlin 1916. Also cf. Norman H. Baynes *The Historia Augusta. Its Date and Purpose*, Oxford 1926,88 ff., and Syme, *op. cit.*, 60 f.
68. Cf. Baynes, *loc. cit.* and Syme, *op. cit.* 66.
69. Cf. *PN* 3.3–127, 7–9; 10.1–7 and 11.1–6.
70. Cf. *ClA* 12.1–14; 13.3–14.6.
71. As to the senate: *SA* 19; 21.3–5; 52.2; as to the army: 12.4–5; 25.1–2; 50.1; 51.5–8; 52.1; 53–54; 59.4–5.
72. As to the senate: *Cl* 3.1–2; 4; 18.1–2; as to the army: 11; 12.5.
73. *A* 11, and the whole *vita Taciti*.

74. As to the senate: *Car* 1–2; *Pr* 11.2–4; 13.1; 24.4; as to the army: *Pr* 8; 20.3–6; 22.4; 23.
75. Pescennius Niger: *PN* 33.9–12; 4.1–5; 12.4–8; Clodius Albinus: *ClA* 2.1–5; 6.8; 10.4–11.1.
76. Pescennius Niger: *PN* 2.2–4; 3.1–2; Clodius Albinus: *ClA* 3.5; 7.2; 12–14.
77. Pescennius Niger: *PN* 7.2–6; Clodius Albinus: *ClA* 13.3–10.
78. *PN* 4.7–8; *ClA* 3.4; 6.8; 10.3.
79. Cf. Frank Kolb, *Literarische Beziehungen zwischen Cassius Dio, Herodian und der Historia Augusta*, Bonn 1972.
80. *A* 2.1.

AMMIANUS' TERMINUS AND THE ACCESSION OF THEODOSIUS I

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The long and fruitful association between Ammianus Marcellinus and Charles Naudé has been recently acknowledged in an authoritative study by J.F. Matthews.[1] One of the subjects which has occupied Prof. Naudé and other scholars is the composition of Ammianus' last books.[2] My scope here is considerably narrower and touches only on the last paragraphs of Ammianus' history. The thirty-first book of Ammianus describes the battle of Adrianople, the death of Valens, and the defeat of the eastern Roman army in 378. It then proceeds to highlight the activities of the victorious Goths, their siege of Adrianople, their plundering of the Thracian countryside, and their march to the imperial capital, Constantinople. Ammianus then leaves the Goths outside the city walls, fighting the Saracens and plundering the countryside, and transfers his story to the further parts of Asia Minor where a local commander, Iulius, orchestrates a massacre of all the Goths stationed in the region.[3]

Iulius' story is also narrated by Zosimus.[4] The two historians differ, however, in their chronology. Ammianus seems to place the episode fairly soon after the battle of Adrianople, and before the accession of Theodosius I; Zosimus postpones it to the period following Theodosius' elevation.[5] Modern scholars have generally favoured Ammianus' chronology.[6] But Ammianus is not always right and Zosimus is not invariably wrong. In what follows I propose to re-examine the chronology of events immediately following Adrianople, with particular attention to the accession of Theodosius I.

By any reckoning the story of Iulius, coming, as it does hard on the heels of the dramatic events taking place in other parts of the eastern empire, is anti-climactic. Its appearance at such an important junction in Ammianus' narrative has been explained on personal grounds. Ammianus approved of Iulius' action since, to his mind, it saved the eastern regions of the empire

from the fate of Thrace.[7] Moreover, his own city, Antioch, remained secure as a result of Iulius' initiative.[8]

Whether Ammianus composed his last books in the late 380s or the early 390s, he was then in a position to evaluate the policy which Theodosius adopted vis-à-vis the Goths throughout the 380s. Coming to power at a critical moment in the history of Rome, the emperor could scarcely afford to resort to the tactics adopted by Iulius. Instead, Theodosius' Gothic policy rested on a series of agreements which allowed the Goths to settle on Roman soil under their own leaders in return for supplying recruits to the Roman army. But these developments fell outside the scope of Ammianus' narrative. His annalistic framework was essentially complete with the death of Valens in August 378. It seems, however, possible to speculate that if Ammianus had treated his readers to a full recital of the events between Adrianople and the formal accession of Theodosius in January 379, he would have faced a problem. Hence, the careful selection of facts which he did choose to include, and the silence which envelops the rest.[9]

The commonly accepted version of this event starts with Gratian summoning Theodosius from his self-imposed exile in Spain, proceeds with the grant of a military command, and ends with Theodosius' appointment in Sirmium as Augustus of the eastern Roman empire on January 19, 379.[10] Matthews' detailed and authoritative analysis of the period further conjures up a whole network of Gallo-Spanish Theodosian supporters at the court of Gratian.[11] Among these were relatives of the future emperor, some of whom were then in key positions at court; several eminent Gallic nobles; and possibly even two military figures, Fl. Timasius and Magnus Maximus. Timasius had served under Valens, but is absent from the pages of Ammianus and probably did not hold an important command before the 380s.[12] Magnus Maximus' military career was confined to the west.

None of the members belonging to the presumed Theodosian party was in Sirmium when Gratian decided to recall Theodosius.[13] It is unlikely that they had engineered the move before the crisis of Adrianople. Moreover, none of the military men connected with this faction had then enough influence either to suggest Theodosius' recall or to prevail upon the army to accept the choice. In fact, the eastern army, or what was left of it, has been strangely absent from the modern list of Theodosian supporters. Are we to believe that the decision to recall Theodosius, to put him in charge of military operations, and to elevate him to the imperial throne, was tacitly if not happily accepted by the sorely tried commanders of the eastern army and their soldiers?

If the influence of a Gallo-Spanish court party on the proceedings in Sirmium is largely discounted, how does one explain the startlingly fast sequence of developments which resulted in the elevation of a semi-retired

young commander? Theodosius was the son of a general who had been executed at the beginning of Gratian's reign.[14] Assuming that the execution of the elder Theodosius was meant to secure the fragile dynasty of Valentinian, it is extremely difficult to envisage Gratian bowing to the pressure of his own court to recall Theodosius' son barely three years afterwards. If an experienced man was needed at that moment, Theodosius was hardly likely to have been Gratian's first choice.

In a speech delivered in 389 in front of Theodosius at Rome, the Gallic rhetor Pacatus recalled the events of 378 and 379. He also supplies an interesting detail unattested elsewhere. According to Pacatus, there were three candidates to the imperial throne and Theodosius was only the third on the list.[15] We do not have the names of the other candidates, although a guess can be hazarded (see below). However, Pacatus' statement, made in public and in the presence of the emperor himself, was not likely to have been an outright lie or mere rhetorical convention. It hardly contributed to the imperial majesty of the reigning emperor to be publicly revealed as a last choice.

Pacatus, our main source for Theodosius' elevation, has several other curious details. When offerred the throne, Theodosius declined, and persisted in his refusal for some time.[16] Gratian made his offer publicly, surrounded by soldiers of possibly both the eastern and western armies.[17] Although the theme of 'recusatio imperii' is common enough, Pacatus' emphasis on Theodosius' hesitation and its public nature, coupled with his reference to three imperial candidates, raises doubts about the hitherto accepted version of what happened in Sirmium between Adrianople (August 378) and the formal accession of Theodosius on January 19, 379.

For the year 379 the chronicler Hydatius records two events. The first entry covers the association of Theodosius with Gratian in the imperial rule, and echoes a similar statement of the Gallic chronicler, and of Prosper.[18] Hydatius' second entry refers to the appointment of Theodosius as Augustus.[19] Thus Hydatius seems to point to two distinct stages in the process of Theodosius' imperial elevation: first, an informal sharing of power; secondly, the formal acknowledgement of a fait accompli. A juxtaposition of the evidence of Pacatus and Hydatius raises suspicion of usurpation. Is it possible that Theodosius reached the throne originally as a usurper whom Gratian was compelled to accept? What really happened after the battle of Adrianople?

Among the survivors of Adrianople three men stand out: Victor, Saturninus and Richomer. In 378 Victor was Magister Equitum of the east, after a long and successful career in the eastern army under both Julian and Valens.[20] In 369 he became consul. In 378 he was one of the few who managed to salvage his own troops from the disaster of Adrianople. After the battle, Victor and his soldiers joined Gratian in Sirmium. Flavius

Saturninus was appointed Magister Militum just prior to Adrianople.[21] Before this he had been Comes and, like Victor, withdrew in time to save his soldiers from dying at Adrianople. Flavius Richomer advanced through the ranks of the western army and became Comes Domesticorum under Gratian.[22] Before Adrianople he had volunteered to go as a hostage to the Gothic camp but found himself in the middle of the battlefield fighting the Goths with the eastern army. The emperor Gratian, who had left Gaul in order to help his uncle, remained in Sirmium after the death of Valens. In September, more than a month after the battle, Gratian issued *CTh* 10.2.1 in the name of three emperors: himself, his brother Valentinian II, and ... the dead Valens.

These were the chief actors in the drama that unfolded in Sirmium.[23] All three survivors, Victor, Saturninus, and Richomer, were in a position to exert pressure on the young emperor to promptly address the problems which the eastern provinces faced and, above all, to restore the confidence of the demoralised troops of the eastern army. A solution clearly called for the appointment of an experienced commander acceptable to the soldiers, preferably one with a record untainted by the recent defeat. Theodosius had been military commander (Dux) in Moesia (Prima) between 373 and 376. His record would have been familiar to Victor, then Magister Equitum of the east, and possibly also to Saturninus. In 378, the remnants of Valens' army reassembled in Moesia and their commanders debated the military succession in Sirmium. The name of the former Dux Moesiae must have come up immediately.

Theodosius was then recalled from his Spanish estates, and appointed Magister Militum, possibly of Thrace. The move indicated that Gratian was not then looking for an imperial candidate but for an emergency appointment to secure the region against the barbarians and to rally the eastern troops. Although there is no information about the early campaigns of Theodosius, it can be assumed that he won a victory over the Sarmatians, perhaps in September or October of 378.[24] His grateful soldiers reacted in a time-honoured way and offered their victorious general the imperial throne. After all it had been empty since the beginning of August.

Gratian found himself in an unenviable position. He had a brother who had already been Augustus but was far too young to assume sole control over the east. A compromise was clearly called for. Gratian offered the throne to two people whom he trusted, at least more than he did the son of a disgraced general. This is the point where Pacatus' reference to three imperial candidates, including Theodosius, makes some sense. Whoever the other two may have been, they prudently declined the purple. Perhaps one of them was Saturninus. His loyalty to Theodosius, dating to the very first days of his usurpation, was amply rewarded in 383 with the consulship.[25] Gratian had eventually to capitulate and to bestow approval on his newly

elected imperial partner. Though Pacatus graced the period between the usurpation and the imperial acknowledgement with the title of 'recusatio', the doubts must have been all on Gratian's side. But by 389, when Pacatus addressed the victorious Theodosius, Gratian had been dead for over five years, and few would have remembered or cared to contradict his account.

Is it possible to attach a date to the usurpation? In the early years of Theodosius two dates stand out. The first is his elevation or recognition by the ruling Augustus in January 19, 379, an arrangement which a year later was formalised by their joint consulship;[26] the second when, nearly two years later, on November 24, 380, Theodosius finally entered Constantinople, his capital, a week after imperial victories over the Goths, Alans and Huns had been proclaimed.[27] Yet what was there to prevent him from waiting another eight weeks and entering the capital in time to celebrate the end of his first consulship and the beginning of his third regnal year? Perhaps then the day of November 24th may have represented for Theodosius a crucial turning point in his career: the moment when his soldiers had acclaimed him in 378. In later years the two months which elapsed from the date of the usurpation to Theodosius' formal accession blended into one event. But both Pacatus, a contemporary, and Hydatius, a century later, preserved echoes of the problems which followed the death of Valens and the choice of his successor.

The strongest condemnation of Theodosius' usurpation can be gleaned from the stony silence of Ausonius, Gratian's pupil and chief minister. In the middle of 379 Ausonius composed a lengthy speech of thanks to Gratian, his imperial benefactor. Among topics of contemporary interest which the consul found worthy of inclusion were Gratian's military achievements on the Rhine and the Danube, the avenging of his uncle, and the organisation of the east.[28] Amidst such a remarkable record, it is surprising, to say the least, that Theodosius is altogether absent. The Treveran court must have been well informed of the proceedings in Sirmium. By the time Ausonius delivered his oration, Theodosius had been legally installed for at least six months.[29] Here was ideal material for a panegyric, strangely passed over by the panegyrist. Pacatus, Ausonius' fellow-teacher from Bordeaux, indirectly praised Gratian for choosing a man who was not related to himself.[30] In 383 Themistius praised Theodosius for appointing as consul a man unrelated to the imperial family, and in a year which marked the emperor's quinquennalia.[31] Ausonius' reticence is best explained in the light of the circumstances which carried Theodosius to the throne. Rather than depict his much admired emperor Gratian in a helpless position, Ausonius chose to ignore both the usurpation and Gratian's forced acquiescence in it.

Eunapius, who had little interest in the affairs of western emperors and no sympathy with Theodosius, condensed the chain of events into a single reference recording Theodosius' appointment 'as an associate in the empire'.[32]

Gratian, he claims, was unequal to the task of controlling both parts of the empire. If Eunapius is to be believed, even Theodosius underestimated the barbarian threat. Iulius, the commander of Asia Minor, whose massacre of the Goths there elicited so much praise from Ammianus, did not bother to consult the emperor but instead obtained permission to execute his plan from the senate in Constantinople.[33] Modern scholars have been understandably unhappy with the Eunapius/Zosimus version of the events. Yet, Eunapius betrays a state of affairs in which the supreme authority was not yet vested in the hands of a clearly designated individual. This situation fits the two months of uncertainty when Theodosius and Gratian wrangled over the issue of legitimacy. Eunapius was right to place Iulius' action after Theodosius' accession, but he failed to distinguish between its two phases, the early usurpation and the formal elevation. His error, however, dates the episode of the Gothic massacre in Asia Minor to some time between the end of November 378 and of January 379. Had Theodosius then been already installed as legitimate ruler of the east, Iulius would have met the fate that awaited Gerontius in 380.[34]

Ammianus, who probably knew what had taken place in Moesia, was able to skip the early imperial career of Theodosius. His imperial annals were brought to a conclusion with the death of Valens. Perhaps it is also possible to detect here the personal disappointment of a soldier turned historian who, after testifying to a promising beginning of the commander Theodosius, saw him leading a Roman army to victory only twice more, on each occasion over another Roman army. At the risk of ending his great work with an anti-climax, Ammianus chose to conclude with the story of Iulius. Writing, as he did, at least a decade after the events, he was able to gauge the merits and failures of the emperor's Gothic policy. Direct criticism was clearly too risky. But as far as Ammianus was concerned, the only solution to the Gothic problem was the one adopted by Iulius. Iulius, then, and not Valens or Theodosius, served as the terminus for his history. And by concluding with a bloody massacre rather than with a story of peaceful settlements, the aged soldier expressed his dissatisfaction with current imperial policies. Theodosius, he seems to imply, should have followed the Gothic policy of Iulius.

NOTES

1. J.F. Matthews, *The Roman Empire of Ammianus*, Baltimore 1989, 558.
2. *Ibid.*, 20–7, for 390 or 391; C.P.T. Naudé, 'The Date of the Later Books of Ammianus Marcellinus', *AJAH* 9 (1984) 70–94, for the late 380s.
3. 31.16.8.
4. 4.26.
5. 31.16.8: 'his diebus'; Zos. 4.24.4 records the elevation of Theodosius.

6. F. Paschoud, *Zosime. Histoire nouvelle* 2.2, Paris 1979, 388f., n.154; Matthews, *Ammianus*, 513, n.45; H. Wolfram, *History of the Goths*, Berkeley 1988, 130, who also believes that this unauthorised action cost Iulius his command. P. Heather, *Goths and Romans 332–489*, Oxford 1991, 149.
7. Matthews, *Ammianus*, 417, 16, 227.
8. Recently Antioch has been rejected in favour of Alexandria as the historian's birthplace, G. Bowersock, 'Review of Matthews' *Ammianus*', *JRS* 80 (1990) 244–50. If true, one reason at least for the inclusion of the Iulianic episode can be eliminated, since Alexandria was hardly menaced by the Goths.
9. Cf. silence on the end of the general Theodosius.
10. G. Kaufmann, 'Wurde Theodosius von Gratian zunächst zum Magister Militum und erst nach einem Siege über die Sarmaten zum Kaiser ernannt?', *Philologus* 31 (1872) 473–80; Matthews, *Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court*, Oxford 1975, 91, n.3.
11. Matthews, *Aristocracies*, 94–7; *idem*, 'Gallic Supporters of Theodosius', *Latomus* 30 (1971) 1073–99.
12. *PLRE* 1, 914. Timasius' connection with Valens is based on Zosimus 5.8.3. Lippold, *RE* Suppl. 13, 953 doubts his Spanish connection.
13. Indeed, the only high-ranking civil servant whose presence is securely attested in Sirmium is the ubiquitous Olybrius, then Praetorian Prefect of Illyricum in that year. *PLRE* 1, 641.
14. The story is obscure. Orosius 7.33.7 and Jerome, *Chron.* s.a. 376 are the main sources. Among modern discussions, A. Alföldi, *A Conflict of Ideas in the Late Roman Empire*, Oxford 1952; A. Demandt, 'Der Tod des älteren Theodosius', *Historia* 17 (1969) 598–626; C.P.T. Naudé, 'Flavius Merobaudes and the Death of the Elder Theodosius', in L. Cilliers and A.H. Snyman (eds.), *Varia Studia in honorem W.J. Richards*, Bloemfontein 1987, 388–99.
15. 12.1: 'solus omnium qui adhuc imperaverunt ut princeps esses praestitisti. alios empta legionum suffragia, alios vacans aula, alios adfinitas regia imposuere rei publicae; te nec ambitus nec occasio nec propinquitas principem creaverunt. nam et eras a familia imperatoris alienus et adsciscebaris TERTIUS (my emphasis) et cogebaris invitus...'.
16. *Pan. Lat.* 12.11.1 (Galletier).
17. *Ibid.*, 11.2. C.E.V. Nixon, *Pacatus. Panegyric to the Emperor Theodosius*, Liverpool 1987, 64, n.40, based on Ausonius' *Gratiarum Actio* 9.
18. *CM* 2, 14: 'in consortium regni adsumptus'; *CM* 1, 646; 1, 461.
19. *CM* 2, 14: 'Gratiano Augustus appellatur'.
20. *PLRE* 1, 957–9.
21. *PLRE* 1, 807–8.
22. *PLRE* 1, 765.
23. Although the presence of Saturninus and Richomer is not attested directly, it can certainly be assumed.
24. Pacatus 10.2; Ausonius, *Grat. Actio* 2. Note the doubts justly cast by Kauffmann on the date of the Sarmatian victory, above n.10.
25. Themistius indicates that the consulship had been originally reserved for Theodosius himself, as part of his quinquennalia, *Or.* 16.202d–203a, 205b–c (Downey).
26. Had Theodosius already been destined for the throne in 378, he would surely have become consul in 379. The decision to appoint two westerners was taken by Gratian in Sirmium, after Adrianople. Ausonius, *Gratiarum Actio*.
27. *Cons. Const. s.a.*379, 3; Wolfram (above, n.6), 131. These were won by Theodosius' general, with the emperor safely ensconced in Thessalonike.

28. *Grat. Actio* 2. Note the title Sarmaticus which Ausonius bestowed on Gratian, and which the emperor probably owed to an early victory of Theodosius.
29. On the date, R.P.H. Green, *The Works of Ausonius*, Oxford 1991, 537.
30. *Pan. Lat.* 12.12.1.
31. Themistius (above, n.25). The choice of a private citizen does seem unusual for Theodosius, who filled the *fasti* of 381 and 382 with relatives.
32. Zos. 4.24.4.
33. *Idem* 4.26.
34. Zos. 4.40, with A. Ehrhardt, 'The First Two Years of the Emperor Theodosius I', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 15 (1964) 10–11, on the date.

THE PLATAEAN *ELEUTHERIA* AND THE 'DAY OF THE VOW' IN SOUTH AFRICA: A HISTORICAL PARALLEL AND THE CASE FOR HISTORICAL ANALOGY

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Occasionally our patchy knowledge of ancient institutions may be illuminated by an analogy from a modern, non-industrial society. We know from the canonic account of the great Persian invasion of Greece in 480 B.C.,[1] that

> the campaign of Plataea was the finest achievement of Greek unity .... They had remained loyal to Zeus Hellenios, the God of the Greeks whom the Athenians had once invoked in the allied cause. They fulfilled the oath to which they had solemnly pledged themselves before crossing Mt. Cithaeron: 'I shall fight to the death, I shall put freedom before life, I shall not desert colonel or captain alive or dead, I shall carry out the generals' commands and I shall bury my comrades-in-arms where they fall and leave none unburied' ....
>
> After the battle ... *the member states of the Greek League entered into a covenant, that on every anniversary of the victory the political and religious representatives of the Greeks should meet at Plataea to offer thanksgiving to Zeus the Liberator and to conduct games in honour of liberation; that the Plataeans should be dedicated to Zeus as an inviolable and sacred people; and that the Plataeans should offer sacrifice to Zeus and Hermes on behalf of the Greek dead. These ceremonies were maintained for many centuries*, the chief magistrate of Plataea ending the sacrifice with the words 'I drink to the men who died for the Freedom of the Greeks'.

The above is essentially the version of Diodorus[2] which is enshrined in some of the popular, or standard, handbooks on Greek history,[3] namely, that on the eve of the last great land battle (Plataea 479) the so-called

'council of the Hellenic league'[4] decreed to fight the Persians to the finish and to vow to the gods that if they were victorious the Greeks would unite in celebrating the 'festival of liberty' (*Eleutheria*) on that day every year for the rest of time.[5]

> The Greeks gathered in congress decreed to make common cause with the Athenians and advancing to Plataea in a body, to fight to the finish for liberty, and also to make a vow to the gods that *if they were victorious the Greeks would unite in celebrating the Festival of Liberty on that day and would hold the games of the Festival in Plataea.* And when the Greek forces were assembled at the Isthmus, all of them agreed that they should swear an oath about the war that would make staunch the concord among them and would compel them nobly to endure the perils of the battle. The oath ran as follows: 'I shall not hold life dearer than liberty, nor will I desert the leaders, whether they be living or dead, but I will bury all the allies who have perished in the battle; and if I overcome the barbarians in the war I will not destroy any one of the cities which have participated in the struggle; nor will I rebuild any one of the sanctuaries which have been burnt or demolished, but I will let them be and leave them as a reminder to coming generations of the impiety of the barbarians' (emphasis added).

We also know that various versions of what purported to be the text of this covenant were circulated in later centuries[6] and that in the 2nd century A.D. the commemorative festival of the *Eleutheria* was, according to Plutarch, still being observed.[7]

> After this (the battle) there was a general assembly of the Hellenes at which Aristides proposed *a decree to the effect that deputies and delegates from all Hellas convene at Plataea every year, and that every fourth year festival games of deliverance be contested — the Eleutheria*; also that a confederate Hellenic force be levied ... to prosecute the war against the barbarians, also that *the Plataeans be set apart as inviolable and consecrate, that they might sacrifice to Zeus the Deliverer on behalf of Hellas* (emphasis added).

As early as the fourth century B.C. the historian Theopompus dismissed this oath as an Athenian fraud.[8] Modern scholars either defend the authenticity of the oath or reject it as Theopompus once did.[9]

Even the sceptics agree however that there is a core of truth in the legend and although, as some believe, the original version of the oath is not recoverable, it has been argued that the wording of the extant versions was modified in accordance with the propagandistic needs of the periods in which the oath was resurrected.[10] Both camps therefore agree on one

point: that there was an original text of the oath, if not in 479, then at some later time.[11]

I believe that we can go some distance in resolving the crux and thus better understand the nature of the Hellenic covenant, by studying an episode from South Africa's history. Although historians should be extremely cautious in adducing modern analogies for past circumstances, there are nevertheless certain cases where the circumstances of ancient and modern events are demonstrably similar and where the modern events (which generally are well documented) can be used as a model by which we may explain the ancient, poorly documented events.

The events and circumstances surrounding the Covenant of Blood River (December 16, 1838) are remarkably similar to those of 480/79, not only in the fact that in both instances we have a small, outnumbered group of defenders (in 1838 the band of Voortrekkers under attack from Dingane's Zulu *impi*) successfully defeating a numerically superior force of 'barbarians', but also in the fact that the anniversary of the battle of Blood River (as it is called), December 16, has until very recently been observed in South Africa as a religious holiday in fulfilment of a vow allegedly made by the defenders on the eve of the battle. Here then we have a parallel for the festival of the *Eleutheria* which was observed in Plutarch's day, allegedly in fulfilment of the vow made in 479.

Building on the pioneering work of South African historians after the 1960s[12], Leonard Thompson shows how the canonic version of the battle of Blood River, as taught in South African schools and disseminated in popular history books at the time he was writing, about a decade ago, differs profoundly from the facts as revealed by primary sources.[13] He also shows how the propaganda of political groups between the 1840s and 1980s created, modified and elaborated on the myth to suit current ideological tendencies.

In the case of the controversy surrounding the Covenant of Plataea certain historians (starting with Theopompus), as indicated above, maintain that the documents (such as they are) are forgeries.[14] But may we make the same assertion in the case of the far more numerous primary documents relating to the Covenant of Blood River?

I would argue that in both cases we are dealing not with mere forged documents or barefaced lies, but with a universal and historical phenomenon — the making of political myth. The modern analogy may prove, against the arguments not only of the defenders of the historicity of the Oath of Plataea but also those of their opponents, that we should be thinking not so much in terms of 'authentic texts' of either covenant, but rather of constructs — myths or fictions — synthesized out of known facts or events. In other words, the traditions, of both the ancient covenant and its modern counterpart, grew out of events that were initially obscure and perhaps

even insignificant at the time they occurred. I propose then that modern analogy proves (*contra* Siewert and others, who vouch for the historicity of the Plataea 'text') that the wording of any particular extant version of the oath can only be fiction; and also that it suggests that the myth of the panhellenic Oath of Plataea probably had a very simple, local origin, as in fact Herodotus (7.132) and Thucydides (2.71) lead us to believe.[15]

Some of our sources have given rise to the general belief that at some stage during the Persian invasion of Greece the patriotic Hellenes swore some kind of oath and made a covenant, either in order to strengthen their resolve or to create a deterrent for those states which contemplated surrender to the barbarian without a struggle.[16] The earliest tradition, essentially, is that the Hellenes vowed that in the event of their defeating the enemy, they would 'tithe' the traitors (i.e. slaughter, or enslave the inhabitants, raze the land and dedicate it to Apollo[17]). This much Herodotus tells us, writing a generation after the actual event:[18]

> The Hellenes who had undertaken to fight the barbarians swore an oath. The oath was as follows: *as many as surrendered themselves to the Persians, being Hellenes, without compulsion and when things were well-disposed for them, these they would tithe to the God of Delphi.* Thus was the oath of the Hellenes (emphasis added).

The fact (i.e. the swearing of the oath) is, as we have seen above, embellished in Diodorus' account: the Greeks, if victorious, would commemorate the occasion in future by the regular celebration of festival games at four-yearly intervals. This latter part of the vow (not in Herodotus) is explicitly associated with the decisive land battle of Plataea in 479. Some sources place the vow immediately before the battle, some after it.[19]

Thus an account conflated out of these widely differing *testimonia* constitutes the popular notion perpetuated in some modern histories of the Greeks[20] and, as we indicated above, is derived principally from the account of Diodorus, who himself adopted and adapted Ephorus, a fourth-century historian, who was in turn influenced not only by the circumstances and institutions of his own day, but also by Isocrates. He would therefore also reflect the panhellenic sentiments which the latter propagated.[21] Thus, although there are no primary sources for the Covenant of Plataea, there are nevertheless various versions of it which appear in a number of extant ancient literary and epigraphic sources, from the time of Herodotus until well into the Roman Empire.

The discovery in 1932 of the Ephebic Inscription at Acharnai — a fourth-century composite document comprising a dedication, the text of an oath traditionally recited by Athenian Ephebes on their induction into the army, and what purports to be an oath sworn by the Athenians when they were on the point of engaging in battle with the barbarians — intensified discussion

about the historicity of the Covenant of Plataea and promoted the notion that the epigraphic version is in fact the 'original'. After all, things always look more authentic when written on stone! The fourth century epigraphic version of the oath is as follows:[22]

> The oath which *the Athenians swore when they were going to fight against the barbarian*:
> I shall fight as long as I live and shall not consider it more important to be alive than to be free and
> I shall not fail the *taxiarch* or the
> *enomotarch*, be he either alive or dead
> and I shall not go away unless the *hegemones*
> lead the way and I shall do whatever the generals command. Those who died of our comrades-in-arms, I shall bury on the spot
> and I shall leave no-one behind unburied. *And*
> *after defeating the barbarians in battle I shall*
> *tithe the city of the Thebans and I shall not destroy Athens or Sparta or Plataea*
> *nor any of the other cities of those*
> *who shared in the fighting* ... (emphasis added).

Siewert attempts to prove that the oath on the stone was indeed the original one that was sworn by the Greeks before the battle of Plataea (just as Diodorus says). He argues that its wording is very similar to, and in many places identical with, that of the literary versions of the oath which we find in Diodorus — and in the fourth-century version included in Lycurgus' speech *Against Leocrates*.[23]

> It was for this reason ... that all *the Hellenes exchanged this pledge at Plataea, before taking up their posts to fight against the power of Xerxes*. The formula was not their own but an imitation of the oath which is traditional among you ... for though the events of that time are ancient history by now, we can discern clearly enough in these recorded words the courage of our forefathers. Please read the oath:
>
> OATH. I shall not consider life more important than freedom. I shall not forsake the *hegemones* be they either alive or dead, but I shall bury all those of the allies who were killed in the battle. And having conquered the barbarians in the war, *I shall tithe all those who sided with the barbarian. And I shall not rebuild a single one of the temples burnt and razed by the barbarians but I shall allow them to be left for future generations as a memorial of the barbarians' impiety* (emphasis added).

The above may be a literary version of the oath, possibly derived from Ephorus. For it is far closer in wording and content to that of Diodorus,

than to the epigraphic version.[24] The clause about the rebuilding of the shrines, for instance, is common to both Diodorus and Lycurgus. The salient difference however consists in the less specific tone of Lycurgus' version. In other words Thebes is not singled out as the villain, as it is in the inscription.[25]

Siewert's main argument is based on the fact that the vocabulary and style of the epigraphic text is decidedly non-literary and 'archaic' — that is, it bears verbal and stylistic similarities to other allegedly 'archaic' Greek documents — though he admits it shows instances of contamination, or 'Modernisierung', notably the line which singles out Thebes for punishment by tithing.[26] His hypothesis has not however found wide support in recent years (M. Ostwald is the exception).[27]

The more widely accepted interpretation (reflected principally in the works of Habicht, Robertson and Raaflaub)[28] is that *none* of of the extant versions is the 'original', but that all reflect the efforts of later propagandists to use the original oath for political and ideological needs on particular occasions. They also argue for example that the reference to Thebes in the epigraphic version accords very well with the events of the late 370s, when the Athenians and Spartans were sinking their long-standing differences in the face of mounting Theban imperialism and aggression. Xenophon in fact twice refers to the notion of 'tithing' Thebes in the context of events leading up to the battle of Leuctra.[29] Moreover the clause which prohibits the destruction of Athens and Sparta reflects the friendly attitude that prevailed between the once deadly enemies. This friendly attitude resulted in the Alliance of 369.[30] However, even the more critically-minded scholars still presuppose that there was an *original* oath of Plataea — an 'Ur-Text' of the Hellenic Oath, which forms the core of the later variants. Yet apart from Herodotus' version,[31] written a generation after the event and in a highly rhetorical and ideological context which has no pretensions of chronological exactitude but is intended as a prelude to the formation of the so-called Hellenic league, there is not a trace among our fifth century sources of anything like the oath or the covenant as it is known.[32] Even Thucydides, who had ample opportunity for expanding on the theme in his Plataean *logos*, gives us a vastly different picture from that of the vulgate — derived from Diodorus: Thucydides tells how the Plataeans try to dissuade Archidamus from ravaging their land:[33]

> For Pausanias ... when he had freed Hellas from the Persians together with such of the Hellenes as chose to share the danger ... offered sacrifice in the market-place of the Plataeans to Zeus Eleutherius and calling together all the allies restored to the Plataeans their land and city to hold and inhabit in independence and no one was ever to march against them unjustly or for their enslavement, but in that case the

> allies then present were to defend them with all their might. These privileges your fathers granted to us on account of the valour and zeal we displayed amid those dangers ....

After their city has been captured the Plataeans make the following defence:[34]

> Turn your eyes upon the sepulchres of your fathers, slain by the Persians and buried in our land, whom we have honoured year by year with a public offering of raiment and other customary gifts .... You will be bringing desolation upon the temples of the gods to whom they prayed when they conquered the Persians and you will be robbing of their hereditary sacrifices the people who founded and established them.

In the *Plataicus*, published c. 373, Isocrates moreover concurs with Thucydides: for he does not mention a covenant of the kind we read about in Diodorus, Lycurgus or the Acharnai inscription.[35] Moreover Isocrates mentions nothing about a quinquennial festival (*Eleutheria*) or the consecration of the Plataeans, even though both Thucydides and Isocrates refer to an oath (or sacrifice) and to some kind of μνημεῖα connected with annual honours which the locals paid to the dead.[36] In Thucydides' account the Plataeans are pleading in their own defence and for their lives, while in Isocrates' work they are pleading for the reinstatement of their *polis*. Had the Plataeans, in either instance, used in their arguments the details mentioned in Diodorus and Plutarch, they would surely have aided their own cause. Both Thucydides and Isocrates wrote τὰ δέοντα. If they had known about the covenant and its particular terms they surely would have mentioned them. Thus we are still faced with the question of whether there ever was a 'Covenant of Plataea' and, if there was, whether we have any means at all of retrieving it from our sources.

Since we have no primary sources, our chances are practically nil. Consequently, our principal task should not be speculation about the existence of an 'Ur-Eid' or an 'Ur-Dokument', but rather should we be looking for the historical circumstances and events — the raw materials — which could have given rise to the notion, or the *myth*, of a Covenant of Plataea. Henry Tudor observes that there is no 'original' in a political myth — as far as content is concerned it is 'not the origin that defines its character or direction; the myth is shaped and reshaped by the men who pass it on and they shape it in accordance with their own presuppositions and in response to their particular experience of the world'.[37] In other words, a myth on the first occasion of its telling is no more true or authentic than that of any of its subsequent re-tellings.

Let us examine our specific example more closely: the notion of a beleaguered or surrounded community, united and outnumbered in the face of

a horde of attacking barbarians is a potent and useful theme for political propagandists; reinforced by such a notion, the prospect of danger (real or imagined) can be used to create singleness of purpose in a community towards the achievement of a particular political goal, while the history of the successful aversion of such a danger provides an argument that can be used, in retrospect, to justify the political ideologies of any party which chooses to use it.[38] The circumstances which generated the Covenant of Plataea, as well as the political myths which evolved from the latter, find a close parallel in South African history.

In February, 1838 Piet Retief, the leader of one of a number of bands of Voortrekkers, together with his senior-ranking advisors was murdered during a negotiating session with, and at the instigation of the Zulu king, Dingane, who then sent his forces to wipe out the Voortrekker encampment. Survivors of the massacre joined forces with another group under Andries Pretorius and determined to avenge the treacherous attack and to establish a permanent foothold in Natal. A commando of about 460 Trekkers advanced into the heart of the Zulu kingdom and challenged and defeated the mighty army of Dingane. Their laager was situated on the banks of the Ncome, a small stream, which, because of the immense carnage inflicted on the Zulus on 16 December, 1838, became known as Blood River.[39]

According to prevailing popular historical traditions about both the defeat of the Persians at Plataea, on the one hand, and the Zulus at Blood River on the other, the victory over 'the barbarians' was attributed to divine assistance in fulfilment of a covenant or vow, which each group made before the decisive battle. After the event, the conditions and circumstances of the alleged vows were either created or adapted and manipulated as a means of justifying or sanctioning political policies and ideologies. Since the historical situations of the Greeks in 479 and of the Voortrekkers in 1838 are similar in this one respect and since, in the latter instance, we have primary sources in which we can observe the evolution of the political myth from events or facts documented in primary sources, we may, by analogy, postulate and reconstruct a parallel process for the Covenant of Plataea.

In his analysis of the South African covenant, Thompson observes that the classic political myth has three hallmarks: these are (a) partial concordance with historical reality, (b) delayed codification, followed by (c) rapid development for political purposes and adaptation to changing circumstances.[40] He then shows that the account of the battle of Blood River and the Covenant associated with it fulfils these conditions and thus qualifies as a political myth. Our extant testimony for the Covenant of Plataea indicates that it, too, may exhibit these three characteristics. Thompson shows that the myth of the Covenant of Blood River was actu-

ally created by the political and historical circumstances which prevailed in South Africa at least forty years after the event and that over the past century it has still undergone (and continues to undergo) striking transformations in accordance with the ideological and propagandistic requirements of the government in power. The myth of the Covenant of Plataea, as our evidence leads us to believe, was generated by the political circumstances of the fourth, rather than the fifth century[41] — circumstances that prevailed over a hundred years after the actual battle of Plataea — and it too underwent codification (that is, the epigraphic version of the Oath) as well as numerous transformations during that century and into Hellenistic and Roman times.

Let us examine first the details of the South Africal model. In South Africa December 16, the anniversary of the Battle of Blood River, is still (to the best of my knowledge, at the time of writing) a 'religious' holiday. This holiday is called the Day of the Vow[42] because of the pledge allegedly made by the defenders before the battle, to the effect that if God granted them victory they and their descendants would celebrate the anniversary for all time to come. This is the fully fledged political myth — it is the version of the oath which appears in the vulgate tradition of South African history, which is taught in schools and told to tourists and to the world at large.[43] For the modern English-speaking world it has been canonized by the novelist James Michener:[44]

> When all the details were perfected, the time was ripe for the crucial moment in Boer history ... The Voortrekkers ... had numerous men who knew the Old Testament almost by heart, and *one of these was Sarel Cilliers*, an educated farmer of deep religious conviction, and *upon him fell the responsibility* of reminding his fellow Voortrekkers of the sacred mission upon which they were engaged, and he *recited those passages from the thundering Book of Joshua* which presaged the forthcoming battle .... Then Cilliers climbed upon the carriage on which a beloved cannon named Ou Grietjie (old Gertie) rested, and repeated for the last time the Covenant upon which the Voortrekkers had agreed: 'Almighty God, at this dark moment we stand before you, promising that if You will protect us and deliver the enemy into our hands, we shall forever live in obedience to Your divine law. *If You enable us to triumph, we shall observe this day as an anniversary in each year, a day of thanksgiving and remembrance, even for all our posterity.* And if anyone sees difficulty in this, let him retire from the battlefield.'

The canonic 'epigraphic' form of the oath, as it appears in the Voortrekker Memorial Church in Pietermaritzburg, reads as follows (in the official English translation): 'Here we stand before the holy God of Heaven and Earth

to make Him a vow that if He will protect us and deliver our enemies into our hands, we will observe the day and date each year as a day of thanks, like a Sabbath, and that we will erect a church in His honour wherever He may choose and that we will also tell our children to join with us in commemorating this day, also for coming generations. For His name will be glorified by giving him all the honour and glory of victory'.[45]

From 1952 December 16 was known as the Day of the Covenant — when the holiday was accorded full 'religious' status along with Christmas, Easter and Ascension Day. Before then it was called Dingaan's Day and it had no ideological or political significance outside the Afrikaner nationalist movement.[46] Since the 1920s however it had been customary among the Afrikaners to celebrate it with local festivals,[47] which included 'boeresport' and 'volkspele' as well as political and sentimental speeches by religious leaders, academics and cabinet ministers, which related the events of 1838 to current political ideology and aspirations.[48] Such rhetoric continues to the present day. On 16 December, 1983, for example, the leader of the conservative opposition party, Dr. A.P. Treurnicht, reacting against the liberal tendencies of the then Prime Minister, Mr. P.W. Botha, referred to the white Afrikaner nation as 'a surrounded and threatened people' and referred specifically to the Voortrekkers at Blood River, '... in its hour of utmost need, in a struggle for life and death, a surrounded and threatened people placed its dependence in God ... Today again our people are a surrounded people'.[49] More recently, in 1988, on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the Great Trek and the Battle of Blood River, the Prime Minister specifically referred to the (hitherto ignored) 200 black and coloured servants of the beleaguered trekkers: 'On 16 December 1838 (he said) white, brown and black stood together in the laager at Blood River; it was not only a trek for Afrikaners'.[50] Here then is a striking example of a myth being adapted to suit the official policies of a specific period.[51]

Now the vow itself — and we have excellent primary evidence in support of its authenticity — was only publicly or generally observed a generation after the event, in the late 1870s, when it obtained the status of a political myth in the Transvaal Republic under the presidency of Paul Kruger and under the ever-encroaching shadow of British Imperialism.[52]

Let us examine the earliest primary source which mentioned the vow — an entry, dated 23 December, 1838, from the journal of Andries Pretorius, commandant of the 'Wenkommando'. It was written, in retrospect, a week after the battle and published in the anti-British Cape Town journal *Zuid Afrikaan*, in February 1839.[53]

> I also wish to inform you that we have decided among ourselves to make known the day of our victory, being Sunday, the 16 of this month of December, among our entire community and that *we shall*

> *consecrate it to the Lord, and celebrate it with thanksgivings*, since, *before we fought against the enemy we promised in public prayer that should we manage to win the victory, we should build a house to the Lord in memory of his name, wherever He shall indicate it. Which vow we now hope to honour*, with the help of the Lord now that he has blessed us and heard our prayers.

The text clearly states that there were two separate vows; *before* the battle, it was vowed to build a church and it was only *after* the victory that it was decided to 'make known and *consecrate the day of victory*'. There is no mention of any decision to regard its annual celebration 'as a Sabbath' as the developed myth has it.[54]

Now compare this passage with the official version written some months later by Jan Bantjes (Pretorius' secretary and amanuensis), who claimed to have joined the latter's commando for the express purpose of recording its proceedings. This claim implies that Bantjes had conscious historiographical pretensions, that is, he purports to recount events that are linked in a coherent and chronologically ordered narrative. This implies a degree of abstraction from — and thus distortion of — reality. Bantjes' report was published in the Minutes of the Volksraad of the Natal Republic, eighteen months after the event.[55]

> That Sunday morning, before service began the chief commandant called together the men who would conduct the service and told them to suggest to the congregation that they should all pray to God ... for his help in the struggle. ... *He wanted to make a vow to the almighty (if they were all willing) that 'should the Lord give us the victory, we would raise a House to the memory of His Great Name wherever it shall please Him. And that they should also invoke the aid ... of God to enable them to make it* (sc. the victory) *known even to our latest posterity, so that it might be celebrated to the honour of God*' ... Messrs. Cilliers, Landman and Joubert were glad to hear it. They consulted their congregations about it and obtained their general consent. After that, when divine worship began *separately, Mr Cilliers conducted the one that took place in the tent of the chief commandant*, where he started with the singing of Psalm 38.12–16, then delivered a prayer, and *preached about the first 24 verses of the Book of Judges; and then followed the prayer in which the aforementioned vow was made to God*, with fervent supplication for God's help and assistance in its fulfilment. The 12th and 21st verses of the said 38th Psalm were sung again and he ended the service with the singing of Psalm 134 (emphasis added).

First, the two separate parts of the covenant, as reported by Pretorius, which were made before and after the battle respectively — the building of

the church and the undertaking to celebrate the anniversary of the victory — are combined into one episode and set on the Sunday before the battle, the 9th December. Again, there is no mention of observing the anniversary of the battle as a Sabbath in the future. Second, the initiative for, and wording of, the vow are ascribed specifically to Pretorius. Thirdly, Sarel Cilliers is only one of three ministers who administer the vow *separately* to their own congregations. Cilliers leads the service in the commandant's tent, which could have held little more than a dozen men. There is no mass rally, address from a gun carriage, or thundering verses from the Book of Joshua, as one version of the myth has it.

Three years after the battle, the church was in fact built in Pietermaritzburg, but after only 5 years it fell into disuse and was sold. It was then used for a number of secular purposes until 1908, when it became the Voortrekker Museum, which it remains to this day. A second 'Church of the Vow' was built on another site in 1861. It was demolished in 1955 and the present Church of the Vow, next door to the original church was built in 1961.[56] The promised solemn and communal commemoration of the anniversary however never publicly took place. A few individuals, including Sarel Cilliers, are nevertheless alleged to have piously observed it in private.[57] No one else took any notice of the vow until 1877, when H.J. Hofstede, in the first historiographical work to be written in South Africa, from an Afrikaner, i.e. nationalistic, point of view, *A History of the Orange Free State*, written in Dutch, included an extract from a journal allegedly written by Sarel Cilliers on his deathbed[58] — and on that account surely true![59]

> It was on the 7 December. I complied to the best of my weak capacity with the wish of all the officers, and I knew that the majority of the burghers concurred in the wish. *I took my place on the gun-carriage. The 407 men of the force were assembled around me.* I made the promise in a simple manner, as solemnly as the Lord enabled me to do. As nearly as I can remember my words were these: 'My bretheren and fellow countrymen, at this moment we stand before the holy God of heaven and earth, to make a promise, *if He will be with us and protect us, and deliver the enemy into our hands so that we may triumph over him, that we shall observe the day and the date as an anniversary in each year, and a day of thanksgiving like the Sabbath, in His honour*; and that we shall enjoin our children that they may take part with us in this, for a remembrance *even for our posterity*; and if anyone sees a difficulty in this, let him retire from the place
> ....

According to Cilliers, the vow was confirmed each evening and on the following Sabbath.[60]

This autobiographical document is nevertheless the earliest written manifestation, or formulation, of the canonic vow and the myth in the history of South Africa. The actual document which Hofstede quoted in his work is no longer extant, and as far as I know, no-one else saw it. The witnesses whom Hofstede cited were all dead at the time he wrote his history.[61] The story is therefore unverifiable. It is quite obvious however how utterly this historiographical account differs in tone and content from the contemporary versions — not only is it more political in intent, but it is also, in short, pure fiction, even though it is based on individual facts that may well in themselves be true. Its overall conception and publication in the context of Hofstede's patriotic history, moreover, is closely linked with contemporary circumstances. The British annexed the Transvaal Republic in the same year, and it was in the Transvaal that the myth was first put to political use.

In 1880, President Paul Kruger announced that Britain's annexation of the Republic was God's punishment for the Afrikaners' failure to honour the vow made 40 years before and in the same year the vow was formally renewed in a ceremony at Paardekraal.[62]. This was also the year in which the First War of Independence began (1880–81) — an astoundingly successful guerilla conflict which resulted in Britain's granting autonomy to the Republic. The victory was linked with the vow, and Kruger instituted an elaborate festival of Thanksgiving — an 'Eleutheria', one might say — which was to be held every five years, on the four days leading up to 16 December. An eyewitness account informs us that on each day specific activities were arranged, culminating in a solemn address by a minister, which explained the significance of the celebration.[63] The mood and procedure, if not the details, are strikingly similar to the programme of the Plataean *Eleutheria* as held in Plutarch's day.[64] In the 1890s, after the discovery of gold, and with the inevitable prospect of British intervention and re-annexation, the quinquennial festivities were discontinued and an annual religious holiday was instituted. In 1891, for the first time, Cilliers' 'death-bed' version of the myth was actually circulated at the unveiling of a monument commemorating the victories of 1838 and (more particularly) 1881.[65] After the Second War of Independence (the 'South African War') and under the Union Government, 'Dingaan's Day' as it was called, continued to be observed, but as a secular public holiday, except by the more ardent Afrikaner nationalists, who used it for an occasion on which to promote the myth of the Covenant and the destiny of the Afrikaner nation.[66] And in 1952, four years after the Nationalist party came to power and four months before the first General Election under the new government, the anniversary of the victory at Blood River was once again instituted as a religious holiday to be observed by all ethnic and cultural groups in the country.[67]

Can the myth of the Covenant of Blood River tell us anything about the evolution of the myth of the Covenant of Plataea? I believe it can in the following respects. First, like the modern example, the ancient covenant may have originated in circumstances quite different from those conveyed in the formulated myth. We have seen how Bantjes, in his historiographic account combined two separate vows of Andries Pretorius into a single vow just before the battle; we also see how many years later one author (Hofstede), in a quite different historical context, elevated and dramatized the concept of the vow, citing a venerable eye-witness as a documentary source, and gave it a more universal and ideological application.[68] The aspect which was emphasized in the primary sources — the building of the church — is completely ignored in the myth, while the dominant role of Sarel Cilliers and the institution of a 'sabbath' — absent from the primary account — is emphasized with the citation of 'documentary' evidence[69] (cf. the tithing-clause in the Ephebes' oath). The myth of the Covenant of Plataea, I suspect, may have had its origin, first, in the two comparatively minor statements which Herodotus attributes to the Spartan general Pausanias just before the battle of Plataea, when he appealed to the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians for solidarity in the struggle against the barbarians (emphasis added):[70]

> Meanwhile Pausanias sent a horseman to the Athenians at the time when the cavalry fell upon him, with this message: '*Men of Athens, now that the great struggle has come which is to decide the freedom or slavery of Hellas, we two, Lacedaemonians and Athenians*, are deserted by all the allies ... must endeavour to defend ourselves and to aid each other' ... (61) (After a series of unpropitious sacrifices) *Pausanias* raised his eyes to the Heraion of the Plataeans and *calling the goddess to his aid, he besought her not to disappoint the hopes of the Hellenes*;

and, second, in the tithing oath (quoted above). This vow, although Herodotus emphasizes it and gives it a dramatically prominent position in the narrative, provides no precise chronological point of reference. Possibly the vow was formulated after the victory to justify Spartan and Athenian reprisals against Thebes, Thessaly and the Ionian states which had medized but this cannot be verified. The concept of a tithing oath in 480/79 was certainly used as a means for justifying reprisals against Thebes in the late 370s and possibly it was remodelled by Alexander the Great after its destruction, when Medism was a serious problem.[71] We do not know precisely when the Plataean *Eleutheria* were instituted; Thucydides knew nothing about them, neither did Isocrates in the late 370s, but we have epigraphic evidence that the *Eleutheria* were being celebrated around the middle of the third century.[72] Possibly the festival was connected with

Alexander's rebuilding of the walls of Plataea, as Plutarch says.[73] The version of the myth found in Plutarch *Arist.* 21 (cited above) may have been intended either to promote Athenian *prostasia* over the *Eleutheria* at some stage — since he attributes the covenant and the founding of the festival to Aristides the Athenian —, or to emphasize the glory of the Greek past during the Roman imperial age.

To conclude. The surviving evidence for the festival of the *Eleutheria* and the Covenant, especially if one takes into account the evolution of its modern parallel, suggests that there was probably no single covenant or Oath of Plataea made on one specific occasion and under a single specific set of circumstances. The epigraphic text, by which Siewert sets so much store, as well as the literary versions of the oath, are as much a fiction as Sarel Cilliers' alleged death-bed testimony of the Covenant of Blood River, or the more recent myths that descended from it.

NOTES

1. Thus N.G.L. Hammond, *History of Greece*, 3rd ed., 1986, 250 (emphasis added).
2. The second section is derived from Plutarch, *Aristides*, 21 (quoted below).
3. Cf. E. Tigerstedt, *The Legend of Sparta*, Lund, 1965, vol.1, 208.
4. On the fictitious nature of this 'league' and its council, cf. A. Tronson, 'The Hellenic League of 480 — Fact or Ideological Fiction?', *AC* 34 (1991) 93–110.
5. Thus Diodorus 11.29: ἔδοξε τοῖς συνέδροις τῶν Ἑλλήνων παραλαβεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ πανδημεὶ προσελθόντας εἰς τὰς Πλαταιὰς διαγωνίσασθαι περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας, εὔξασθαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, ἐὰν νικήσωσιν, ἄγειν κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐλευθέρια κοινῇ, καὶ τὸν ἐλευθέριον ἀγῶνα συντελεῖν ἐν ταῖς Πλαταιαῖς. συναχθέντων δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς τὸν Ἰσθμόν, ἐδόκει τοῖς πᾶσιν ὅρκον ὀμόσαι περὶ τοῦ πολέμου, τὸν στέξοντα μὲν τὴν ὁμόνοιαν αὐτῶν, ἀναγκάσοντα δὲ γενναίως τοὺς κινδύνους ὑπομένειν. ὁ δὲ ὅρκος ἦν τοιοῦτος· οὐ ποιήσομαι περὶ πλείονος τὸ ζῆν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, οὐδὲ καταλείψω τοὺς ἡγεμόνας οὔτε ζῶντας οὔτε ἀποθανόντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τελευτήσαντας τῶν συμμάχων πάντας θάψω, καὶ κρατήσας τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν βαρβάρων οὐδεμίαν τῶν ἀγωνισαμένων πόλεων ἀνάστατον ποιήσω, καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν ἐμπρησθέντων καὶ καταβληθέντων οὐδὲν ἀνοικοδομήσω, ἀλλ' ὑπόμνημα τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις ἐάσω καὶ καταλείψω τῆς τῶν βαρβάρων ἀσεβείας (Translated by C.H. Oldfather, *Diodorus Siculus*, vol. 4, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge Mass./ London, 1946). Except where otherwise indicated, translations of all authors quoted are those of the Loeb Classical Library.
6. E.g. 11.29; Lycurgus, *In Leocr.* 81; Tod *GHI* 2, 224 (the 'Acharnai inscription') and the so-called 'Glaukon inscription' of the Chremonidean war (See R. Etienne and M. Piérat, *BCH* 99 [1975] 51). The other *testimonia* are cited by P. Siewert, *Der Eid von Plataiai*, Münchenn, 1972, 12ff.
7. Plut. *Aristides* 21.1 (translated by B. Perrin): ἐκ τούτου γενομένης ἐκκλησίας κοινῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἔγραψεν Ἀριστείδης ψήφισμα συνιέναι μὲν εἰς Πλαταιὰς καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος προβούλους καὶ θεωρούς, ἄγεσθαι δὲ πενταετηρικὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Ἐλευθερίων, εἶναι δὲ σύνταξιν Ἑλληνικὴν μυρίας ... ἐπὶ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους πόλεμον, Πλαταιεῖς δ' ἀσύλους καὶ ἱεροὺς ἀφίεσθαι τῷ θεῷ θύοντας ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος. See also Paus. 9.2.5–6; Strabo 9.2.31.

8. *FGrH* 115 F 153: ὁ Ἑλληνικὸς ὅρκος καταψεύδεται, ὃν Ἀθηναῖοί φασιν ὀμόσαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρὸ τῆς μάχης τῆς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς πρὸς βαρβάρους ... 'The Hellenic oath is a fabrication, which the Athenians say the Hellenes swore before the battle of Plataea against the barbarians' (tr. C. A. Fornara, *Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 1983, p.56).
9. Among its defenders, e.g. J.A.O. Larsen, 'The Constitution and Original Purpose of the Delian League', *HSPh* 51 (1940) 175–212; H.W. Parke, 'Consecration to Apollo', *Hermathena* 72 (1948) 82–114; 106f; G. Daux, 'Serments amphictioniques et serment de Platées', *Studies Presented to D.M. Robinson 2*, St. Louis, 1953, 775–782; A. Raubitschek, 'The Covenant of Plataea', *TAPA* 91 (1960) 178–183; P. Siewert (1972) and M. Ostwald, *Autonomia*, Athens, Ga., 1981, 177. Among its detractors are Ch. Habicht, 'Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der Persenkriege', *Hermes* 89 (1961) 1ff; N. Robertson, 'False Documents at Athens', *Historical Reflexions* 3 (1976) 5ff and K. Raaflaub, *Die Entdeckung der Freiheit*, München, 1985, 127. Detailed references for the above may be found in N. Robertson and K. Raaflaub, locc. citt.
10. E.g. A.R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks*, 2nd ed., 1984, 544; R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*, 506f, and Raaflaub, 127.
11. Robertson (1976), for instance, argues that the document originated between 378 and 368.
12. In particular, F.A. van Jaarsveld, *The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism*, 1868–1881, New York, 1961; *Id. The Afrikaner's Interpretation of South African History*, Cape Town, 1964; *Id.* 'A Historical Mirror of Blood River', in A. König and H. Keane (edd.), *The Meaning of History*, Pretoria, 1980, 11 ff; B.J. Liebenberg, *Andries Pretorius in Natal*, Pretoria, 1977 and A. du Toit, 'No Chosen People: the Myth of the Calvinist Origins of Afrikaner Nationalism and Racial Ideology', *AHR* 88 (Oct., 1983) 920–952.
13. L. Thompson, *The Political Mythology of Apartheid*, New Haven, 1985, Chapter 5.
14. See note 8.
15. These texts are quoted and discussed in detail below.
16. As in the case of Herodotus (see text below). In the case of Diodorus, only the first objective is implied. Plutarch puts the covenant after the battle.
17. For the meaning of δεκατεύειν, see Parke (1948).
18. Hdt. 7.132: ἐπὶ τούτοισι οἱ Ἕλληνες ἔταμον ὅρκιον οἱ τῷ βαρβάρῳ πόλεμον ἀειράμενοι· τὸ δὲ ὅρκιον ὧδε εἶχε, ὅσοι τῷ Ἱερσῃ ἔδοσαν σφέας αὐτοὺς Ἕλληνες ἐόντες μὴ ἀναγκασθέντες, καταστάντων σφι εὖ τῶν πρηγμάτων, τούτους δεκατεῦσαι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖσι θεῷ. τὸ μὲν δὴ ὅρκιον ὧδε εἶχε τοῖσι Ἕλλησι.
19. See note 16.
20. As in the case of Hammond, cited above.
21. Cf. for instance, F. Jacoby, *FGrH* 70 II C, 22f. Moreover, Diodorus, who lived during the last years of the Roman republic, would also have developed and elaborated the tradition in his own way; cf. K. Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century*, Princeton, 1990, 5f; cf. 29f.
22. Tod *GHI* 2, 204, lines 21–35. Translation by Fornara (1983), p. 57: Ὅρκος ὃν ὤμοσαν Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτε ἤμελλον| μάχεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους·υυυυυυ| Μαχοῦμαι ἕως ἂν ζῶ, καὶ οὐ περὶ πλέονος | ποήσομαι τὸ ζῆν ἢ τὸ ἐλεύθερος εἶναι, κ||αὶ οὐκ ἀπολείψω τὸν ταξίλοχον οὐδε τὸ|ν ἐνωμοτάρχην οὔτε ζῶντα οὔτε ἀποθαν|όντα, καὶ οὔκ ἄπειμι ἐὰμ μὴ οἱ ἡγεμόνες | ἀφηγῶνται, καὶ ποήσω ὅ, τι ἂν οἱ στρατηγ|οὶ παραγγείλωσιν, καὶ τοὺς ἀποθανόντ||ας τῶν συμμαχεσαμένων θάψω ἐν τῶι αὐτ|ῶι καὶ ἄθαπτον οὐδένα καταλείψω· καὶ ν ικ[ή]σας μαχόμενος τοὺς βαρβάρους δεκ ατεύσω