

# Crime and crime prevention on public transport

**Oliver Page**

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Prudence Moeketsi  
Willem Schurink  
Leseli Molefe  
David Bruce



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## **Crime and crime prevention on public transport**



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CENTRE FOR THE  
STUDY OF VIOLENCE  
AND RECONCILIATION



## **FOREWORD**

This study on Crime and Crime Prevention on Public Transport is dedicated to all public transport users and providers and law enforcement agencies, who share with us as researchers the vision of developing a crime free and safe public transport and modal interchange systems for all.

Ucwaningo Ngobugebengu kanye Nokuvikelwa Kobugebengu Kwizithuthi zabantu lwethulwa kubo bonke abagibeli, abanikazi kanye nabathintene nazo nabagcinimthetho. Umbono walolucwaningo (wethimba labacwaningi) ukuthuthukisa lezizindawo zingabi nobugebengu futhi kuphephe ukuhamba ngezithuthi naseziteshini zazo.

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- 11 South African Rail Commuters Corporation
- 12 Golden Arrow Bus Company
- 13 South Coast Bus Services

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From left to right:

Prudence Moeketsi (Team member), Mzwandile Sokupa (Steering Committee), Carmen Domingo- Swart (Team member), Leseli Molefe (Team member), Elrena van der Spuy (Steering Committee), Dr. Willem Schurink (Team member), Amanda Meyer (Team member), Prof Bernardus Smit (Steering Committee), Pat van der Reis (Steering Committee), William Dichaba (Team member), Adnaan Abrahams (Steering Committee) and Oliver Page (Project Manager/Team leader).

The Authors

PRETORIA

November 2000



## DISCLAIMER

The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors entirely.

In the presentation of this overview of crime on public transport (focusing on the modal interchanges in Wynberg (Cape Town), Berea Road (Durban) and Belle Ombre (Pretoria)) and the subsequent discussions it should be noted that:

- The authors are not presenting a national picture of crime on public transport nor a description of a situation that is statistically correct. The methodology used by the Focus Group to obtain the information as presented in this report does not permit this. The reader should not accept what is presented in this report as being typical of what happens on all modes, at all times to all commuters.
- The statistics to substantiate the Focus Group participants' experiences in respect of actual incidents were, in most cases, very sketchy or difficult to obtain. In some cases the transport provider was reluctant to provide such statistics postulating that such information could be used inappropriately by third parties to the detriment of the transport provider. *It is stressed that the lack of statistical evidence should not be taken as implying that the criminal acts and crime prevention actions as presented in this report are not experienced by public transport users.*

# PREFACE


The high crime rate in South Africa has had a negative impact not only on national economic growth, investor confidence and tourism, but also on the safety and security of its citizens and residents. For many thousands of people in South Africa public transport has become the primary (and in cases the only viable) mode of transport when moving to/from A to B.

The White Paper on National Transport Policy<sup>1</sup> envisions a total transport system (which includes public transport) as being one which should:

‘Provide safe, reliable, effective, efficient, and fully integrated transport operations and infrastructure which will best meet the needs of freight and passenger customers at improving levels of service and cost, in a fashion which supports government strategies for economic and social development whilst being environmentally and economically sustainable.’

Clearly, the above is an ongoing process for public transport operations/infrastructure in South Africa. It is therefore imperative that, if the service is to be provided to customers (public transport passengers), the factors that act against this should be identified and resolved. Crime on-board public transport (and the community’s response to this) is one such factor, and is the basis of this report.

Whilst travelling from A to B, the public transport commuter may be exposed to the potential of becoming a victim of crime. This is based on the fact that, within communities, community crime prevention forums may be operational and, in the central business districts, forums such as Business Against Crime may operate. Who or which organisation protects commuters whilst travelling between A and B?



A limited amount of research has been conducted in the area of crime on-board public transport in the South African context. Such studies as have been done (which will be acknowledged throughout this report) have noted that formal crime prevention strategies could help to reduce crime on-board public transport. Despite some of these strategies having been implemented over the years, on-board crime continues to affect public transport commuters.

In a previous transport research project (focussing on crime at Modal Interchanges) by Amanda Meyer<sup>2</sup> of the CSIR it was stated that the solution to safer public transport lay in the hands of the communities served and in a close relationship between communities and their law enforcement agencies. This will be the focus of this ground-breaking project funded by the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology through its Innovation Fund.

A consortium of research organisations led by the CSIR was responsible for undertaking the research. The other members of the consortium, were the Human Sciences Research Council and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

In 1997/98 the CSIR, through its strategic focus on crime prevention, initiated and funded a pilot project to investigate crime at public transport Modal Interchanges. The research, based on community inputs, combined with research on the psychology of crime, highlighted crucial aspects about crime patterns and the fear of crime at these Modal Interchanges. Although the initial research could not sufficiently address crime on-board public transport vehicles *per se*, certain perceptions were identified, e.g. crime on-board trains was still considered to be very high and no community policing was perceived as taking place on trains. Thus, the investigation of crime on-board transport vehicles, forms the platform of this report.

The research undertaken by the consortium was divided into four phases, spread over a period of 24 months. These phases and their respective objectives are as follows:

- |         |  |
|---------|--|
| Phase 1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Investigation into on-board crime (commuter bus, commuter rail and minibus taxi) and determination of how this crime is perceived by public transport users.</li><li>• A cursory investigation into taxi drive-by shootings.</li><li>• Investigation of informal policing and 'spontaneously formed' crime prevention groups at Modal Interchanges.</li><li>• Investigation into the reasons for the distrust between the formal policing agents and the communities that they serve. This included an analysis of police attitudes towards informal policing groups within these communities.</li></ul> |
| Phase 2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Provision of a sound theoretical framework to be used as an appropriate study methodological strategy, as well as of appropriate data collection methods to guide the execution of the research.</li><li>• Outlining the evaluation framework used in the development of the partnership that was established between the official law enforcement agencies, the informal crime prevention groups and the public transport stakeholders to combat and prevent crime in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal</li><li>• Describing the Hamba Uphephile Partnership, a coordinated crime</li></ul>                         |

prevention initiative between law enforcement agencies, public transport providers and informal crime prevention groups in Durban.

- Describing the key activities undertaken by the Consortium in the development of the Hamba Uphephile Partnership.

Phase 3

- Outlining the particular design utilised in the evaluation.
- Qualitative evaluation of stakeholders' and researchers' perceptions and experiences of the Hamba Uphephile Partnership.
- Surveying commuters' perceptions of crime on-board public transport.

Phase 4

- Presentation of an overview of the networking international tours undertaken.
- Presentation and discussion the lessons learnt from international networking tours.

Phase 5

- Conclusions
- Recommendations

It is the intention of the research presented in this report to give the reader further insight into crime and crime prevention on-board public transport, how commuters deal with it and how, through the development of the Hamba Uphephile Initiative, a positive impact can be made on the reduction of crime on-board public transport.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACRONYM	DETAIL
BOUTEK	Division of Building Technology CSIR
BTP	British Transport Police
CBD	Central Business District
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIU	Criminal Investigation Unit
CJS	Criminal Justice System
CKS	Chapman, Koloti and Sebola Consulting
CP	Canadian Pacific
CPF	Crime Prevention Forum
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CPTP	Canadian Pacific Transit Police
CPU	Crime Prevention Unit
CSVR	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
DACST	Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology
DCC	Durban City Council
DCP	Durban City Police
DCRA	Durban Central Residents' Association
DMC	Durban Metro Council
DMP	Durban Metropolitan Police
DOCD	Department of Community Development
DTMB	Durban Transport Metro Buses
FELDDTA	Federated Local and Long Distance Taxi Association
FG	Focus Group
FGs	Focus Groups
GABS	Golden Arrow Bus Services
GBH	Grievous Bodily Harm
GIS	Geographical Information Systems
GO Transit	Greater Ontario Transit Authority
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council

<b>ACRONYM</b>	<b>DETAIL</b>
HUP	Hamba Uphephile Partnership
ICA	International Crime Prevention through Environmental Design Association
ICD	Independent Complaints Directorate
IDP	Integrated Development Programme
ISS	Institute of Security Studies
MCPA	Mississauga Crime Prevention Association
METRAC	Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children
MI	Modal Interchange
Mis	Modal Interchanges
MP	Member of Parliament
MSDF	Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework
MTA	Metropolitan Transit Authority
NCPS	National Crime Prevention Strategy
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NTTT	National Taxi Task Team
NYCPD	New York City Police Department
NYCT	New York City Transit
NYSPPD	New York State Police Department
PAGAD	People Against Gangsterism and Drugs
PAR	Participatory Action Research
PUTCO	Public Utility Transport Corporation
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RT	Research Team
SABTA	Southern Africa Black Taxi Association
SACO	South African Commuters' Organisation
SALDTA	South African Long Distance Taxi Association
SAPS	South African Police Service
SARCC	South African Rail Commuter Corporation
SCBS	South Coast Bus Services Pty Ltd
SDU	Self Defence Unit
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TAC	Traders Against Crime
TTC	Toronto Transit Corporation

ACRONYM	DETAIL
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
WAT	Warwick Avenue Triangle
WG	Working Group

## **A. INTRODUCTION**

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This Annexure explains in further detail the methodology that was employed in the execution of the research, namely the qualitative paradigm. This Annexure also describes the core features of symbolic interactionism, which was the approach all three the consortium partners, explicitly or implicitly used as a framework for the aspects of the research they were responsible for.

In the ensuing discussion an exposition will be given of:

- what the term 'qualitative research' implies and
- the theoretical framework that was utilised

Since no research enterprise can be detached from the scientific belief of the researcher(s), attention will also be given to these.

### **A.1. Explaining qualitative research**

Although sharing an anti-positivistic set of basic beliefs or paradigm qualitative researchers have different perspectives, based on their world-view of what scientific truth entails. The term 'qualitative research' can thus mean different things to different people (see Strauss & Corbin<sup>1</sup> (p17)). It is therefore difficult to describe qualitative research in a way that will satisfy everybody. For our purposes, qualitative research is defined as a multi-perspective approach (utilising different qualitative techniques and data collection methods) to social interaction, aimed at describing, making sense of, interpreting or reconstructing this interaction in terms of the meanings that the subjects attach to it (Denzin & Lincoln<sup>2</sup> (p2)).

### **A.2. Theoretical framework employed in the research**

In order to meet the principal research objective, that is, to describe and understand the social construction of informal crime prevention activities and/or structures at modal interchanges, a qualitative methodology was opted for because it best elucidates what people experience, how they interpret their experiences, and how they structure the world in which they live. The qualitative approach is rooted in a number of theoretical perspectives, among which symbolic interactionism is highly influential.

Stemming from the works of Cooley, Dewey, Mead, Park, Thomas, Becker, Blumer and others (Taylor & Bogdan<sup>3</sup> (p9)), symbolic interactionism has been widely influential in especially the study of small-scale interaction, personality development and deviance (Bilton et al<sup>4</sup>). While there is no agreement among social scientists about the use of symbolic interactionism or the importance of some of its concepts, most scholars use it synonymously with qualitative research (Bogdan & Biklen<sup>5</sup> (p35)). Small wonder then that symbolic interactionists have set important guidelines for the execution of qualitative research. It is for this reason that it was decided to use symbolic interactionism as the general theoretical framework for the present study.

Symbolic interactionism emphasises the diversity of social roles and subcultures as well as the manner in which actors construct roles and identities through interacting with others. Interpretation, according to symbolic interactionists, is neither an autonomous act nor is it determined by any specific force. People can only come to know themselves or their own social identities through the responses of others. They typically develop 'shared perspectives' or common definitions in a given situation because they interact and share experiences, problems and backgrounds. 'Shared definitions' are sometimes accepted as the 'truth', but the meaning is always subject to negotiation (Bogdan & Biklen<sup>5</sup> (p36)). Often individuals create new definitions



because the original ones that served as a basis for their behaviour have had negative repercussions for them. It is this development of definitions that constitutes the most basic area of research for the symbolic interactionist. While personality traits, socio-economic status, physical environment, cultural prescriptions and other factors are regarded as useful in attempts to understand human behaviour, these and other abstract theoretical constructs are relevant only in so far as they enter into and affect the defining process. Further it is suggested that it is not the rules, regulations, norms, or whatever that are crucial in understanding behaviour, but how these are defined and used in specific situations' (Bogdan & Biklen<sup>5</sup> (p34)).

'Self', is another important aspect of the symbolic interaction approach. Bogdan and Biklen<sup>5</sup> (p:37) writes: 'The self is not seen lying inside the individual like the ego or an organised body of needs, motives, and internalised norms or values. The self is the definition people create (through interacting with others) of who they are. In constructing or defining self, people attempt to see themselves as others see them by interpreting gestures and actions directed toward them and by placing themselves in the role of the other person. In short, people come to see themselves in part as others see them. The self is thus a social construction, the results of persons perceiving themselves and then developing a definition through the process of interaction. This loop enables people to change and grow as they learn more about themselves through this interactive process.'

According to Bilton et al<sup>4</sup>, symbolic interactionism's principal ontological claim is that reality is not fixed but is constantly being recreated through the meaningful interactions of individuals. Symbolic interactionists reject the positivists' development of hypotheses prior to investigation as well as their predefined observer categories. Exponents of symbolic interactionism hold that discovery in social science can only be gained by 'look(ing) at the world through the actors' eyes and mak(ing) sense of it through the means they employ, since there is no more to the social world than this' (Bilton et al<sup>4</sup> (p639)).

In order to make a discovery as described above, a research design has been developed to facilitate an unstructured approach. From a symbolic interactionist point of view, validity generally does not involve 'the measurement of alleged causal relationships between variables but the apprehension of the way individuals create reality in interaction with others' (Bilton et al<sup>4</sup> (p639)).

Symbolic interactionists therefore typically collect qualitative or 'soft' data (that is, they concentrate on qualities of human behaviour) to reconstruct people's social reality. However, as Bilton et al<sup>4</sup> (p650)) state, once exploratory research has been accomplished, symbolic interactionists often develop tentative hypotheses and assess them (cf. analytic induction). These steps as well as the symbolic interactionists' search for proof of their theories indicate that they are not 'completely free from positivistic influence' (Bilton et al<sup>4</sup> (p651)). Symbolic interactionism's explanatory logic means that the researcher must endeavour to provide meaningful, intelligible descriptions of how subjects or participants as meaning-attributing individuals manage their social lives. However, symbolic interactionists may follow a positivistic logic to explain social reality (phenomena) when they implicitly or explicitly count and measure their data. This provides another indication that 'symbolic interactionism goes some way down the anti-positivistic road but stops short of its end' (Bilton et al<sup>4</sup> (p651)). Therefore, while symbolic interactionists are critical of applying positivistic principles and quantitative methods, their empirical work sometimes reflects methodological features of the quantitative/positivistic approach.

### **A.3. Methodological account of the execution of the research**

Although qualitative researchers argue that their research is as scientific as that of their quantitative colleagues, most would probably agree that qualitative methods still need to be refined (that is, the logical procedures and operating principles involved in implementing unstructured methods should be worked out in more detail), and that the criteria for judging qualitative studies need to be made more explicit.

According to recent trends in the field of qualitative research abroad, it appears that more systematic attempts have been made at developing explicitly stated criteria for evaluating qualitative studies. One important criterion, which is generally accepted by modern qualitative researchers, is that of scientific credibility. In this regard Athens<sup>6</sup> (p265)) notes: 'Scientific credibility is not an ascribed quality of a study, but rather an achieved one. Thus, a study is neither intrinsically credible nor incredible; rather, the researcher must make it so. The way in which a researcher makes a study credible is by supplying an adequate account of his or her research along with the description of its results. An account is merely a story told by the researcher about how he or she performed the research in question.' Athens continues: 'The adequacy of a research account is given by the presence or absence of a sufficient description of three significant matters. One is the means by which the researcher initially gained entrée to the persons, groups, or organisations that were studied, and once gained, how this access was maintained or increased over the duration of the study...' Finally he contends: 'The second matter which should be discussed in a research account is the means by which the researcher actually produced the empirical observations or cases examined in the study. A third and related matter which should be discussed in a research account is the means by which the researcher actually analysed his or her empirical observations or cases so as to produce the results reported in the study.'

It is important to note that a research account does not contain a complete exposition of all the many steps and decisions taken during the execution of the actual research. Not only is a complete account of all activities involved in conducting qualitative research impossible, but such an account will only 'bore a reader or bury him in a surfeit of information' (Ackroyd & Hughes<sup>7</sup> (p113)). Modern qualitative researchers generally accept that a study's credibility can be established by providing what Becker<sup>8</sup> (p37) originally called the 'natural history' of a research project. Such a history typically includes information on the three matters mentioned above by Athens<sup>6</sup>, namely: how entry was gained, how data were gathered, and how the gathered information was analyzed.

The intention of this Annexure is to give the reader some idea of general principles followed in the study as well as major issues that the researchers had to contend with and how they dealt with them.

### **A.3.1 Preparation for data collection**

Qualitative fieldwork is not a straight- forward unproblematic procedure whereby the researcher enters the field, collects the data and leaves the field unscathed. In fact qualitative fieldwork should rather be compared to a journey into a minefield riddled with potential moral and ethical pitfalls (see Punch<sup>9</sup>). Fieldwork is as Punch<sup>10</sup> (p85) states: definitely not a soft option, but rather, represents a demanding craft that involves both coping with multiple negotiations and continually dealing with ethical dilemmas. Such pitfalls can as a rule not be identified beforehand but have the potential to totally alter the nature of the research. The qualitative fieldworker is expected to become involved in prolonged immersion in the life of a group, community or organisation in order to discern people's habits and thoughts as well as to decipher the social structure that binds them together (Punch<sup>10</sup> (p84)). The process of gathering data in the field thus requires time, a deep personal involvement and commitment, the ability to withstand tedious situations of prolonged drudgery and discomfort, skills to resolve conflict situations on the spot and courage to face and deal with dangerous situations (see Lee<sup>11</sup>).

Despite the increase in the popularity and sophistication of qualitative research (see Denzin & Lincoln<sup>2</sup>), researchers are at present still grappling with the problem of how such studies should be best conducted. Although methodology text books, monographs and collections dealing with aspects of fieldwork (for example Filstead<sup>12</sup>; Lofland<sup>13</sup>; Schatzman & Strauss<sup>14</sup>; Bogdan & Taylor<sup>15</sup>; Douglas<sup>16</sup>; Shaffir et al<sup>14</sup>; Burgess<sup>17</sup>; Smith & Manning<sup>18</sup>; Taylor & Bogdan<sup>5</sup>; Punch<sup>9</sup>;

Hugo<sup>19</sup>; Shaffir & Stebbins<sup>20</sup>; and Lee<sup>11</sup>) provide important suggestions and guidelines for such research, these guidelines should not be regarded as recipes, since at best their role is to make recommendations regarding the right ingredients to use. Therefore the inability to provide such recipes is not surprising. The social process of field research is highly variable and is subject to continual change owing to the effect the researcher, subjects, research methods used, problems that need to be addressed, and the data that are collected can have on the process. The interactional, situational, and ever changing character of fieldwork roles and relationships militates against the development of exact procedures. Hence the difficulty of delineating the do's and don'ts [sic] and ropes (Haas & Shaffir<sup>21</sup> (p244)).

However it is important to note that the qualitative research process is not a linear process and therefore, although various steps taken during the fieldwork process could be identified it does not mean that one stage will follow the other sequentially. The most important steps and decisions can be described on the basis of the following phases:

### **A.3.2 The Preparation Phase**

Schurink who has been conducting qualitative research in various different settings since the seventies noted that as researchers, when first entering the field, qualitative researchers must be prepared to feel as if they have been dropped off in foreign country, where true interpretation of meaning is hindered by a lack of understanding of the language, customs and value system of the inhabitants. Furthermore, Schurink went on to stress the importance to go into the field well prepared and not to rush in where angels fear to tread (see Coffield & Borril<sup>22</sup>). It goes without saying that the chances of obtaining permission to undertake the research are increased when researchers are able to explain the purpose and methods of the research in such a way that both gatekeepers - people who have the power to grant or withhold access to people or situations for the purposes of research (cf. Becker<sup>23</sup>; Bogdan & Taylor<sup>15</sup>) and subjects can understand its benefits.

Because of the constant interaction with subjects and the danger of contaminating the research thereby making it less valid, it was emphasised that each research team should strive to become invisible and to blend in with the setting.

### **A.3.3 Negotiating access into the setting**

During the early phases of acquaintance the foundations for a contractual relationship or partnership between the researcher and the gatekeepers should be set. Benny and Hughes<sup>24</sup> emphasise the importance of equality and comparability between a researcher and a subject in qualitative research. In order to set the foundations for a contractual relationship between him/herself and the gatekeeper the researcher must create an atmosphere of equality. To close a contract the parties need to go into the research agreement as equals. The phase of establishing a contractual relationship largely concerns agreement on the objectives of the research and the way in which it should be undertaken. As regards the current study to a greater or lesser extent the research team promised that all the information offered by the research participants would be treated confidentially whilst the various subjects agreed to share their perceptions and experiences with the researchers.

### **A.3.4 Establishing and Maintaining Appropriate Researcher Roles**

As is clear from the above paragraphs, a major obstacle in conducting qualitative research is that the researcher is not part of the setting and will therefore, despite attempts to fit in or disguise his/her true identity, especially in the beginning phases of the fieldwork, stick out like a sore thumb. It is a well-known fact that subjects will not act naturally when in the presence of outsiders, especially if they are aware of the fact that they are being studied. The researcher should thus strive to blend in with the setting by structuring his/her role in such a way as to collect the type of

information required, while at the same time restricting disruption of the normal flow of events as far as possible.

The researcher thus has to establish an acceptable role for him/herself in the setting under study. Establishing these roles is by no means easy and involves a number of issues. A fundamental issue facing the researcher even before the research has commenced is the question of whether the research should be conducted openly or covertly. Another problem concerns the researcher's participation in the activities of the group concerned. Various levels of participation can be distinguished between a researcher who does not participate at all in the activities of the group that he/she is studying and one who participates as much as possible in such activities. Gold<sup>25</sup> distinguishes at least four master roles that can be performed by qualitative researchers, namely 'full participant', 'participant-as-observer', 'observer-as-participant' and 'full observer'. Gold's complete observer role describes researchers who are complete outsiders who strive to be objective and to become invisible. The observer-as-participant will, in order to create a friendly atmosphere and to blend in with the setting (while observing), interact casually and non-directively with research participants but will strive not to become part of the setting; the participant-as-observer will interact closely enough with participants to obtain an insider view but will not participate in the activities that will make him/her a true member of the group; and full participants will either be part of the setting or will in the course of the research become involved in the central activities of the subjects under study.

Some aspects of the present study were conducted in an overt manner. There were however occasions when a covert role was assumed (for example when observing the taxi ranks and hawkers doing their trade without revealing the fact that research was intended). In addition, the researcher roles varied from observer-as-participant (that is, observing activities and interviewing subjects) to participant-as-observer (that is, participation in conversations and certain activities).

Once the inexperienced researcher has gained access to a setting the most pressing question is what s/he should now do to ... comprehend and to illuminate the subject's view and to interpret the world 'as it appears to him (or her)' (Matza<sup>26</sup> (p25)). Put differently: What should s/he listen and watch out for? Gaining an understanding of an insider world is by no means an easy task for an outsider (the researcher). The researcher is confronted by behaviours he finds bewildering and inexplicable: the actors are oriented to a world of meanings that the observer does not grasp (Wax<sup>27</sup>). This was certainly the case in the present study where the research team found themselves in a pool of various activities. In order to understand the interactive process qualitative researchers thus need to undergo a learning process whereby they require an understanding of the interactive process that shapes human behaviour (Shaffir & Stebbins<sup>20</sup>). It is widely believed that in order to understand people's life worlds the researcher needs to think in their symbols and that the data must therefore be collected in the subjects' own language and within their meaning systems i.e. values and norms (Shaffir & Stebbins<sup>20</sup>). As already indicated, the research team stressed to their research participants that they had to as far as possible expose the researchers to their world views. Data collection specifically in the beginning involves participation in the daily life of the people being studied by observing things that happen and by listening attentively to what is said without saying too much. (Shaffir & Stebbins<sup>20</sup>). While the research team could due to time constraints not participate meaningfully in the every day life routine of the research participants, they generally tended more to listen to the interviewees' accounts and would normally only interrupt the conversation when they needed clarity about something that was said and that wasn't clear. In addition, only a few general questions, the so-called W-questions (What is happening? Who are the actors/people involved in certain things? When do certain things occur? Why are certain behaviours happening?) would be put to interviewees.

As gaining entrance or getting into the process of learning the ropes is shaped by the characteristics of the setting, so the personality of the researcher, and the subjects' feelings and

responses to the researcher influence the project. There is therefore no fixed recipe for the researcher to learn the ropes or whereby data should be gathered. The only requirement is that the group under study should be observed systematically over a period of time. Preferably more than one method should be used to collect data since the different methods (participant observation, individual interviewing, focus-group interviewing, human documents etA.) provide different facets of the same symbolic reality (Berg<sup>28</sup> (p4)) and more valid results can thus be obtained. In the present research all these qualitative methods were employed as well as photography.

### **A.3.5 Design a first rough draft of the protocol for recording information**

A protocol is a form for recording information. This is needed to note observations in the field or to jot down facial or other forms of research participants' 'body language' during interviews. One might design an observational protocol as a single page with a dividing line down the middle to separate descriptive from reflective notes. The former can consist of portraits of the informants, a reconstruction of dialogue, a description of the physical setting, accounts of particular events, and activities. The latter involves an opportunity for the researcher to record personal thoughts such as speculation, feelings, problems, ideas, hunches, impressions, and prejudices, as quoted by Crewell<sup>29</sup> (p152) from Bogdan and Biklen<sup>5</sup>.

In the current study the following protocols were used: note taking, generally known as 'fieldnotes', audiotaping, and filming. The fieldnotes that were used were not merely summaries of events but rather detailed reproductions of what occurred. Of course, everything that occurred at a given point in time and place could not be recorded. Nevertheless, the following issues were addressed: What activities occurred? Where did the activities occur? What are the views and/or first order/concrete theories of the interviewee or writer? Is there any abstract or second order constructs that could illuminate these worldviews? Which procedures were employed in constructing the notes?

Schatzman and Strauss<sup>30</sup> (p99-101) have developed a model which considers all these prerequisites of note taking. The model has been utilised by various fieldworkers. It has also proved useful in the participant observation studies Schurink undertook for the HSRA. It was therefore decided also to employ this model in the present study. The model consists of three elements, namely observational notes, theoretical notes and methodological notes.

- **Observational Notes (ON)**  
Observational notes give an account of what happened. Little or no interpretation is provided. 'Each ON represents an event deemed important enough to include in the fund of recorded experience, as a piece of evidence for some proposition yet unborn or as a property of context or situation. An ON is the Who, What, When, Where and How of human activity. It tells who said or did what, under stated circumstances' (Schatzman & Strauss<sup>30</sup> (p100)).
- **Theoretical Notes (TN)**  
Theoretical notes are self-conscious, systematic attempts by the researcher to derive meaning from some or all ONs. 'The observer as recorder thinks about what he has experienced and makes whatever private declaration of meaning he feels will bear conceptual fruit. He/she interprets, infers, hypothesises, conjectures; he/she develops new concepts, links these to older ones, or relates any observation to any other...' (Schatzman & Strauss<sup>30</sup> (p101)).
- **Methodological Notes (MN)**  
Methodological notes are mainly reminders, instructions and critical comments to the recorder or researcher. 'Methodological notes might be thought of as observational notes on the researcher himself and upon the methodological process itself; as complete a chronicle as the recorder finds necessary or fruitful' (Schatzman & Strauss<sup>30</sup> (p101)).

When should these fieldnotes be made? Ideally, they should be made while one is observing and/or participating in some sphere of social life. This is however not always possible (Hammersley & Atkinson<sup>31</sup> (p146)). Restrictions include those connected to the research setting, the fieldwork design and the fieldworker's personality. As far as the current study is concerned notes were typed onto a notebook every night.

### **A.3.6 Choosing research sites**

It is obvious that one of the first decisions to be taken before embarking upon a project is to select an appropriate research location. In the current study, as has already been indicated, it was decided to focus on certain settings in specific geographical areas where modal interchanges occurred. In order to save money and time it was decided to choose the same modal interchanges that served as pilot projects for the study that was conducted during 1997/98 by Transportek of the CSIR.

### **A.3.7 Collecting data**

'Qualitative research', 'field research', 'unstructured research' and other terms used in qualitative research have 'at least one feature in common, namely the elucidation of the sense and meaning that people attach to social situations. From this it follows that exponents of this research style require data-gathering methods that will enable them to discover the wealth of people's subjective life worlds. Participant observation, in-depth or unstructured interviews and personal documents (also termed the 'documentary tradition') lend themselves to such discovery' (Schurink<sup>32</sup> (p114)). As already pointed out in the present study, use was made of participant observation, unstructured interviewing (both individual face-to-face and focus groups and unstructured interviews), human documents, and photographing.

Another research method used required that the researcher visit by car places where some form of street behaviour is taking place (e.g. commercial sex workers soliciting clients). Cohen<sup>33</sup> calls this procedure 'selective participation observation'. According to Cohen this procedure differs from ordinary participant observation in that the researcher does not enter the subjects' milieu completely nor does he or she attempt to become part of the subjects' world across the city. Finally, this method provides a relatively high degree of safety, convenience and concealment, which cannot be secured when conducting research on foot. At varying times the researchers visited areas around the three modal interchanges where hawkers were plying their trade and gathered valuable first-hand information on informal trading, patrons, passers-by and other people.

The bulk of the data gathered in the current study was collected through unstructured interviews. They took the form of informal conversations or in-depth interviews, which were generally conducted individually with subjects.

### **A.3.8 Analysing and reporting data**

While qualitative researchers sometimes use tables to summarise findings they typically provide in-depth descriptions or quotations of how social life is constructed. They normally provide clear examples from the voluminous amount of data representing the way in which research participants have organised their worlds, their thoughts about what is happening, their experiences as well as their perceptions. This, of course, is no easy task. However, Sanders and Pinhey<sup>34</sup> (p413) provide some suggestions as to how this can be accomplished. Firstly, examples from the data that typify certain observed patterns should be provided in order to enable the reader to see what they look like. Secondly, qualitative researchers should provide examples of any negative cases in order to illustrate (to the reader) how strong /complete or weak/incomplete the patterns really are. If there are a number of exceptions to a given pattern, there is probably a competing pattern or pluralistic groupings in the research area, and so, while presenting

findings, the researcher will want to clearly show the different patterns, using examples for illustration.

As Sanders and Pinhey<sup>34</sup> point out, one way in which researchers can illustrate data graphically is to construct an outline chart depicting different types and subtypes of patterns. In the present research the data are predominantly presented by means of direct quotations from people in modal interchanges. Only the clearest and most representative quotes are presented. In a number of cases however, excerpts had to be edited or paraphrased for the sake of brevity. In addition, photographs and excerpts from unsolicited documents are also presented.

Researching the various stakeholders and role players at the respective modal interchanges was more than merely gathering data. The intimate contact between the researchers and the subjects not only enabled the researchers to discover the richness of people's subjective life worlds, but also inevitably had an effect on them. The researchers' experiences during the fieldwork were simultaneously pleasant (exciting and enriching) and unpleasant (uncomfortable and tiring). Some of their 'ups' included:

- the fact that people generally supported the research; and
- that the various stakeholders shared private experiences and perceptions with the researchers.

The researchers' most prominent 'downs' were:

- the long hours they had to work in order to observe activities of people involved at the modal interchanges and to recruit subjects for interviewing,
- the stifling heat during the researchers' visit to the Wynberg modal interchange, and
- the frustrations to establish contact and/or ensure interviews with certain stakeholders.

Although no claim is made about the completeness of the above-mentioned exposition of the most important decisions and steps of the investigation, it should nevertheless give some indication of its effectiveness. Put differently, the explicitness of the description of the decision-making steps should enable the reader to judge the scientific credibility thereof. However, an indication will also be given below of how this study meets the 'hard', strict, controllable and rigid rules of customary scientific research.

### **A.3.9 Quality of the data**

As has frequently been indicated, qualitative research is extremely flexible, though decisions and steps are taken while the research is being conducted, and not before it commences. Although some of these decisions can be noted in the report, it is not possible to reproduce all the steps followed in a particular investigation in such a way that a blueprint is given for other researchers who wish to replicate the investigation. Schurink<sup>35</sup> (p100) states that this does not, however, mean that the results of a qualitative study cannot be tested in further research. In fact, analytic induction emphasises the need to search for cases that contradict the findings. Moreover, it encourages the verification of results although a repetition of the original investigation is not required. Therefore qualitative research should be judged in terms of the degree that it stimulates further research, or as Katz<sup>36</sup> (p145) expressively puts it: 'Qualitative research reports properly may be regarded as good to the extent that readers test them in application to new data in the very process of reading. Underlying the reader's experience in 'recognising' as valid or rejecting as 'artificial' an analytic formulation in a qualitative text is an implicit application to phenomena within the reader's experience, to new data existing beyond the reach of the original research.'

The preceding remarks indicate that replicability is problematic in qualitative research, but that there is scope for other researchers and also the readers to test the findings. Such considerations should also be borne in mind in the evaluation of the present study.

In contrast to quantitative researchers who tend to pay little attention to validity in relation to reliability, qualitative researchers place great emphasis on this matter. Naturally there are multiple sources of bias that can negatively affect the validity of the research results (see, for example, Douglas<sup>16</sup>, Mouton & Marais<sup>37</sup>). Some of these sources of bias also threatened the validity of the present research findings. However, these sources of bias will not be pursued further here.

In order to constrain inhibitory factors, a number of strategies were applied during the study, of which the most important is triangulation (Denzin<sup>38</sup>). Mouton and Marais<sup>37</sup> (p91) state that this strategy indicates the use of multiple methods of data collection in a single project in order to compensate to some extent for the disadvantages of each. In the present study, five data-collecting methods were used, namely, participant observation, face-to-face in-depth interviews, focus groups, documentary material, and photographing. It is thus reasonable to assume that the limitations incurred by applying a single method were minimised in this way.

Although it would be naive and presumptuous to claim that all possible disturbance factors were neutralised in the present study, the researchers feel sure that at least the major observer effects were sufficiently eliminated and that the data collected do in fact have a high degree of validity.

## **A.4. The Focus Group process**

This section describes the FG method used in determining crime on-board the public transport vehicle. Using the FG method involved bringing together small groups of people for an in-depth discussion of crime and crime prevention on-board public transport.

Key aspects in establishing FG were as follows:

### **A.4.1 Step 1 Selection of participants**

- **Participants for FG should ideally come from the population group under study**  
Potential participants were asked if they used the mode in question before being invited to form part of the FG.
- **Participants were randomly selected**  
In most cases this was done by the moderator. The moderator approached a potential participant, e.g. a hawker, at the MI and explained the FG concept. This was followed by asking if the potential participants were interested in becoming part of a FG and did they know of any others who would be interested in participating. It can be said that 50% of the FG participants were strangers to each other.

In some cases the transport provider had already established links with informal commuter groups and participants were selected from members of these groups. This initiative on the part of the transport operator ensured that there was 'live and regular' communication between commuters and the transport operator. Examples were seen with PUTCO (Pretoria) and the Chesterville Taxi Association.

In Cape Town, the area initially chosen to study was the Wynberg MI but arising from informal discussions with some commuters it was revealed that the Cape Flats area, was seriously affected by crime (in general and affected commuters) that deserved some attention. Hence a decision was made to conduct the bus commuter FG in Wynberg and the train and taxi commuter FG in Elsies River, in the Cape Flats. In both cases the FG participants were made up from church goers.



Ideally FG should be between 6 and 10 participants, nevertheless the number of FG participants varied from session to session. It was difficult to determine exactly how many would turn up at the venue. As can be seen in Tables A.1 to A.3 the number of FG participants varied from 4 to 21. The gender breakdown of the FG is shown in Figures A.1 to A.3. It was not our duty to turn participants away due to the largeness of the FG or to cancel an arranged meeting due to the small number. Participants who had made an effort to turn up had done so at an opportunity cost and it was decided to honour their effort.

#### **A.4.2 Step 2 Selecting an appropriate venue**

- **The venue that was selected was within a familiar environment of the participant**

It was important that participants felt at home during the FG session. The venue of the FG would therefore be very important to ensure the success of the FG session. The opulence of an office, going into upmarket suburbs etc may all suppress the potential value that the participants could add in the FG session.

It was originally planned to conduct the FG sessions at the Transportek/CSIR offices in the three urban areas (Pretoria (Lynnwood), Cape Town (Stellenbosch), Durban (Congella)), chartering a minibus taxi to collect and return participants back to a central point. Due to logistical constraints it was decided to conduct the focus group sessions as close to the participants as possible. This decision was based on not inconveniencing the participants in any way and would hopefully enable them to realise that they are the main focus of the survey and not us as the interviewers/conveners. Table A.1 to A.3 also indicate the venues used to conduct the FG sessions.

#### **A.4.3 Step 3 Convening the session**

- **Moderators primarily acted as listeners to the issues being discussed.**

One moderator and one transcriber were present at each of the FG sessions. Dictaphone recording was not used at any of the FG sessions. The moderator would welcome the participants and open the meeting by giving details of what was the aim of the session. Soft drinks were distributed to participants in order to set them at ease.

The moderator asked questions according to a structured Interview Guide. Participants were enabled to share all their views on the topic being asked. The moderator ensured that all who wanted to speak were able to speak before moving on to the next question. In addition, questions were asked in such a way so as to engaged the entire FG in discussion with the result that the answer to a structured question would come as a FG consensus.

Depending on the venue, some participants may have been sitting at a distance (or at an awkward angle) from the moderator and their input could have been lost. In such cases, the moderator at times would stand up (though this was used as a last resort so the participants did not feel as though they were in a classroom setting) and move closer to the participant to ensure that their sharing was not lost.

#### **A.4.4 Step 4 Thanks and appreciation**

- **Thanks of appreciation were given to each FG participant**

FG participants were not paid in cash nor were they advised before hand that there would be any form of payment. It was a decision of the project team that cash payments would not be entertained. By advising potential participants that there was a cash payment involved could impair the discussion results, e.g. people would talk for the sake of talking. Tables A.1 to A.3 also indicate the tokens of appreciation given to the FG participants.

Metrorail (Durban) had formalised commuter groups. Members of these commuter groups regularly met with Metrorail management and were paid for their services (at R120 per

session). It was decided not to use these members as we could not ensure that they were genuine/grass roots commuters rather than community representatives of Metrorail passengers.

#### **A.4.5 Step 5 Synthesis of information**

- After the FG session the transcriber would collect and synthesise the information gained from the discussion. The transcribed notes were then supplemented by input from the moderator. The sharing of thoughts enabled all points that were raised to be captured.

#### **A.4.6 Focus group session interview guides**

Key elements of the interview guide were as follows:

- **Open ended questions were asked.**

This permitted exploratory discussion of crime on-board public transport. In some cases questions were translated (beforehand) into the vernacular language, e.g. isiZulu. This was done in order to ensure that the moderator had a correct understanding of the original question which would assist in its proper interpretation and transmission of the questions to the FG.

At the end of the discussion each participant was interviewed on a one-on-one basis. This process (contained in a supplementary interview guide) aimed to collect specific socio-economic, e.g. age, and crime information (i.e. being a victim/witness of) relating to the participant.

Table .A.1. Durban Focus Group						
MODE	DATE AND TIME OF DISCUSSION	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS	LANGUAGE MEDIUM	VENUE	TOKEN OF APPRECIATION	NOTES
Bus	Thursday 8 <sup>th</sup> April 1999 15hrs00	12	IsiZulu	Easy Way Café, Lamontville	Frozen Chicken	Participants very grateful for this innovative 'thank you'
Rail	Wednesday 7 <sup>th</sup> April 1999 15hrs30	5	IsiZulu	Kentucky Fried Chicken Berea Road Station	Kentucky Fried Chicken	
Taxi	Friday 9 <sup>th</sup> April 1999 11hrs00	7	IsiZulu	Chesterfield Taxi Association Office	Kentucky Fried Chicken	

Table .A.2. Pretoria Focus Groups						
MODE	DATE OF DISCUSSION	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS	LANGUAGE MEDIUM	VENUE	TOKEN OF APPRECIATION	NOTES
Bus	Thurs 18 March 1999 18hrs00	4	seSotho	PUTCO Boardroom, Hermanstad	Sandwiches were provided by PUTCO management	
Rail	Sun 28 March 1999 09hrs00	21	seSotho	Apostolic Church, Winterveld	Braai	
Taxi	Wednesday 14 April 15hrs00	8	seSotho	inside a minibus taxi at the Marabastad Taxi Rank	Cans of soft drinks were purchased from the hawkers	Not to take away FG participants from their surroundings the FG discussion was conducted from inside a minibus taxi

Table .A.3. Cape Town Focus Groups						
MODE	DATE OF DISCUSSION	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS	LANGUAGE MEDIUM	VENUE	TOKEN OF APPRECIATION	NOTES
Bus	Sunday 18 <sup>th</sup> April 1999	14	English	Wynberg Methodist Church		Granted permission to interview the group before they started their own meeting
Rail	Monday 19 <sup>th</sup> April 1999	8	English	Norwood Methodist Church, Elsies River	R30 donated towards the group's social function	Group of women. Some of them no longer use public transport due to the problems they have experienced before
Taxi	Monday 19 <sup>th</sup> April 1999	10	English	Norwood Methodist Church, Elsies River		Both groups were interviewed concurrently as it was not possible to split them up

Part of this one-on-one interview represented a victimological approach, where specific questions were asked to gain information about whether the participants had themselves been a victim of crime or in their knowledge did they know or witness another person who had been the victim of on-board crime. It was stressed that this other person should either have been witnessed personally by them, or if hearing about a victim the information should be at 'first hand.'

## **A.5. Interaction with SAPS through participant observation techniques**

Initiating the process of participant observation with SAPS officials included an initial formal interview with the station commander at each of the relevant police stations. In Pretoria the interviewee was the senior officer in charge of the relevant satellite police station. In Durban and Cape Town the senior officer spoken to was the commander of the main police station responsible for the area which the modal interchanges fell into.

The approach taken to asking questions relating specifically to the issue of vigilantism was thus an indirect rather than a direct one. Thus, particularly due to the time constraints that the research has been conducted under it was assumed that the researchers would not be able to entirely win the confidence of the police officers who were the subjects of research and therefore that it would be unlikely that they would spontaneously confide in the researchers. It was therefore assumed that if the research openly presented itself as being concerned with vigilantism and with the police responses to vigilantism it would be likely that information perceived by the police as potentially detrimental to their interests might be withheld (see Jupp<sup>39</sup> (p131)). The study therefore presented itself as a study which was generally concerned with policing issues in the police station areas which included the relevant modal interchanges. In the interviews the researchers indicated that they were particularly interested in the policing issues relevant to the modal interchange. Issues that were raised included questions about the phenomenon of people 'taking the law into their own hands'.

According to Jupp<sup>39</sup>, 'where the subjects of inquiry have general rights, duties and obligations over and above those of everyday citizens, as is the case with the police, then the moral right to be free from social investigation (or indeed any kind of investigation) is correspondingly reduced' (p156). Where it appears likely that the subjects of research will take steps to conceal the true state of affairs '[T]he alternative is for the researcher to engage in some form of deception. .. For example, the subjects may be aware that some form of research is under way but may have been deliberately misinformed as to its true purpose or aim. Such deception is, of course, quite common in social research.' (p155). At the same time it places on the researcher certain responsibilities. In particular 'there is a responsibility to the subjects of inquiry, particularly where promises of confidentiality and anonymity have been made' (p156-157).

This was supplemented by interviews generally with more senior interviews with members of the SAPS. Interviews were also conducted with a senior member of the Durban City Police, with senior members of Metrorail Protection Services in Durban and with members of Modalink and Paige Security Services in Cape Town. In the interests of encouraging a free and frank exchange of views all of the interviews were conducted on the understanding that the identity of respondents would not be disclosed.

## **A.6. Scientific beliefs**

The researcher's philosophical or meta-theoretical assumptions guide research in the human sciences. However, an extensive and critical discussion of each assumption will not be given as this falls beyond the parameters of this section. The intention here is to alert readers to the fact that in each scientific discipline there are different if not controversial philosophical assumptions about research, which to a greater or lesser degree influence, and are reflected in the various stages of making decisions about, a particular study. The resultant variety of scientific beliefs in

each discipline is complicated by the increasing tendency in the social sciences to opt for multidisciplinary research. It follows that if, for example, sociologists with different scientific beliefs join forces with psychologists with different beliefs, the research will reflect diverging and frequently conflicting views of society, the human race, the dimensions of the phenomenon that requires investigation, what comprises good research and ways in which scientifically accountable knowledge should be obtained.

Naturally there was also a diversity of perspectives and views among the researchers involved in this particular multidisciplinary project. The researchers represented the following disciplines: sociology, Criminology, criminology, ... and. Their metatheoretical assumptions can mainly be traced back to the two general research traditions in the human sciences, namely positivism, and antipositivism or humanism (cf. Schurink<sup>40</sup>). During the execution of the research it was apparent that both positivistic and antipositivistic assumptions guided the researchers. It therefore seems fair to say that the study can be typified as positivistic-antipositivist.

In conclusion, three matters should be noted. In the first place the value of using different research strategies and data-collecting methods in the present research is stressed. As each approach utilised in the study has shortcomings, the different methods in combination can, to some extent, compensate for the shortcomings of each, thereby maximizing both the validity and credibility of the findings. Secondly addressing the complex phenomenon of crime on-board the transport vehicle and at modal interchanges necessitates an interdisciplinary approach. Finally, the requirements of the DACST's Innovation Fund requires relatively large multi-year projects which implies multidisciplinary research.

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## **ANNEXURE B**

**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (PRE 1990) OF VIGILANTISM  
IN SOUTH AFRICA**

## B. ANTI-CRIME VIGILANTISM

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Focussing on the 1970's and 1980's it is possible to distinguish at least four 'forms' of vigilantism in South Africa.

- **Orthodox Policing**

Firstly there is evidence of forms of 'orthodox' policing and justice structures which involved community in 'dealing with' individuals suspected of involvement in criminal activity. The black townships during this period were under policed. According to Scharf and Ngcokoto<sup>1</sup>, 'with no credible formal adjudicative structures to use, Africans perforce resorted to their own informal structures, taking on various forms, and using a range of enforcement options, starting from 'private' police forces in the form of *makgotla*, peace-keepers or vigilantes to neighbourhood moral pressure'. In Guguletu, for instance from as early as the 1950's onwards, 'groups of peace-keepers called Amasolomzi were formed to patrol the streets and apprehend trouble makers'. (p344).

- **Tribal Courts**

Similarly tribal courts called Makgotla also existed in Soweto and many other township areas and can be seen as having represented a community based response to the problem of crime. These structures were not simply a response to crime but can also be seen to represent the continuity (or re-establishment) of traditional structures of authority in black urban areas. While more spontaneous forms of 'street justice' might also have occurred, the impression created here is that these structures were relatively formalised and that where 'justice' was imposed this was, to a significant degree, in terms of the deliberations and decisions of those these bodies.

While the formation of these structures can to some extent be seen as a community response to the inadequacies of official policing structures they may also be seen to have represented a continuation of traditional systems of justice in a colonial context. Some might therefore wish to question whether the term vigilantism is appropriate to describe these structures. For the purpose of our research it is not necessary to resolve this issue but simply to observe that, in township communities, systems have persisted whereby community members have imposed their own types of justice and that these systems existed outside of the formal governmental policing and judicial structures.

- **Police Vigilantism**

Discussed in section B.3.

- **Conservative Vigilantism**

Discussed in section B.4.

### B.1. Vigilantism and political resistance

Particularly during the 1980's in South Africa a new form of vigilantism emerged within many township communities. From 1983 onwards the South African government was faced by a wave of violent popular resistance as a result of which there was a breakdown of state control over the black townships. While popular resistance was broadly based, incorporating unions, community organisations (civics) and others, the youth were at the forefront of violent resistance to the apartheid government and its security forces.

The formation of Self Defence Units (SDUs) was can be seen as having been an initiative from within township communities to in some ways give a more coherent and organised form to the

activities of the youth. It is not our intention to detail the historical context which gave rise to the SDUs or provide a detailed history of their formation and functioning. What should perhaps be noted however is that while the formation of these structures may initially have to some extent been endorsed by other popular structures, once formed and legitimised they to some extent took on a life of their own with the consequence that in many cases the other organisations which served as organs of popular resistance lost their ability to control the operation and functioning of these structures.

There was in some ways a multiple rationale behind the establishment of these para-military structures. The primary justification given for their creation was not simply that policing services provided in township areas were inadequate but that the security system (police and army) represented a hostile force which not only served generally to uphold an oppressive political system, but were also engaged in acts of random brutality against township communities. Furthermore, within organisations of popular resistance to the apartheid government the understanding at the time, at least amongst some elements, was that the mass of South Africans were involved in a revolutionary struggle the objective of which was to overthrow the existing system of government. Part of the strategy towards achieving this objective was to establish 'organs of people's power' to take over the administration of the country in areas where the official structures had been driven back.

Thus not only were the existing policing services far from adequate but during this period such systems of control to a significant degree collapsed. While the official security forces continued to operate in township areas this could only be done by means of the deployment of police and troops in armoured vehicles. As state control over the townships collapsed SDUs were able to step into the gap as alternative policing structures.

While they justified their existence on the grounds that communities were under attack from hostile 'external' forces, they also became involved in imposing 'justice' within communities. According to Marks<sup>2</sup>:

'Youth who were engaged in the liberation struggle saw themselves not only as defending the community in a physical sense. More broadly, they perceived themselves as defending the 'morality' of the township, and in so doing building unity or homogeneity. .. 'Showing the right way' could be done through a number of means - from simple chastisement to physical punishment'. (p14 -15).

While initially justice was supposed to be imposed by sentence of a 'people's courts' there was a proliferation of summary justice. In enforcing a consumer boycott in Nyanga in the Western Cape for instance '[U]ndisciplined youths claiming to be comrades punished transgressors summarily by forcing them to consume their illegal purchases on the spot!' (Scharf and Ngcokoto<sup>1</sup> (p 357)) While some, particularly those identified as collaborators with the system were dealt with by even more brutal measures.

More generally this breakdown in control over youths in communities not only fed into a prevailing youth vigilantism but also into burgeoning youth crime.

## **B.2. Police vigilantism**

A further manifestation of vigilantism during this period can be seen to have been the vigilantism of those in the official police structures, particularly the South African Police, but also other structures that were created at the time.

Arguably this reached its most serious levels as police became more and more involved in the suppression of political resistance. However what is also true is that prior to the demise of

apartheid those who scrutinised the activities of the police focused overwhelmingly on the activities in dealing with political activists and those involved in political demonstrations. As yet there have been few significant efforts to document the activities of the police in the ordinary enforcement of the law. However Desiree Hansson for instance, notes that out of 447 police shootings in Metropolitan Cape Town during the years 1984 to 1991 '217... were not political, 201 were political, and in 29 this information was missing' (personal communication with team member). It is therefore not necessarily the case that official violence was more severe in dealing with perceived political threats than it was in dealing with alleged criminals.

As political resistance intensified during the early to mid eighties the government created supplemented the ranks of the SAPS by providing for the appointment of special constables (known as 'kitskonstabels', the Afrikaans for 'instant' constables - a reference to their short periods of training) and also extended the powers of the municipal police who worked for the town councils in black townships. According to the then Minister, Adriaan Vlok the need to bolster the ranks of police in the townships arose from a shortage of police personnel and the difficult in policing townships and cost effectiveness (CIIR<sup>3</sup> (p 21-23)). Extra-legal official action was not only the work of the South African Police but also of these other police agencies.

The extent to which police operated outside of the law is reflected, for instance in the recently released report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While on a formal level official policy, and police training for instance, purported to promote legality in the actions of members of the police in practise there were several factors which can be seen to have contributed to police vigilantism. On the most basic level the status of black people as non-citizens served to promote a double standard in policing. When this was combined with racial hostility it is easy to see how this developed into callousness and brutality when black people were the 'victims' of policing.

At the same time those in authority over the police appear to have encouraged forms of vigilantism in various ways. This encouragement firstly took the form of a failure to sanction unlawful actions by the police. While quite how this worked remains to some extent unclear it appears that many of those in positions of authority not only failed to sanction, but also directly encouraged such extra-legal violence. Writing as early as 1986 for instance Foster and Luyt<sup>4</sup> (p311) noted that,

'Statistics reveal an alarming incidence both of police crime and of deaths caused by police officers in the course of their duties. Most seriously, officers convicted of violence crime run very little risk of dismissal from the force. ... A review of the case law demonstrates that officers who have ill-treated detainees have not only escaped punishment, but have been promoted in spite of their records.'

### **B.3. Conservative vigilantism**

The fourth form of vigilantism emerged predominantly in the late 1980's. Haysom<sup>5</sup> (p67), describes the emergence of a wide number of groups of this kind in different parts of the country, who were identified by names such as the A-Team, Ama-Afrika, Phakatis, Mabangalala, Amadoda and the Witdoeke'. These groups were 'violent, organised, and conservative groupings operating within black communities' and 'act to neutralise individuals and groupings that are opposed to the apartheid state and its institutions'. Although they 'receive no official recognition' they 'are alleged to enjoy varying degrees of police support.'

Conservative vigilantism may be seen to have partly been an attempt at re-asserting authority by groups who had been marginalised by the movement of opposition to apartheid including chiefs in the homeland areas and who resented the new untrammelled authority of the youth. There is some evidence that, 'the police actively prompted the formation of vigilante groups in some areas'

(Haysom<sup>5</sup> (p 69)). While this was not necessarily always the case what is clear is that the authorities supported their existence particularly as their victims were consistently 'those perceived to be resisting apartheid institutions'. This official support enabled them to act 'brazenly as if their extra-legal violence has no legal consequences' (Haysom<sup>5</sup> (p 69)).

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## ANNEXURE C

POLICING AT THE MODAL INTERCHANGES



## **C. INTRODUCTION**

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Each of the areas modal interchanges studied falls under a specific station area. The Belle Ombre MI falls under the Pretoria Central Station Area, Berea Road falls under CR Swart Square, and the Wynberg modal interchange falls under the Wynberg police station. Stations fall under a station commander. Each station falls into a 'area' consisting of a number (usually 20 to 30) of stations and thus under an Area Commissioner who reports to the Provincial Commissioner.

Policing plans and priorities are established at National level and are released publicly annually. From their, every province has to use these plans as a framework within which to establish their own provincial aims and objectives. This process then occurs again at Area level, taking provincial aims and objectives into account. Priorities at station level therefore may partly reflect local crime as recorded by the police station but will also reflect priorities set at national and other levels within the police service.

### **C.1. MARABASTAD/BELLE OMBRE**

Marabastad is a sector of the Pretoria Central station area. At the time of our interview there were 37 police based at the station. Of these 19 form part of the 4 reliefs, a further 8 members are involved in doing visible policing, and 4 are involved in clandestine operations. In addition the Captain and a sergeant are based at the station doing administration.

Members of the police service gave slightly different accounts of the main crime problems. A senior police officer interviewed said the main crime problem in the area is common robbery. By contrast armed robbery is only reported far more infrequently. In some months there will be one and in some none at all. Members of the police service who were accompanied on patrol however mentioned the following as problems: major crime issues involve the selling of dagga, illegal selling of alcohol, theft of goods and armed robbery. Car hijacking takes place occasionally. Housebreaking as a problem has declined significantly since the intervention of the Pretoria Inner City partnership.

There has recently been a problem of people snatching cell-phones at the corner of Bloed and DF Malan. A major problem in the area are various kinds of 'con artists' who defraud people of money. These present the police with particular difficulty partly because the legal issues involved are often not straightforward and it is therefore difficult to deal with the problem by simple law enforcement.

A major problem for the police is the squatter settlement. Problems here include prostitution, and violence. The police devote a lot of attention to policing the area but when there is violence and a person is charged the complainant frequently withdraws the charge at court. Also if people who are being pursued by the police often disappear into the squatter settlement where it becomes exceptionally difficult to find them.

According to a senior member of the of the CPF the informal settlements are used as haven of safety for criminals or provide a refuge for criminals who are either from the area or who used the area as hideouts. Some residents are engaged in activities such prostitution, illegal selling of alcohol and dagga, theft of firearms from the soldiers who visit the prostitute in the area, muggings, storing stolen goods. At some stage it was reported in the Pretoria News that stolen goods to the amount of R10 000 were discovered in one the shacks in the informal settlement.

The Marabastad police also tried the Broken Windows approach e.g. arresting people for drinking in public or selling liquor in public. They used to have special operations against drinking in public which is often a cause of other problems. However, if someone was arrested the cases were always summarily withdrawn in court. Only dagga related cases would be prosecuted. The senior police officer suggested that the only solution to the problem would be a special court. Nevertheless they still arrest people for drinking in public. Another problem with these operations was that people who had been arrested would often give addresses for a place far from Pretoria. Particularly if one has arrested a large number of people it becomes impractical to verify whether they are giving the correct addresses or not.

With respect to the modal interchange the senior police officer said that there was not really a significant crime problem in the area. There are occasional muggings. Every now and then a vehicle is stolen or broken into. Last year there was a problem with taxi violence. The police used to have a problem with taxi's blocking the roads but since the establishment of the ranks things are better. These days the taxis operate strictly from the ranks.

There has also been an attempt to remove the traders from the station and the trains. Metro Rail got an court interdict against the informal traders. When a person is found trading they are arrested for contempt of court by the Metro Security or the SAPS mobile unit. However people are still selling on the trains.

Policing of the modal interchange is therefore not necessarily a priority for the Marabastad SAPS. Their strategy for the area depends on the information they receive. If appropriate police would focus on the modal interchange more intensively but this would depend on them receiving information that motivated for the area to be prioritised.

#### **C.1.1 Private security**

The policing of Belle Ombre Station is primarily dealt with by a security company employed by Metrorail. They also deal with security on the trains. The Pretoria Central Police station also has a mobile unit which works on the public transport system (trains) with Metro Rail security. The Marabastad personnel are however responsible for general crime prevention at the Belle Ombre interchange but do not patrol the station.

The security guards are expected to report crimes to the police station as soon as they arise. Although the station falls under the jurisdiction of Metro Rail security the police do intervene in certain 'serious' situation. There is therefore a fair amount of cooperation between the police and the security guards. One police officer also indicated that he thought it was not an entirely good idea to leave the policing of the station to the security guards. One consequence of this was that it gave the security guards a free hand to do what they wished. Sometimes they were involved in unlawful activities.

#### **C.2. BERE A ROAD**

The policing system relating to the Berea Road modal interchange is slightly different. Policing at the Berea Road modal interchange is in various ways undertaken by three formal structures, the South African Police Service, the Durban City Police, and Metro Rail Protection Services. Furthermore the SAPS at least have a presence, in the form of a satellite station, at the Berea Rd station.

Berea Road is policed by the SAPS as part of the Durban Central policing area for which the central station is CR Swart Square. Of 6 satellite stations attached to CR Swart, one is located on Durban station while a second one is located a few streets away in Wills Road on the other side of the Warwick Ave area which holds a significant part of the 'taxi rank' that

occupies a large part of the area surrounding Berea Road station. Each satellite falls under the command of a Captain.

Both the Wills Rd and Berea station satellites operate on a 24 hour basis. The station satellite is purely concerned with policing on Berea station while the Wills Rd police station is responsible for much of the area surrounding Berea Rd railway station. The main task of the police based at the satellites is visible foot patrols (known in police slang as 'business watch') though after dark the emphasis is more on vehicle patrol.

The six satellite stations have roughly 200 personnel allocated to them giving an average of about 30 personnel per satellite. Police in the satellite stations work 12 hour shifts, starting either at 7 a.m. or 7 p.m. The standard system is for each police officer to work 2 day shifts followed by 2 night shifts and then have four days off. There are thus four shift groups implying that on average 7 - 8 police officers would be available to work each shift. However a proportion of these personnel are often unavailable for reasons such as ordinary, sick or study leave. Because of the apparent threat of armed attacks on police stations the policy is to allocate 3 or 4 members to staffing of the police station during each shift. As a result there are often few members who are available for patrol. In addition police management are unable to make up for shortages at a particular satellite by drawing on staff at another satellite with a relative surplus of staff as re-allocating a police officer to another satellite has come to be classified as a 'transfer' and thus can only be undertaken subject to consultation with a number of role-players including the members and commanders concerned and the union.

The major crime problem dealt with at Berea Road are 'muggings'. Where weapons are used in the muggings these are usually knives. Often the mugging might involve a physical assault on the victim without a weapon being used. Depending on whether a weapon is used or not the crime will therefore be either recorded as an 'armed robbery' or 'common robbery' in police statistics. Apparently there is also a 'tremendous problem' with illegal liquor and the police therefore occasionally 'have a raiding exercise' to counter this. Particularly on Friday afternoon/evenings there is a massive flow of people through Berea Road modal interchange area making it particularly difficult to maintain a visible police presence with limited personnel as the modal interchange area becomes congested and police officers become lost (from view) in the crowd.

In the Durban Central police station area as a whole a major problem is theft of and out of motor vehicles. Roughly 30-40% of crime in the area is theft out of motor vehicles. a particular problem is thefts from delivery vehicles. There is also a major problem of shoplifting and particularly organised shoplifting. Insurance fraud and cell phone theft were other problems mentioned.

Durban places a major emphasis on maintaining a positive image as a holiday and tourist destination and there is beach front satellite called the Tourist Protection Unit which operates year round. The TPU is regarded as the 'prime' satellite station and has more personnel dedicated to it than other satellites. While the safety of tourists is thus regarded as a priority throughout the year particularly during the periods where there is a major influx of holiday makers and tourists into Durban, policing of the beachfront area receives far greater attention. The summer holiday season and major events such as an annual international surfing competition usually held in mid-winter thus have a significant impact on police priorities and deployment of personnel in Durban as does the presence of a major International Conference Centre and the location in Durban of major sports facilities. In the words of a senior police officer policing in Durban thus 'suffers from events'. Despite the obstacles to redeployment policing personnel and resources will frequently be diverted from the inner city during these periods or for specific sports or other events.

A centralised crime information analysis unit is based at CR Swart Square. There is also a plain clothes unit called the street crime unit which works on the basis of information provided by the analysis unit.

### **C.2.1 The Durban City Police**

The responsibilities of the Durban City Police (DCP) primarily involve traffic control and visible policing for the purposes of crime prevention. They do not have the investigative powers or responsibilities of the SAPS and thus, once a crime is reported or a person arrested, the case will be handed over to the SAPS. Visible policing resources have particularly been concentrated in the main West/Smith/Pine streets CBD area using a 'high profile bobby on the beat' approach with 2 constables patrolling each side of the main streets. According to a senior DCP member the intention is to demonstrate the effectiveness of this type of policing to the City Council so that funds will be allocated to enable this type of policing to be implemented in other parts of the city.

The DCP also have other responsibilities including the regulation of street trading in terms of local government ordinances, the allocation of taxi ranks, and the enforcement of regulations relating to bus transport. The DCP thus have particular responsibilities in relation to the Berea Road modal interchange particularly as it falls into the 'restricted trading area' where informal traders are required to have permits in order to conduct their business.

One problem which the regulation of street traders helps to inhibit is congestion on pavements and other pedestrian walkways. Where such congestion is a problem, criminals often take advantage of the relative vulnerability of pedestrians. In addition to problems like theft (snatching), pickpockets and ATM fraud the DCP also deal with lots of petty offences such as urinating in public. As in Marabastad there are also a large number of con artists who prey on people, such as those from rural areas, sometimes by impersonating policemen. The work of the Durban City Police is also facilitated by the fact that the magistrates court has a municipal prosecutors pool that charges for by-law offences.

The DCP also have a special 'street child unit'. While their work is mainly focused on the beachfront area they also sometimes become involved in work with the children of traders who appear to be neglected. It appears that street children are sometimes used by syndicates to break into cars or homes.

The DCP are represented on the Durban Central CPF. However much of the communication between the SAPS and DCP takes place on a relatively informal basis.

### **C.2.2 Metrorail Protection Services**

In the words of a representative of Metro Rail Protection Services (MRPS) the station can be conceptualised as having three parts. The first part is the area inside the barrier gates leading to each of the platforms. This is the area which MRPS is primarily responsible for. The second part is the area within the station outside the barrier gates. While MRPS do play a role in providing guards to patrol this area of the station, these areas are primarily the responsibility of Intersite rather than Metrorail. Metrorail therefore invoices Intersite for the latter services. The third part is the area outside the station which is seen as the responsibility of the municipality.

MRPS's primary area of responsibilities is therefore the area inside the barrier gates as well as on board the trains. Their area of responsibility includes 56 railway stations and a further 44 smaller stations called 'halts'. The 60 Metrorail trains make in the region of 440 journeys on a working day. Roughly 70 staff fall under the protection services division though Metro

Rail employs a further 450 private security guards who are deployed throughout the region on trains, on stations and as escorts for technicians who are working in areas believed to be dangerous.

MRPS sees its role as essentially five fold:

- The protection of Metro Rail income has been accomplished in part through contracting in a private security company;
- Commuters are protected through the deployment of security guards on stations and trains. Roughly 80% of the 450 security guards do security at the stations and halts;
- The guards are also responsible for the protection of Metro Rail assets in relation to which alarm systems are also used;
- In addition to the escorts for technicians the protection of personnel also involves escorting personnel to and from ticket offices; and
- The fifth component is defined as assisting the SAPS to 'maintain law and order'.

The main crime problem dealt on the trains are robberies including armed robberies. Part of the role of the security guards is also to prevent dangerous acts, such as people jumping on and off the trains while they are in motion. In the core area served by Metrorail, trains runs from 3 am until as late as 10 a.m. Due to the fact that the serious crime mainly takes place on trains during off peak periods MRPS has started adopting an approach in terms of which guards are primarily located at the stations during peak periods. However during off peak periods the number of guards at stations is reduced and the 'surplus' guards are instructed to patrol on board the trains. Some of the guards are armed and some unarmed depending on the risk profile of the station at which they are based.

MRPS has its primary interface with the police through the SAPS Area Commissioner but their liaison and cooperation with the SAPS extends far beyond this. Their cooperation with the SAPS sometimes takes the form of 'joint operations' which may also involve, for instance, the SANDF and traffic police.

Up until 1998 the SAPS maintained a dedicated 'mobile unit' responsible for patrols on the trains. Apparently the unit was to a large degree ineffective having a particularly low arrest rate. Since the unit was disbanded there has been no increase in reported crime on the trains.

### **C.3. WYNBERG**

The Wynberg Modal Interchange (MI) falls within the jurisdiction of the Wynberg police station which makes up one of 29 police stations in the Western Metropole policing Area. The police station is located next door to the Wynberg Magistrates Court and is about 2 blocks away from the Modal Interchange. Units located at the station include the Crime Intelligence unit, the Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) and the Station Coordinating Committee (SCC).

The Crime Intelligence (CIU) unit consists of a commander and a field worker. The aim of this unit is to collect crime information and statistics pertaining to the Wynberg area. This information is collected primarily from police sources such as the number of crimes reported at the charge office. Informers from within the public however, are also instrumental in providing information to this unit about crimes that are being committed in the community. The CIU then acts to warn the Station Commander and relevant police units about crime

trends and patterns in the Wynberg district. The main crime issues in the station area are theft out of motor vehicle, theft of motor vehicle, and robbery both armed and common.

The Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) consists of 8 members and is headed by a commander. Two members from the unit are allocated to patrolling the shopping area (business watch). The remainder are deployed in vehicles partly on the basis of information provided by the CIU to deal with emerging crime patterns in the area. For instance if information indicates that there is a housebreaking problem in a particular area the unit will patrol that area. Their presence in the area is intended to provide a visible police presence as well as to respond rapidly to reports of a crime in progress. At the time of the interview the CPU was busy with road blocks and sector patrolling until after the elections. According to the interviewees this had resulted in a decrease in crime in the areas where this form of policing was occurring. These road blocks as part of an election safety strategy however, seemed to be hampering the CPUs normal activities. a senior member of the CPU mentioned that certain areas were being neglected as a result of this strategy.

A further 20 to 30 members are based at the community service centre. On average 5 are allocated to each shift. In addition to staffing the community service centre they are also responsible for visible policing in the area. In the region of 30 of the members based at the station are allocated to duties at Wynberg court. There are also in the region of 8 detectives based at Wynberg.

As is the case in Pretoria the Cape Peninsula also has a mobile unit called the Shuttle Services. The unit was established to police the trains within the Peninsula which includes more than one policing area. In this regards they are a special unit that has authority across different local and area jurisdictions including the West and Eastern Metropoles and part of Boland. Their headquarters is a satellite station located at the Central Cape Town train station on Adderley street. Other sub-stations exist at the train stations at Bellville, Phillipie and Stuurhof. This unit is responsible for patrols of train carriages. They do not operate on trains outside of the peninsula as the relative commuter density is substantially less. The regular police stations are responsible for crime committed on trains that pass through their jurisdictions.

Shuttle services has to therefore work with relevant security role players that are responsible for security in and around the stations where the relevant trains pass through. The main crimes that they come across on the trains include: theft, robbery with force, drunkenness, possession of drugs and stolen goods. The main problems that had been experienced at the taxi rank included robbers using taxis to escape with stolen goods, assaults, drivers using illegal licences, gambling, drunkenness and drinking and driving.

There are also other units that operate both vertically and horizontally within the WC policing structure. These include the Western Cape Special Internal Investigations Unit and the Anti-Corruption Unit. This means that they are responsible directly to the Provincial Commissioner and can operate across various area and sector jurisdictions.

### **C.3.1 Private Security**

There are effectively two components to the private security arrangements which are in force at the Wynberg modal interchange. As is the case in the other two provinces security arrangements on the station itself are the responsibility of Metrorail security. Metrorail security therefore also has its own 'core' staff but also contracts in private security companies. However the Cape Town metropolitan area is also unique in that private security guards have specially been employed for the purpose of policing at modal interchanges outside of the station area.

Modalink is a Section 21 (not for profit) company which is contracted by the Cape Metropolitan Council to coordinate, integrate and market public transport. One of their areas of responsibility is the coordination of private security. They therefore contract in private security companies to provide their services at modal interchanges. At interchanges such as Wynberg where they have brought in private security these security guards are responsible for patrolling the interchange area outside of the station.

Both private security guards as well as guards employed directly by Metrorail Security do not have the special powers of peace officers but merely the powers of arrest of ordinary citizens. However there is at least one important difference between the powers of the guards on the stations and those who patrol the area outside the station. In addition to the powers of arrest of ordinary citizens under the Criminal Procedure Act, guards on the stations also have specific powers in terms to the Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act and thus have the right to search people on these premises. In the event of a person refusing to be searched these guards can therefore also arrest a person and take them to a police station. Furthermore in terms of the succession act to the old South African Transport Act they also have powers to, for instance, prohibit the crossing of railway lines at unauthorised points.

At the Wynberg interchange the company contracted to provide security is Paige Security Services though this is only one of roughly six private security companies that Modalink has contracts with. There is a high degree of collaboration between the private security guards and the police. According to one police officer this relationship is crucial enabling them to deal with crime problems which would not have been addressed had it not been the efforts of the police and the security officers at the modal interchange. Paige Security Services and the police have committed themselves to information sharing work together during operations in the modal interchange.

The relationship between Modalink and the police was also said to be good and they sit on the various structures where police interface with civilian bodies to share information and work out partnerships and anti-crime strategies.



## **ANNEXURE D**

### **STAKEHOLDER MEETINGS**



**MEETINGS FOR THE YEAR 1999**

<b>MONTH</b>	<b>DATE</b>	<b>MEETING TYPE</b>	<b>VENUE</b>
OCTOBER	11	PROF KAHN STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
	28	STEERING COMMITTEE WORKSHOP	CSIR, PRETORIA
	26	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
NOVEMBER	24	SARCC STEERING COMMITTEE	SARCC, WOODMEAD
	3	STEERING COMMITTEE BUS FORUM	CITY ENGINEERS, DURBAN
	18	DURBAN WORKING GROUP	CSIR, DURBAN
	17	CATO MANOR DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION STEERING COMMITTEE	CATO MANOR DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, DURBAN
	30	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
	4 (PM)	CATO MANOR DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION STEERING COMMITTEE	CATO MANOR DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, DURBAN
	11	CATO MANOR DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION STEERING COMMITTEE	CATO MANOR DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, DURBAN
	4 (AM)	DURBAN WORKING GROUP	CSIR DURBAN
DECEMBER	3	SARCC STEERING COMMITTEE	SARCC, WOODMEAD
	14	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
	6	DURBAN WORKING GROUP	WARWICK JUNCTION PROJECT OFFICE, DURBAN

### MEETINGS FOR THE YEAR 2000

MONTH	DATE	MEETING TYPE	VENUE
JANUARY 2000	28	DURBAN WORKING GROUP	WARWICK JUNCTION PROJECT OFFICE, DURBAN
	26	SARCC STEERING COMMITTEE	SARCC, WOODMEAD
	14	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
FEBRUARY	16	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
	24	DURBAN WORKING GROUP	WARWICK JUNCTION PROJECT OFFICE, DURBAN
	15	STEERING COMMITTEE UNISEC	CSIR, PRETORIA
	2	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
	18	STEERING COMMITTEE CRIME UNIT	CSIR, PRETORIA
	25	STEERING COMMITTEE SAPS DURBAN	SAPS, DURBAN
	22	STEERING COMMITTEE CRIME UNIT	CSIR, PRETORIA
	21	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
	9	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
	14	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
	8	STEERING COMMITTEE SARCC	SARCC, WOODMEAD
	2	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
MARCH	10	DURBAN WORKING GROUP	WARWICK JUNCTION PROJECT OFFICE, DURBAN
	1	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
	15	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
APRIL	17	DURBAN WORKING GROUP	WARWICK JUNCTION PROJECT OFFICE, DURBAN
	4	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA

<b>MONTH</b>	<b>DATE</b>	<b>MEETING TYPE</b>	<b>VENUE</b>
MAY	17	DURBAN WORKING GROUP	WARWICK JUNCTION PROJECT OFFICE, DURBAN
	26	LONDON TRANSPORT OLIVER PAGE	LONDON TRANSPORT
JUNE 2000	15	DURBAN WORKING GROUP	WARWICK JUNCTION PROJECT OFFICE, DURBAN
	19	DURBAN WORKING GROUP	WARWICK JUNCTION PROJECT OFFICE, DURBAN
JULY	6	STEERING COMMITTEE METRORAIL	METRORAIL, JOHANNESBURG
AUGUST	21	STEERING COMMITTEE CRIME WATCH	CRIME WATCH, DURBAN
	22	STEERING COMMITTEE CITY ENG DURBAN	CITY ENG, DURBAN
	18	STEERING COMMITTEE TRADERS AGAINST CRIME	WARWICK JUNCTION PROJECT OFFICE, DURBAN
	18	STEERING COMMITTEE METRORAIL DURBAN	METRORAIL, DURBAN
	30	DURBAN WORKING GROUP	WARWICK JUNCTION PROJECT OFFICE, DURBAN
	17	STEERING COMMITTEE DURBAN METRO BUSES	DURBAN METRO BUSES
	24	STEERING COMMITTEE IKUSASA	CSIR, PRETORIA
	22	STEERING COMMITTEE METRORAIL DURBAN (MKG)	METRORAIL, DURBAN
	22	STEERING COMMITTEE METROBEAT	METROBEAT, DURBAN
	23	STEERING COMMITTEE TNO REPRESENTATIVE	CSIR, PRETORIA
SEPTEMBER	15	STEERING COMMITTEE METRORAIL	CSIR, PRETORIA
OCTOBER	19	DURBAN WORKING GROUP	WARWICK JUNCTION PROJECT OFFICE, DURBAN
	12	STEERING COMMITTEE	CSIR, PRETORIA
	3	STEERING COMMITTEE PROF KAHN	CSIR, PRETORIA
	5	STEERING COMMITTEE KLS CONSULTING	KLS, DURBAN



## ANNEXURE E

STAKEHOLDER TELEPHONE/FAX LIST

NAME	ORGANISATION	TELEPHONE	FAX
1. Mr Amos Maphanga	Berea Residents Association	031-362 6271	031-362 6199
2. Mr Cecil Brimacombe	Business Against Crime	031-335 1017	031-332 1288
3. Mr Sbu Xulu	Universal Security Services cc	031-261 6640	031-261 6671
4. Mr S. Maphumulo	Chesterville Taxi Association	031-306 8703	031-306 8703
5. Mr Arthur Dlodlo	Chesterville Taxi Association	031-306 8703	031-306 8703
6. Mr Siphelele Zuma	COSATU	031-304 1690	031-304 1822
7. Mr T. Murugan	Durban Bus Liaison Forum	031-902 1440	031-902 9029
8. Ms J Burton	Durban Chamber of Commerce and Industry	031-305 1000	031-332 1288
9. Mr P. L Gumede	Durban City Police	031-300 3223	031-305 7442
10. Mr B.A Crockers	Durban City Police	031-300 3223	031-305 7442
11. Mr L.M Buthelezi	Durban Long Distance Taxi Co-operative	031-309 5367	031-309 5367
12. Mr K. Mngomezulu	Durban Minibus Taxi Liaison	031-307 8703	031-307 8703
13. Ms J. Muscat	Durban Transport Municipal Board (DTMB)	031-309 4126	031-309 5108
14. Mr M.P. Gwabe	Greater North Taxi Co-operative	031-309 5969	031-309 8757
15. Mr T.E. Mkhwanazi	Greater North Taxi Co-operative	031-309 8757	031-309 8757
16. Mr J. Bassa	Intersite Property Developers, Durban	031-305 8756	031-305 8764
17. Mr. M. Mpshe	Department of Justice, Pietermaritzburg	0331-45 2361	0331-94 8884
18. Mr Keith Whitehead	Metrorail - Durban Station	031-361 7975	031-361 8049

NAME	ORGANISATION	TELEPHONE	FAX
19. Mr Ranesh Sivanarian	Metrorail - Durban Station	031-361 8041	031-361 8049
20. Ms Fikile Sithole	Provincial Taxi Office - Dept of Transport	031-303 1385	031-303 1871
21. Mr B. G. Mhlongo	Provincial Taxi Office - Dept Of Transport	031-303 1385	031-303 1871
22. Mr D.P. Scales	SAPS - Area Command Office	031-360 4517	031-360 4610
23. Mr J.P. vd Westhuizen	SAPS - Area Command Office	031-360 4560	031-360 4838
24. Mr T.V. Ncokwana	SAPS - Crime Unit, Westmead	031-700 6114	031-700 5095
25. Mr J.T. Mbatha	Security International	031-206 2467	031-205 1190
26. Cllr Trevor Prince	South Central Metro Sub-Structure	031-304 1710	031-304 1710
27. Mr S.J. Phungula	Spoornet	031-361 3390	031-361 2088
28. Director	Tourism KwaZulu Natal	031-304 7144	031-305 6693
29. Mr Albert Mavundla	Traders Against Crime	031-309 2820	031-309 2820
30. Mr N. Zondo	Traders Against Crime	031-309 2820	031-755 4685
31. Mr Chris Edmunds	Traders Against Crime	031-307 7717	031-307 7444
32. Mr C. Shewpersad	Traffic and Transportation - City Engineers Department	031-300 2652	031-305 5871
33. Mr A. Aucamp	Traffic and Transportation - City Engineers Department	031-300 2543	031-305 5871



## **ANNEXURE F**

**WORKING GROUP'S ACTION PLANS**

## WORKING GROUP'S ACTION PLAN

The following tables indicate the proposed actions of the Working Group.

**Table D1: Working Group's Action Plan – Coordination**

COORDINATION	
TOPIC	DESCRIPTION
WHAT?	Meeting with the Durban Metro Councillors, Law enforcement (SAPS to provide information), Training of "evaluators" in line with the protocol, Training/capacity-building programmes and links to other existing training programmes Managing action plans and other day-to-day activities.
HOW?	Establish Co-ordinating committee HSRC/CSIR to engage in capacity-building, especially the Traders Against Crime, in order to improve the provision of feedback to SAPS and other stakeholders Dr W. Schurink volunteered to prepare a Power-point presentation for the Durban Metro Councillors
WHEN?	As soon as possible. A meeting to be with councillors once the presentation documents are ready
RESPONSIBLE PERSON/BODY	Mr G Molefe (between now and the time when the project has been taken over by a responsible authority)
KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	Quick response to victim's calls and effective arrests More reliable SAPS statistics, Reduction in crime and fear of crime Availability of the crime database system that will be located in a suitable place Elimination of bottlenecks, duplication of services and conflicts Service quality, effective impact on crime.
TIME SCALE	April - August 2000.
BUDGET	The budget for various activities to be discussed by the appointed Funding Task Team



**Table D2: Working Group's Action Plan – Training**

TRAINING	
TOPIC	DESCRIPTION
WHAT?	<p>Training of volunteers in crime research methodology</p> <p>Training of lay assessors</p> <p>Training on basic arrest procedures, crime reporting, testifying in court</p> <p>Appropriate stakeholder capacity building on specific areas</p> <p>Training of Trainers by the Durban Metropolitan Council</p> <p>Disaster management training by the Durban Metropolitan Council</p> <p>Identification of existing Training Programmes.</p>
HOW?	<p>Identification of stakeholder training needs</p> <p>Development of training modules</p> <p>Development of specific training modules for the Project Team</p> <p>Increasing effective foot patrols within the pilot study area</p>
WHEN?	<p>April 2000, for evaluators and volunteers</p> <p>A short status quo report from responsible persons on what training programmes are available to be given within two weeks, feedback to be given during the next meeting on 10 April 2000</p>
RESPONSIBLE PERSON/BODY	<p>Durban City Police, Cllr Trevor Prince, SAPS, Loss Control and Disaster Management</p> <p>Co-ordinate specific issues on capacity building</p>
KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	<p>Effective contribution of the Community Police Forums (CPF)</p> <p>Feedback from the research team of the Project Team</p> <p>Effective stakeholder feedback from the SAPS</p> <p>Increase in the number of successful trainees and their feedback to the PT</p>
TIME SCALE	<p>Training of volunteering evaluators in mid April 2000</p> <p>Identify, as soon as possible, training needs for stakeholders. For SAPS liaise with C.R. Swart Square police station</p>

**Table D3: Working Group's Action Plan – Crime Awareness**

CRIME AWARENESS	
WHAT?	<p>Promotion of the Hamba Uphephile project</p> <p>Roadshow - publicity campaign</p> <p>Dissemination of information through newsletters and pamphlets,</p> <p>Crime prevention initiatives</p> <p>Reach other stakeholders and invite them to join the initiative,</p> <p>Link or establish other media columns and articles where information on this initiative can be shared by residents of greater Durban, e.g. Metrobeat,</p> <p>Crime prevention programme scope to be widened to include new issues such as drugs, alcohol abuse and other offences,</p> <p>Bus operators and their drivers could distribute awareness materials,</p> <p>Taxi operators and their drivers could distribute awareness materials,</p> <p>Metrorail could provide information distribution points where awareness materials could be made accessible to its commuters</p> <p>Link the Hamba Uphephile project to similar initiatives.</p>
HOW?	<p>DCP to inform Traders Against Crime of their territorial area of jurisdiction</p> <p>Contact Durban Metro Communications Department</p> <p>CPFs to hold meetings and distribute awareness materials such as newsletters and pamphlets</p> <p>TAC to hold meetings and distribute awareness materials such as newsletters and pamphlets</p> <p>Transport providers to distribute awareness material</p> <p>Local SAPS satellite stations to distribute awareness materials (They are currently engaged in distributing some information.)</p> <p>Project Team members will also distribute the initiatives' materials.</p>
WHEN?	<p>It was agreed that another suitable date other than 27 April 2000 be proposed as the first day of a major launch of the awareness campaign</p>
RESPONSIBLE PERSON/BODY	<p>Community Policing Forum</p> <p>HSRC/CSIR as a member of the Project Team</p> <p>Research Team to lead the development of the 1st awareness products such as newsletters and pamphlets,</p> <p>Co-opt other media agents who can provide columns for the initiative.</p>
KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	<p>Distribution of prepared awareness materials</p> <p>Increase of reporting in SAPS stations, indicating a decrease in the fear of crime</p> <p>Responses from the commuters in evaluation surveys should indicate awareness of the project</p> <p>Increase in the numbers of people visiting the Warwick Junction Precinct</p> <p>Improved feedback between SAPS and affected stakeholders.</p>
TIME SCALE	<p>Evaluation surveys in May and July 2000.</p>

**Table D4: Working Group's Action Plan – Publicity**

PUBLICITY	
WHAT?	<p>For use in marketing and for acquiring future funding</p> <p>To situate the protocol within local and national crime prevention strategies and in the minds of the recipient commuters and residents of the pilot study area</p> <p>To solicit public opinion and input towards the project.</p>
HOW?	<p>Through KZN-Live, SABC (TV channels and radio stations), and newspapers</p> <p>Documentation and interviews</p> <p>Newsletters and pamphlets, etc</p> <p>Network with Telkom to share its two hour slot on crime initiatives in Ukhozi Radio Station</p> <p>Locate other appropriate consumer channels such as Youth Radio</p> <p>Publicise all success stories irrespective, of the size of the success</p> <p>Transport and insurance industry to distribute publicity materials</p> <p>Billboards for the vision and mission statements of the Hamba Uphephile project</p>
WHEN?	As soon as possible, once funding is available .
RESPONSIBLE PERSON/BODY	<p>HSRC/CSIR. (Dr W. Schurink to assist in the design and format of the newsletter, and Ms P. Moeketsi to organise a public awareness campaign)</p> <p>Councillor Prince,</p> <p>Businesses and organisations that can provide funds</p> <p>Communications Department of the Metropolitan Council.</p>
KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	<p>Presentation of a finalised corporate marketing strategy (document)</p> <p>Presentation of the Hamba Uphephile Crime Brief</p> <p>Identification of companies who will volunteer to develop, distribute or even provide funding towards the development of material for publicity.</p>
TIME SCALE	Quarterly reviews

**Table D5: Working Group's Action Plan – Publicity**

ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGNS	
TOPIC	DESCRIPTION
WHAT?	Workshop and presentation for the Project team on Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Obtain information on current activities regarding ED plans
HOW?	Influence local Planning Departments to incorporate ED in all their designs Solicit outside assistance from NCPS and Provincial Safety Secretariat Arrange with CSIR-Boutek to give a presentation to the Project Team
WHEN?	Councillor Prince and Sgt van Bargaen to give feedback (end of April 2000)
RESPONSIBLE PERSON/BODY	HSRC/CSIR, SAPS, Metrorail, Parks and Recreation, CPF (Chairperson)
KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	Identification of potential hazard areas Implementation of ED in pilot study area Submission of ED proposal to the local Departments
TIME SCALE	Quarterly workshops for the Project Team. CSIR to arrange with its Division Boutek to present to the Project Team At least one workshop by the end of April 2000
REPORTING POINTS	
WHAT?	Identify appropriate and accessible crime reporting points (SAPS/DCP will be leading agencies) Improve reporting procedures among the transport industries (taxi, bus, train) Establish a dynamic database and see how this can be linked to existing databases Use of the GIS tool for crime mapping and as a Decision Support Tool (deployment of human resources)
HOW?	HSRC/CSIR to help install/set up database Use SAPS/DCP statistics to identify crime hot spots Make use of local knowledge (especially the Traders Against Crime) Implement GIS as part of the database
WHEN?	End of April (written report)
RESPONSIBLE PERSON/BODY	DCP/SAPS, HSRC/CSIR, Cllr Prince, Local SAPS Stations, TAC, Commuter Transport Operators (CTOs).
KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	Review of existing crime reporting points Establishment of new and modified reporting points Reduction of fear of crime Increase in the reporting of crime incidents
TIME SCALE	Quarterly 1st reporting point to be established by the end of June/July

**Table D6: Working Group’s Action Plan – Evaluation and Monitoring**

EVALUATION AND MONITORING	
WHAT?	These will be based on the above-mentioned Action Plans
HOW?	These will be based on the above-mentioned Action Plans
WHEN?	These will be based on the above-mentioned Action Plans
RESPONSIBLE PERSON/BODY	These will be based on the above-mentioned Action Plans
KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	These will be based on the above-mentioned Action Plans
TIME SCALE	These will be based on the above-mentioned Action Plans



## **ANNEXURE G**

**MONTHLY NEWSLETTERS**

Crime Prevention on Public Transport a DACST Innovation Fund Project

# Hamba Uphephile!

Issue No: 11 (September 2000)

Editor: Oliver Page

This newsletter #11 continues our regular (monthly updates) communication with you, in this project of Crime and Crime Prevention on Public Transport.

**These monthly updates will aim to:**

- Inform you on the current status of the project
- Share with you important insights gained from stakeholders
- Invite your comments on any of our research findings and initiatives implemented

**September 2000 happenings:**

• **Metrorail (National) Presentation**

On the 20<sup>th</sup> September 2000 saw a number of executives of Metrorail (National) visit Transportek. The visit was in aid of familiarising themselves with the professional services offered by Transportek and lay the foundations for a Memorandum of Understanding between the two organisations.

The project manager made a short presentation of the work done so far on the Crime and Crime Prevention on Public Transport Project, which was well received with interest shown by the executives.

• **Submission of Manuscript to UNISA Press**

During the last week of October the Phase 1 Report (An Overview of Crime and Crime Prevention on Public Transport) was submitted to UNISA Press. UNISA Press one of the foremost academic publishers in South Africa will review the manuscript and if the manuscript meets their standards it hopefully will be published.

**October 2000 expected happenings:**

• **Completion of the final report**

October sees the race by the project team to synthesise the mountains of information gained into one final report and present to DACST, on brief, on budget and on time at the end of October 2000.

• **Visit of Prof Michael Kahn**

Prof Michael Kahn of the University of Cape Town, is the DACST appointed Technical Reviewer to our project. The project team will meet with Prof Kahn and discuss a number of issues around the project to ensure that the project meets the original objectives as set out in November 1998.

• **Meeting with Warwick Junction Project Office**

Continued effort is being made by the project team to ensure the sustainability of the initiative implemented in Durban. During October the project team, will meet with members of the Warwick Junction Project Office as well as local government officials in Durban to discuss issues relating to the continuation of the initiative after October 2000.

**Conferences/Seminars**

**Transportation Research Board 80<sup>th</sup> Meeting**

This will take place from the 7 – 11<sup>th</sup> January 2001 in Washington DC. The annual TRB meetings offer the transport professional one of the largest gathering of transport professionals in one place. Papers being presented cover: energy, highways, public transport, aviation, marine, rail, intermodal, ports, freight, safety and the environment. For more information visit: <http://www4.nationalacademies.org/trb/annual.nsf>

**Iport CDROM**

Transportek is about to launch the Iport CDROM. This fully interactive transport information resource will be a state-of-the-art CDROM, giving information on everything that is to do with transport in South Africa. Aspects of the CDROM will cover current issues (updated regularly over the internet) in Transport, Provincial and National transport personalities, statistics, conferences etc. For more information on the CDROM (and having your details put on it) you can contact Ms. Constance Maleho on 012 841 3158.

**Request for Proposal Ideas**

Transportek (the foremost transport research institute in South Africa) has recently signed a joint venture agreement with the National Department of Transport. This signing has realised additional funds for renewed/cutting edge research in transportation. If you have ideas as to what new/innovative research could be undertaken in South Africa/Southern Africa on issues revolving around crime and public transport please submit your ideas/proposals to the editor.

**Towards the finishing line.....**

Many of you may have watched the Olympic Games in Australia and noticed that often the maximum effort of the athlete is expended just before the finishing line. So it is with this project, with only four weeks to go, it is full steam ahead. The project team intend to have a workshop to brainstorm the recommendations being proposed, as well as having the final report, critically assessed both in terms of its readability and technical level by an independent expert. It is hoped that the final report, will be 'world class' and will add value to a better understanding of crime and crime prevention on public transport in South Africa.

**Key team member's contact Details:**

- Oliver Page (Project Manager), Tel: (012) 841 4362 or [opage@csir.co.za](mailto:opage@csir.co.za)
- Prudence Moeketsi, Tel: (012) 841 4287 or [pmoeketsi@csir.co.za](mailto:pmoeketsi@csir.co.za)
- Willem Schurink, Tel: (012) 998 5574 or [eva@acc.co.za](mailto:eva@acc.co.za)

# Hamba Uphaphile!

Issue No: 10 (August 2000)

Editor: Oliver Page

This newsletter #10 continues our regular (monthly updates) communication with you, in this project of Crime and Crime Prevention on Public Transport.

#### These monthly updates will aim to:

- Inform you on the current status of the project
- Share with you important insights gained from stakeholders
- Invite your comments on any of our research findings and initiatives implemented

#### Erratum

In Newsletter #8 (June 2000) it was erroneously reported that the Hon. Minister of Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete launched the Crime Prevention Research Resources Centre. Please note that the centre was in fact launched by the Deputy Minister Brigitte Mabandla of DACST, who also delivered the keynote address. Apologies to Deputy Minister Brigitte Mabandla for this error.

#### August 2000 happenings:

- Visit of Mr. Renger Erenst a Dutch Police Commissioner seconded to the TNO (a Research Institution) to Transportek/CSIR. A presentation of the project was made to Mr. Erenst, (in South Africa for the Police Commissioners Conference in Durban). The presentation was well received and Mr. Ernest acknowledged that crime on public transport is a problem in the Netherlands as well.
- Hosting of a Working Group meeting in Durban to discuss a variety of issues regarding the current status of the project.
- Meetings were held with a number of media organisations with the intention of promoting the project to the people of Durban.

#### September 2000 expected happenings:

- A Working Group Meeting of Durban Stakeholders involved in the project will be convened.
- Discussions with various individuals regarding the sustainability of the project after October 2000.
- Continued publicising of the project through articles in a variety of local magazines/newspapers.

#### Sustainability

One of the aspects of this DACST Innovation Funded project is not just the innovation achieved but the potential 'sustainability' of the project. The project team and Working Group members realising this have had a number of exploratory discussions as to what may happen after October 2000 when the final report is delivered to DACST. Two options are available:

1. The initiative falls flat (possibly due non acceptance of the project by a particular role player) or

2. The initiative is championed and driven by another organisation locally based in Durban.

Option 2 is the goal that the project team will be working towards over the next few weeks. If you have any further ideas as to other options or ways to secure sustainability, please share them with the editor.

#### Conferences/Seminars

- **Effective Criminal Justice Witnesses and Victims in the Criminal Justice Process.**  
Tuesday 5 September 2000 at the CSV (Johannesburg). Call Caron Kgomo 011 403 5650 for more details.
- **A conference on Road Safety on Three Continents** (Europe, USA and Africa) will be held at the CSIR between 20 – 22 September 2000. For more information please visit <http://www.vti.se/Caltforpapers/trafficsafety.asp> or contact Dr. P. Venter 012 841 3930 (Tel).
- The 6<sup>th</sup> International Investigative Psychology Conference – **Detecting and Preventing Crime in the New Millennium.** University of Liverpool (UK) 8 – 10 January 2001. Call for Papers. For more information contact +44 151 794 3912 or [ppcsy@liverpool.ac.uk](mailto:ppcsy@liverpool.ac.uk)
- **Transport Survey Quality: How to Recognise It and How to Achieve It.** August 5 – 11, 2001, Kruger Park, South Africa. Contact the Editor or visit [http://www.its.usyd.edu.au/conferences\\_main.htm](http://www.its.usyd.edu.au/conferences_main.htm)

#### Publications

**Making South Africa Safe- A Manual for Community-Based Crime Prevention.** This document has recently been published by the National Crime Prevention Centre and is a user friendly exposition of community based crime prevention. The document (which is free) can be obtained from Philip Nel 012 421 8287 or [philipn@mweb.co.za](mailto:philipn@mweb.co.za).

#### Interesting Web Sites

The South African National Department of Transport Website can be seen at <http://www.transport.gov.za/>

#### Advertising

This newsletter is circulated to more than 200 persons involved in crime prevention with a focus on public transport. Please, if you have something that you would like to share just inform the editor and it will be placed in forthcoming issues.

#### Key team member's contact Details:

- Oliver Page (Project Manager), Tel: (012) 841 4362 or [opage@csir.co.za](mailto:opage@csir.co.za)
- Prudence Moeketsi, Tel: (012) 841 4287 or [pmoekets@csir.co.za](mailto:pmoekets@csir.co.za)
- Willem Schurink, Tel: (012) 998 5574 or [eva@acc.co.za](mailto:eva@acc.co.za)



# Hamba Uphaphile!

Issue No: 9 (July 2000)

Editor: Oliver Page

This newsletter #9 continues our regular (monthly updates) communication with you, in this project of Crime and Crime Prevention on Public Transport.

**These monthly updates will aim to:**

- Inform you on the current status of the project
- Share with you important insights gained from stakeholders
- Invite your comments on any of our research findings and initiatives implemented

**Crime and Crime Prevention on Public Transport Phase 1 Draft Report June 1999**

In the June 2000 Newsletter, solicitation was made regarding any further comments on the above report. To date none were received. It is therefore taken that readers of the Phase 1 report are satisfied with our findings. This report will be updated regarding a number of developments since June 1999 and the manuscript submitted to a potential publisher during the next few weeks.

**July 2000 happenings:**

July has been a relatively quiet month for the project team. Nevertheless, the project is ticking over and a number of activities were undertaken.

- **Presentation of paper at the South African Transport Conference, Pretoria**  
Oliver Page presented a paper entitled, 'Crime and Crime Prevention on Public Transport – Rail commuter action towards enhancing their travelling security.' The presentation presented an overview of the project as well as reporting on the findings from the October 1999 of Durban commuters. A number of commendations were received regarding the quality of the paper and presentation.

An electronic copy of the paper is attached to this newsletter. To those of you who receive the newsletter by fax/post, if you require a copy please just indicate.

- **'War on buses in Cape Town Townships'**  
All of our South African readers will no doubt be aware of the situation regarding Golden Arrow buses servicing the Cape Town Townships.

From our research it was indicated by a number of bus operators in the Metropolitan areas surveyed that they had from time to time been the target of attacks by minibus taxi or rival bus operators. Such attacks could be in the form of blockading routes, or intimidating passengers etc.

The current situation in Cape Town is extremely serious. To date there have been at least 70 attacks, which have resulted in 7 deaths (both of innocent passengers and drivers), to the extent that buses entering certain areas are either escorted by the police or the drivers must wear bullet proof vests.

Unfortunately, no arrests of the perpetrators of these crimes have been made. A number of initiatives to bring interested parties to the table have also stalled. Despite the seriousness of the situation, the bus drivers have not allowed themselves to be intimidated and are rendering services to the public who need them.

For more information on this story, visit [www.mq.co.za](http://www.mq.co.za)

**August 2000 expected happenings:**

- Seminar on 'The Role of Statistics and Research in Combating Rape,' 14 August 2000 at the CSIR. More details can be obtained from Patsy Redelinghuys on 012 841 3412 or visiting the web page on: [www.ncps-rrc.co.za](http://www.ncps-rrc.co.za).
- A Working Group Meeting of Durban Stakeholders involved in the project will be convened
- Continued publicising of the report through articles in various magazines.

**Conferences**

- A conference on **Road Safety on Three Continents** (Europe, USA and Africa) will be held at the CSIR between 20 – 22 September 2000. For more information please contact Dr. Pieter Ventér on 012 841 3930 (Tel).

**Project Completion**

There are now three more months left until project completion. There is still much to do, but we are asking for your continued support and ideas. One area where we have identified a need is the sustainability and replicability of the initiatives started in Durban. It is intended that a handbook will be produced outlining the process followed which will also give guidance to other communities/commuters in combating crime on public transport.

**Key team member's contact Details:**

- Oliver Page (Project Manager), Tel: (012) 841 4362 or [opage@csir.co.za](mailto:opage@csir.co.za)
- Prudence Moeketsi, Tel: (012) 841 4287 or [pmoekets@csir.co.za](mailto:pmoekets@csir.co.za)
- Willem Schurink, Tel: (012) 998 5574 or [eva@acc.co.za](mailto:eva@acc.co.za)

Crime Prevention on Public Transport a DACST Innovation Fund Project

# Hamba Uphethele!

Issue No: 8 (June 2000)

Editor: Oliver Page

This newsletter #8 continues our regular (monthly updates) communication with you, in this project of Crime and Crime Prevention on Public Transport.

**These monthly updates will aim to:**

- Inform you on the current status of the project
- Share with you important insights gained from stakeholders
- Invite your comments on any of our research findings and initiatives implemented

**June 2000 happenings: Training, Training, and more Training!!!**

A workshop (facilitated by Oliver Page and Prudence Moeketsi of the CSIR) was held at the Warwick Junction Project Centre over a two-day period. Approximately thirty informal stakeholders were afforded the opportunity of learning about the following subjects:

- How to conduct a safety audit on public transport
- By Laws of Durban Metropolitan Council
- Procedures for reporting crime
- Procedures followed in the court system of South Africa
- Crime Intelligence (i.e. how the security forces partner communities in the prevention on crime)
- Areas and responsibilities of the commuter rail operator Metrorail.

**CPTED Workshop**

On the 20<sup>th</sup> June a workshop in Durban was held with formal stakeholders facilitated by Karina Landman and Susan Liebermann of BOUTEK/CSIR. This workshop focussed on Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. Feedback received by the project team was that the workshop was well received by the participants.

**A Word of Thanks**

Both the HSRC and the CSIR would like to thank officials of the Warwick Junction Project Office for allowing us use of their facilities and their continued support shown throughout the project.

**Impumelelo Awards**

The annual Impumelelo Awards aim to recognise innovation in projects which build public capacity to deliver social services. Our project of Crime and Crime Prevention on Public Transportation has been submitted for consideration. More details can be found at <http://www.idasa.org.za/bis/bisimpumelelo.htm>

**Submission of Phase 1 report for publication**

The University of South Africa press has offered to consider our Phase 1 report (second draft published in

June 1999) for publication. If you have any written comments on this document, please can you forward them to the project manager before the 17<sup>th</sup> July 2000.

**London Underground Limited Visit**

At the end of May 2000 the project manager was privileged to meet in London officials from the Revenue Services Unit (headed by Geoff Dunmore) of London Underground Limited. The aim of the meeting was to discuss Fare Evasion on LUL and what strategies had been used to manage it.

**Launch of the Crime Prevention Research Resources Centre (RRC)**

Wednesday 28<sup>th</sup> June 2000 saw the official launch of the Crime Prevention Research Resources Centre in Pretoria. The keynote speaker was the Hon Minister of Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete. The Centre aims to become a clearing house of all information related to crime and violence prevention research and developments in Southern Africa. More details can be obtained from Patsy Redelinghuys on 012 841 3412 or visiting the web page on: [www.ncps-rrc.co.za](http://www.ncps-rrc.co.za).

**July 2000 expected happenings:**

- Continued quantitative surveying of stakeholders views of the process followed to attain the 'Co-operative Stakeholder Crime Prevention Model'.
- Continued meetings with various stakeholders in Durban
- On 20<sup>th</sup> July 2000 the project manager will be presenting a paper entitled, '**Crime and crime prevention on public transport – rail commuter action towards enhancing their travelling security**,' at the South African Transport Conference, 17 – 20<sup>th</sup> July 2000, CSIR Conference Centre, Pretoria. Contact Ms. Cilla Taylor 012 667 3681 or Email [confplan@iafrica.com](mailto:confplan@iafrica.com) for more details. Copies of the paper will be available with the July 2000 newsletter.

**October 1999 Preliminary Survey Results**

Continued from the May 2000 newsletter. Of the 472 criminal incidents personally experienced:

- Pickpocketing accounted for 118 (25%),
- Intimidation leading to theft 109 (23%) and
- Stabbing 49 (10%)

**Key team member's contact Details:**

- Oliver Page (Project Manager), Tel: (012) 841 4362 or [opage@csir.co.za](mailto:opage@csir.co.za)
- Prudence Moeketsi, Tel: (012) 841 4287 or [pmoekets@csir.co.za](mailto:pmoekets@csir.co.za)
- Willem Schurink, Tel: (012) 998 5574 or [eva@acc.co.za](mailto:eva@acc.co.za)



## **ANNEXURE I**

**1999 International Crime Prevention through  
Environmental Design Conference Programme**

DATE / TIME	EVENT / SESSION	LOCATION	DATE / TIME	EVENT / SESSION	LOCATION
<b>SUNDAY, September 19, 1999</b>					
6:00 - 7:00 p.m.	Pre-Registration Out-of-town Delegates	Mississauga Novotel Hotel - Paris Room A - Upper Lobby Floor	9:45 a.m.	"The City of Oakland's Campaign to Bust Crime"	Hammerson Hall
7:00 - 9:00 p.m.	Welcome Reception	Mississauga Novotel Hotel - Paris Room A - Upper Lobby Floor	10:30 a.m.	<b>BREAK</b>	
<b>MONDAY, September 20, 1999</b>			10:45 a.m.	Panel Discussion "Safe Community and the Marketplace"	Hammerson Hall
8:00 a.m.	Registration	Mississauga Living Arts Centre - Atrium	12:00 Noon	<b>BUFFET LUNCHEON</b>	Atrium
9:00 a.m.	Opening Ceremonies	Hammerson Hall	1:30 p.m.	<b>Breakout Sessions:</b>	
10:00 a.m.	<b>BREAK</b>		4a	CPTED from the Heart - An Intuitive Approach in Institutional Settings	Staging Room
10:15 a.m.	Keynote Session: "The Fundamentals of a Safe and Healthy Community"	Hammerson Hall	4b	Designing Safety into the Planning of Waterfront Parks	Bank of Montreal South
12:00 Noon	<b>LUNCH</b>	Each delegate is responsible for own arrangements	4c	Lighting Design and Application	Bank of Montreal North
1:30 p.m.	<b>Breakout Sessions:</b>		4d	Building Community Partners for Safety	Rogers Theatre
	1a An Introduction to CPTED and its Principles	Staging Room			
	1b Visions for New Community Planning	Bank of Montreal South			
	1c <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Evaluating Crime Hot spots with CPTED	Rogers Theatre			
	1d Integration of CPTED into the Planning Process	Bank of Montreal North			
2:45 p.m.	<b>BREAK</b>		2:45 p.m.	<b>BREAK</b>	
3:00 p.m.	<b>Breakout Sessions:</b>		3:00 p.m.	<b>Breakout Sessions/Tours:</b>	
	2a Local Knowledge of Safe Cities - Using CPTED to Build a Citizens Movement	Staging Room	5a	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Safe Shopping is Good Business	Staging Room
	2b A Mainstreet is the Foundation of a Community	Bank of Montreal South	5b	Creating an Urban Sense of Place - An Overview of the Dundas Square Project - Toronto	Bank of Montreal South
	2c New Perspective - Livability and Safety of High Density Housing	Rogers Theatre	5c	Eyes on the Rural Community	Rogers Theatre
	2d New and Creative Approaches to CPTED	Bank of Montreal North	5d	Grass Roots Crime Prevention	Bank of Montreal North
4:30 p.m.	<b>END of DAY SESSIONS</b>		5e	Working Examples of CPTED Residential Design - a bus tour of the Trelawny and Savannah Projects	Departure Point: Atrium
7:00 p.m.	3a Evening Lighting Tour	Departure Point: Mississauga Novotel Hotel Lobby			
7:00 p.m.	Board of Directors' Meeting	Mississauga Novotel Hotel - Vienna Room, Upper Lobby Floor	4:30 p.m.	<b>END of DAY SESSIONS</b>	
<b>TUESDAY, September 21, 1999</b>			5:00 p.m.	Networking Reception and the Design Charette Presentations	Mississauga Civic Centre - Great Hall
8:00 a.m.	Design Charette	Mississauga Civic Centre - Committee Rooms A,B,C,D, 2nd Floor	7:00 p.m.	International CPTED Association Sub-committee Meetings	Mississauga Civic Centre -
9:00	"The Alchemy of CPTED" Less Magic, More Science	Hammerson Hall		1) CPTED Training and Education	Committee Room "A"
				2) Advanced Research and Development	Committee Room "B"
			<b>WEDNESDAY, September 22, 1999</b>		
			8:30 a.m.	AGM/Business session/ Continental breakfast for all Participants	Royal Bank Theatre
			10:30 a.m.	<b>BREAK</b>	
			10:45 a.m.	Panel Discussion "Where do we go from here?"	Royal Bank Theatre
			11:45 am	Chair's Closing Remarks	Royal Bank Theatre
			12:00 Noon	<b>END OF CONFERENCE</b>	

**TABLE H 2**  
**TECHNICAL TEAM FOR THE LAST MEETING – (CONVENED BY THE CEO)**

<b>NAME</b>	<b>METROPOLITAN UNIT</b>
Mr Richard Dobson	Implementation Leader
Mr Kevin Bennet	Operations Team Leader
Ms Sue Wilkinson	Project Leader *
Mr Hoosen Moola	Co-ordinator Special Operations
Mr Adriaan Peters	Traffic and Transportation
Mr Sid Brettel	Safer Cities
Mr Mduduzi Mashiyane	Safer Cities
Mr Mike Andrews	Development Facilitation
Inspector Vincent Ngubane	Durban Metropolitan Police
<b>Other organisations</b>	
Mr Goodenough Molefe	KLS Consulting – Project Co-ordinator
Mr Oliver Page	CSIR – Project Leader
* Richard Dobson has assumed this role (from 01 October 2000)	



**TABLE H 1**  
**STAKEHOLDER MEETINGS (HOME FOR THE HAMBA UPHEPHILE PROJECT)**

<b>DATE</b>	<b>TIME</b>	<b>NAME OF ORGANISATION</b>	<b>CONTACT PERSON</b>
18-08-00	09h00	Emergency Services	Sid Brettel
" "	12h00	Traders Against Crime	Nicholas Zondo
21-08-00	09h00	Safer Cities Project	Sid Brettel
" "	11h30	Crime Watch	Chris Edmunds
" "	14h00	Metrorail	Ranesh Sivanarain
22-08-00	11h00	City Engineers Department (Traffic and Transportation)	Clara Shewpersad
01-09-00	10h00	Universal Security Services	Sbu Xulu
06-09-00	14h00	CEO – North Central and South Central Local Council	Sibusiso Sithole
26-09-00	09h00	Universal Security Services	Sbu Xulu
" "	11h00	Councillor Trevor Prince  (South Central Local Council)	Cllr T. Prince
28-09-00	15h30	Warwick Junction Project officials	Richard Dobson
04-10-00	13h30	SAPS – CR Swart Square	Director Harry
05-10-00	11h00	CEO - North Central and South Central Local Council and other metropolitan departmental officials	Sibusiso Sithole



## **ANNEXURE H**

**STAKEHOLDER MEETINGS ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF  
THE PROJECT**

# Hamba Uphephile!

Issue No: 6 (April 2000)

Editor: Oliver Page

This newsletter #6 continues our regular (monthly updates) communication with you, in this project of Crime and Crime Prevention on Public Transport.

#### These monthly updates will aim to:

- Inform you on the current status of the project
- Share with you important insights gained from stakeholders
- Invite your comments on any of our research findings and initiatives implemented

#### April 2000 happenings:

- It has been a relatively quiet month due to a number of public holidays falling during this month which impacted on our proposed project schedule.
- The report of the Project Manager's trip to the UK and US in January 2000, where he met with a number of transit security officials of the New York Transit Police and the British Transport Police has been written. Copies can be obtained on request.

#### Development of the Crime Prevention Model

The process of developing the 'Stakeholder Co-operative Crime Prevention Model' has been a long process; requiring much patience, nurturing and understanding. Nevertheless, during the process a number of lessons have been learnt by the Research Team as well as the Working Group as follows:

- The development of trust between the Stakeholders and the Research Team took more time than was anticipated and it could not be rushed. This aspect of the project process was not accommodated for in the original project plan.
- The focus in the original project plan was to obtain a better relationship between the formal security agents (the South African Police Services) and the informal stakeholders (the latter group based at modal interchanges). The Research Team had reconfigured this objective into having all stakeholders involved in crime and crime prevention on public transport improve their working relationship (in combating crime on their systems through) through improved coordination.
- The principal requirement for sustainability of the crime prevention initiative did not allow for fast tracking the buy-in of stakeholders. If the Research Team had marched too fast, there would have been a danger that the stakeholders could perceive us as dictating to them and hence view the process as a top down rather than participatory (bottom up).

- The widening of the stakeholder base (operating within and around Durban) involved ensuring that all key stakeholders involved in public transportation and safety and security were brought on board.
- The bottom up approach followed (which is also endorsed by the Utilisation Focused Evaluation Methodology (UFE)) resulted in securing the buy-in of/feedback from the stakeholders on a number of occasions. This iterative approach significantly lengthened particular phases of the original project plan.
- It became clear that a new methodology had to be developed for this unique project. Reviewing contemporary views and practices from the field of programme evaluation and developing guidelines for the Consortium's initiative also took time.

#### Forthcoming Conferences

You may be interested in the following:

- First Announcement & Call for Papers - 2nd World Conference on **Modern Criminal Investigation, Organised Crime & Human Rights**. Venue: **International Convention Centre, Durban, South Africa** Date: **27-31 August 2001**

For more information: Tel: 011 442 6111 or visit <http://www.eventdynamics.co.za/>

#### Erratum

The contact number for the **Conference on Modern Criminal Investigation, Organised Crime & Human Rights** (described above) should read as above and not 011 442 611 as indicated in the March 2000 newsletter.

#### May 2000 expected happenings:

- Due to the disruption of intended project actions, next month will see the resumption of the actions postponed from April 2000. (Refer to March 2000 newsletter).
- A detailed report of the Stakeholder Co-operative Crime Prevention Model will be finalised. Copies will be made available in June 2000.

#### Key team member's contact Details:

- Oliver Page, Tel: (012) 841 4362 or [opage@csir.co.za](mailto:opage@csir.co.za)
- Prudence Moeketsi, Tel: (012) 841 4287 or [pmoeketsi@csir.co.za](mailto:pmoeketsi@csir.co.za)
- Willem Schurink, Tel: (012) 998 5574 or [eva@acc.co.za](mailto:eva@acc.co.za)
- Goodenough Molefe, Tel: 082 477 9881 or [glmolefe@lskzn.co.za](mailto:glmolefe@lskzn.co.za)



# Crime Prevention on Public Transport a DACST Innovation Fund Project

## Hamba Uphethele!

**Issue No: 7 (May 2000)**

**Editor: Oliver Page**

This newsletter #7 continues our regular (monthly updates) communication with you, in this project of Crime and Crime Prevention on Public Transport.

### These monthly updates will aim to:

- Inform you on the current status of the project
- Share with you important insights gained from stakeholders
- Invite your comments on any of our research findings and initiatives implemented

### May 2000 happenings: Training, Training, and more Training!!!

A workshop (facilitated by Dr. W. Schurink, Mr. Mandla Seleokane and Mr. Keme William Dichaba of the HSRC) was held at the Warwick Junction Project Centre over a four-day period. Thirty four informal stakeholders were afforded the opportunity of learning about the following subjects:

- ♦ Social science research approaches
- ♦ Unstructured interviewing methods
- ♦ Victim interview scheduling
- ♦ Role-playing with interview schedules and discussions
- ♦ Guidelines on field interview techniques
- ♦ Exercises in writing field-notes
- ♦ Understanding the South African Bill of rights
- ♦ How to conduct a civilian (citizen's) arrest

You can contact Dr. Schurink (details below) for more information on the courses.

A number of meetings were also held between the research team and various representatives from the following organisations in Durban:

- ♦ SAPS
- ♦ Durban City Police
- ♦ Local councillors (in the study area)
- ♦ Warwick Junction Project Office
- ♦ Traders Against Crime

### Recently Published Reports:

**'Justice versus Retribution: Attitudes to punishment in the Eastern Cape'**, by Martin Schonteich of the Institute of Security Studies (South Africa). This report makes interesting reading validating some of the findings of our study as to the public's perception of crime and justice. The report can be gained from the Institute by calling (012) 346 9500 or email: [iss@iss.co.za](mailto:iss@iss.co.za).

### October 1999 Preliminary Survey Results

In October 1999 the research team undertook a survey of commuters at the Berea Road/Warwick Junction Modal Interchange. Summary statistics are as follows:

- 1908 commuters were surveyed, over a 5 day period (6am to 18hrs each day)
- 58% (1107) were males and 42% (801) females.
- 33% (643) were commuters who had used commuter rail on the day that they were surveyed, with 29% (569) respectively for minibus-taxi, 28% (543) bus, 4% (76) car, 4% (69) walked and 2% (8) did not indicate the transport mode used.
- 16% (303) of those interviewed had been a victim of crime related to public transport in 1999
- 38% (131) of the incidents analysed in our study occurred on a commuter train or at the train station,
- 15% (57) of the incidents analysed in our study occurred on a bus or at a bus stop
- 15% (56) of the incidents analysed in our study occurred on a minibus taxi or at a taxi rank
- 25% of the incidents described were pick-pocketing related. This being the most common type of criminal incident.

### June 2000 expected happenings:

- **Launch of the Visit and Explore South Africa (VESA) Tourism CD-ROM.**

Transportek in collaboration with the South African Tourism Authority (SATOUR) has produced a 'state of the art' interactive CD-ROM on tourism in South Africa. The CD-ROM presents in detail the vast splendour and beauty of diversity of South Africa. More details can be obtained from Chris Rust on 012 841 2927 or email [crust@csir.co.za](mailto:crust@csir.co.za)

- Quantitative surveying of stakeholders views of the process followed to attain the 'Co-operative Stakeholder Crime Prevention Model'.
- **Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Workshop**  
A workshop for interested persons is being held in Durban on CPTED on the 19/20<sup>th</sup> June 2000 (facilitated by BOUTEK of the CSIR). Please contact Prudence Moeketsi (contact details below) if you would like to attend as numbers are limited.

### Forthcoming Conferences:

The Project Manager will be presenting a paper at the: **The South African Transport Conference, 17 – 20<sup>th</sup> July 2000 at the CSIR Conference Centre, Pretoria.** Contact Ms. Cilla Taylor 012 667 3681 or Email [confplan@iafrica.com](mailto:confplan@iafrica.com).

### Key team member's contact Details:

- Oliver Page, Tel: (012) 841 4362 or [opage@csir.co.za](mailto:opage@csir.co.za)
- Prudence Moeketsi, Tel: (012) 841 4287 or [pmoekets@csir.co.za](mailto:pmoekets@csir.co.za)
- Willem Schurink, Tel: (012) 998 5574 or [eva@acc.co.za](mailto:eva@acc.co.za)



## **ANNEXURE J**

**BIBLIOGRAPHY OF DOCUMENTS COLLECTED WHILST AT THE 1999  
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH  
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN**

## RESOURCE DIRECTORY COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION & SAFETY

TITLE	TYPE	AUTHOR	NOTES
1998 Annual Report	Pamphlet	Brampton Safe City Association	Canada
A Working Guide for Planning and Designing Safer Urban Environments	Report	Safe City Committee of the City of Toronto	Canada
Auto Theft Reduction Program 2000	Pamphlet	Toronto Police	Canada
Brampton Block Parent Program – Newsletter Spring 1999	Newsletter	Brampton Block Parent Program	Canada
Community Crime Prevention Grant Program	Report	Minister of the Solicitor General Province of Ontario	Canada
CPTED Rail, Transit & Terminal Assessment Form	Booklet	TDC Associates 1995	Canada
CPTED: Past, Present and Future	Paper	C Ray Jeffery	USA
Crime Prevention Handbook	Booklet	Mississauga Crime Prevention Association	Canada
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design	Report	Peel CPTED Advisory Committee	Canada
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design	Pamphlet	The Mississauga CPTED Advisory Committee	Canada
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design in Public Housing	Report	US Dept of Housing and Urban Development	USA
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design in South Africa	Report	CSIR and the Institute of Security Studies	South Africa
Crime Stoppers	Pamphlet	Toronto and Regional Crime Stoppers	Canada
Environmental Design for Safer Communities in South Africa	Report	CSIR and the Institute of Security Studies	South Africa
Home Health and Safety Patrol	Pamphlet	America Sensors	USA
Kid Safe – A Kid's Guide to Community Safety	Newsletter	Toronto Star	Canada
Making Brampton the Safest City in Canada	Pamphlet	Brampton Safe City Association	Canada
METRAC Safety Audit Checklist	Pamphlet	METRAC	Canada
Neighbourhood Watch	Pamphlet	Crime Concern	Canada
Operation Lifesaver	Children's Activity Book and posters	Transport Canada	Canada

## RESOURCE DIRECTORY COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION & SAFETY

TITLE	TYPE	AUTHOR	NOTES
Protect Yourself	Pamphlet	Toronto Police	Canada
Purse Snatch – Robbery and Theft Prevention	Pamphlet	Toronto Police Service	Canada
Robbery Prevention – Suggested Guidelines	Booklet	Metropolitan Toronto Police	Canada
Safer by Design	Report	CSIR and the Institute of Security Studies	South Africa
Safety is Everybody's Business	Presentation	METRAC	Canada
Safety of Children Starts on Our Streets _Become a Block Parent Today!	Pamphlet	The Block Parent Program of Canada	Canada
Secure Stations Scheme – Guidelines for operators	Booklet	Crime Concern	United Kingdom
Seniors & Police Summer '99	Newsletter	Peel Regional Police	Canada
Shifting to a Geographic, Team Approach to Service Delivery	Presentation	City of Oakland	USA
The Alchemy of CPTED: Less magic, more science!	Paper	Dr. Randall I Atlas	Canada
Turn off the Violence – Can you Recognise Violence?	Pamphlet	Crime Concern	Canada
What is a Caring Community	Pamphlet	Crime Concern	Canada
What is Suspicious	Pamphlet	Scarborough Neighbourhood Watch	Canada
Working for You	Booklet	Region of Peel	
Would you like to make Brampton the Safest City in Canada?	Pamphlet	Brampton Safe City Association	Canada

## RESOURCE DIRECTORY COMMUNITY COMMUTER PERCEPTIONS OF TRANSPORT SERVICE/SECURITY

TITLE	TYPE	AUTHOR	NOTES
New Yorkers' Perception of Fear and Disorder in the Subway 1998 – 1992	Report	Metropolitan Transportation Authority Department of Police and Planning	USA
New Yorkers' Perception of Subway Service 1992	Report	Metropolitan Transportation Authority Department of Police and Planning	USA

## RESOURCE DIRECTORY CORPORATE CRIME PREVENTION & SAFETY

TITLE	TYPE	AUTHOR	NOTES
Corporate Physical Security	Pamphlet	KMPG Investigation	USA
Violence in the Workplace – How to Develop your Programme	Presentation	SEARS	USA

## RESOURCE DIRECTORY COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION & SAFETY WOMEN

TITLE	TYPE	AUTHOR	NOTES
Making Transit Stops Safer for Women	Report	Scarborough Moves Forward	Canada
Making your Community and Workplace Safer for Women	Pamphlet	METRAC	Canada
Moving Forward – Making Transit Safer for Women	Report (bound)	Toronto Transit Commission/METRAC	Canada
Moving Forward – Making Transit Safer for Women 1989	Report (unbound)	Toronto Transit Commission/METRAC	Canada
Take Back Toronto! Safety Tips for Women	Pamphlet	Safe City Committee	Canada
Wife Assault – It is a Crime	Pamphlet	Ontario Women's Directorate	Canada
Women's Safety Audit Guide	Booklet	METRAC	Canada

## RESOURCE DIRECTORY COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION TRANSIT/TRANSPORT

TITLE	TYPE	AUTHOR	NOTES
Do something about danger, aggressive driving. Report it.	Pamphlet	Road Watch	Canada
1999 Corporate Security Districts and Zones	Map	Toronto Transit Commission	Canada
Help Make the Better Way the Safer Way	Pamphlet	Toronto Transit Commission	Canada
Help Make the Better Way the Safer Way	Pamphlet	Toronto Transit Commission	Canada
Keeping Metro and the TTC Safe and Secure	Pamphlet	Toronto Transit Commission	Canada
Safety and Security on the TTC	Booklet	Toronto Transit Commission	Canada
Security Procedures for Collectors	Pamphlet	Toronto Transit Commission	Canada
Security Procedures for Janitors	Pamphlet	Toronto Transit Commission	Canada
Security Procedures for Subway Operators	Pamphlet	Toronto Transit Commission	Canada
Security Procedures for Surface Operators	Pamphlet	Toronto Transit Commission	Canada
Security Public Awareness Campaign	Pamphlet	Toronto Transit Commission	Canada
System Security Program Plan	Report	Toronto Transit Commission	Canada
TTC Your Safety Partner – Passenger Guide to TTC Safety Features	Pamphlet	Toronto Transit Commission	Canada
Can you make the grade?	Pamphlet	Transport Canada	Canada
Crime Prevention Checklist	Pamphlet	Canadian Pacific Railway Police Service	Canada
Operation Lifesaver	Pamphlet	Transport Canada	Canada
Rail Safety and You	Video	Canadian Pacific Police	Canada
Transit Policing Spring 1994	Journal	Transit Police Service	USA

## RESOURCE DIRECTORY COMMUNITY MISCELLANEOUS

TITLE	TYPE	AUTHOR	MAIN SUBJECT	NOTES
1999 CPTED International Association Conference Programme	Booklet	CPTED	Conference Programme	Canada
1999 International CPTED Association Conference - Program at a Glance	Programme	CPTED	Conference Programme	Canada
Community Safety and Crime Prevention	Pamphlet	University of the West of England, Bristol	Distance Learning Course	United Kingdom
GO	Folder	Go Transit	GO Transit promotional material	Canada
International CPTED Association Members Directory	Addresses	International CPTED Association	Members listing	USA
Get Involved	Pamphlet	Central Ontario Crime Prevention Association	Membership form	Canada
International CPTED News July 1999	Newsletter	International CPTED Association	Newsletter	USA
Saving lives along Canada's railways – Direction 2006	Folder	Transport Canada	Personal safety/security promotional material from commuter rail perspective	Canada
Info on GO (Greater Ontario Mass Transit System)	Folder	GO Transit	Personal safety/security promotional material from commuter rail perspective	Canada
Customer Oriented Policing and Problem Solving (COPPS)	Booklet	Canadian Pacific Railway Police Service	Policing	Canada



## **PHASE ONE**

### **CRIME AND CRIME PREVENTION ON PUBLIC TRANSPORT -**

### **A CASE STUDY OF THREE SOUTH AFRICAN MODAL INTERCHANGES**

This report was written by a consortium of companies the names of the team leaders and their members are as indicated:

#### **CSIR**

Oliver Page (Team Leader)  
Prudence Moeketsi  
Solly Matjila  
Tuelo Mogashoa  
Lucet Ramokgopa  
Diamond Motha  
L Molefe

#### **HSRC**

Dr. Willem Schurink (Team Leader)  
William Dichaba  
Victor Ramaema

#### **CSV**

David Bruce (Team leader)  
Joe Komane



# 1. INTRODUCTION

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## 1.1. Background to the project

A limited amount of research has been conducted in the area of crime on board public transport in the South African context. Such studies as have been done (which will be acknowledged throughout this report) noted that formal crime prevention strategies could help to reduce crime on board public transport. Despite some of these strategies having been implemented over the years, on board crime continues to affect public transport commuters.

In a previous transport research project (focussing on crime at Modal Interchanges) by Amanda Meyer<sup>2</sup> of the CSIR it was stated that the solution to safer public transport lay in the hands of the communities served and in a close relationship between communities and their law enforcement agencies. This will be the focus of this ground-breaking project funded by the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST) through its Innovation Fund.

In 1997/98 the CSIR, through its strategic focus on crime prevention, initiated and funded a pilot project to investigate crime at public transport Modal Interchanges (MI). The research, based on community inputs, combined with research on the psychology of crime, highlighted crucial aspects about crime patterns and the fear of crime at these MI. Although the initial research could not sufficiently address crime on board public transport vehicles *per se*, certain perceptions were identified, e.g. crime on board trains was still considered to be very high and no community policing was perceived as taking place on trains. Thus, the investigation of crime on board transport vehicles, forms the platform of this report.

## 1.2. Objectives of the Phase 1 research

The objectives of the Phase 1 can be summarised as:

- a) Investigation into on board crime (commuter bus, commuter rail and minibus taxi) and determining how this crime is perceived by public transport users. This necessitated involved the following tasks:
  - determination of the *status quo* in regard to on board crime and crime prevention from a corporate view and a community view. This focuses on three metropolitan areas and input is obtained from all stakeholders (formal and informal),
  - determination of the actual levels of on board crime and of factors affecting such levels,
  - investigating whether there is a relationship between on board policing (formal and informal) and on board crime levels, and
  - determination of what corporate and community strategies are being used to enhance crime prevention on board public transport.
- b) A cursory investigation into taxi drive-by shootings. This necessitated the following tasks:
  - gathering national statistics on drive-by shootings,
  - determining where (in a provincial sense) the largest numbers of such incidents occur,
  - determining the main reasons for taxi drive-by shootings, and
  - determining the status-quo of taxi drive-by shootings.

c) Investigation of informal policing and 'spontaneously formed' crime prevention groups at MIs. This necessitated the following tasks:

- establishing whether informal crime prevention activities and/or structures are found in Cape Town (Wynberg MI), Durban (Berea Station MI), and Pretoria (Belle Ombre MI). the geographical locations of these cities are indicated in Figure 1.1.
- describing the nature of the activities performed at MIs by individuals to prevent crime and/or, where such activities are informally structured, their social organisation;
- eliciting from the stakeholders identified their perceptions about crime and social problems, how these should be dealt with, and the range of claims, concerns, and issues they may hold in relation to these informal crime prevention initiatives;
- describing the crime phenomena and other social problems found at MIs and how these are addressed.



**Figure 1.1: Geographical locations of the Modal Interchanges studied**

d) investigation into the reasons for the distrust between the formal policing agents and the communities that they serve. This will also include an analysis of police attitudes towards informal policing groups within these communities. This necessitated the following tasks:

- investigation of police attitudes towards the phenomenon of vigilantism and towards those individuals or groups involved in vigilante activities,
- determination of the extent to which the police are amenable to developing a closer relationship with the groups concerned, and
- investigating 'police-community' relationships generally, particularly the police's experience of these relationships.

### **1.3. Methodology of Phase 1 research**

Three broad research methodologies were available to the researchers, namely: quantitative, qualitative and participatory methodologies. The methodology (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4) used in this research primarily followed the investigative/qualitative research route, supplemented by quantitative methodology and participatory observation as and when these were required to enable the objectives to be attained. Use of the qualitative methodology approach we aimed to elucidate what the people interviewed experienced, how they interpreted their experiences and how they structured the world in which they live. To summarise, the following methods were used:

- Literature searches (primarily focusing on Southern African resources)
- Interviews with transport experts to draw on research from past studies;
- Interviews with formal stakeholders, i.e. transport providers such as Public Utility Transport Corporation (PUTCO), Metrorail and Taxi Associations;
- Interviews with formal public and private security providers, e.g. the South African Police Service (SAPS), Paige's Security;
- Participant observation techniques, and
- Individual and group (focus group) interviews with informal stakeholders, e.g. bus commuters. These interviews took the form of structured (i.e. interviews based on prepared questions in the form of an interview guide) and unstructured interviews.

### **1.4. Scope of Phase 1 research**

It is accepted that the influence crime on society should be limited. The focus of the analysis shifts from being offender-based to being victim-based. In keeping with the DACST Innovation Fund thrust this report will primarily look at crime and crime prevention on board public transport from a community perspective. This will involve obtaining an understanding of community perceptions and responses to on board crime and crime prevention, which will provide insight when strategies are formulated to resolve crime issues.

By focusing on three MIs and using qualitative research methodology (to be discussed in Chapter 4) the resulting information primarily reflects the local environment. Nevertheless, such information can represent a piece of a jigsaw which when added to information from other MIs and voices of other focus groups, will complete the picture of on board crime and crime prevention in the national context.

It should be noted that this report primarily focuses on on board crime on public transport routes originating/terminating at the MIs defined. It does not analyse crime outside the transport vehicle itself, e.g. crime taking place on the station concourse is excluded. Nevertheless, informal crime prevention strategies to combat crime on board the transport vehicle and at the MI are presented. This has been done in order to indicate how commuters/users of MI are helping themselves to create a safer travelling/working environment.

This report will primarily draw on South African research and strategies towards on board crime. The development of public transport in South Africa (taking into account its historical development as a tool of apartheid) has been unique. This fact has necessitated the continued development of innovative solutions and strategies which will enable the public transport system to meet the vision of the Transport White Paper (see Section 1.1). Some of solutions and strategies are contained in the Moving South Africa Report<sup>3</sup>.

## **1.5. Phase 1 report structure**

The structure of the report is as follows:

Chapter 1	Introduction and a background to the research into crime and crime prevention on board public transportation
Chapter 2	Crime theory and an overview of crime in South Africa
Chapter 3	The research area (i.e. physical locations of the MIs)
Chapter 4	Methodology
Chapter 5	Discussion of key issues resulting from researching commuters' and formal stakeholders' perceptions of on board crime
Chapter 6	An overview of fare evasion
Chapter 7	An overview of taxi drive-by shootings
Chapter 8	Presentation of community on board public transportation crime prevention strategies
Chapter 9	Discussion of community crime prevention activities/structures at MIs
Chapter 10	Formal stakeholder on board public transportation crime prevention strategies
Chapter 11	Policing concepts and vigilantism
Chapter 12	More on policing and vigilantism
Chapter 13	Police-community relationships and attitudes
Chapter 14	Conclusions emanating from this research
Chapter 15	Recommendations

## **1.6. Summary**

This chapter presented an introductory overview of the research that has been conducted in the first phase of research into on board crime and crime prevention on public transportation (spanning a period of twenty four months).

## 2. CRIME AN OVERVIEW

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No crime prevention drive should be seen in isolation, but must be visualised against the background of criminology as a whole. This chapter will therefore briefly discuss theories of crime and give an overview of the current crime environment in South Africa.

### 2.1. Crime theory

Crime has become a front-page news item in the daily lives of many South Africans. What has given rise to this and how can it be resolved? are questions that are being asked of politicians and social scientists. It is not within the scope of this report to give a detailed analysis of crime in society. Nevertheless, a basic understanding of crime theory will provide additional insight into the possible theories which may give rise to crime on board public transport.

Crime can be defined as 'the breaking of laws'. In addition, Sutherland (quoted by Brown<sup>4</sup> (p19)) noted that, '[an] unlawful act is not defined as criminal by the fact that it is punished, but by the fact that it is punishable.' This definition, therefore encompasses all criminal acts that are committed, whether or not the culprit has been apprehended. For example, a passenger who smokes cannabis (locally known and referred to in this report as 'dagga') publicly and where fellow passengers do nothing about it, is committing a criminal act, similar to that of another passenger who steals another's property and is subsequently apprehended by a security official.

Crime can be an act of:

- **Commission**  
Commission of a prohibited act, e.g. such as murdering or robbing a fellow passenger on a train
- **Omission**  
The Failure to perform a required act, e.g. a passenger not purchasing a valid ticket before commencing travel.

There are six basic paradigms which have formed mainstream crime thinking. These paradigms provide a theoretical basis as to why crime may or may not be committed or not by the offender. These paradigms are summarised in Table 2.1.

Crime prevention, as used in this report, is defined by Needle<sup>5</sup> (p 29), as 'the anticipation, recognition and appraisal of a crime and the initiation of some action to keep it from occurring.'

Furthermore, crime and crime on board public transport can be seen as a symptom of a dysfunctional community or society at large. The statement that 'a society that fails to provide a humane existence for all its citizens, gets the crime it deserves,' (Brown<sup>4</sup>, (p16)) may well provide an explanation for communities/societies struggling with crime.

Table 2.1: Crime Paradigms			
Crime Paradigm	Explanation for crime	Crime focus	Notes
Free will	Individuals are able to make rational and calculating choices regarding their own behaviour.	Any criminalised behaviour	Criminal choices are made when advantageous
Positivism	Forces beyond the control of individuals, rather than rational decisions, determine criminal behaviour	Any deviant or criminal behaviour.	Deficient social fabric, e.g. poor family structure
Interactionism	Reactions of persons and groups to particular behaviour result in some types of people being labelled criminals		Society labelling certain types of behaviour (which otherwise would be classed as trivial) as deviant
Critical perspective	Power elites define crime and operate agencies of social control in their own interest, preserving their position in society	Crime of the state and powerful individuals	
Integration	Crime can be explained by combining two or more theoretical perspectives	Varies with the theories incorporated	
Environmental	Crime is often concentrated in particular 'hot spots' located in specific geographical areas and which occur at particular times		

## 2.2. Criminal acts

Crime can be classified in a number of different ways. The general classification used by the SAPS is summarised in Table 2.2.

<b>Table 2.2: Categorisation of criminal acts having some relevance to on board crime</b>		
<b>Criminal act</b>	<b>Examples</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Violent crimes	Murder	
	Attempted murder	
	Robbery with aggravating circumstances	Generally including the use of dangerous weapons; depending on the specific circumstances, this class of crime sometimes includes mugging.
Social fabric crimes	Rape	At transport interchanges or inside transport vehicles
	Assault with grievous bodily harm	
	Gross indecency (sexual)	Exposing one's genitalia in public
	Common assault	
	Theft of motor vehicles (including the theft of minibus taxis)	Hijacking of vehicles (whilst operating with passengers on board)
	Theft from transport vehicles	Theft of passengers' belongings or vehicle items, e.g. light bulbs, doors
Violence aimed at property	Arson	The setting on fire of the property of the transport provider
	Malicious damage to property	Vandalism, graffiti and stone throwing perpetrated from inside or outside the transport vehicle
Crimes dependent on transport provider or police action for detection	Illegal possession of firearms	
	Drug-related crime	Being in personal possession of more than 150 grams of dagga (i.e. cannabis)
	Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	Applying to drivers of transport vehicles
	Prostitution and child prostitution	Using the transport interchange or vehicle as a base for this type of activity.
	Fare evasion	

Only violent crimes, social fabric crimes, crimes against property and crimes dependent on SAPS action for detection that have the potential of taking place on board public transport in South Africa are analysed in this report. An overview of taxi violence in the form of taxi drive-by shootings is discussed in Chapter 7.

### 2.2.1 Sub-criminal acts

Sub-criminal acts which are not provided for in the categories contained in Table 2.2 above can also be prevalent on board public transport. Such sub-criminal acts can be explained by anti-social behaviour. Examples of this type of behaviour can be seen in: staring at or making lewd remarks to a fellow passenger. Such activities, despite having an unwanted and unwarranted effect on the 'victim', are not covered in this report.

### 2.3. Goals of criminal justice

In her report 'Crime Prevention at Modal Interchanges'<sup>2</sup>, Meyer said that a plausible link to crime prevention lay with informal policing groups. These had developed as a result of victims and witnesses feeling incapacitated by the workings of the formal security providers (at MIs and by justice system. In an ideal environment what should the goals of the criminal justice system be? Some of these goals are indicated in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3: Goals of an ideal criminal justice system (Brown <sup>4</sup> )		
Goal	Definition	On board context
Deterrence	Prevention of crime by instilling a fear of punishment in potential offenders by using punitive sanctions to dissuade persons from committing criminal offences	Patrolling by informal and formal security agents
Incapacitation	Prevention of crime by physically eliminating capacity for crime	Imprisoning offenders Banning of known criminals from using public transport
Rehabilitation	Preventing additional criminal acts by offenders through elimination of their motives to offend	Encouraging ownership of public transport by the community Marshalling of MIs by ex-offenders
Retribution	Punishment of offenders because they deserve it as a consequence of their law violations	

### 2.4. Crime measurement

Various methods have been used to compile crime statistics. These methods may be summarised as:

- General crime reports
- Crime victimisation surveys
- Self-report data

Each of the above methods has its unique advantages and disadvantages. They are also somewhat limited in giving a picture of the perception of crime (from the viewpoint of the potential criminal and the potential victim). In this case there has been the development of alternative methods to measure crime, e.g. observational studies. A recent South African victimisation survey (1998) has been completed by Statistics South Africa (SSA)<sup>6</sup>.

### 2.5. South African national crime statistics

The reported national crime statistics for the years 1994 to 1999. are summarised in Table 2.4. Figure 2.1 diagrammatically presents these statistics (on a proportional scale). The statistics indicated relate to the types of crime that can affect public transportation users, i.e. the commuters and operators, the (providers). At the time of writing a moratorium had been placed on the publication of crime statistics by the SAPS. This was due in part to the alleged




inconsistencies in the collection, collation and analysis of statistics by different police authorities/departments. Nevertheless, the figures indicated in Table 2.4 were taken from the official SAPS web site.

Key points from the statistics indicated in Table 2.4 only can be listed as follows:

- Approximately half of the 1 cases of reported crimes during the years 1994 to 1999 were related to the removal of property from the person, either by force (robbery) or without force (common theft, e.g. pickpocketing).
- Approximately 1 in 5 cases of reported crimes during the same period were related to assault (with intent to cause grievous bodily harm).

More than 10 per cent of the reported cases in each of the years 1994 to 1999, were in respect of malicious damage to property.



**Figure 2.1 Number of Crimes Reported (nationally) to SAPS as a proportion of crimes reported (see Table 2.4) (Source: SAPS)**

Key points from Figure 2.1 can be listed as follows:

There has been relatively small change in the proportion of theft crimes (with respect to the other crime categories) reported during the period 1994 to 1999.

The relatively small change in most of the crime categories above (i.e. there has been no dramatic proportionate change), may imply the obdurate nature of crime in South Africa for the period indicated.

<b>Table 2.4: Number of Crimes Reported (nationally) to SAPS (Source: SAPS)</b>						
<b>Criminal Act</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>
Murder and attempted murder	54 132	53 149	54 298	52 736	54 293	52 485
Robbery (with aggravating circumstances)	84 900	80 071	67 249	69 693	88 319	97 173
Rape	42 429	47 506	50 481	52 159	49 280	51 249
Assault ( with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm)	210 250	220 990	230 425	234 554	234 056	256 434
Theft (general)	382 407	388 252	380 197	387 836	427 132	479 637
Arson	11 357	9 761	10 064	9 830	10 130	9 900
Malicious damage to property	122 598	128 393	130 313	127 004	127 590	132 863
Drug related crime	47 323	40 782	39 241	42 805	39 830	41 461
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>957 390</b>	<b>970 899</b>	<b>964 264</b>	<b>978 612</b>	<b>1 032 628</b>	<b>1 123 201</b>

NB: It should be noted that the figures in Table 2.4 may not correlate with the numbers of prosecutions or convictions of offenders. Table 2.4 is only a **partial** listing of crime statistics, as not all the categories of crimes are indicated, e.g. child abuse.

## 2.6. Under-reporting of crime

Care should be taken in the interpretation of Table 2.4, as all the criminal incidents reported and captured by the SAPS do not represent all the crimes that took place in the year in question. There is therefore an element of under-reporting. Various factors contributed to this. To obtain the full picture of crime it is therefore necessary to measure (or at least, to estimate) the level of under-reporting of crime. As will be discussed later in this report, a significant percentage of Focus Group (FG) participants, who themselves had been the victims of on board crimes, failed to report such crimes to any security agency, either formal or informal.

The HSRC<sup>7</sup> has conducted research into the under-reporting of crime in South Africa, and figures taken from the SAPS Quarterly Report 1997 indicate that in a country-wide survey between 3 - 28 February 1997, the researchers found that:

With respect to violent crime against adults:

### Percentage Under-reported

Murder	22%
Serious Assault/attempted murder	19%
Common Assault	40%
Rape/attempted rape	37%
Other violent crime not mentioned above	24%

With respect to race:

Percentage Under-reported

Black	21.6%
White	16.8%
Coloured	16.4%
Asian	5.0%

From the HSRC research it was evident that victims of common assault or rape/attempted rape and black people tended more often than other groups not to report crime. In fact, during the course of researching this study, it was noted from discussions with Metrorail that, 'Whites and Indians tend to report crime incidents but Blacks have become untrusting of reporting crime and therefore under-report.'

**2.7. Crime and its effects on passenger movements**

Crime can affect existing and potential users of public transport systems in many ways. Various studies have been conducted in South Africa (Van der Reis<sup>8</sup>) and internationally (Atkins<sup>9</sup>) looking at how passengers physically and psychologically are affected by crime and how they attempt to reduce the possibility of becoming victims of crime. It is not within the scope of this report to describe these in detail. Nevertheless, some of the personal strategies which are employed by the commuter to reduce the possibility of becoming a victim of on board crime are listed below:

- Cancelling the trip altogether
- Moving from public transport to private modes
- Transferring to another mode of public transport
- Travelling at another time
- Travelling in groups or sitting where there are people
- Travelling in daylight hours.

Some of the above strategies are certainly not available to the majority of commuters using the MIs in the three research areas. The majority of commuters, despite their fears, are totally dependent (economically and spatially) on using public transport in order to effect their daily travelling requirements, e.g. going to work. As Atkins<sup>9</sup> (p 114) in his analysis of personal security on public transport has pointed out:

'they (the passenger) must either endure the fear when travelling or else be restricted in their participation in various activities. Either way they must limit their lifestyle: personal freedom is being constrained.'

This limitation in personal freedom takes on an added perspective when viewed against the historical structure of South African society, which placed many of these commuters in areas where they did not want to be.

## **2.8. Summary**

A basic introduction to crime theory has been presented in this chapter, briefly explaining fundamental concepts. An overview of criminal activity in South Africa was also given. Key findings are that half of the criminal incidents reported to the SAPS during the period 1994 to 1999 were related to theft and robbery incidents. Nevertheless, reported criminal incident statistics must be looked at against the extent of under-reporting of crime, which was also discussed.

### **3. THE RESEARCH AREA**

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#### **3.1. Introduction**

The research is focused on facilities mainly associated with mass public transport, thus excluding crime analysis at parking areas, park and ride garages, etc. Furthermore, facilities associated with metered taxis, long-distance coaches and with air travel are specifically excluded. Thus, the modal facilities analysed will incorporate:

- commuter rail;
- minibus taxis; and
- commuter buses.

Crime on board mainline passenger trains (operated by Spoornet), though not operating from any of the MIs selected, are briefly considered to enable the picture of crime on board public transport to be completed.


Only transfer facilities at which all the above modes of transport are represented are analysed. The following MIs were chosen to be analysed as case studies as they were considered to be representative of such facilities and because each has, or has in the recent past had a reputation for high levels of violent crime:

- Belle Ombre Railway Station and Bus Depot and Marabastad Informal Taxi Rank (Pretoria, Gauteng),
- Wynberg Railway Station and its associated taxi ranks and bus depot (Cape Town, Western Cape),
- Berea Road/Warwick Avenue Railway Station and its associated taxi ranks and bus depot (Durban, KwaZulu Natal)

A brief description of the social and physical environment at each of the MIs is presented below.

#### **3.2. Belle Ombre/Marabastad**

Marabastad lies on the periphery of central Pretoria, bounded by Daspoortrant on the northern side, Struben Street on the southern side, Apies River and Steenhoven Spruit on the eastern side and Skinner Spruit on the west (See Figure 3.1). All modes of public commuter transport such as rail, bus and taxi are available in the area. PUTCO Bus Services is the largest bus service in Marabastad. Other bus operators operating through Marabastad include: Mamelodi Bus Services, North West Star and Atteridgeville Bus Services. There are about four Taxi Ranks in Marabastad.



**Figure 3.1 The Belle Ombre Modal Interchange, Marabastad, Pretoria**

The Community Development Act of 1966 effectively froze all the potential development in the area over the past thirty years. As a result the area has further degraded into a slum, riddled with problems of crime, homelessness, informal squatting, unregulated trading, taxi violence, lack of services, disintegrated community life and numerous social problems, such as overcrowding, unemployment and pollution. Today Marabastad can be categorised as a pulsating cosmopolitan inner city slum area made up of a muddle of Indian businessmen trying to make a living, prostitutes, street hawkers and homeless black people (mostly men) from all over South Africa as well as from other African countries. Not only have the physical conditions of Marabastad deteriorated and continue to deteriorate, but the crime situation is rapidly getting worse.

Development in and the rendering of municipal services to Marabastad is further hindered by:

- the fact that the administration of Marabastad falls under the Gauteng Province and not under the municipality of Pretoria, and
- that fact that different land claims are made by different people for the same piece of land. As long as the claims on sites are unresolved, development can only take place in publicly owned spaces.

However, despite the many obstacles, a few recent milestones have been achieved. The Pretoria Inner Partnership established a Homeless Working Group and managed to secure a R1 million grant from the Vusani Amadolobha Fund (established on provincial level to assist

local government in the implementation of projects according to the Gauteng Four Point Regeneration and Integration Plan for City, Town and Township areas) as a first step in the upgrading of Marabastad. The reinstatement of the Marabastad Development Forum as the representative body of the people of Marabastad was formalised by the opening of an office for the Forum in Marabastad. A core document, the Integrated Spatial Urban Design Framework, has been drawn up as a guideline for the development of Marabastad. The key elements of the proposed development are:

- Integration of Marabastad within the framework of the inner City,
- Formulation of guidelines for development within Marabastad,
- Development of guidelines for the handling of squatters, illegal immigrants and hawkers,
- Strengthening and enhancement of the architectural value of Marabastad,
- Development of guidelines for the use of the vacant land on the periphery of Marabastad,
- The provision of assistance to the Lands Claims Commissioner in resolving claims, and
- Enhancement of Marabastad as a tourist and unique shopping destination.

### **3.2.1 Social problems and crime**

Marabastad is a perfect example of an inner city area plagued by the vicious cycle of physical decay, breakdown in social integration and control, fear of crime and more crime. Recent developments in crime prevention emphasise the relationship between community disintegration or disorder and crime and the fear of crime. Peoples' perception of an *uncivil* area (where buildings are vandalised and where outsiders with different values and norms move in), is that it is a dangerous area where criminals can easily hide and that it should, if possible be avoided. The result is that outside people who used to visit Marabastad on a regular basis to do shopping now avoid it. Commuters who have to move through the area because they cannot afford alternative transport are fearful and tend to move through the area as swiftly as possible. Because of the escalation of crime and the fear of crime people who live in the area tend to keep more to themselves, and are no longer willing to participate in community life. Community members become more isolated and fearful and use the streets less often. These conditions encourage people to commit more crimes in the area since, with fewer people on the street, natural surveillance is reduced, which makes such an area extremely vulnerable to criminal invasion and to further urban decay, which only leads to further increase in crime.

### **3.3. Wynberg**

The Wynberg MI is located in the Western Cape Province and falls within the jurisdiction of the City of Cape Town (see Figure 3.2). More specifically it represents one of the projects of the Wetton-Lansdowne Corridor Programme, which was identified as a future metropolitan activity area by the Metropolitan Spatial Development framework (MSDF).

The Wynberg MI represents the main transport interchange between the Corridor and Wynberg station. In recent years transport operations at the interchange have increased substantially. This has also contributed to various problems, such as capacity constraints, traffic congestion and inadequate facilities for both commuters and the various transport operators, and has also had a negative impact on surrounding land users.





**Figure 3.2 The Wynberg Modal Interchange, Wynberg, Cape Town**

In order to address these problems, a development framework for the area around Wynberg station was developed for both the eastern and western side of the interchange, 'in order to rationalise transport operations in the area,' (taken from Minutes of the first meeting with the public; Issues, Constraints and Opportunities, 14/03/1966). From information obtained from both interviewees and unsolicited documents, it appears that the renovation process at the eastern side has largely been completed and that the process for the western side is still in progress.



### 3.3.1 Social problems and crime

While people's views on social matters and issues always vary to some extent, it was found that the local role players who participated in the research shared certain sentiments regarding the most prevalent social problems in the area. During the discussions of the social problem theme, four to five social problems tended to come up. Taken together, various social problems were regarded as particularly troublesome at and around the the MIs (that is, within a radius of two kilometres). These problems are listed as follows:

- homelessness (adults and street children),
- vagrancy,
- *latchkey* children (unsupervised children returning from school),
- teenage pregnancies,
- traffic congestion,
- undocumented migrants,
- drug-trafficking,
- prostitution and
- conflict

The overall impression gained from the discussions is that all these problems are interrelated in some way.

## 3.4. Berea road

The Berea MI is situated in the inner area of Durban, KwaZulu-Natal. More specifically the interchange lies in what has become known as the Warwick Avenue Triangle or Warwick Triangle (See Figure 3.3). The triangle and the Grey Street area are included in a project striving for a holistic and integrated redevelopment of the area.

### 3.4.1 Social problems and crime

This area, being one of Durban's busiest, has approximately 300,000 people passing through it on a daily basis. Another characteristic of this area is that it contains South Africa's largest informal fresh produce and traditional African medicine markets. A visitor to the area is confronted by, amongst other things dozens and dozens of minibus taxi's, buses, motor vehicles, a large number of stalls where hawkers trade and by shoppers and commuters pass, and people being jostled along pavements, resulting in squalor and litter formation.

From the material collected it is clear that a number of social problems are of concern to people in and around the Berea MI. The following represent the most prominent of these problems:

- shebeens and problems surrounding them;
- prostitution and accompanying violent and other crime;
- lack of day-care facilities, especially for hawkers' children;
- prevalence of bag-snatching and pick-pocketing during peak hours;
- petty crime, muggings, stabbing of both passengers and the general public;
- traffic congestion and accompanying violent conflict;
- organised gang activities, and
- corruption in the safety and security sector




Figure 3.3 The Berea Road Modal Interchange, Warwick Junction, Durban

### 3.5. Summary

This chapter has presented the three MI interchanges which form the areas of investigation in this research. A brief description of the social makeup of each MI was also given. Each of these MIs represents a cacophony of legal (and at times illegal) activity and therefore present a number of challenges relating to crime and public transport. In order to better understand these challenges, the way in which the research is undertaken is of paramount importance. The following chapter describes the research methods used in this study.

## 4. METHODOLOGY UTILISED IN PHASE 1

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### 4.1. Introduction

This chapter summarises the methodologies used in collecting information and conducting the research (qualitative) with regard to crime and crime prevention on public transport. From the outset it is important to note that the qualitative research process is not a linear process and that therefore, although various steps taken during the current fieldwork process could be identified, it does not imply that one stage necessarily followed the other sequentially. The most important steps and decisions taken can be described on the basis of the following phases:

- preparation phase;
- data collection phase;
- synthesis phase, and
- production of report phase

Only the key aspects of the research process are contained in this chapter. The overarching research process is captured diagrammatically in Figure 4.1 (overleaf). Further details of the methodological process, as analysed from a social science perspective, are presented in Annexure A.

### 4.2. Preparation phase

As any experienced qualitative researcher knows, entering and staying in the field is not a straightforward easy procedure. One central problem, said to be shared by all qualitative researchers, is the problem of getting in (Berg<sup>10</sup>). Getting in is hard work and, as noted by Taylor and Bogdan<sup>11</sup>, it is not uncommon for researchers to *spin their wheels* for weeks or even months trying to get into the fieldwork setting. The problem of entering the field (and thus preparation to enter the field) begins at the design stage of qualitative research.

Shortly after the Consortium was commissioned to investigate informal crime prevention initiatives at MI with a view to developing, implementing, and evaluating these or newly developed initiatives, the project team started with preparations for the execution of the research. Questions that received attention were: Who should be included in the research? What would the MI settings be like? What would be the best approach to secure access? What role would the respective team members take? Should the research be undertaken openly or covertly?

For the research to be successful, team members were made aware of the importance of going into the field well prepared and not to '*rush in where angels fear to tread*' (see Coffield & Borrill<sup>12</sup>). It goes without saying that the chances of obtaining permission to undertake the research are increased when researchers are able to explain the purpose and methods of the research in such a way that both 'gatekeepers' (people who have the power to grant or withhold access to people or situations for the purposes of research)) and subjects can understand its benefits. (see Becker<sup>13</sup>; Bogdan & Taylor<sup>14</sup>)

Although no fixed recipe can be provided, the team members followed the advice to first prepare themselves by studying the available literature on qualitative studies. This knowledge gave the researchers confidence and provided guidelines on how the subject(s) could best be approached.




Figure 4.1: The Research Process

Emotional preparation for entering the field is of vital importance, especially when entering settings regarded as dangerous or the life worlds of so-called deviants. Since the attitude that the researcher projects will be critical for the success of the research, the researchers prepared themselves as best as possible to go into the settings with an open mind and not to be judgmental but appreciative and never to try to correct the behaviour observed (Berg<sup>10</sup> (p91)).

In qualitative research as a form of inter-subjective research, the researcher him/herself is the research instrument. Just as quantitative investigators have to learn to use their instruments, so those who undertake qualitative research have to prepare themselves thoroughly as research instruments.

#### **4.2.1 Identification of stakeholders**

This was achieved through referring back to research by Meyer<sup>2</sup>, networking with experts in the fields of public transport and crime prevention and generally following leads that were obtained from interviews held with the various stakeholders.

#### **4.2.2 Selection of research sites**

The selection of research sites (MIs) was based on the previous research looking at crime at MIs by Meyer<sup>2</sup>. It was decided to revisit these MIs to continue with the research that was initiated by Meyer. Details on these MIs were given in Chapter 3.

#### **4.2.3 Gain/negotiate formal access**

The approach to the interviews firstly involved obtaining formal 'access' through a request to the various stakeholders, both formal and informal in each of the affected study areas, for permission to do research to effect this study. While the process of obtaining access involves a risk that the researchers will be seen as acting on behalf of those in authority, the research team regarded it as necessary in order to pre-empt the possibility of its research being obstructed at later points by the stakeholders.

Successful fieldwork is usually determined by the accessibility of the setting and the researcher's ability to build up and maintain relationships with what are called 'gatekeepers'. Once the researcher has located and established contact with gatekeepers, he or she must gain the person's co-operation. Taylor and Bogdan<sup>11</sup> (p20) rightly point out that one of the most sensitive issues facing qualitative research is to explain one's research procedures and interests to both subjects and gatekeepers. Identifying particulars proving the researcher's credentials are vitally important in order to reassure a subject that he or she is dealing with a *bona fide* researcher. Honesty and candour are therefore important qualities for qualitative researchers. The researcher should be able to convince gatekeepers of the sincerity of his/her intention to collect data in an objective manner. Based on Schurink's experience, the origin, aim and object of the research, how it would be undertaken and the envisaged purpose of the results were set out and explained clearly to all prospective research participants. In addition, practical aspects of the research, such as how the team would collect the data and how the data would be recorded, were discussed in detail. Schurink usually spent quite some time explaining to research participants that they needed to regard the researchers as naive outsiders who wanted to learn the values and norms of the MI and their peoples. The team strove from the outset of every interview to establish a cordial atmosphere so that the gatekeepers/subjects would feel secure and to trust them enough to share their experiences and viewpoints with them.

Researchers often experience difficulty in gaining access to bureaucratic organisations such as government departments. No problems were experienced when the SAPS, Metrorail, bus companies and other organisations and private businesses were approached to participate in the research, but Taxi association officials were generally uncooperative at first but, when the correct protocol was followed, they were able and willing to share important insights.

One of the most successful ways that the project team found to gain entry into a setting was to make use of indigenous people who are part of the setting to be studied (see Whyte<sup>15</sup>). Thus the best 'ticket' into the setting, sometimes the only 'ticket', is introduction by a guide or an informant. The team was fortunate to establish contact with and to secure the co-operation of such people in all three settings.

#### **4.2.4 Preparation of interview guides/report forms**

Interview guides were designed in-house by the various teams in order to facilitate information capturing that would enable the research goals to be met. The interview guides/report forms were then assessed by persons knowledgeable in research techniques before being they were finalised.

#### **4.2.5 Literature searches/reviews**

The review of literature was primarily directed at:

- understanding broad issues to do with the phenomenon of crime on public transport, and
- understanding the various issues of methodology that could be used in conducting the research.

Literature searches were conducted using the search facilities of in-house libraries. Working backwards from one source to another is also another way of ascertaining the extent of literature on a particular topic. Unsolicited documents, that is, documents such as newspaper reports, official records, and essays/documents compiled by the research participants for their own use, were also accessed during this process.

#### **4.2.6 Internet searches**

The internet is a powerful electronic tool which can be put to very effective use in the research process. The summaries of many articles, books etc have been placed on the internet. An advantage of using the internet in research is that one is able to search archived information of newspapers/journals, which can often give recent developmental trends which may not have been published in hardcopy form.

#### **4.2.7 Collection of statistics**

Various official sources of statistics were accessed. These included SSA, SAPS and the annual reports of transport providers.

#### **4.2.8 Liaison with experts**

Experts in the field of public transport and crime prevention were consulted on an ad hoc basis for their views and advice regarding the research project. These experts proved invaluable as being at the cutting edge of their professions they were able to indicate where and what type of research had already been conducted, which would lessen the likelihood of the current research project 'reinventing the wheel.'

### 4.3. Data collection

The collection of data was effected by various methods, which are described briefly in this section.

#### 4.3.1 Interviews

Interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis or in Focus Groups (FG) with various stakeholders, both formal and informal. Following qualitative research procedure, the names of interview participants are confidential to the research team. Nevertheless, the names of formal organisations that participated in the research can be gained by looking at the list of acknowledgements at the beginning of this report.

Although various interview strategies were available, the focused interview was employed in this research. The reason for the selection of this type of interview, originally developed by Merton and Kendall<sup>16</sup>, was that it is particularly well suited to provide insight into the life worlds of people, including those found at MIs. While many decisions were made and steps taken during the execution of approximately two dozen in-depth interviews, the following were among the most important:

- Once the subjects had agreed to the interview, origin, nature and aims of the research were briefly explained to them.
- Trouble was taken to ensure that the subjects felt at ease. As has already been mentioned, the subjects were also reassured that information provided by them would not be used to their disadvantage. Finally, the assurance was given that they would not be mentioned by name in the report.
- The necessity to record the interviews (conducted by the HSRC team) on tape (it saves time and captures the typical language of the subjects) was made clear to the participants. In order to make them feel more at ease and to ensure that they understood the questions put to them, the language in which they could best express themselves was used as far as possible.

The interviews were conducted in various contexts, such as in the open air, in cars/minibus taxis, in offices, in cafes and in private homes.

Key points from the interview process can be indicated as follows:

#### 4.3.2 Why focus groups?

FG are regarded as a research method that can be used to:

- collect 'qualitative' information, as opposed to the traditional mass interview technique which provides 'quantitative' information;
- conduct exploratory research into an area that has not been well researched, and
- evaluate the 'man on the street's' perception of crime and crime prevention strategies.

As similar studies looking at crime on public transport have been conducted in the past (see reports by Meyer<sup>2</sup> and van der Reis<sup>8</sup>) benchmarking against these studies would be effected better by the collection of qualitative rather than quantitative data. Shortfalls of the traditional mass interview technique are summarised in Table 4.1, with the corresponding advantages of one qualitative methodology (in this case FG) identified.

For further explanation of the interview methods refer to Annexure A.

<b>Table 4.1: Characteristics of Traditional Mass Interview Techniques versus Focus Groups</b>	
<b>Traditional Interview Guide Deficiencies</b>	<b>Focus Group Advantages</b>
Information is given only to what was asked for in the interview guide.	Open ended questions promote discussion and interaction among the participants. The resulting discussion is able to give insight into other issues that were not originally thought of.
Costly and time consuming. Interview guide design, validation of responses, interview logistics etc all impact on the final cost of conducting the traditional mass interview.	Open ended questions asked by moderator at one or more sittings.
Approach of the interviewer may not elicit correct response.	Moderator primarily commences the discussion and listens to what the participants have to say in response to questions asked
Survey and interview results are not always 'self explanatory, i.e. a wrong answer may be given to a misinterpreted question.	Participants answer questions in the way that they understand, each participant contributing to the total understanding of the question being discussed.
People do not make decisions in isolation from their social context.	The interaction of FG participants in a group setting enables a reflection of social reality to be achieved.

### 4.3.3 Participant observation

Participant observation was mainly employed with regard to the visible behaviour at and around the MI, such as like informal trading, the behaviour of taxi and bus operators, visible policing, and the interaction between these groups on the one hand and the interaction between passers-by and these stakeholders and role players, on the other hand.

In addition to interviewing SAPS officials through formal channels, some of the team members also accompanied SAPS officials on their street patrols. This meant that a member of the research team accompanied a SAPS police officer on patrol. While this was seen partly as a form of participant observation, this was not the main objective of this part of the research. In particular it was not anticipated that, during the limited time during which the research was conducted, the researchers would be able to observe any situations of where members of the police service had to deal with situations of vigilantism, as it is understood that these incidents are by no means a daily occurrence.

Rather, the business of accompanying members of the SAPS on patrol was seen primarily as a method of extended interview. Thus it was presumed that more orthodox interview techniques might be ineffective, particularly as the issue under investigation, (police attitudes to vigilantism), was regarded as being likely to be an area of sensitivity. Thus, to paraphrase Jupp<sup>17</sup>(p150)

'It is the informal attitudes [in Jupp 'actions'] which are the outcome of everyday police theories and which are part of cop culture that police officers often seek to hide from view. They can do this by erecting barriers to insulate themselves from social researchers and others or by seeking to



present a favourable image of their actions by mystifying and even falsifying the nature of police work’.

Thus the benefit of accompanying the police on patrol was seen to be that it would be a means of winning the confidence of the police. It was hoped that a willingness to accompany the police on patrol would indicate to the police officers that the researcher was not seeking superficial exposure but was willing to be exposed to the reality of police work. Thus the objective of accompanying the police on patrol was seen as a mechanism for breaking down the barriers between the researcher and police. The hope was that they would share with the researcher aspects of ‘what they really think’ rather than engage in ‘impression management’ (Jupp<sup>21</sup> (p155)).

Altogether, this aspect of the research involved accompanying over 20 police officers on patrol for a total of over 20 hours. Further notes on the team’s interaction with the police through participant observation can be found in Annexure A.

#### **4.3.4 Photographs**

Although the practice of photographing has spread widely throughout contemporary society during the last 160 years, but social scientists have only fairly recently started to use photographs as a source of systematic information (Dowdall & Golden<sup>18</sup>).

Photographs can be used:

- as several forms of data (e.g. empirical, phenomenological, and reflexive or narrative (Harper<sup>19</sup>),
- as a tool to study community life, like the details of everyday events, the activities as well as the contexts in which they occur;
- to assist in imagining a holistic reality (‘They fuel our sociological and anthropological imaginations, providing another way to capture, translate, and render the synthetic totality that is social life and culture’ (Margolis<sup>20</sup>)),
- to direct qualitative analysis and insight further than was originally anticipated,
- to simplify factual information (‘Researchers can take aerial photographs, for example, to better grasp population distribution and its relationship to school location’ (Bogdan & Biklen<sup>21</sup> (p142))).

Two categories of photographs can be distinguished, namely, found photographs and researcher-produced photographs (Bogdan & Biklen<sup>21</sup> (p142)). In the present research both types of photographs were utilised to assist the research team to remember factual detail and for scrutiny at a later stage to illuminate social processes, events, relationships, and meanings.

#### **4.3.5 Human/personal documents**

There is rich variety of documentary material at the disposal of the interested researcher and, as this material has been used by different researchers and for different reasons, the term ‘human documents’ is not easily defined. For the purposes of this research, the definition provided by Redfield<sup>22</sup> together with a few remarks by Plummer<sup>23</sup> in this regard will suffice.

Redfield<sup>22</sup> (p vii) gives the following definition:

‘(A) human or personal document is one in which the human and personal characteristics of somebody who is in some sense the author of the document find expression, so that through its means the reader of the

document comes to know the author and his views of events with which the document is concerned.'

#### **4.4. Synthesis of data**

An important feature of qualitative research is the generation of a substantive body of data on the phenomenon under study, which facilitates the reconstruction of the dynamics of the phenomenon.

This approach, which emphasises the totality, 'gestalt' or whole of a phenomenon rather than segregated parts thereof, naturally generates masses of data. Detailed information on, for example, subjects' thoughts about what is happening, their experiences as well as their perceptions, need to be captured and stored in a form which ensures that the data are both manageable and retrievable.

In accordance with general qualitative practice, data recording and storage in the present research took place by means of interview guides, taped interviews (which were partially transcribed), photographing and field notes, of which mention has already been made. However, it was not always possible to write field notes or to tape casual conversations and the researchers sometimes had to rely on their memories.

##### **4.4.1 Analysis of data**

With regard to the strategies employed during the analysis of the data, the following broad steps were followed:

- All transcriptions, field notes, documentary material and photographs were studied carefully, and
- Patterns and themes (that is, generalities) and deviations from these were sought in the data (cf. Babbie<sup>24</sup>).

Compiling and formalising the information, this could be an involved process, depending on the amount of data collected. The synthesising of the qualitative data derived from the various methods required time, patience and expert judgement.

##### **4.4.2 Qualitative validation of data**

It should be noted that a contextual research strategy was employed. The emphasis was thus on the internal validity (the production of accurate findings and results that concur with the subjects' life world).

Reliability and the replicability of an investigation are closely linked. This contention is based on the argument that, if a researcher uses reliable methods in an investigation, a repetition of the investigation by other researchers will yield data greatly similar to those of the original investigation.

As an example to illustrate the above, the potential limitations of FG methodology (as was used to collect information about on board transport vehicle crime) and how they were overcome (to ensure the validity and accuracy of our results) in this research can be summarised as follows:

- **Subjective interpretation**

The interpretation and transcript of the discussion must be interpreted correctly. This may well be influenced by the level of understanding of the question being asked. Difficulty may arise where the moderator uses a

language in which he or she is not 100 per cent fluent or where FG participants use the language of the moderator, which is not their mother tongue. In South Africa, where there are eleven official languages, this point becomes very real.

The moderator's choice of language medium was determined by the FG participants using the language of their choice. It was therefore imperative that the moderator be fluent in both the languages used and be able to transcribe from that language into English. In all cases at least one of the moderators was fluent in both the languages that were used in the discussions.

- **Limited representivity**

The relatively small numbers of FG participants, generally, would not necessarily be statistically representative of the larger population. Therefore it would not be appropriate to use the results from the FG sessions as applying to the population as a whole. However, they do represent a piece of a jigsaw puzzle of crime on board public transport in the areas stated.

FG participants were also selected randomly with respect to age and gender. In Cape Town, in cases of where members of organised church groups were used as FG participants, the views of these groups could be biased as they were composed of young to middle aged women. One advantage of using such groups was that the participants were able and willing to share their travelling fears, feelings and experiences without the fear of being victimised. Describing a personal case, one of the FG participants, revealed that her daughter had to wear cycling shorts on the train journey to and from school, as this would reduce the possibility of her being raped. This type of information is unlikely to be shared amongst a group of complete strangers.

- **Limited participation in FG discussion by participants**

FG participants holding back owing to language eloquence by other members, etc may well deprive the FG of valuable information and the results would be one-sided. Skilful FG discussion moderating between the moderator and participants ensured that all participants were able to share their views.

- **Artificial setting**

To ensure that FG participants were not taken out of familiar surroundings, all FG sessions were held in venues to which the participant could relate. These could take the form of a café at the MI or, in an extreme case, right inside the transport vehicle itself (as in the case of the Pretoria Taxi FG session).

Despite the majority of FG participants being selected at random, there was the likelihood that participants could have come together in reality. The structure of many communities in South Africa is such that funeral parties, travelling from the same township into the urban area (at the same time and by the same mode), extended family structures, etc., increase the probability that one is likely to know of people without ever met them.

The above points are summarised in Table 4.2.

<b>Table 4.2: Potential focus group limitations and strategies to overcome these</b>	
Potential shortfall	Resolved in study
Subjective interpretation	Participants communicated in the language of their choice.
Limited representativity	Random selection according to gender, except in Cape Town where organised groups were used
Limited interaction of FG participants (primarily male)	Skilful discussion moderating by moderator
Artificial setting	<p>FG conducted in familiar surroundings and with people of the same socio-economic background.</p> <p>NB: The above factor is not seen as a stumbling block to invalidate the results from the FG discussion. Public transport in South Africa is primarily used by commuters of a similar socio-economic background.</p>

#### **4.5. Summary**

In this chapter the theoretical, methodological and evaluation frameworks that guided the research process were presented. The research process was summarised into a four step model. Limitations and advantages of each of the process steps were discussed and briefly analysed.

## 5. ON BOARD CRIME DISCUSSION OF KEY ISSUES

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This chapter presents a discussion of key issues that emanated from the FG discussions and interviews with formal stakeholders in respect of crime on board public transport.

### 5.1. Types of crime

It became very clear from the information gained from the FGs and interviews that most crime occurring on board public transport occurred on commuter trains and took the form of theft, e.g. pickpocketing or robbery. An exception to this was seen in Cape Town where more serious crimes, such as rape and murder, took place on board public transportation.

In addition to the above, commuter trains and some of the buses (belonging to the bus operators interviewed) were affected by stone throwing by youths from outside the vehicle. Drunkenness and the smoking of dagga by passengers were minor concerns noted.

There was relatively little or zero crime on board commuter buses and minibus taxis (which was specifically targeted at the passengers) that originated/ended at the MIs studied, with the exception of routes to and from the Cape Flats.

The relatively high incidence of theft/robbery on board public transport, compared with other types of crime, corresponds strongly with the national picture of half the cases of reported crimes during 1994 to 1999 being either theft or robbery-related (see Section 2.5). This correlation also concurs with the findings of Van der Reis' 1982<sup>8</sup> research(p17).

Typical items which were stolen included the following:

- Expensive valuables, e.g. jewellery, watches, cell phones, clothes
- Groceries
- Money
- Parcels (especially over the festive/holiday periods, as one FG participant noted)
- Purses/wallets/handbags

In respect of the formal stakeholders, all acknowledged that robbery and theft were the major on board criminal acts. Bus operators in Durban and Cape Town acknowledged that robbery (usually armed) of their drivers did happen from time to time, although there was suspicion, to some degree, that some of these robberies were self-perpetrated, i.e. that the driver was working with the criminals.

Three of the bus companies interviewed indicated that vandalism and stone throwing (by youths from outside the bus) were a cause of concern in their day-to-day bus operations. In most cases the perpetrators were not apprehended and even if they were in most cases they were minors who were protected from prosecution (in most cases) by law.

#### 5.1.1 Methods used in the execution of crime on board public transportation

The following methods were indicated as those used by criminals (also summarised in Table 5.1):

- **Verbal demands to the potential victim**

A rail commuter FG recalled where, 'at one stage there was a group of six 'tsotsis' (local term for thieves) who were moving from one coach to the other, with a box full of jewellery, and literally demanding the commuters' jewellery.'

**Table 5.1: Methods used in the execution of crime on board public transportation**

Method	Explanation
Verbal Demands	This can be either through shouting at the potential victim to instil potential fear in them or through the use of suggestive or abusive language.
Gun Point	A gun is used to force the potential victim to act. This method is usually used against drivers of buses or minibus-taxis. Nevertheless, passengers may be injured or killed as a result of being caught in the cross fire.
Knife Point	A knife or other sharp instrument is used to intimidate the victim to give whatever is demanded or, in extreme cases, to physically harm the victim in the process of robbery.
Snatching	This action involves the rapid removal of a victim's belongings, e.g. a purse or bag. Criminals could commit this act from inside the vehicle or through an open window
Coercion	Obtaining the victim's obedience to act on the perpetrator's command by using force.
Driver's Door	This action is usually effected against the bus driver at the point of bus turnaround. Forcibly opening the door to obtain access to the driver. The criminals can then threaten/intimidate the driver and demand the trip's takings.
Ambush	Usually effected against bus or minibus-taxi drivers at the point of vehicle turn-around. The door or driver's window of the vehicle has often been used to effect this type of crime.
Interception	Interception is a method where the last passenger to disembark from a transport vehicle is prevented from doing so and pushed/forced back into the vehicle where a crime (usually sexual) is committed. Female passengers have been the targets for this type of on board crime perpetrated by males.

- **Gun point**

Usually against drivers of buses or taxis. However, taxi or bus passengers may also be injured or killed as a result of gunshots. This could be an unintended result if the assailant, i.e. passenger was caught in the cross fire. In the case of trains in Cape Town, the story is different. Some robberies, are deliberately aimed at passengers, can lead to fatal gun shot wounds.

- **Knife point**

Relating how on board crime is committed at knife point, an Elsie River, an FG participant stated that, 'at times passengers are forced, at knife or gun point, to take off their expensive clothes and give them to the criminal.' Describing an extreme case, the participant related how a woman was left naked on the outskirts of the town. Owners of the nearby shops, who were shocked to see a naked woman, came to her rescue and gave her a blanket to cover herself.

- **Snatching of purses, necklaces and spectacles.**

This could be done inside the vehicle or through an open window. An example of such an occurrence was given by one of the FG participants (rail commuter, Cape Town) who

had her spectacles forcibly taken off her nose through an open carriage window. She was very surprised as the frame was not very expensive.

- **Coercion**

Coercion, means getting another person or persons to obey ones commands by using force. An example of this is given by a taxi FG participant as follows. 'Last year I was in the train. The criminals forced everyone in the coach to accept a packet of bananas. Those who resisted were informed that they would be beaten up. After that they (the criminals) demanded that we take all our monies out as a form of payment for the bananas we had had. Everyone in the coach was searched, everything they (the criminals) could lay their hands on was taken and they got off at one of the stations. We were all scared and we did not say anything.'

- **Using driver's door**

In the case of attacks on bus drivers, it was related to the researchers that, despite the driver being protected from the passengers on board, he is nevertheless still vulnerable to crime when criminals use the driver's door.

- **Ambush**

Usually effected against bus drivers at the bus terminus. The criminals will wait in hiding or pretend to be bonafide passengers boarding the bus at the bus terminus. Once on board they (the robbers) suddenly pull out some kind of weapon, threaten the driver and demand the trip's takings.

- **Intercepting the last passenger to disembark**

Another method related to the researchers (when in Cape Town) was that, the last passenger to disembark from a minibus taxi would be stopped from doing so and pushed back into the vehicle where a crime (usually sexual) would be committed. Female passengers were often the targets for this type of on board crime perpetrated by males. 'Last passenger' vulnerability is confirmed by Atkins<sup>9</sup> (p120), where he notes that, 'it is often the start and end of a journey that is perceived as least secure.'


### 5.1.2 Statistics

Statistics of on board crime were generally not available from the majority of the formal stakeholders, the exception being Metrorail. This was due in part to criminal incidents being so low on certain transport modes that incidents were not recorded at all, or on the other hand, to the transport provider not making such statistics available to the research team (possibly out of fear that they could impact negatively on the transport provider's image).

The informal stakeholders coming together as groups did discuss on board crime incidents but did not record them.

The following can also be stated in respect of the above:

- The SAPS does record on board crime incidents but these are used for operational purposes and are not put into the public domain.
- It was pointed out by Metrorail, Durban that the SAPS crime database does not assign a separate data block to railway lines. There is thus no clear distinction between crime happening in an area and that happening on the railway. This is illustrated simply in Figure 5.1. In this example, a crime incident occurring on the railway will be recorded as a crime incident in sector 1 and combined with all other crimes in this sector, having nothing to do with transport.



**Figure 5.1 SAPS Crime Incident Structure**

- When a docket is opened, the basic information (e.g. type of crime, etc.) is usually entered into the SAPS's electronic data system. Crime address information is, however, entered at CAS-block level. These blocks are fairly large for example, (the CAS-block that includes the Belle Ombre/Marabastad MI, consists of the whole Pretoria Central Business District).
- The information that can be gained from the SAPS electronic database cannot therefore be used, when it is necessary to pinpoint which crimes have taken place in a relatively small area, such as at a public transfer (i.e. MI) facility.
- The interviews showed that passengers using minibus taxis at the Belle Ombre and Berea Road MIs were encouraged by the taxi associations to report all incidents to the taxi officials. However, once this information is received it not is recorded or captured in any way for future analysis or reporting.
- The close working relationship between the SAPS at Wynberg and the taxi operators is beneficial in terms of the potential apprehension of criminals and of record-keeping.

It should also be noted that the lack of statistical data will negatively impact on any potential crime prevention initiative. As is emphasised in a report by the Australian Institute of Criminology on public transport crime (p3), 'the first task of any crime prevention programme must be to analyse existing data to establish incident patterns, including the type of crime, location, time and other relevant environmental variables'<sup>25</sup>. Undertaking of this step will enable added focus to be achieved in a crime prevention initiative the same time it can save the transport/security provider money. Again, with respect to the effectiveness/success of crime prevention programmes, the same report states that (p26), 'the success of any of the crime prevention models is directly proportionate to the amount of research and data available that reveal the geographical and other environmental factors that correlate most significantly with criminal acts'<sup>25</sup>.



It was not part of this research study to determine a crime index, e.g. the number of robberies per 1000 passengers carried. This in itself could be argued as being flawed, as on some public transport systems large percentage of passengers evade paying fares. Thus, to base the number of passengers on ticket sales would be incorrect the same time, not all crimes experienced or witnessed on public transport are reported. Considering the extent of the under-reporting of criminal incidents, as discussed in Section 2.6, and the lack of statistical evidence to support FG claims, the research team stands by its research findings as supported Atkins<sup>9</sup> (p113), who states that, 'there are, therefore, good empirical reasons when studying the transport consequences of personal insecurity, to place little weight on recorded crime statistics.'

## **5.2. On board crime according to Transport Mode**

The research team's investigations revealed that commuter trains were perceived as being more crime prone than other forms of public transport.

There could be a tendency that perceptions may have been built on hearsay rather than on hard facts. Nevertheless, the individuals in several Focus Groups there were participants who gave personal testimonies to being victims of crime on commuter trains. For example, one participant from the Durban taxi FG stated 'the last time I boarded a train was sometime last year (1998). Whilst in the train we (the passengers) were robbed at gunpoint in the coach. I still have memories. From my past experience, I can still remember people being thrown out of windows when I used to travel by train from Durban to Johannesburg.'

Experiences such as that described above stay with the victim for a long time afterward and possibly, when it is retold to another, it can be told in such a way as to relive the experience, bringing it into a present-day context. However, it should be noted that the South African Rail Commuter Corporation (SARCC) has spent millions in the development of a new window for commuter trains and, since the implementation of this type of window, the ejecting of persons through windows has been reduced significantly.

Responses from the formal stakeholders in most cases confirmed the prevalence of crime on board rail. As one taxi operator FG participant noted, 'the trains have become a hiding place for criminals.' A response from another stakeholder was that, 'crime on the train in Cape Town has reached disturbing levels that needs serious attention.'

Taxis, on the other hand, have fewer problems than on board trains. Nevertheless, to some degree, taxi commuters in Cape Town do experience some problems. The Elsies River taxi commuter FG noted that on board criminal acts occurred mostly in the 'coloured' (persons of mixed race) areas. From a follow up telephone call to one of the FG participants to determine the possible reasons for crime in the area, the participant felt that the high illiteracy and unemployment rates and drug abuse were possible causes. The participant went on further to state, that in his view, 'the criminals are deriving some satisfaction out of these acts.'

## **5.3. Surrounding environment**

From the commuter FG the following was gained:

- 'On board crime happens anywhere and everywhere. The physical environment has little impact, it is the potential victim and their vulnerability that determines where the criminal strikes.'
- Knowing another fellow commuter decreases the likelihood of on board crime. A taxi FG participant stated that, 'Chesterville is a small township, although it is developing now.'

There is a strong likelihood of some people knowing each other in the taxi. This reduces chances for the potential robbers.'

From interviews with the formal stakeholders the following areas were identified:

- The 'Commuter Watch' system, which has been implemented in Wynberg, has, as has been alleged by the local police, proved successful because of the cooperation between the police and the taxi operators. Affiliated taxis have stickers on their front windows as a form of identification and of reassurance for the commuters.
- Metrorail indicated that the Durban - South Coast line (Durban to Kelso) has the highest incidence of crime on its routes. Possible reasons given for this situation were that, 'maybe it was because the criminals considered this unguarded railway line. There are Indians and Whites that use this line. It is possible that criminals may consider that there is a lot of money and valuables.' As discussed in Section 2.6, Indians and Whites have a greater propensity to report crime.
- According to Metrorail, Cape Town, the types of crime on board depend on the route, on which one is travelling. On the central line, used mostly by Blacks and Coloureds, more serious crimes (rape and murder) are committed. On the northern line, used a lot by farmers (as well as other commuters), there are mainly acts of vandalism and, because of unplanned development of informal residential areas (e.g. squatter camps), pedestrians are run over by trains whilst crossing the railway line. The southern line is affected by financially motivated criminal offences, such as robbery, snatching of jewellery, etc.
- South Coast Bus Services (SCBS) indicated that the Isipingo to Durban City Centre route was often affected by on board crime (robbing of the driver). A possible reason for this was that it was that part of that company's route system which generated the most money.
- Durban Transport Metro Buses (DTMB) indicated that the city centre at night and isolated terminals were locations which increased the potential for on board crime against its buses. Low income residential areas could also be problematical.
- From this research it became evident that transport-related crime in Cape Town took place in the immediate area of the transport mode, such as at the taxi rank or in the passengers queues.

In the Cape Flats area, however, criminal acts such as rape are directed at the on board passengers. When FG participants were prompted to identify the possible reasons for the high crime rates in these areas, they revealed that most of the taxi drivers and their guards used illegal drugs which might be responsible for their horrifying behaviour. It was also suggested that some of the taxis were owned by drug lords (who might be operating in another area in order to avoid being linked to the taxi).

Table 5.2 presents a summary of possible factors affecting on board crime splits according to rural/urban location. Overall, this sub-section can be summed up by a comment made by a security official, 'crime has not targeted any specific area. It follows the flow of cash and valuable assets.'

Table 5.2: Potential factors influencing on board crime by urban/rural environment and origin of passenger		
Route	Advantages (Decreasing On board Crime Potential)	Disadvantages (Increasing On board Crime Potential)
Rural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community spirit</li> <li>• Little money</li> <li>• Potential acquaintance with of fellow passengers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of being 'streetwise'</li> <li>• Long journeys</li> </ul>
Urban	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Streetwise</li> <li>• Busier MIs necessitating the use of automated surveillance devices</li> <li>• Busier MIs increases potential of attracting a greater number of formal security agents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Higher concentration of money</li> <li>• More money per person</li> <li>• Every man for himself.</li> <li>• Higher density of people</li> <li>• Anonymity</li> <li>• Increased difference between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'</li> <li>• Expensive jewellery worn by passengers</li> </ul>

#### 5.4. Time of attack

Based on the results of this research two schools of thought emerged regarding the time which afforded the greatest opportunity for on board crime.

**Peak periods**, usually the return trip (commonly in the afternoons), Friday and Saturday afternoons, month-ends and holiday periods (Christmas) in most cases afforded the following advantages to potential criminals:

- Crowded transport vehicles**  
 One Cape Town FG participant explained how, in some instances, the packed train would serve as a conducive environment for some criminal acts like using another person (without his or her consent) to fulfill ones sexual gratification, e.g. masturbation. The criminal would simply rub himself against the unfortunate passengers in front. As a FG participant recalled, 'I only realised that I was wet when I disembarked.'
- Carrying of shopping/wages/valuables**  
 Returning home from shopping or the week's work, passengers are prime targets for potential criminals.
- Wearing of expensive clothes and jewellery**  
 Expensive clothes and jewellery attract attention from criminals, who, rather than taking these items for themselves, usually sell them within a short period of relieving the unfortunate victim of them.

Off-peak periods give the following opportunities:

- **Evenings allow criminals to work under cover of darkness**

Off peak periods, usually the late evenings, present further advantages to criminals (in addition to their being naturally dark). Criminals can deliberately disrupt the on board lighting system, plunging the transport vehicle into complete darkness. Once this is effected they can carry out their criminal activities undetected.

- **Low volumes of passengers**

As one rail commuter FG participant observed, 'yes, daytime trains are also very dangerous, especially for those commuters who board the train between 09h00 and 14h00, as they are likely to be going to town to pay their accounts. The security personnel are often not around at that time of the day.'

In Cape Town, off-peak periods were seen as the times when serious crimes, such as rape, were committed.

- **Fewer passengers in transport vehicles**

In vehicles with lower passenger volumes criminals are able to intimidate the potential victim without fear of retaliation from fellow passengers.

- **On board hawkers**

It was perceived that on board hawkers despite working illegally, have more space to move around and that people with cash can then be identified (when they purchase an item from the hawker)

There is limited statistical evidence to confirm or disprove the above. Nevertheless, the latest statistics provided by Metrorail Durban indicated that in 1998, March and November were the months with the highest recorded number of criminal acts against Metrorail staff and property.

In respect of bus operations, most attacks take place at the outer bus terminals. At this stage, all the passengers would have disembarked and the bus driver being alone, would then be reconciling monies collected during the outward trip before commencing the inward trip.

## **5.5. Destination on board activity**

The origin/destination of passenger, e.g. church etc, does not act as deterrent to the criminal. To the criminal, all passengers are potential victims.

## **5.6. Transport vehicle design**

In this research it was found that the design of the transport vehicle influenced the level of on board crime. Of particular concern was the physical state and age of the commuter train carriages. The deficiencies here are acknowledged by Metrorail, which is in the process of redesigning train carriages. Transport vehicle design deficiencies are shown in Table 5.3.

**Table 5.3: Transport vehicle design deficiencies**

Mode	Item	Deficiency	Results
BUS	Driver's door	Can be forcibly opened Not controlled by driver	Permits ambush of driver from driver's side Can alight anywhere, even whilst the bus is in motion
	Protective cages	Reduces driver/passenger interaction	Does not protect against verbal threats and intimidation Driver can be trapped in an emergency
	Money hole	Weak spot in complete driver's protection	Gun can be placed through this and the driver held up.
	Narrow aisle	Permits only one person (maximum two) to pass at a time	When passing close to another standee gives a criminal an opportunity to steal.
	Long length	Rear view mirror may still conceal all backseat activity	Back seat criminal activity, e.g. vandalism
	Fixed number of passengers	Not always adhered to by driver Not always enforced by traffic officers	Overloading Crowded vehicles present opportunities for criminals
	Speakers	Noise generation	Confusion in the vehicle (see Section 5.15.21)
TAXI	Aisle structure	Movement restricted	Some passengers have to alight or get up to enable others to pass. This process can increase a passenger the potential to fall victim to theft
	Fixed number of passengers	Not always adhered to by driver Not always enforced by traffic officers	Overloading Crowding vehicles present opportunities for criminals
	Door	One main exit door, near to the front of the vehicle	Last person off can be forced back in (see Section 5.1.1)
	Speakers	Noise generation	Confusion in the vehicle (see Section 5.15.21)
TRAIN	Panic button	Non-existent	Help cannot be summoned Communication cannot be established with on board train staff or security
	Doors	Can be opened fully whilst train is in motion (if doors are held open at the time of train departure)	Potential opening for ejection of person Potential escape route for a 'nimble' criminal
	Intercom	Non-existent	Communication with train staff/security staff not possible

During discussions, one of the stakeholders (Metrorail), acknowledged the need to build in security aspects during the planning phase of any MI. To drive the point home, he cited the case where a suburb would never be built without knowing where the schools, clinics, shops, etc would be located. The same approach should be applied in the design of a MI. Commercial as well as other activities, should be well thought out in order to make it difficult for the criminal to be tempted to commit a crime and/or to escape.

The three main types of transport vehicle studied in this report are illustrated in Figures 5.2 to 5.4.



**Figure 5.2 Commuter bus**



**Figure 5.3 Minibus taxi**



**Figure 5.4 Commuter train**

In order to take advantage of the design deficiencies of certain types of transport vehicles, the criminal has to be ingenious and very agile. A case in point, where criminals alight whilst the train is in motion, is summed up by a statement from a rail commuter FG participant. 'One main advantage they have is that 'bahlika is staff' (english translation: 'they can easily get off the train whilst it is in motion'. At times they wait for the train to start moving off, then they quickly snatch the purse or parcel and either leave through the door or through the window.'

Despite deficiencies in design, some FG participants indicated that it is not the design of the vehicle which is the reason for on board crime but that the people being carried represent potential victims to the criminal It should thus be noted that:

- Expensive on board crime security measures may stifle on board crime but may not necessarily stop it altogether. There is a cost benefit balance that has to be established here to ensure that returns on investment funds are optimised.

## **5.7. On board atmosphere**

Discussions with the commuter FG indicated that on board atmosphere may impact on the level of on board crime. However, most respondents indicated that this had very little effect. On board atmosphere factors are strongly related to:

- Noise external and internal (see Section 5.15.21),
- Overcrowding (see section 5.15.20), and
- Litter and poor lighting inside the transport vehicle.

## **5.8. Distance travelled and on board crime**

Two opposing views were expressed regarding whether on board crime was related to the distance travelled by the commuter. Both these views are summarised in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4: Travel distance and on board crime			
Distance	Factor	Permitting	Outcome
SHORT	Alighting points (especially if on demand)	Closer together	Quick getaway for criminal
	Trip length	Short trip length of the average passenger	People just want to get to destination as quickly as possible
	High volume of on-off passengers	Majority will use cash as a means of payment	Increased likelihood of cash
	Off peak hours	Fewer people on board	Increased likelihood of rape and murder
	Last passenger to disembark from transport vehicle	Interception from outside the vehicle or being pulled back from within it	Increased likelihood to be robbed or raped
LONG	Time	Time to study commuters Time to plan strategy Time to move up and down the transport vehicle/carriage	Best strategy chosen to commit crime
	Sleep	Alertness of passenger is reduced Criminal can study sleeping victim	Increases potential to be a victim of crime
	Alighting points	Greater number of alighting points, e.g. stations or bus stops	Can offer multitude of escape routes for criminal
	More passengers	Crowded transport vehicle	Get lost by interweaving between passengers
	Socialise	Get drunk, idle chat or singing	Increase personal vulnerability to criminal
	Last passenger to disembark from transport vehicle	Interception from outside the vehicle or being pulled back from within it	Increased likelihood to be robbed or raped

## 5.9. Potential victims

From the commuter FG perspective the criminal focuses on what he or she can get and not on the make up of the potential victim. The ease at which the criminal views the potential of conducting crime influences the number of criminals that work together. For example, a lone pickpocket may find it easy to work on an overcrowded transport vehicle because everybody is pressed close together. Whereas, on a less crowded train carriage, a gang may be more effective in subduing potential victims who may try to object to their actions and cause problems.

As one rail commuter FG participant put it regarding potential victims, 'it seems like the tsotsis (thieves) are able to 'sniff' as to who has money and those people will be targets.'



From speaking with the stakeholders the following were identified as potential victims.  
Whites and Indians

On the Durban Metrorail south coast line (Durban to Kelso), the high incidence of White and Indian commuters using this line could have contributed to the high crime rate. (See Section 5.3.)

- **Tourists**

In discussions with SAPS Pretoria it was stated that tourists visiting Pretoria from Johannesburg would use the local train service (as would be the case in their home country, considering the distance between the two cities). Tourists felt that use of the local rail service was cost efficient. Nevertheless, by using the local train service they (the tourists) were unknowingly placing themselves in the path of a potential on board criminal.

Nevertheless, an alternative view was expressed by a security official that was interviewed when he said, 'shoppers and workers are mostly the targets when they go or come from work where they are paid. Church goers are perceived not to carry their valuable assets and are also considered not to have a lot of cash (at least not an amount worth robbing).'

In Cape Town, on the other hand, potential victims would include school girls and women. One of the formal stakeholders interviewed explained how some taxi operators, in the area in which he operates, were at one stage involved in the sexual abuse of young school girls. School girls who were caught in this trap would not be taken to school by the taxi driver but instead be driven around the local area. They would thereby miss out on school and their education. These school girls, in return for the favours and gifts they received from these men, would have to work as sex workers as a form of repayment.

## **5.10. Attacks on transport provider's staff**

In the case of Metrorail staff, the consensus from the rail FG was that, 'staff here were never attacked because they were surrounded by security.' This state of affairs was also confirmed by the Durban and Pretoria Metrorail officials who were interviewed. A Metrorail contracted security official gave a possible reason for this state of affairs, when he said with regard to attacks on Metrorail staff, 'almost never. One incident happened six months ago where the ticket examiner was robbed of cash. Security officers always wear uniforms, maybe that is why criminals do not attack them.' However, the Cape Town Metrorail officials gave a different picture. In the first quarter of 1999, four of their ticket examiners working on board a train were shot and seriously wounded.

Statistics revealed by DTMB indicated that, over a three year period seven of their staff had been robbed or shot at. If this figure is related to the number of passenger bus trips per month (61 500) on DTMB buses, the probability of staff being attacked is very low.

In another case relating to bus operations, we were told that the taking of money from the driver (if it happens) can occur outside the bus. An example was where a bus driver would stop at a café to buy something and therefore must carry the money bag on his person. The lapse in security leaves the driver open to be mugged/robbed.

### **5.10.1 Statistics**

As discussed in Section 5.1.2, statistics are generally not available for on board crime and even less for attacks against transport provider staff. The rarity of these actions has, in most

cases, resulted in the majority of formal operators that were interviewed not keeping such records.

### **5.11. Perpetrators of on board crime**

The consensus reached by the FG was that on board crime could be perpetrated by individuals, groups or gangs. Different opportunities to effect on board crime result in different strategies used by the criminal. Thus, to state that this type of crime, would be perpetrated by 'X' number of people would be an over-generalisation. But it is certain that the longer the number of potential victims the greater the need for criminals to work in groups, taking support from their companions in crime.

The consensus reached by the stakeholders varied between individuals and groups. In a recent incident on Metrorail Durban's network an organised group (operating as a unit) of 21 people were arrested for on board crime offences. Again, in respect of vehicle hijacking, e.g. of minibus taxis, organised groups were usually responsible. Vandalism was primarily the result of scholar/youth action.

Two bus operators indicated that suspicion had been raised against their staff (drivers). It was alleged that some bus drivers were faking robberies, thereby being in league with the criminals. The same operators indicated that, in cases of robbery of their bus drivers it was usually gangs of three to four members which were responsible.

One of the FG participants, when asked the possible reasons for serious crimes on the Cape Town rail system stated that, 'the city is infested with gangsters. But these usually operate in the residential areas. Therefore, crimes committed on board could be by those criminal elements who take chances, with the knowledge that the blame will fall on organised gangsterism.' In another case, a Metrorail official suspected that these criminal acts were related to the oversupply of hawkers.

In some cases it was revealed to the researchers that there was a perception (amongst commuters regarding on board taxi crimes) that the taxi drivers and their marshals were at times perpetrators of serious criminal offences. This, though a perception of some commuters, was very real in the Cape Town study area.

#### **5.11.1 Personal knowledge of perpetrators**

One bus operator indicated that, when crime is reported, there is a possibility that one of the passengers may know the perpetrators. Despite this, very little information comes from the passengers. Possible reasons for this state of affairs as put forward were:

- passengers fear for their own lives and
- the possibility of intimidation within their communities (if the witnesses are identified).

In one case one of the bus operators indicated that he had received a telephone call from an anonymous passenger who said that he would expose the criminal who had robbed one of the bus company's buses if he would pay him R5000.

### **5.12. Present trend of on board crime**

Schools of thought here differed. A summary of the answers is given below:

- **Increasing**

Reasons	<p>Strongly related to unemployment</p> <p>Strongly related to the local economy, i.e. where the criminal resides</p> <p>Lack of visible security officials</p> <p>Crime being used as a survival strategy in the harsh economic times</p> <p>Abuse of drugs</p>
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- **Decreasing**

Reason	<p>Visible security officials</p>
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- **Staying the same (static)**

Reason	<p>A very low level of reported incidents in the past, which has basically remained static to the present day. (This should be looked at in light of the under-reporting of crime discussed earlier.)</p>
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In most cases the views given in interviews were not based on statistical evidence and cannot be regarded as being the total picture of crime on board public transport in the respective research areas.

### 5.13. Reporting of on board crime

There was a strong indication from discussions with the FG that the first port of call for reporting crime was the transport provider. Reasons given for this were:

- 'The the taxi association officials were more accessible,' stated by a participant of the Marabastad taxi commuter FG.
- 'Taxi officials would try to resolve the incident in-house without getting SAPS involved, except for Wynberg taxis who have a close working relationship with the SAPS.'
- Because they (Metrorail security) are closer to where crime happens, stated by a security official.'

On occasions, when on board crime was reported to the transport provider, the complainant was met with indifference and even, in extreme cases, would be reprimanded for doing so. A bus commuter FG participant stated, 'passengers do not report crime happening on Indian buses. They (the buses) do not stop, even if people have been shot or stabbed. You cannot report to their conductors because they are perceived to be working with the criminals. They beat passengers up for petty things like questioning the difference in fares for the same journey or for another passenger.'

In another instance a participant from the taxi commuter group stated that 'incidents have been reported to the taxi officials in their offices, of drivers who sometimes misbehave and become unruly (i.e. do not listen to commuters and sometimes dump people who challenge things on the road). Failure (of the taxi association) to resolve these things have led to people losing trust in the capacity of the taxi association offices in conflict resolution. As a result people do not report now.'

In respect of bus operators, drivers/staff who have been victims of on board crime are first to report this to the management of the bus company, as well as to the local SAPS office. In the case of vandalism (on board buses), it was stated by one bus operator interviewed that getting the names of these vandals was possible from identification of the school that the bus served. In another cases the research team was advised that, after being robbed the driver should drive to and report the incident immediately at the nearest SAPS station before returning to the depot.

In other cases relating to bus passengers who have been victims of on board crime, one bus operator stated that victims/witnesses are encouraged to report such cases directly to the company.

#### **5.14. Perception of what happens after crime is reported**

A participant from the Durban taxi commuter FG commenting on the lack of action after reporting rude drivers stated that 'unfortunately, the troublesome drivers seem to continue showing that disciplinary measures (i.e. those of the taxi association) were not effective.' Nevertheless, there appeared to be consensus among the taxi commuter FG that the taxi officials network to try to trace lost property, for example.

Discussion with the FGs also revealed that there was a perception that the amount of interest shown by the security agents may be related to the class of travel of the victim, i.e. that first class passengers obtain more attention than third class passengers. A member of the rail commuter FG (Pretoria) explained this perception this way 'crime is reported to the security but nothing is done about it. The Metrorail personnel do not take the reported crimes seriously. We as the train executive committee, report to the security but there is no personnel on board, especially on third class. Most of these security personnel are in the first class coaches. In the third class coaches people on board are in most cases helped by us, the comrades. What is unfortunate is that Metrorail regards comrades (i.e. us as passengers) as their enemies.'

Discussions with Metrorail on the above issue reveal that it is impossible for any security agent to provide a security presence on each and every carriage. This would result in an escalation of costs to Metrorail, which in turn would place the cost of public transport out of the reach of the majority of commuters. In addition, because of the large numbers of Metrorail passengers travelling third class, in a full carriage it is virtually impossible for security agents to conduct a full patrol.

In the case of PUTCO, structures were in place established to resolve problems relating to on board crime. Each incident is recorded and a senior person is tasked to follow up on resolution of the problem. PUTCO also offers assistance to the victim/witness in reporting the incident to SAPS. Another bus operator also indicated that in his experience, there was little follow-up by SAPS when on board crime is reported. Pressure would then be exerted on SAPS to act. Nevertheless, this action could not guarantee positive results.

Interviews with SAPS gave the theoretical process of what should happen, which is as follows:

- A criminal incident is reported to SAPS officer
- A docket is opened and a unique number is assigned to case
- The docket is sent to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to begin evaluation and investigation process. The CID tries to determine why the crime took place.
- If the suspect is still in the vicinity, the SAPS goes and locates the person and arrests him/her.
- The SAPS communicates with victim/witness regarding to the outcome of the investigations.

Note: A docket (representing a case) cannot be closed until communication (giving the progress of the case) with the witness/victim has been effected by the CID.

An official of a transport provider that was interviewed indicated that its local operation had decided to employ its own investigators/security guards. One of the reasons for not using officers of SAPS was that, 'they (that is officers of the SAPS) are not effective, and we as a transport provider do not expect much from them.'

#### **5.14.1 Factors which discourage the reporting of crime to security officials/management**

This section will present some of the findings from FGs that in some cases, resulted in victims/witnesses not reporting on board crime to the appropriate security channels. The factors below may all be perceptions, but they also represent the real experiences of FG participants who had witnessed or were themselves victims of on board crime which, once experienced, leaves an impression of the efficiency and partiality of the security agents, which can take a long time to remedy.

- **Criminals are perceived to be working in collaboration with security agents**

A rail commuter FG participant summed the above as follows, 'the security personnel are in some instances working with the 'tsotsis' (thieves). Therefore one should not expect anything to happen after a crime is reported.'

Discussions with transport providers indicated that they regularly engage consultants to assess security efficiency and the potential of collusion between criminals and security officials.

- **Reporting the crime where it took place**

With transportation always being on the move, to report crime (physically) becomes a little more problematic in real life. In theory, the victims/witness of on board crime can report such crimes to any SAPS station. Nevertheless, the reception of the crime report by the SAPS that is not in the vicinity of where the crime took place may be opposite to what was to be expected by the victim/witness. As one rail commuter FG commented, 'when a criminal act is committed against a person on board, she or he cannot wait and expects to report the case to the nearest police station where she or he alights. The police demand that you report at the place where the crime took place. Which, in actual fact, means you have to break your journey to go and report and come back again to resume your journey. Most people cannot afford that luxury.'

- **Slow wheels of justice**

The proper procedures must be followed before the apprehended criminal can be convicted or released. The length of time that this process may take often discourages some commuters from reporting on board crime and increases the possibility of them dealing with the culprit (if caught) immediately. Community justice is perceived by some commuters to be the best method of dealing with crime. A rail commuter FG participant noted, 'when you report (the crime) to the comrades, they deal with the suspect then and there. They take the law into their own hands because they know that the criminal is not going to be brought to book. Therefore it is better to sort the criminal out on the spot.'

- **Details of the criminal required**

Basic details about the perpetrator of the crime asked by the security official may assist in focussing where the CID could start the investigation. Such questions to the victim/witness may seem illogical and it may be perceived that the security official is trying to frustrate investigation of the crime and belittle the victim/witness. One participant for a taxi operator FG stated, 'we reported at the Centurion SAPS station (the crime that took place against us) but that was a waste of time because SAPS demanded

that we give them the name and surnames of the criminals. But how on earth were we supposed to have that kind of information!

- **Not a member of the community**

Discussions with a bus operator indicated that, if a gang attacks a bus driver and not the passengers being transported (who are members of a community) the community may not come forward and report the crime, as the driver is only a driver and not part of their group. This implies that travelling commuters do not see the bus operator as providing a community service (or the driver as being part of the community even though he is not resident there) and they therefore divorce themselves from the driver/operator of the bus.

- **Lack of understanding of criminal procedure**

From discussions with the SAPS as to the procedure that is followed after a crime has been reported, it is apparent that the average commuter is unaware of criminal procedure. A case in point, (which was shared by SAPS), is one in which a criminal has been arrested for stealing a passenger's purse. If the criminal has money to pay the bail, the law requires that such person be released. Once free, the criminal may then go back to the station, where he is seen by the very people who delivered him (a short while before) to the security agents. These people they cannot understand how the criminal has been released so quickly, and they quickly assume that some indiscretion has been done by the security officials. This furthers their distrust of the security agents and encourages them to take the law into their own hands the next time a crime occurs in their immediate surroundings.

- **Management bother**

A discussion with a bus operator revealed that not all on board crime affecting his company was reported to management. Drivers (without management agreement) had sometimes arranged braais in the community to get community buy-in in helping them resolve on board crime. The bus operator went further to say that management was aware of these actions but accepted it. Nevertheless, the management did not think that such an approach had worked as much as they would like.

## **5.15. Other factors increasing the potential of on board crime**

### **5.15.1 Terminal activity/noise**

All the MIs studied in this report represent areas of a myriad of activities. The activities generated at these MIs give each a unique characteristic. Nevertheless, the downside is that they often enable criminals to conduct their work amidst the 'cacophony of noise'. There is a need then for potential passengers to be alert at all times. A participant from the Marabastad Taxi Commuter FG stated that, 'as regards to on board crime on taxis, only cases of passenger neglect have been witnessed by me.' He went on further to say that, 'whilst sitting in a taxi another fellow passenger alighted to get a newspaper. In so doing he left his luggage in a loading taxi. On his return to his seat he noticed that all his belongings disappeared.'

### **5.15.2 Security logistics**

Security officers cannot be everywhere all the time. This proves to be a limitation when the transport mode comprises a number of coaches, such as a train. As one security official indicated, 'if a crime is reported, the security officers at the next station attend to it.' Furthermore, in such a situation, by the time the train arrives at the next station the criminals

have already disappeared either by moving to another carriage or by jumping off the train as it enters the station etc.

#### **5.15.3 Volume of passengers carried**

There is an implied relationship between the number of passengers carried and the revenue that may accrue to the transport provider. This relationship was alluded to from discussions with DTMB. When asked the times of increased driver vulnerability to on board crime, the response was 'at month ends'. This is because to the bus then carries a greater number of passengers, therefore resulting in increased levels of takings. The criminal realising this, would therefore prepare to strike at such periods. (See also Section 5.15.20 regarding overloading).

#### **5.15.4 Transport network structure**

A significant proportion of the population in Cape Town without private means of transportation relies on Metrorail trains as its main means of transport. The erosion in the level of Government subsidies has led to trains running up to 120 per cent of capacity (i.e. crush capacity) during peak times. The present road network structure in Cape Town is limited by having only two major access points into the Central Business District (CBD), namely, the N1 and N2. This structure, it is being argued, discourages the use of taxis and buses. Travelling by these modes may take up to two hours to reach a destination within the city centre (travelling from the Cape Flats) compared to twenty minutes by train. Therefore, taxis are used as feeders from the residential areas to the MI. There is, therefore, a need to make the rail system as efficient as possible.

#### **5.15.5 Internecine taxi and bus feuding**

Discussions with bus operators revealed that at times on board crime on buses can result from internal feuding between taxi associations which can spill over to victimising bus passengers. In such cases bus passengers are forcibly removed from the bus and frogmarched into the awaiting taxis. In the transfer process passengers who refuse to disembark voluntarily from the bus may be physically removed by the taxi operator or a contracted party of a taxi association. In other cases some passengers may accidentally leave personal items behind in the bus. These instances can influence the level of on board crime.

#### **5.15.6 Lack of ownership**

Lack of direct ownership by drivers of their vehicles could be another factor encouraging on board crime. In an interview referring this drivers, stated a bus operator, that 'the driver feels little effort in handing over money. At times some drivers put money into shoes. The driver is concerned about his safety and we about his safety and money.'

The author is not arguing that drivers of transport vehicles should place their lives in second place behind protection of the day's takings. Nevertheless, handing over of the takings without a second thought as to the wider consequences of such action (affecting companies' revenue and, consequently, their turn profitability, salaries/wages etc), should be discouraged. Some may further state that the mere protection and upkeep of one's immediate surroundings (including transport) reflects a personal internalisation of one's surroundings.

#### **5.15.7 Suppression of natural instincts and reactions**

Over the years there has been much evidence to substantiate the perception that criminals are becoming increasingly ruthless in the execution of their criminal activities. The consideration of the life of the potential victim often is taken lightly and many criminals have deliberately taken the life of their victims without a second thought. In this environment

victims will submit to the criminal's demands in order to avoid the greater danger (e.g. that of losing their lives) and, in the case of witnesses, 'look but do not see'. One rail commuter FG participant noted 'most of these goods are snatched in front of other commuters and no one will come to your rescue!'

The above again reflects the perceived powerlessness of many people as they go about their daily lives. In another case a participant from a taxi operator FG stated, 'the taxi drivers and other commuters do not normally interfere. The criminal will just get off at the next stop after he has completed his job. Taxi drivers are forced to stop so that the criminal can get off. People are these days too scared to come to the rescue of others because they, too, fear for their own lives.'

#### **5.15.8 Selling of alcohol at modal interchanges**

Within close proximity to all the MIs studied and, in some cases, actually at the MIs, bottle stores were very evident. The consumption of alcohol before a journey can impact negatively on one's alertness and increase the potential to become a victim of on board crime.

The research team's interviews with formal transport providers showed that the selling of alcohol was not a problem on their systems. This, however, was not the case with Spoornet mainline passenger rail services. Discussions here revealed that genuine travellers, often hawkers, sold alcohol to fellow passengers thus carrying out their business activities on the train.

#### **5.15.9 Command of respect from the driver**

The firm but courteous attitude of the bus or taxi driver can influence the level of on board crime on their vehicles. A taxi commuter FG had the following to say regarding this factor, 'there are drivers who are well known that they do not tolerate any nonsense and criminals are scared of them. Commuters on those taxis are relatively safe.'


From the above statement, it is clear that the respect for the driver positively affects on board passengers and discourages potential criminals outside the vehicle.

#### **5.15.10 Lack of investment by transport providers**

From observation of the physical state of transport vehicles used to service the travelling needs of the public, it became evident that much of the current vehicle fleet is 'past its sell-by' date. This is particularly true with regard to the minibus taxis and commuter trains currently in service, where there is currently a large under-investment. A Metrorail estimate (for the 1999/2000 financial year) for the cost of re-capitalisation of the infrastructure and rolling stock is put at approximately R700 million per annum with the capitalisation backlog being approximately at R15 billion<sup>26</sup>.

The lack of investment funds, inadequate passenger contributions (in the form of fares) and an erosion (in real terms) of government subsidies have all resulted in transport vehicles (for all modes) not being in a state where on board crime can be minimised. The crime/investment cycle is summarised in Figure 5.5.





**Figure 5.5 The Crime Investment cycle**

#### **5.15.11 Idle chat by fellow passengers**

In order to pass the time or to catch up with the latest news, some passengers initiate conversations with their fellow passengers, which at times, may soon catch on and a row of people may be engaged in the same conversation. On the positive side, even though the intention of the initiator was harmless (as it may indicate a community spirit), the downside is that passengers may inadvertently give details of their intended purchases or of parcels within their possession. On the negative side, such a ploy may be initiated by a criminal with the intent of catching a victim unawares. One Durban bus commuter FG participant said in respect of the vulnerability of certain types of victims, 'because they (that is the potential victim) can be reckless and chat about their plans to buy in town, thus revealing indirect information that they have in relation to their financial resources.' The same participant continued and gave an example of an incident which he had witnessed. 'A woman who was talking to others about the goods she was going to buy in town, and was later alerted by a friend of her opened clutchbag. She lost some money in that instance.'

On the other hand, the strategy of minding one's own business and of keeping quiet in order to reduce the possibility of becoming a victim of on board crime, is also no defence. Witnessing such an incident, a rail commuter FG participant recalled where 'in one incidence, a woman was quiet all the way and had a sling bag with her. She was extremely surprised when someone made her realise that her handbag was opened. She had not heard or felt anything and yet her purse was gone. A sum of R1 800.00 was contained in that purse.'

#### **5.15.12 Embarking/disembarking using same door**

In the majority of transport vehicles in South Africa, (see pictures in Section 5.6) passengers are able to enter and exit through the same opening/door. This in itself presents an opportunity for on board crime. One witness from the rail commuter FG states:

'I personally witnessed at the end of last year an example of criminal incidence on public transport. This was where someone's purse was taken as the people were alighting from the train. I think the criminals realised that the guy had some cash with him after he bought some sweets from the hawkers because, when the train stopped at the station, they caused confusion. They pretended as if those who were boarding were forcing their way in. In that process they were able to do what they intended to do. We only realised when the guy screamed saying, 'Awu, bayithatha imali yami yonke. Ngiyobona ngenze njani,' (in English this is translated as, 'Oh, they have taken every cent that I had. What am I going to do?') It turned out that the guy was left penniless. I decided to give him R5.00 just to enable him to reach his destination.'

#### **5.15.13 Perceived corruption of transport provider staff/security officials**

The perceived corruption of security officials is an obstacle dissuading many victims/witnesses from reporting crime. One commuter rail FG participant noted 'but nothing happens thereafter (that is after the incident has been reported). At times the perpetrator is known by the police who, in most cases, are susceptible to bribery.'

In another experience related to the researchers it was stated that 'taxis are usually stopped in the mornings by Durban City police inspectors, who in most cases are found to be looking for bribes. They operate as a syndicate where, if a taxi is found to have a fault, they will radio the next traffic blockade, ending in a taxi driver having been stopped about four times in one trip. This results in school kids arriving late for school and exams, and employees arriving late for work. Black police officers are at the centre of this operation. One police inspection car which operates in the KwaMashu and Mtshebhini area rotates a few areas daily collecting bribes which have been developed into formal offerings. The taxi operators seem to pay as if there are preconceived agreements.'

It can be argued that the use of the same door for boarding and alighting passengers may not be the real cause of crime on board public transport, but it may enhance the opportunity to escape after committing the crime. Nevertheless, commuter perceptions are strong and this is what they perceive.

#### **5.15.14 Commuter attitude**

Commuter attitudes, especially towards the security officials, can influence the level of on board crime. For example, fellow passengers may turn on the security officials who may want to offload (or arrest) a destitute mother with child for not paying their fares. In such a potentially explosive atmosphere, security officials must make correct judgements as they go about their on board duties. It would come as quite a shock to fellow passengers to understand that this mother with child was picking the pockets of other passengers, taking advantage of the community protection that she received. (This is a hypothetical example of what could happen, constructed by the author.)

#### **5.15.15 Protest marches**

Discussions with SAPS Pretoria revealed that another potential form of on board crime results from people who use the train to attend protest marches. At times deep seated issues (i.e. returning from a protest march without issues being resolved) can erupt on board the transport vehicle as participants in the protest vent their frustrations by vandalising transport vehicles.

Not seeing the public transport system as their own (but as belonging to the state), many of these protesters show little respect for it and thereby attempt to destroy it. This lack of internalisation of the exterior community was mentioned in Section 5.15.6 previously.

#### **5.15.16 Unmanned stations (halts)**

Discussions with Metrorail revealed that there are some stations on its network which are unmanned (see Table 5.5). They basically operate as halts, at which the trains stop and passengers are allowed to board or disembark. Such stations, being unmanned by Metrorail staff, security or SAPS officials could offer an ideal escape route for criminals.

<b>Table 5.5: Number of stations/halts in Metrorail network</b>			
<b>Region</b>	<b>Manned</b>	<b>Unmanned</b>	<b>Total</b>
Pretoria	45	47	92
Durban	56	44	100
Cape town	Not available	Not available	117

Unmanned stations offer another drawback in that if an on board criminal act has taken place, it has to be reported at a manned station. By the time the crime is reported (at a manned station), the criminal has already disappeared, which increases the difficulty of tracing such a person.

Discussions revealed that the unmanned stations could be unmanned either on a permanent or temporary basis, with roving staff attending to such stations as and when scheduled. In addition, these stations could be unmanned in respect of either security provision or ticket office provision or both. The research team was informed by Metrorail that there was no substantial evidence of criminal activities at unmanned stations, which would justify a full deployment of staff at such stations. Not manning a station is a calculated risk to allow resources to be deployed optimally elsewhere within budget limitations.

#### **5.15.17 Entry and exit to modal interchange**

The lack of vigilance by controllers at the entry of MIs can impact on the level of on board crime. One rail FG participant noted, 'most of them (the criminals) do not buy train tickets. They use very old tickets and, when they pass the ticket examiners, they pretend to be in a rush and go past. Some of the ticket examiners know these criminals and, therefore, do not bother.'

#### **5.15.18 Interconnecting carriages**

Currently, the majority of commuter rail carriages are separate self-contained units. The interconnecting doors were not designed to permit free flow passenger movement between carriages but to provide an exit in times of emergency. After interviews with Metrorail, the commuter rail operator has undertaken a process of unsealing interconnecting doors after having sealed them. The current process of unsealing the interconnecting doors has been influenced by Metrorail's aiming to minimise the possibility of a victim being trapped in a carriage where an on board criminal act is being committed.

#### **5.15.19 Mixing of differing cultural groups in same vehicle**

The unintentional mixing of certain groups of people can lead to friction on board the transport vehicle. In an interview with DTMB it was stated that reports of children fighting each other

from different schools travelling on same bus mostly linked to senior schools, were received from time to time.

#### **5.15.20 Overloading**

Every transport vehicle used for public transportation has a legally stipulated maximum number of seated and/or standing passengers. Going over these limits gives rise to overloading. Overloaded transport vehicles may either increase or decrease the opportunity for on board crime. Both of these schools of thought can be summarised as follows:

Overloading factors and their influence on on board crime are presented below.

- **Number of seated passengers**

Seated passengers offer greater protection to themselves and their belongings.

- **Number of standing passengers**

Greater number of standing passengers, closely pressed together, give opportunities to pickpockets etc.

- **Width of aisles**

Increasingly narrow aisles force standing passengers to stand together. When one is disembarking, passing closely between the standing passengers affords an opportunity to commit crime unknowingly.

The number of standing passengers (being in direct relation to the level of overloading) as a factor in onboard crime is confirmed by Van der Reis. Here, Van der Reis<sup>8</sup> (p30) found that 'as the number of standing passengers increased, so too did the commuter's fear of crime. Furthermore, Van der Reis went on to say that 'the respondents felt relatively safe when everyone was seated.'

#### **5.15.21 Noise**

Unwarranted noise generated from within the vehicle, e.g. loud music, compounds the confusion that may be evident on a crowded bus. Taking advantage of this, criminals can work unnoticed and, when the cry is given by a victim, it is submerged within the extra noise.

#### **5.15.22 Personal economics**

Personal economics can influence the propensity to commit crime. One rail commuter FG participant stated, 'people are unemployed and hence they resort to crime. People also get used to a certain way of living. Even if one gets employed, if pickpocketing has been a way of living for years, it is very difficult to kick the habit.'

From another perspective relating to the harsh economic environment, a situation that has arisen is an attitude of 'every man/woman for himself/herself'. A security official stated that 'these hawkers sometimes sell liquor to commuters waiting for the train. These people are vulnerable when they get on trains. Some of the hawkers collaborate with criminals, thus not acting to protect their customers who are often train commuters.'

The availability of so many valuables in such a confined space presents a formidable economic temptation to the criminal. One taxi operator summed it up: 'once an opportunity presents itself, the criminal goes for it. Therefore the presence of the driver does not serve as a deterrence.' Taking advantage of opportunities and the surrounding environment to commit criminal acts goes back to crime theory, as presented in Section 2.1

### 5.15.23 Criminal ingenuity

Despite the presence of security agents on the commuter trains, the following strategies illustrate the ingenuity of the criminal in being one step ahead of the law and in identifying potential victims:

- It is impossible for security to be everywhere at all times. One FG participant noted that, 'security guards on board the trains tend to do their rounds in groups and immediately thereafter disappear into their own coach.' At this stage the criminals are able to come out of hiding and survey the environment.
- It was revealed that smokers of dagga often used the first class carriage on commuter trains. This was to enable them to be the first to see the security guards waiting at the next station and give them a chance to dispose of the incriminating evidence.
- 'Criminals board at one point and alight at the next convenient station after the mission is completed. These people are on business (it is their job) and they study the circumstances very carefully. At times they change from one train to the other. They work in groups and they communicate with each other. They signal to each other once the target has been identified. The groups have specific areas where they operate and have to stick to those areas to avoid conflict with other groups.' (Insight provided by a rail FG participant.)
- 'One strategy that criminals use is to put a purse on the floor and enquire from the rest of the people on board as to who has lost some money. Those who show concern, especially women who would rush and put their hands on their breasts (to feel their purses) are most likely to be the most immediate targets.' (Statement from a rail commuter FG participant.)
- The use of gifts and money to entrap school girls

This strategy, as discussed in Section 5.9, was reportedly used by some taxi operators in the Cape Flats.

### 5.15.24 Organised gangs

Discussions with Metrorail revealed that cable theft along certain commuter routes was a problem. The theft of the overhead cables (and, in some cases, of the cables which run alongside the rail track) cause immense damage to the operating regime of the commuter trains in that, once the cable is interfered, with it automatically trips the system and the signals change to red.

Knowing this, organised groups of people can split into two groups, one to tamper with the cable causing trains along a route to stop, its second group can then board the train and do their criminal work. Although there were no reported cases of such gangs working together in this way, it becomes a very real possibility, with the continuing menace of cable theft on Metrorail's commuter network.

Some FG participants believe in the possibility that some taxis are under the control and/or ownership of gangsters and drug lords. One participant went a step further saying 'some taxi drivers pay protection fees in order for them not to be harassed or intimidated by gangsters.'

### 5.15.25 Type of operation

Revelations from the Durban bus commuter FG indicated that there were perceived (some participants spoke from personal experience) differences in the level of on board crime of the Indian versus DTMB operated buses. A statement by one of the participants given in support of the perception was 'pickpocketing, stealing of expensive valuables and jewellery, happens on the Indian owned buses. There is no crime in the DTMB Buses'.

During the course of the Durban bus FG discussion, the moderator probed deeper to understand this perception by asking the question, 'Why is there crime on the Indian buses?' The response of the Durban bus commuter FG group, was that 'they (the Indian-operated buses) are often overloaded above the normal capacity, thus allowing the thugs to move around and rob people, usually at gun or knife point. In the DTMB buses overloading is not allowed. Once the bus is full it does not stop to collect more passengers.' Another participant in the same group responded by stating that 'Indian operated buses are cheaper than the DTMB buses and it seems that they make up for the loss by overloading.' Another stated that 'Indian buses operate like taxis where you as a passenger are always treated like a stranger. We do not know each other and buses stop anywhere and anyhow.'

#### **5.15.26 Staff impersonation (i.e. an impostor who looks authoritative)**

A participant in the Durban Bus FG cited one example. 'One day a man pretended to be a bus conductor and collected fares from all the passengers. He then alighted at the next bus stop. When the real conductor came, people could not believe that they paid the wrong person. These are some incidences which take place in these Indian buses.'

In another incident a participant of the rail commuter FG stated that 'tsotsis wear smart clothes and therefore are less likely to be suspected by commuters.'

Even security personnel are copied, as one incident recalled by a rail commuter FG participant indicates, 'at times Metrorail uses private security personnel to search people on board. 'Tsotsis' then, at times, use that strategy and rob people under the pretence of being privately employed security personnel. Unsuspecting culprits fall for this because they are unable to verify anything they are being told.'

#### **5.15.27 Inconsistent points of departure**

Another factor that influences the potential for on board crime on commuter rail, was that at times, the departure platforms of trains were changed at the last minute. Regular commuters get used to travelling on the same train, at the same time from the same platform. When there is a change of platform (which the research was, were told by a rail FG participant, sometimes is not even verbally announced) there is a rush to the other platform and in the commotion, criminal acts can take place. Sharing a personal, experience a mature female rail commuter FG participant said, 'at times you just see your train stopping at a different platform than the usual one. This causes a lot of confusion and criminals use that opportunity. You are not even given time to run to the platform where this particular train has stopped. People like myself are unable to run for the train.'

Even though this is more likely to occur on the platform (rather than on board) once one arrives in the carriage there is a frantic checking to see if one has all his or her possessions and here again, one leaves oneself open for identification by a potential criminal.

#### **5.15.28 Long journeys**

The existing locations of the majority of townships in the research areas are often at a distance from their areas of employment. Therefore, long journeys (journeys of more than one hour) have become the norm for many commuters. Long journeys which often commence in the early morning (trip to work/city) and end in the evening (trip from work/city) mean that the commuter often catches up with sleep on the journey itself. This can in turn result in the following:

- Passenger's neglect of belongings
- Allowing oneself to be watched by criminal

See Table 5.4 for more details.

#### **5.15.29 Anonymity of fellow traveller**

One taxi FG participant noted with regard to the higher level of on board crime on commuter trains. 'There are many people in the train who most often do not know each other and it is easier for criminals to escape. This is more evident in cities like Cape Town, where 80 per cent of the commuters rely on rail transport. People who use buses usually know each other and it is easier to identify the culprits. Commuters even go to the extent of having permanent seats on the buses. The taxis are too small for people to do crime unnoticed and the vigilance of the taxi personnel helps.'

#### **5.15.30 Disempowerment/powerlessness**

The previous regime's disenfranchisement and disempowerment of the predominantly black, i.e. African, population is still being felt today even after the 1994 democratic elections. Discussions with the commuter FG revealed that participants felt powerless to do anything in the face of crime, especially where violence or threats were used. This powerlessness is made all the more acute when the commuter perceives that the security agents are part of the on board crime problem.

The following statements were given in support of the above:

- 'At times the commuters are thrown out of the windows. And no one interferes.' (Participant in the bus commuter FG, Durban.)
- 'But at times police are useless. I watched a taxi driver paying a bribe of R20 to policemen for an overloaded taxi. He (the driver) thereafter continued with his journey.' (Participant bus commuter FG, Durban, recollecting an incident when travelling in an overloaded minibus taxi.)

#### **5.15.31 Type of passenger**

Some readers may argue that the types of passenger carried on public transport may themselves be part of the problem of on board crime. Such views were recorded in research presented by Atkins<sup>9</sup> (p116) who noted that 'several transport operators were concerned at the decreasing numbers of respectable middle class commuters travelling on the system. It was further suggested that the absence of such people made it easier for young hooligans to engage in anti-social behaviour.'

## **5.2. Summary**

The key findings that resulted from interviews with informal and formal stakeholders of the public transport systems in the three Mis studied were presented in this chapter. The perception of crime on board public transport as presented here is very real, as evidenced from the many personal experiences related in this chapter.

## 6. FARE EVASION

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This chapter aims to present an overview of fare evasion as it affects the three modes considered in this study, namely, commuter rail, minibus taxi and bus.

### 6.1. Introduction

Fare evasion is a situation in which a passenger rides on the transport system without paying the appropriate fare for the ride in question. Fare evasion can take various types:

Non payment:	This is a case where the passenger does not pay any fare whatsoever, or uses a forged ticket, i.e. rides for free. At times, the non-payment of a fare may be a deliberate protest against the charging of fares to certain categories of passenger, e.g. the unemployed.
Partial payment:	This is a case where a passenger pays an incorrect fare, which is usually less than the appropriate fare for the ride in question. For example, paying the fare for two travel zones, when in fact four zones were travelled (i.e. overriding).
Incorrect payment:	This is a case where the passenger pays the correct fare, but does not qualify for such a fare. For example, a teenager paying a child's fare for the journey in question.

The evading of fares was used prior to 1994 as a form of protest against the apartheid government by commuters. In this new fully democratic dispensation, users of services are being encouraged to pay for the services they use. The very low fares charged by Metrorail may result in passengers feeling that, since the fare is so low, how much would be missed if I do not pay? On the other hand, many of the fare evaders may be those people who do not see the transport service as a community service for their benefit which needs to be maintained by their financial contributions.

In another case fare evasion can be used to capitalise on on board crime by transport provider staff. An example was given by Spoornet where, some ticket inspectors on their mainline passenger trains, on coming across a passenger who did not have a valid ticket (or had failed to purchase one), would demand an upfront (deposit) payment from the passenger, promising to return later to collect the complete fare. The ticket inspector does not return and thus the passenger is allowed to alight at his or her destination after only paying a fraction of the correct fare.

### 6.2. Extent of the problem

In discussions with transport providers it was recognized that fare evasion was a problem, but transport providers were unable to determine its extent (in financial terms at least), with any certainty. This is partly because, most of the transport providers interviewed as part of this study, have differing levels of control over passenger access to/exit from their transport systems/vehicles. For example, access/exit control is approximately 100 per cent effective with regard to minibus taxi transport, but much less for commuter rail.



Fare evasion by passengers is a very real problem in respect of Metrorail commuter rail services. Fare evasion on buses and minibus taxis is minimal (if not non-existent), possibly owing to the fact that, on entering the vehicle, the driver expects payment from the passenger. According to a report in Business Day, 23 October 2000, Metrorail indicated that fare evasion levels had been reduced from 27% in the 1999/2000 financial year to 23% in the first half of the 2000/2001 financial year. Nevertheless, according to a statement in the SARCC 1999 Annual Report the Auditor General stated that<sup>27</sup>, ‘the external auditors of Transet were again unable to express an opinion on the completeness of fare income since inadequate physical access and exit procedures, facilities and resources at commuter stations did not provide sufficient assurance that every commuter was in possession of a legitimate and valid travel ticket during peak commuting periods. Under these circumstances I am unable to express an opinion on the completeness of fare income.’

It should also be noted that with the rail concessioning programme being implemented by the National Department of Transport the publication of the true extent of fare evasion could act as a disincentive to potential operators of concessioned routes.

### 6.3. Fare evasion and criminality

Discussions with transport providers revealed that there is a strong and definite link between fare evaders and people who commit crime on the public transport system. Therefore a potential strategy of the transport provider is to increase the difficulty of fare-evading passengers entering the transport system.

Types of fare evaders are indicated in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Types of Fare Evaders		
Fare Evader Type	Characteristic	Notes
Opportunistic	Takes a chance when it arises	Can never remove opportunistic fare evaders completely from the system.
Hardened	Determined individual who will find a way of getting into the transport system	Other alternative methods that have been used by fare evaders are: stealing a ticket or reselling used tickets and, in extreme cases, forging a ticket
Child Impersonator	A person older than the maximum child fare age nevertheless purchasing a child fare to enter the system	
Forcer	Sliding under, jumping over or breaking access control devices, e.g. barriers	

#### 6.3.1 Transport user differentiation

One method that can be used to identify the different types of fare evaders indicated in Table 6.1 is ‘user differentiation.’ This is the process whereby the various types of users are ascertained from the types of ticket purchased or from their travel patterns.

The process of differentiating the transport system user can lead the transport provider to determine which group of travellers may need financial help in order to facilitate travel, e.g.

scholars or the unemployed. Once each group is identified, the transport provider can initiate programmes to legitimise the travel needs of these groups by providing special fares/permits etc, where possible.

#### **6.3.2 Differentiation leads to enforcement focus**

By distinguishing between the different types of transport users, methods can be developed to check the validity of travellers within these groups. This, therefore, represents a shift in the balance of focus of the transport provider's enforcement strategies when it comes to fare evaders. When various groups are legitimised for travel (i.e. by transferring these groups from unauthorised to authorised user through the provision of special fares and conditions etc), the transport provider can focus on genuine fare evaders.

### **6.4. Transport systems and fare evasion**

Again, the design of the transport system/vehicle may have an influence on the extent of fare evasion being experienced by the transport provider. Table 6.2 highlights potential methods of fare evasion and identifies potential solutions for reducing the incidence of this.

As regards Advantages and Disadvantages of access control at the entrance to or exit from the transport system (commuter rail transport), Table 6.3 indicates the benefits of both strategies.

**Table 6.2: Transport systems and fare evasion**

<b>Mode</b>	<b>Deficiency</b>	<b>Effect</b>	<b>Resolved Low Cost</b>	<b>Resolved High Cost</b>
<b>BUS</b>	Physical checking of tickets	Difficulty of manually checking tickets (over time) to ensure that all are valid.	Colour coding Physical checking of tickets on exit	Automatic validation device on entry and exit
	High volumes of passengers	Slipping into vehicle behind fare paying passenger	Guiding rail	Automated entry/exit by barrier system
	Physical acceptance of money	Incorrect money given Passenger has no change	Certain denominations of cash accepted, i.e. no coins	Automated fare collection and ticket issue
	Long trip lengths with many stops	Passengers may give incorrect information about where they boarded or where they will alight	Flat fares	Fare zoning
	Students/scholars versus non studying youth	Non students claiming to be students	Demarcation of travelling times	Introduction of student travel cards
<b>TRAIN</b>	Open/Porous stations	Easy access into the system by passengers	Turnstiles Station fencing	Automated entry/exit by barrier system Electrified fencing around station
	Unmanned stations	Travelling without purchasing ticket	Purchasing tickets in nearby shops	Ticket machines at unmanned stations (but could become subject to vandalism) Ticket offices at major stations remaining open for longer
	High volumes of passengers	Slipping into vehicle behind fare paying passenger	Guiding rail	Automated entry/exit by barrier system
	Ticket office opening times	Passengers travelling outside opening hours access the system	Purchasing tickets in nearby shops	Ticket machines at unmanned stations (but could become subject to vandalism) Ticket offices at major stations remaining open for longer
	Cheapest mode (in most cases)	Unemployed and other low wage earners use the system		Free travel at selected times Subsidised travel at selected times
	Cash only payments	Forged currency can be used	Cash currency validation device	
	Physical acceptance of money	Incorrect money given Passenger has no change	Certain denominations of cash accepted	Automated fare collection and ticket issue

Table 6.3: Advantages and Disadvantages of access versus exit control with respect to commuter rail transportation			
LOCATION	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
At start of journey, e.g. at station	Ticket inspection on entry to the system	Controls access to system to ticket holders	Fare evader can purchase ticket to the next stop just to enter the system and then travel beyond the price paid Fare evader can locate open stations and enter system and exit at a station which is either open or only has entry control.
At end of journey, e.g. at station	Ticket inspection at exit from the system	Can focus enforcement energies at a busy station or terminus.	Fare evaders can claim that they boarded at the previous stop. Can be difficult for a ticket inspector to confirm this. At peak times travellers who are being interrogated by the ticket inspectors due to discrepancies with their tickets can cause disruption to other passengers, e.g. increase congestion at station exit
On the train	Ticket inspection whilst onboard the system, either in the vehicle or on the platform	Potential to identify those without tickets whilst they are actually in or using the system (prosecution should be easier in this case, if the fare evader does not have a valid reason to be without ticket)	At peak travel periods the level of congestion may limit the number of tickets checked Fare evaders can alight or move to another carriage if ticket inspector is seen

It should also be borne in mind that the access control function covers two activities, namely:

- Ticket validation tickets are authenticated as to their correctness and validity
- Risk verification preventing persons from entering the system who are carrying dangerous weapons, e.g. pangas.

## 6.5. Fare evasion control strategies

Potential fare evasion control strategies that could be considered/assessed by the transport providers interviewed, can be listed as follows:

- **The sale of tickets**  
The availability of tickets for sale at the commencement of a journey could act as a strong motivator to the user to purchase a ticket. It should be noted that if you cannot sell tickets you cannot control revenue.
- **Increased inspection regime**  
Use of ticket inspectors to validate tickets, especially at transport terminus. Where a trip ends at a transport terminus, it is somewhat easier for ticket inspectors to check tickets as all passengers have to disembark.
- **Integrity of staff**  
To weaken the opportunity for dishonesty in the collection of fares, etc, transport providers need to regularly test their own staff members to identify corrupt practices or persons.
- **Shame policy**  
One aspect in the identification of fare evaders was the potential 'shame' resulting from their exposure, in the media. Public exposure of the offender has been seen as a strong deterrent to fare evasion. The effectiveness of such a policy in respect of fare evasion on public transportation should take into account the different social conscience standards, which can vary from country to country.
- **Security of transport provider's staff**  
Discussions have revealed that customer care and diligence exercised by transport provider's staff decreased with the increasing fear of crime and personal safety being experienced by these staff members. To reduce this fear, the transport provider first and foremost should focus on the personal protection/safety of his staff rather than on giving the highest level of service to his customers/users. It stands to reason that, by improving the safety and security of the transport provider's staff, the positive result will be that staff members can increase their diligence and alertness in executing their duties, in turn giving a higher level of service to the transport provider's customers/users. Another potential spin-off from this strategy is that the transport provider's staff can become more vigilant in identifying fare evaders.
- **Training**  
Continuous training of security officials and ticket inspectors is very important for reducing the level of fare evasion. The staff of the transport providers' staff must know how to deal with the potential of aggression or violence from users who are apprehended for not having a valid ticket for their entire journey.
- **Enlisting fare payers to identify non-fare payers**  
By enabling travellers to realise the benefits of paying the correct fare for their journeys, the transport provider through offering higher levels of service, discounts on goods and services etc., can develop a change in the attitude of

bona fide travellers towards fare evaders. Here it is anticipated that bona fide travellers will not pity those travellers who wilfully abuse the system, through evading the payment of the appropriate fare. The development of the travellers' social conscience policy is to encourage all users of the system to pay for the use of it.

- **Penalty fares**

Penalty fares are targeted at opportunistic travellers. The rate should be set at a level that will be a sufficient deterrent against fare evasion. Such a level can be determined through customer research. The aim of the penalty fare is to deter ticketless travel and not necessarily to punish the offender. In respect of those passengers who do not have a valid ticket for some unforeseen reason, a system can be put in place that genuine stranded passengers, e.g. victims of crime, will be able to complete their journeys on the understanding that they give their contact details and subsequently pay the outstanding fare.

- **Community education**

Transport providers could engage school liaison officers to educate scholars/students about travelling safely on the public transport system. At the same time, such programmes can increase the awareness of the serious consequences of fare evasion.

- **Media publicity**

On a positive note, transport providers can engage the media, e.g. TV and newspapers, to increase awareness of their successes and changes etc. The same media could also be used to publicise details of those caught evading fares (see shame strategy above).

- **Ticket incentives**

Another potential strategy that could be employed by the transport provider is to reward those who purchase the correct tickets, especially those who buy bulk tickets, e.g. season tickets. Such rewards could take the form of discount offers at furniture outlets, for example. Increasing the number of users who purchase their tickets in advance could create many marketing and financial opportunities to the transport provider, e.g. direct marketing to the different segments of system users. This in itself could enable the transport provider to solicit a premium for advertising on its system, the premium being used to finance additional measures against fare evasion.

## **6.6. Summary**

This chapter aimed to give an overview of fare evasion on the public transport systems at the Mis studied. Fare evasion is a 'live and ongoing' threat to the financial sustainability of the transport providers interviewed. It becomes apparent that a multi-pronged approach is required to reduce the problem. Such an approach will harness information technology as well as social/community interventions.

The following chapter will seek to explore the world of crime related to the minibus taxis, which though not completely eradicated, still contributes to the image of public transport in South Africa being generally unsafe for the travelling public.

## 7. AN OVERVIEW OF TAXI DRIVE-BY SHOOTINGS

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### 7.1. Introduction

As discussed in Section 5.2, taxis had fewer problems relating to crime than commuter trains. Nevertheless, minibus-taxi drive-by shooting is a phenomenon unique to South African minibus-taxis which operate as a public transport mode and which recurs from time to time. This chapter aims to give a brief overview of this phenomenon.

### 7.2. Definition

A drive-by shooting, as defined by J Rauch<sup>28</sup> (p5), (which will be used in this research) is:

‘an incident involving shots fired from a vehicle, which is moving, or which drives off immediately after the shooting. The objectives are to kill, injure and/or terrify the victims. Damage to property is also likely to result.’

### 7.3. Characteristics of drive-by shootings

From the definition given above we can see that the following aspects constitute this particular type of offence. They are:

- **Shots**  
This therefore assumes that the weapon being used is a firearm, e.g. and AK47
- **Moving vehicle**  
As the vehicle is moving, this implies that the perpetrators of the crime may be skilled in firing at moving/stationary targets whilst they themselves are moving.
- **Casualties due to injury/death**  
The purpose of perpetrating this offence is to cause some injury to the intended victim. This injury can either be physical, e.g. death or psychological/emotional, e.g. fear.
- **Gender of perpetrator**  
According to the report by Rauch<sup>28</sup>, very little information was available in 1993 on the gender of the perpetrators of drive-by shootings. Nevertheless, it could safely be assumed now (as it was then) that most of the perpetrators were men. The minibus taxi industry is very much a male dominated world.
- **Race of the perpetrator**  
The statistics available relating to taxi violence do not identify the race of the perpetrator. It would thus be unwise to say that one racial group is responsible for ‘X’ amount of incidents. Nevertheless, although all races in South Africa are represented in the taxi industry, this in itself may not result in all races being directly involved in perpetrating drive-by shootings. Factors such as cost, availability and location of potential perpetrators etc., can play a more important role.


### 7.4. Statistics

The following points can be made about statistics relating to taxi drive-by shootings:

- It is not possible to provide a break-down of national statistics by cities (to fit in with the MIs of this research) as the Taxi Violence Investigating Unit only collates taxi violence statistics by province.
- Available SAPS statistics give aggregates of taxi-related violence. This makes it difficult to properly identify explicitly drive-by shootings (as the focus area of this project). For the purpose of this research and confirmed in discussions with SAPS, it is assumed that almost eighty five per cent of recorded incidents are drive-by shootings.
- Another shortcoming of the available statistics is that the number of convictions resulting from the arrests is not captured. This could probably be ascribed to the lack of coordination between the Ministries of Safety and Security and of Justice.

#### 7.4.1 National Statistics

Figure 7.1 presents the reported statistics for the period January 1996 to December 1999.



**Figure 7.1: National Taxi Violence Trends (1996 to 1999) (Source: SAPS)**

Key points from Figure 7.1 are:

- the number of incidents fluctuated between a high of 893 in 1996 to 339 in 1997, increasing to 670 in 1999. This period is too short to be able to identify long-term trends.
- If one studies the per centage increase/decrease between each year it is evident that there is a significant inverse relationship between the number of arrests and the number of incidents/deaths and injuries. For example, between 1996 and 1997 the number of incidents decreased by 62 per cent whereas the number of arrests in the same period increased by 79 per cent. Between 1997 and 1998 there was a 64 per cent decrease in the number of arrests and this resulted in an approximate (94 per cent increase) doubling in the number of incidents.


Discussions with SAPS officials indicated that, the decrease in the number of incidents, deaths and the number of injured in 1997, was due partly to increased SAPS crime



prevention efforts such as Operation Thiba in the Soshanguve area (North Pretoria). The decrease in taxi-related crime between 1996 and 1997 corresponds with the decrease in the number of reported murder and attempted murder crime statistics, as shown in Table 2.4

#### 7.4.2 Provincial statistics

Taxi violence statistics by province for the period 1996 to 1999 are summarised in Figure 7.2.



**Figure 7.2: Taxi violence statistics by province (Source: SAPS)**

Key points for Figure 7.2 can be summarised as follows:

- Figure 7.2 clearly shows that three provinces had high levels of taxi-related violence, namely: Eastern Cape, Gauteng and the Western Cape (in that order).
- KwaZulu Natal does not feature as a province with a high incidence of taxi-related violence. However, according to a SAPS official, this could be attributed to under reporting of incidents, as SAPS KwaZulu Natal lacks a specific unit to deal with taxi violence, such as a Taxi Violence Unit.
- The low incidence of taxi-related violence in KwaZulu Natal runs contrary to the belief that some of the taxi violence stems from political differences.
- The Northern Cape Province experienced the least number of incidents. This could be attributed to the size of the taxi industry in this province, which is relatively small.
- When the taxi violence statistics are compared with provincial statistics for murder and attempted murder, the provincial ranking for the top three slots is different; with KwaZulu Natal leading, followed by Gauteng and the Eastern Cape (see Tables 7.1 and 2.4). Without further investigation it is difficult to explain this difference.

<b>Table 7.1: Number of reported cases of murder and attempted murder, ranked by Province (1996 to 1999)</b>				
Province	1996	1997	1998	1999
KwaZulu Natal	14,183	13,209	13,810	13,783
Gauteng	12,962	12,778	13,219	12,402
Eastern Cape	7,647	7,686	7,376	7,427
Western Cape	6,513	6,768	7,639	7,010
North West	3,404	3,243	3,356	3,263
Northern Province	3,271	2,919	2,851	2,904
Mpumalanga	2,668	2,709	2,477	2,386
Free State	2,606	2,463	2,496	2,310
Northern Cape	1,044	961	1,069	1,000
TOTAL	54,298	52,736	54,293	52,485

Source: SAPS

## 7.5. Causes of taxi violence

In this section a brief overview of the causes of taxi violence will be presented. A great deal of research has been conducted into taxi-related issues in South Africa and it is not the intention of this report to reiterate these studies. Nevertheless, mention will be made of these studies as and when appropriate, to which the reader can then refer if more information is required.

### 7.5.1 The National Taxi Task Team

The National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) was formed in April 1995, appointed by the Minister of Transport Mr Mac Maharaj. The NTTT consisted of nine taxi industry representatives (one from each province) and nine government representatives (covering all three tiers of government, i.e. national, provincial and local). The NTTT was also assisted by specialist advisors.

The mandate of NTTT was to, 'investigate the issues affecting the taxi industry and formulate recommendations to the Minister of Transport to address these issues.' The identification of issues and problems was accomplished through public hearings, as well as by inviting written submissions from all stakeholders and role-players in the minibus taxi industry. In addition, the experience and expertise located in the task team was taken on-board.

### 7.5.2 Historical development of taxi violence

In 1984 the Welgemoed Commission called for deregulation of the taxi industry with the aim of disrupting the South African Black Taxi Association (SABTA). During the execution of this process a state of disunity and disorganisation developed between taxi operators. This atmosphere of disunity was further exacerbated due for the following reasons:

- the oversupply of taxi permits, uncontrolled purchase of kombi's and the deregulation of taxi rank infrastructure saturated the supply side of the taxi industry,
- the economic recession of 1985 and the influx of foreigners and of people receiving retrenchment packages contributed to the oversupply of taxis,

- third force activities, through the importation of private armies from areas such as, Kwa-Zulu Natal, Northern Province, Maputo and Angola and the escalation of black on black violence, although politically and racially based, filtered through to the taxi industry.

The culmination of all these factors ultimately initiated the phenomenon of taxi-related violence and killings.

### 7.5.3 Probable causes of taxi violence

Some of the issues raised by participants at the NTTT hearings<sup>29</sup> (and supplemented by interviews with taxi stakeholders as part of this research) were:

- **The taxi industry lacks formality and effective control**

In interviews (conducted in respect of this research) with taxi association representatives, the latter indicated that 'the monitoring of taxi operations, policing of taxi ranks and law enforcement are virtually non-existent.' They went on to say that 'taxi operators without permits are still operating and they are not prosecuted according to the law. Others open taxi ranks wherever they wish and pay law enforcement agents bribes in order to continue their illegal operations.'

This state of chaos within the taxi industry was echoed by an expert on taxi-related issues at the CSIR, who stated that 'until proper monitoring and policing is put into place, the hard work of NTTT will go to waste.'

- **Too many permits have been issued**

A SAPS official interviewed stated that, 'there are too many players for a small market, supply exceeds demand.'

- **Long distance operators switch to short distance trips at times**

Economic pressures and greed have created a situation where some taxis operating on long distance trips, decide to conduct short distance trips at times of low demand etc to make up their earnings.

- **Police must be neutral and not take sides/police must not own taxis/conflict of interest**

During an interview, with a SAPS official again confirmed the allegation that SAPS officials are directly involved in taxi operations, when he stated that, 'SAPS officials have bought kombis (in their private capacity) and started to operate these as taxis and hence they cannot be seen as being impartial.'

In a recent communiqué, Dugard<sup>30</sup> stated that, 'however good the Department of Transport's NTTT recommendations and solutions, in the end it boils down to monitoring, policing and the criminal justice system. I would say that the taxi violence problem is not, in the first instance, a transport problem, but a criminal justice problem. A component of the taxi violence is SAPS officers who own taxis and either turn a blind eye or actively participate in violence against rival associations. Until this is sorted out there is no chance of eradicating the violence.'

- **Perceived tardiness (and potential corruption) of the law enforcers**

A SAPS official stated that, with the high workload of police officers, 'reporting taxi violence to the police is not perceived by taxi people as effective. Police are overworked and take time to react and also accept bribes, thus people have rejected this route.' (See Sections 5.13 and 5.14.)

Another SAPS official said that, 'dockets can go astray in courts. Copies have then to be made but these are not acceptable as evidence.'

- **People are scared to report those causing violence for fear of intimidation (i.e. law enforcers and witnesses)**

With the extra burden placed on speedy investigation of taxi-related crime, potential witnesses often do not want to testify. A SAPS official substantiated this by stating that 'they (the witnesses) are scared to be victimised.' (See Sections 5.13 and 5.14).

On the other hand, law enforcers are also subjected to intimidation. This situation was confirmed by a SAPS official, who stated that, 'traffic officers are scared to fine the perpetrators for fear of intimidation.'

- **Joining fees for taxi associations are exorbitant**

A senior official of the South African Long Distance Taxi Association (SALDTA) said that, 'the real spark of violence is the collection of fees by individuals representing taxi associations from affiliate members of the taxi association.'

Other possible reasons, in addition to those mentioned above are:

- **The South African constitution**

According to Dugard<sup>30</sup>, 'the South African constitution guarantees free economic activity - this impedes legislative and official attempts to clamp down on rogue taxi associations and also on police ownership of taxis.'

- **The criminal justice system**

A taxi official interviewed stated that, 'whilst dockets are disappearing, there has been no successful arrest and prosecution of perpetrators. The government has no grip on [taxi] violence. The police and the criminal justice system are retarding the progress in the taxi industry.'

Dugard<sup>30</sup> states that the situation is exacerbated because, 'beyond police ownership of taxis, there are the more generalised problems with the criminal justice system - poor investigations, etc. which mean that very few perpetrators of taxi violence have ever been charged, let alone served time for their crimes.'

- **Economic**

An academic well versed in taxi issues stated that 'some taxi associations are only trying to protect their own interests. Nevertheless, this does not mean that all of them operate like the mafia.' The academic went on to say that, 'if the resources of the livelihood of the taxi operator are threatened, extreme measures will be taken to protect the same.'

The above list is not exhaustive but gives an indication of the varied factors that have influenced and still may be influencing taxi-related violence.

## **7.6. The status quo of taxi-related violence**

Taxi violence statistics post December 1998 were not available at the time of writing. Because of the erratic nature of taxi drive by shootings and of the differences in statistics collected by official, e.g. SAPS and non-official sources, e.g. newspaper articles, it would be unwise to make a statement regarding the status quo.

With respect to implementation of the recommendations of the NTTT, interviews with officials of CKS Consulting indicated that:

- the process of establishing taxi co-operatives in most provinces is bearing fruit;
- chairmen from the different taxi associations are able to sit around one table and attend business courses together;
- co-operation between the chairmen of the taxi associations is filtering down to rank and file members, and
- training is also provided to drivers, operators and rank marshals. Courses such as rank management, customer service and first aid are provided to ensure quality customer service.

The implementation of the NTTT's final recommendations are well underway. An expressed concern of the participants interviewed was the perceived reluctance of SAPS officials/law enforcers to monitor and enforce the NTTT's recommendations. There is also the continued perception that SAPS officials are involved in covert taxi operations, which is another contributory factor in taxi violence. The alleged failure of the criminal justice system to successfully prosecute the perpetrators was also a cause of concern expressed by interviewees.

## **7.7. Summary**

This chapter presented a brief overview of taxi drive-by shootings, presenting a historical background, potential factors giving rise to this phenomenon and ending off with some comments on the status quo.

## 8. COMMUNITY ON-BOARD CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGIES

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### 8.1. Existing strategies

This section presents a consolidation of existing community on-board crime prevention strategies (i.e. on-board the transport vehicle) as derived from the interviews and FG discussions. The findings are summarised in Table 8.1. Discussion of key issues will be presented at the end of this chapter.

### 8.2. Potential strategies

Potential community on-board crime prevention strategies are presented in Table 8.2.

### 8.3. Crime prevention

Going back to the definition of crime prevention in Section 2.1 the reader will see that it involves the initiation of some strategy to reduce the potential for crime. In respect of public transportation there are three main overarching strategies that are used to effect this. They are:

- **Policing and staffing**

The visible presence of staff at MI and on-board transport vehicles.

- **Situational crime prevention**

The reduction in opportunities to commit criminal acts through modifying the environment. This could take the form of plastic seats, which reduce the potential for vandalism etc.

- **Social crime prevention**

The reduction in crime by changing the attitudes or behaviour of the potential offender.

The focus of the entire study is an understanding as to why informal groups have not formed as yet on-board public transport, in particular on trains. In this chapter issues relating to such informal groups and their on-board crime prevention potential will be discussed.

**Table 8.1: Existing community on-board crime prevention strategies**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
BUS	Cohesive groups	Establishing relationship with fellow passengers Some are formed initially to challenge fare increases Standing together Coming together in a formalised/semi-formalised or ad-hoc manner	Can be formed on long journeys If one sleeps on journey another passenger is looking out for the other Relationship and trust building with fellow commuters Reduction in the level of perceived on-board crime Empowerment of informal group members Sharing on-board crime prevention initiatives and other information with the transport provider Interested in fellow passengers' welfare	The moral integrity of individual members in the cohesive group may be questionable The group may be made up of criminals (unknown to other members in the group) Duplication of activities/services provided by the formal organisations Participation by, co-operation with and guidance from SAPS may be limited Legal status of the group may be undetermined, which could create problems when the group metes out 'street' justice.
	Protection of driver	Knowing the driver personally	He becomes a friend	Driver could take passengers for granted Passengers may get angry when usual driver is replaced
	Purchasing multiple tickets	Purchasing tickets at one time for more than one journey	Financial savings	Need money up front Personal cash flow problems may result in not meeting upfront payment
	Ownership (internalisation) of transport vehicle	Transport service seen as a community service	Protection of service, vehicle and driver of vehicle	
	Minding one's own business	Staying quiet on journey	Decreasing potential of being identified as victim	See Section 5.15.11
	Not buying from on-board hawkers	Not purchasing items from on-board sellers	Not showing cash reduces potential of becoming victim	Not supporting hawkers could be taken as not supporting community economic upliftment

**Table 8.1: Existing community on-board crime prevention strategies**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
	Disallowing overcrowding	Restricting access to vehicle once it is full	Less people	Passengers could place themselves in personal danger
BUS	Commuter groups	See cohesive groups above	See cohesive groups above	See cohesive groups above
	Taking extra money/hiding it on the person	Extra money is taken in case passenger has to use another mode either forcibly or in an emergency	Are able to complete journey if forcibly transferred to another mode	Criminal becomes persistent because he knows victim is likely to have money
	Working with SAPS	Sharing of knowledge with SAPS	Enables SAPS to keep up with criminals and diffuse potential situations	Community may turn against person
	Own morality/honesty	Understanding that one cannot gain from another's misfortune	Support for fellow passenger in times of on-board misfortune	
	Alertness	Staying alert throughout journey, i.e. not falling asleep	Reduces possibility of being taken unawares by criminal	
	Bus monitors	Schools elect bus monitors	Reports vandalism to bus driver	Monitor may be known as an informer and peers turn against him
TRAIN	Commuter groups	See cohesive groups (under buses)	See cohesive groups (under buses)	See cohesive groups (under buses)



**Table 8.1: Existing community on-board crime prevention strategies**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
	Transferring to another mode	Using the bus, taxi or walking Grouping together and chartering a taxi or sharing private vehicle (ride sharing) Purchasing own vehicle (if affordable)	Journeys can be completed at the level of service expected	Increased financial outlay to the commuter Such an action could result in a longer journey time
	Taking extra money	Extra money is taken in case passenger has to use another mode either forcibly or in an emergency	Are able to complete journey if forcibly transferred to another mode	Criminal becomes persistent because he knows victim is likely to have money (especially relevant on pay days)
	Staying awake/sober on journey	Being vigilant at all times whilst travelling	Allows time to become aware of fellow passengers	Increased vigilance could be interpreted by criminal as nervousness on the part of the potential victim e.g. the commuter may have something to hide.
MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
TRAIN	Waiting on the footbridge or at some other area away from the platform	Not proceeding to the train until it has arrived at the platform	Gain a strategic view of platform activity	Rushing for the train when it arrives can increase the potential of personal injury due to tripping or stampeding Storming the ticket inspector/barrier often results in commuters who do not have tickets boarding the vehicle.
	Wearing of trousers by schoolgirls	Wearing of trousers by female scholars	Reduces possibility of becoming a victim of gross sexual indecency	Additional personal baggage capacity may be required Extra financial outlay on clothes necessitated
	Travelling first class	Travelling in the first class section of the train (with appropriate ticket)	Fewer people Amongst people of positive, law abiding attitude	Extra financial outlay Third class passengers may disrespect first class carriage

**Table 8.1: Existing community on-board crime prevention strategies**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
TAXI	Disallowing overcrowding		full	Less people
	Commuter groups	Commuter groups	See cohesive groups above (bus section)	See cohesive groups above (bus section)
	Reinvesting in ex-criminals (a successful strategy of this type has been implemented in San Francisco <sup>31</sup> )	Ex-criminals once rehabilitated are tasked to look after MIs and vehicles	Ex-criminal becomes an ally	Ex-criminals could relapse if tempted
	Taking personal responsibility for fellow passengers	Understanding that one cannot gain from another's misfortune	Support for fellow passenger in times of on-board misfortune	
	Queue marshals	Queue control by designated person	Instils order in queue of passengers	Potentially slow moving queue Increased wait and frustration for some commuters

**Table 8.2: Potential community on-board crime prevention strategies**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
BUS/TRAIN/TAXI	Noting bus/train/taxi information	Transport Vehicle clearly displays information regarding its route, number etc. Passenger can then note details in mind or if regular user to another person	If any shortfalls in service can report to transport providers Widens market of potential travellers, e.g. tourists	Having to ask driver about clarifying information may delay others

## 8.4. Perception by passengers as to on-board security

Public transport is a service provided to meet the travelling needs of commuters. In this section these commuters' perception of on-board crime prevention methods are presented. In this vein, the following perceptions were gained from the FG discussions:

- **Security staff are rarely seen in the third class carriages of Metrorail trains.**  
A rail FG stated that 'we do not have security guards in our coaches. We need to have at least two personnel in each coach. They should be in uniform so that they serve as a deterrent to would-be criminals.' Another rail FG participant re-emphasised this point and went one step further, stating that 'there are no staff members on the trains (the coaches that we use). This issue is very problematic because at times these criminals work together with the police.'
- **Commuters cannot expect any help from the security structures.**  
One rail FG participant noted that 'Commuters themselves have to stand up and fight for their own safety. They should not depend on Metrorail because M/r is only interested in making profits'.
- **Technological on-board crime prevention devices unknown**  
The majority of FG participants were unaware of any technical on-board security measures in operation. This in itself could have negative results in that the potential criminal, being aware of such devices, could become more daring in executing his crime. On the other hand, if the commuter knows that such devices are on-board, his sense of personal security whilst traveling will be increased.

## 8.5. Community strategies - The Cohesive Unit

This section will discuss the 'cohesive unit' as being the cornerstone strategy that can be employed by the community to impact on on-board crime prevention.

There is a perception (and in some cases it is a reality) that there is strength in numbers. Therefore, with their resources like-minded people coming together with the same objectives and experiences can form something that can either facilitate constructive exchange between them and formal organisations (in this case the transport provider) or offer some form of self-help to members.

### 8.5.1 Development of a cohesive unit

The PUTCO Bus Commuter Executive, an informal group of commuters (some members of which participated in the bus commuter FG) will be used as an example to trace the development of a cohesive unit.

In the interviews with some members of the PUTCO Bus Commuter Group, the question was put to them, 'what brought about the formulation of the committee?' The members responded, stating the following two reasons:

- the commuters were unhappy about the way PUTCO was run, especially when it came to fare increases, and
- the commuters did not feel safe on the buses and they did not have any one to report to. There was a formalised body but it did not meet the commuters' expectations.

From the above, it is clear that a common issue which could not be dealt with effectively individually but which collectively could have an impact, was the catalyst for the formation of a cohesive unit.

In addition to the above, there is often the situation where one looks outside for help from formal structures but finds none. Then one is forced to look again and, if there are others who have similar experiences, that is the start of a bonding process. One rail commuter FG participant stated that 'the people themselves have to come together because the police and the security guards are not there to help them in times of need.'

### **8.5.2 Types of cohesive unit**

As regards the different types of cohesive unit, these units may either be formal, semi-formal or informal. Examples of these can be seen in:

- **Formal**

An example of a formal group is the South African Commuters Association (SACO). This national organisation, based in Johannesburg, acts as a mouthpiece for all commuters using public transport. In this role SACO mediates between the commuters, transport operators and Government as and when required. SACO's role in facilitating 'Group and Ride' initiatives is limited. Membership of SACO is open to all commuters.

- **Semi-formal**

This can be seen in the 'gospel' carriages, where commuters congregate to hear a sermon whilst they travel.

It has also been established that commuter rail operators establish links with community groups and commuters to obtain their perceptions and experience of the level of service and market research information.

- **Informal groupings**

An example of this type of group is seen in Durban, with the Traders Against Crime (TAC) informal crime prevention group. This group (based at the Berea Road/Warwick Junction MI) consists of hawkers and other interested persons (many of whom use commuter rail or other modes of public transport) who came together in response to the challenges posed by the criminal element in the central business area of Durban. (This will be discussed in the following chapter.)

### **8.5.3 Positive consequences of cohesive units/informal groups**

The positive consequences of informal groups can be listed as follows:

- **Relationship and trust building with fellow commuters**

Since the inception of the committee most of the commuters who travel relatively long distances from the Eastern Highveld region (Mpumalanga) have formed relationships with each other. 'More or less the same people board the bus on a daily basis. Commuters feel safe to the extent that 90 per cent of those who are seated fall asleep and do not worry about their personal belongings. There used to be incidences of lost coupons, but the good working relationship between the commuters themselves has meant that even lost coupons are brought forward, once found.'

- **Reduction in the level of perceived on-board crime**

The research revealed that among passengers regularly travel together, knowing each other as friends, on-board crime has reduced. Again, using the PUTCO Bus Commuter

Group as an example, a participant stated that, 'the perception of crime is also almost non-existent.'

- **Empowerment of informal group members**

Empowerment of informal group members can take a variety of forms, such as increased knowledge of transport operations through information dissemination by group members and by formal transport providers. Another positive spin-off from empowerment is an increase in the knowledge power of the individual. Knowing how things work and where to turn to for assistance in times of need enables one to become more concerned about preserving the environment.

In realising this empowerment of commuters through informal groups, it was indicated that 'the commuters on the PUTCO buses are from rural areas, e.g. KwaNdebele. Each location within these areas has a representative who serves as link between themselves and the executive committee. The elected officials work closely with PUTCO management in ensuring the comfort of both the labourers and the commuters. The free flow of information has resulted in less bus boycotts and reasonable fare increments. The committee works hard to empower the rural communities in terms of making them aware of their rights and privileges as bus commuters. Weekly and monthly meetings are held in different areas. PUTCO ensures that transport is available for community representatives and committee members to travel to the areas where the meetings are to be held. Furthermore, the committee produces monthly and annual reports which are distributed to members and PUTCO management.'

- **Immediate justice for criminals**

As discussed in Section 5.14.1, the perceived slow turning of the wheels of justice was a factor discouraging the reporting of crime to the security agents. Some informal group members would argue that being able to deal 'appropriately' with crime as and when it appears makes potential criminals think twice about hitting a community. One rail FG participant said that 'we, the comrades, are very successful because we do not wait for the court of law and criminals to respect us.'

- **Sharing on-board crime preventions and other information with the transport provider**

The assistance of informal groups on-board public transport was acknowledged and thanked by a formal stakeholder. Such strategies assist in the operation of the transport in that the driver can concentrate on getting the commuters safely from A to B. It was noted in the interview that 'the bus passengers do stand together, therefore informal community policing does work on buses. The bus passengers act as enforcers and keepers of the peace themselves.'

During the FG discussion, a PUTCO management staff member joined the group, and reiterated that the reports being produced by the Bus Commuter Group come in very handy for PUTCO's Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats analysis (SWOT) and business growth strategic planning.

- **Interest in fellow passenger's welfare**

Travelling on the same bus from the same area and coming from the same social strata, commuters can identify with their fellow passengers' needs and aspirations. On bus operator commented on the success of the informal groups that he dealt with, saying 'passengers know each other and take care of each other. This strategy is successful as nothing is happening on-board.'

When the above question was put to the member of a bus commuter FG, the reply was that 'we are standing together that is all. We want to complete our journeys as quickly as possible and do not want to experience any problems in the process.' Another example related by a formal stakeholder illustrated the commuter's need to get from A to B without any problem. This was an occasion on which, the Minister of Transport, Mac Maharaj, recently boarded a bus at random and caused it to be delayed. Passengers were not pleased, as his impromptu visit had not been arranged.

Another experience was related to the researchers. One day, a woman in the FG overheard a plot to rob a poor man who, she later discovered, was on his way to see his belated wife at the hospital: 'Two young guys were following him when he boarded the bus. It looked like they were following him from the shops where he had bought some stuff. They had seen where the money was (a brown envelope he opened to pay the bus fare), and were waiting for the right time. Fortunately we (the man and myself) were going to get off at the same bus stop and I interfered by pretending to be in a hurry. I forced the man to rush out of the bus and that is how he escaped!'

#### **8.5.4 Negative consequences of cohesive groups**

In discussions with formal stakeholders the following were indicated as potential shortcomings of these informal groups:

- **The integrity of the participants**

Another comment from one of the members of the rail FG indicated that there are also the Masakhane groups which are not effective because they discuss strategies with the commuters and that is where 'tsotsis' learn more robbery tricks.

- **Composition of members**

It was noted that not all members of informal groups are necessarily users of public transport. Councillors and other community representatives may be members (because of their community status) but, owing to the fact that they may have their own means of transport, e.g. cars, they do not experience the day-to-day trials of public transport commuting.

- **Duplication**

One participant from a taxi operator FG would not encourage the formation of such groups noted, 'because it would not be possible. There is a Transport Forum that is operating in the Chesterfield area but we were not made aware of its formation and the only time it raises its head is when we consider a fare increase.' Another participant stated that 'with too many voices, which one should be heard?'

- **Participation by/cooperation with SAPS**

Participation by SAPS may reduce the effectiveness of a group. One bus operator, who supported informal groups stated that, 'I only involve SAPS when there is something which has gone out of control. Because of lack of trust between communities and the police I therefore involve SAPS as a last resort.'

- **Legal status of participant of informal group**

It was pointed out by the SAPS that if a volunteer has assaulted an alleged criminal he (the volunteer) may not get indemnity against a charge of assault laid against him by the alleged criminal. Who then is going to be responsible? There are many of implications regarding the legal operation of such informal groups. SAPS went on further to note that experience has also shown us that these informal groups become a force in themselves.

These groups are not controlled and this causes further problems as they may evolve into vigilante groups.

- **Potential to get involved in clandestine activities**

Another concern raised by SAPS was, how were participants within these informal groups going to survive economically, especially where some of the participants may be economically non-active? The question was then asked, 'how do we know that these informal groups are not allies of or supporting criminal groups?'

- **Interpretation of law**

It was noted in Section 5.14.1 that the ordinary man and woman in the street have a lack of understanding of the correct workings of the legal system. If such people are members of informal groups how then can society be assured that crime prevention and the meting out of justice is conducted according to the law. Misinterpretation of the law may well tarnish the effectiveness of informal groups and make them less attractive to the potential participant.

## **8.6. Encouragement in the development of informal groups**

One rail commuter FG, said 'it would be much better if we had such groups, i.e. informal groups. When you are attacked on the train no one comes to your rescue. We as hawkers have never been robbed on-board. It is only here at the station and the only way we could deal with the criminal elements was to club together and beat them up. They, now, hardly trouble us at all.' Another stated, 'yes we would support them (informal groups). At least they can stamp down these crimes.'

As a last point in this section, it should be noted that the fluid nature of rail commuter travel has in some cases reduced the propensity of passengers to form cohesive groups. In his use of the term 'fluid' the author is indicating that in respect of rail travel different people may travel in different carriages for each and every journey, therefore the element of bonding between commuters is reduced. This can be compared to long-distance commuter buses where commuters using these buses often travel at the same time, use the same bus and sit in the same seats. Over time they are able to identify with other commuters not just on facial features alone. It can therefore be seen that the majority of the measures indicated in Table 8.1 are actions that are done on an individual basis rather than on a group basis.

## **8.7. Summary**

This chapter presented a consolidated summary of community based on-board crime prevention strategies. A discussion of the key issues resulting from our findings was also presented.

## **9. COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES/STRUCTURES AT MODAL INTERCHANGES**

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### **9.1. Existence of informal crime prevention groups at Modal Interchanges**

From the data that were collected as part of the research process at the three MI, except for Berea Road station, no concrete evidence was found that there were any community justice group and/or any informally structured crime prevention initiatives. However, it should be kept in mind that isolated instances occur where one or more individuals in a specific context, e.g. at taxi or bus ranks, or particular settings/situations within the informal trade industry who do not belong to any crime prevention group would, respond instantaneously when being attacked or when observing such acts.

### **9.2. Traders Against Crime**

An organised and active informal crime prevention organisation called TAC, based at the Berea Road MI, has been operating for a number of years. The research team was able to conduct interviews with the co-founder of the TAC and other members of this group. The interviews provide a good overview of how the TAC was formed, how it operates, and some of its challenges, which are presented here.

#### **9.2.1 Origin**

The TAC was formed as a response to the challenges posed by the criminal element in the central business area of Durban to members of the public, the security agencies, businesses and informal traders. Traders came together late in 1996 and organised a Community Policing Forum (CPF) structure to fight crime.

A female member of the organisation told the research team that criminals came at a time when their businesses were prospering. She said that 'Whites used to buy, Indians as well and all sorts of people, including foreigners. It would happen that at the time that these people would buy goods from us that their bags and necklaces would be snatched. We as women could do nothing.' Again, this incident confirms the potential victims' (and witnesses') helplessness/powerlessness, as discussed in Section 5.15.30.

According to other members' statements, women traders were coerced (see Section 5.1.1) by the perpetrators into putting safe-keeping stolen goods in safe-keepers on behalf of criminals and furthermore, would be expected to keep quiet about this. It was stated by a woman trader that 'you wouldn't utter a word, you just have to keep quiet.'

The hawker interviewees concluded by stating that their customers were moving away from their trading areas and that these customers were starting to buy from traders elsewhere. They (the hawkers) realised what had caused the customers to move away from their businesses. They would also ask themselves why are they sitting all day without making any sales, and who was harassing their customers and traders alike?' They then decided to form an organisation to fight crime.

#### **9.2.2 Aims**

TAC's aims can be summarised as follows:

- to work with the police;
- to fight crime;
- to have a crime-free trading area;



- to protect both customers and the general public including tourists;
- to protect and expand their businesses, and
- to protect the economy of the country/local area.

### **9.2.3 Membership**

Membership is open to all informal traders countrywide. There is no fee charged for belonging to the organisation.

TAC expects and encourages members to be full-time card-carrying members. It is hoped that this will help them and other people to easily identify them as belonging to the TAC and set them apart from bad elements.

### **9.2.4 Identification**

The TAC has a membership card system and T-shirts with which they identify themselves.

### **9.2.5 Social structure of the TAC**

Based and modelled along Community Policing Forum lines, the TAC's structure comprises the Executive Committee, the Working Committee (Steering Committee), Disciplinary Committee, and Forums (branches). The organisation's branches or forums are found all over Durban and the TAC is currently trying to set up other branches in townships.

The organisation also operates within internal and external structures, which include the police and other community-based organisations. The TAC and these organisations come together during meetings that are held regularly. As TAC does not exist for gain or for political reasons, it will be difficult for the organisation to be corrupted.

### **9.2.6 Normative structure: code of conduct**

The organisation has certain values which, to some extent, are reflected in its aims. It has a constitution and a set of rules and regulations by which it is governed. For example, members are not allowed to be drunk whilst on duty, every member has to patrol areas, to reserve time for meetings and patrols, to show respect, to keep details of full and permanent membership (evidenced by a membership card) on their person. Members should not indulge in criminal acts. They should take care not to abuse members of the public, and TAC members should never divulge the secrets of the organisation.

The TAC conducts normal trading area patrols and special patrols; when they have been called to respond or assist a particular trading area to fight crime.

### **9.2.7 Night work**

The TAC holds the view that it has been successful in reducing the level of crime during daytime. It believes that criminals operate freely at night. After work, i.e. around 19h00-19h30, TAC members are compelled to leave their respective trading areas. They believe that this is the time that the criminal element moves in and does as it pleases, since the police would also have left the area.

According to the TAC, the need arose to continue the work of fighting crime at night and to clear its name or image, since some criminals masquerade as informal traders when operating at night.

It was also stated that police usually left the study area at around 18h00 - 19h00. The TAC believes that, 'when prevented from doing their job at night, criminals might not take it kindly and will naturally not run away like they do during the daytime. They will want to stand their

ground and fight. This might turn out ugly and this may be misinterpreted to mean that the TAC is now operating like PAGAD.'

#### **9.2.8 Checks against corruption**

The TAC has a system in place, which seems to have worked fairly well thus far.

#### **9.2.9 Breaking the rules**

The TAC acknowledges that its members sometimes transgress. For example, some members satisfy their own personal agendas without the knowledge of the organisation. This was confirmed when a participant related to the research team that 'all that we do now is done from our own thinking/view points. We do not know much. We believe therefore that we may be wrong in what we do.'

Among the problems the TAC have encountered thus far is that of members being involved in criminal activities, in that members were involved in buying stolen goods from criminals and also putting in safe-keeping stolen goods at their stalls on behalf of criminals. The TAC has campaigned against this evil-doing among its members by encouraging honest trading.

#### **9.2.10 Corrective Action**

The working committee discusses issues pertaining to breaches of rules and regulations. Members found to be in breach of such rules can be suspended or expelled.

#### **9.2.11 Sponsorship**

The TAC located offices but, because of lack of funds, was unable to pay for the offices and buy pagers. They eventually got financial support from a former premier of KwaZulu Natal, Dr Mdlalose.

The TAC has no sponsors and this is said to be working against it in that it renders the organisation ineffective to a certain degree and tends to demoralise its members.

#### **9.2.12 Fund-raising**

The organisation has met with the Durban mayor, as well as the then Premier, Dr Ben Ngubane, who both made monetary donations. The TAC also sells T-shirts in trying to raise funds.

#### **9.2.13 Public education**

The TAC suggests that some form of collaboration and public awareness be created among hawkers and other stakeholders. The aim of such collaboration should be to protect the community against criminals. People should be informed that for their protection they should turn to informal traders who would be the first person/s available to assist them.

#### **9.2.14 Comforting victims/victim support**

The TAC tries to help victims in whatever way it can and to call the police to effect arrests.

#### **9.2.15 Action against perpetrators of crime**

The TAC would normally call the police after having apprehended the offender whilst at the same time, assisting the victim. Another participant stated that 'we apprehended criminals, and take them to the police. But because we would not normally have complainants (i.e. victims) except their belongings, the police would release them (i.e. the criminals). We would then beat the criminals up. Eventually many of the criminals fled the area.' Further stressing their successes, one participant stated that 'right now we have seen a significant reduction in the rate of crime, even though there is still a lot of crime.'

#### **9.2.16 Declining members' interests**

The organisation normally has discussions from time to time to address declining interest of members in the activities of the organisation. They visit disillusioned members at their forums and stalls with a view to stimulating their interest in the organisation.

#### **9.2.17 Cooperation with the police**

From the research it became evident that there was a tendency towards cooperation with the SAPS. It was explained in this way:

'I think that these people (TAC members) have taught us a lesson that we could have learned in Cape Town with PAGAD and people like that. Because what they said was, let's get close to the policing forums in our area. Let's associate with them and let's work with them. And let's take everything we have to them. We will carry it so far and they [SAPS] must take it from there. And as long as the police respond, there is no problem.

Furthermore, I think that this is a lesson we all should learn. They [TAC] don't go overboard because the police will now react properly. The City police helped a hell of a lot. They come running when I call them because it helps in doing their jobs better, and they have discipline within their ranks and now because they [TAC] are doing it (combating crime), SAPS are doing it as well, and it is starting to work. But every now and then, when they were slack and they didn't do it, that's when the trouble starts. So if there is a proper link between the guys on the ground and the officials then it is not a problem.'

Any TAC also has those members who commit illegal acts are reported and/or handed over to the police.

Sometimes, hawkers had experienced difficulties when dealing with some satellite police stations. These satellites would release apprehended criminals without giving reasons to the hawkers, and the criminals would continue to carry on the activities for which they had been arrested, (see Section 5.14.). As a hawker related to the team that 'this weakens us and does not encourage us to work with a lot of these police (SAPS). However, the Metro police come out tops because whenever there is anything to attend to they come quickly and make an arrest.'

#### **9.2.18 Relations with Metrorail**

Interviewees stated that their Management Board has cordial relations with Metrorail, and that there are members who trade from Metrorail premises.

#### **9.2.19 Relations with taxis and buses**

The respondents stated that they work together with everybody and that they need the taxis and bus people because without them there would be no business. They also stated that they try to resolve whatever problems occur between them i.e. taxis, buses and other stakeholders such as the City Council and the Durban Metro Police (DMP).

#### **9.2.20 Procedure for prospective street sellers to set up stalls**

Potential traders may approach a member of the TAC to obtain permission to set up stalls. It is reported that the first thing would be to notify other traders about the interests of such potential traders for their approval prior to approaching the Durban Metro for purposes of introducing the 'new' member and having him/her registered accordingly.

#### **9.2.21 Rent**

TAC members do not pay any rental fees for their stalls. Members have, however, been notified that they will be required to pay in future.

#### **9.2.22 Some problems beyond the TAC's control**

The TAC is naturally affected by problems such as taxi violence, boy/girlfriend fights, and members of the public who are drunk and become a public nuisance (or cause trouble).

#### **9.2.23 Perceptions and incidents of crime**

Participants stated that they have witnessed and heard of criminal incidents which occur in the local area. Criminal actions that are committed by criminals generally take the form of theft/robbery, in the following ways:

- removing goods from inside cars at the scene of a car accident;
- snatching personal belongings such as cell-phones, necklaces, sunglasses, watches and other items of value from both pedestrians and motorists.

It is believed that snatching of a motorist's belongings through the open windows of the vehicle which it is stationary at a robot, can contribute to car accidents, since motorists can get agitated and panicky and try to move off quickly.

Other incidents of crime that happen are: removing car wheels from parked cars; breaking into cars and removing valuables; stealing cars; selling liquor in the streets and even murder.

#### **9.2.24 Crime prevention measures**

When TAC members were asked what they would do in the event of seeing members of public being involved in street fighting they replied that they have a system of blowing whistles when incidents of crime happen. They (TAC members) normally intervene and separate the parties involved in street fights. It was reported that the police were called at one stage when robbery was in progress at a certain shop owned by the so-called Indian traders.

#### **9.2.25 Illegal immigrants and crime**

It is suggested that some illegal immigrants contribute to the rising crime rate. These immigrants come out at night and commit various crimes. They do not form part of any of the TAC's structures and also do not participate in any TAC activities.

#### **9.2.26 Training**

To root out unruly behaviour the TAC sometimes invites SAPS officers to its meetings to advise and guide its members about illegal activities that they should not commit.

#### **9.2.27 Success stories and the future**

The TAC has success stories. The organisation has won a mayor's award in the crime prevention category and has met both the Durban mayor and a former premier of KwaZulu Natal, Dr Ben Ngubane in trying to raise funds and to seek recognition.

With regard to improving its crime prevention effectiveness during the hours of darkness the TAC needs direction, advice and support to be able to operate and fight crime at night.

### **9.3. Summary**

This chapter has presented the detailed workings of an informal crime prevention group, TAC, which is currently operating at the Berea MI.

## **10. FORMAL STAKEHOLDERS IN ON-BOARD CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGIES**

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### **10.1. Existing Strategies**

This section presents a consolidation of on-board crime prevention strategies as operated by formal stakeholders. The findings are contained in Table 10.1 Discussion of key issues will be presented in the later sections of this chapter.

### **10.2. Potential strategies**

Potential formal on-board crime prevention strategies are presented in Table 10.2.

### **10.3. Provision of security services by formal transport stakeholders**

The provision of security measures with the potential to reduce on-board crime had been considered by all the transport providers interviewed. However, implementation of such strategies was constrained by determining the cost/benefit relationship between the benefits arising from providing on-board security and the cost of this (as discussed in Section 5.6).

Chapter 9 gave a consolidated picture of what existing and potential crime prevention strategies/measures are being used by informal stakeholders, i.e. the commuters. The need to stay ahead of the criminal has resulted in formal stakeholders being faced with increasing costs of crime prevention measures coupled with the need to increase their income/revenue. This reinforces the cost/benefit dilemma that is faced by all stakeholders, in particular by Metrorail.

### **10.4. Bus operators**

The majority of bus operators interviewed indicated that on-board security was only used as a last resort. In one case, regarding the lack of any on-board crime incidents, a bus operator asked 'why pay for something that rarely happens?'

### **10.5. Rail operators**

In all three centres metrorail has a variety of security measures in place. The effectiveness of such measures is very much affected by cost. Policing trains presents a number of logistical problems which are further compounded by the ageing rail carriage fleet.

### **10.6. Taxi operators**

The research revealed that some of the taxi operators had an informal structure regarding security measures, very much invisible but ready to be put in place when the need arises.

**Table 10.1: Existing on-board crime prevention strategies implemented by formal stakeholders.**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
BUS	Wire mesh protection of driver	Wire mesh placed around driver's compartment	Protection of driver from being attacked by passengers	Can put sharp object through mesh
	Perspex protection of driver	Perspex shield around driver's compartment	Protection of driver from being attacked by passengers	Can put gun or other object through money hole Glare and reflections at night Separation from passenger Communication difficulties Claustrophobia of driver
	Customer care training	Training courses on customer appreciation and treatment	Gain trust of passengers who are likely to report on-board crime when it happens	
	Tickets purchased elsewhere and not on bus	No cash tickets are sold on-board		Accessibility of ticket outlets to passenger Outlay of money to passenger may be prohibitive for monthly ticket
	Rank dispatchers	Queue control by designated persons	Bringing order in passenger queues	Potential slow moving queue Increased wait and frustration for some passengers
	Plain clothes security	Plain clothed security officials riding on bus	Eyes and ears observing on-board crime prevention	Unknown by passengers Criminal may not think twice about harming plain clothes security officer May not be respected by fellow passenger Criminals
	Split shifts	Instead of the bus being out all day it returns to depot at midday to bring in morning's takings for banking.	Reduced amount of money on bus at end of day, therefore decreases attractiveness of bus as a target to criminal	Empty runs, especially in off peak hours Increased cost of operations

**Table 10.1: Existing on-board crime prevention strategies implemented by formal stakeholders.**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
	Telephone hot line	On-board telephone communication with central office	Immediate connection to management/security	Cost The driver may be unable to activate this in the event of a surprise attack
BUS	Industrial relations	Management by staff participation	Better staff relations enabling their buy-in to management decisions	Potentially long process
	Conductor	Having additional members of staff on-board	Sharing with driver in on-board crime prevention	Increased potential money loss to operator through dishonesty Increased cost to operator (through additional wages)
	Free travel for bus marshals	Genuine queue marshals being allowed to travel free on specified buses	In return marshals ensure that buses are looked after	Financial loss to operator (if marshal takes up a fare paying seat)
	Intercom	Communication with depot and passengers	Rapid communication with depot and/or passengers	Cost
	Free travel for uniformed SAPS staff	SAPS officers in uniform allowed to travel free on system	SAPS presence may decrease on-board crime	Cannot state how effective as do not know when officers travel Financial loss to operator (if officer takes up a fare paying seat)
	Review of security aspects of vehicles	Audit of security aspects of vehicles	Deficiencies can be identified and corrected	Cost (time) Qualified staff may not be available
	Talking with community (and taxi operators) in respect of private charters	Regular meetings with taxi associations	Reduces interference by taxi operators	
	Commuter liaison committees	Regular meetings with commuter groups	Enables management to hear first hand commuters' needs and problems	Logistic cost at bringing group together at an appropriate time and venue
	Separation of groups into homogeneous ones even if they live in same area	Different groups travelling in different vehicles	Reduces potential for on-board fighting between different groups/schools	Operational cost

**Table 10.1: Existing on-board crime prevention strategies implemented by formal stakeholders.**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
BUS	Monthly tickets	Multiple ticket packages available to commuter	Cost efficiency in respect of ticket distribution Potentially higher ticket sales (if tickets priced correctly) Less cash is carried on the bus	Passengers may not be able to afford multiple tickets Cross-subsidisation
	Drop boxes	Driver has no access to money box	Reduces number of return trips to bank money (i.e. can bank money once per day)	Cost Increased driver fear as carrying more money on bus (therefore some drivers not keen on having it in their buses)
	Clip cards/coupons	Multiple ticket packages available to commuter	Cost efficiency in respect of ticket distribution Potentially higher ticket sales (if tickets priced correctly)	Passengers may not be able to afford multiple tickets Cross-subsidisation
	Liaison with schools	Regular meetings with schools	School children can appreciate and respect bus service	
	Staff training	Training in identification of potentially criminal situations Training staff in self defence methods	Staff are equipped to deal with potentially dangerous situations	Cost Lack of staff buy-in (especially if there is no financial incentive)
	On-board security guards	Security guard working on-board vehicle	Presence of security guards gives passengers extra security	Cost Staffing logistics
	Noise control	On-board noise at acceptable level to passengers	More conducive travelling environment	



**Table 10.1: Existing on-board crime prevention strategies implemented by formal stakeholders.**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
	Flat Fare System	One fare charged, irrespective of the distance travelled	Reduces possibility of dispute with driver over fare	Can impact negatively on the transport provider in terms of revenue gained
TRAIN	Turnstiles	Access control to platforms through turnstile	Only genuine travellers can access the system	Queues may form in peak periods
	Automatic barrier control	Access control to platforms through turnstile	Only genuine travellers can access the system	Queues may form in peak periods
	Officers from the SAPS patrolling carriages	SAPS officers patrolling on-board vehicles	Presence of SAPS increases passenger personal security Can deal with dangerous situations (as they are armed)	Staff logistics Cost Prioritisation of crime
	Security officers (24 hours) patrolling	Security officers patrolling on-board vehicles as well as station premises 24 hours per day	Presence of security officers increases passenger personal security	Staff logistics Cost Prioritisation of crime
	Undercover crime prevention operations	Plain-clothes asset protection officers patrolling the system	Plain-clothes officers can observe potential criminal activity and make arrest when required	Staff logistics Cost Prioritisation of crime
	Reduction in the number of off-peak trains	Reducing the number of trains running in off-peak periods	Operational cost savings Increased number of passengers in vehicle reduces potential of crime	Decreased level of service for off-peak travellers, i.e. increased waiting times
	Close Circuit Television (CCTV)	Televisions/cameras placed on-board vehicle or at MIs	Potential identification of criminals	Cost Potential conflict with SA constitution Maintenance

**Table 10.1: Existing on-board crime prevention strategies implemented by formal stakeholders.**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
	Court Action	Intervention by Courts to allow SAPS remove illegal hawkers from Metrorail stations	Uncluttered stations improve travelling atmosphere	Potential of negative publicity to transport provider Goes against job creation and sustainability initiative of the informal sector
TRAIN	TV monitors	TV monitors in carriage showing a variety of programmes/adverts	Enhancement of passenger environment in vehicle Passengers assume ownership project asset	Cost (bus has the potential to be financed through advertising) Concentration on screen may decrease passenger awareness of immediate environment
	Training	Training courses on customer appreciation and treatment	Gain trust of passengers who are likely to report on-board crime when it happens	
	Windows	Cannot be opened	Cannot be used to make escape or eject passenger	If weather is hot and humid proves uncomfortable for customers
	Destinati on-board (electronic)	Informati on-board giving status of arriving/departing trains	Allows passenger to arrive at correct platform timeously and therefore board train in good time	Cost Understanding by commuters, re language
	Manned stations	All stations on network are manned	Commuters can report crime at all stations	Cost Staff logistics
	Indigenous languages	Using indigenous languages to convey information	Messages/information understood by all commuters	Cost Prioritisation of languages
	Cultural signage	Using signs instead of words to convey information	Messages/information understood by all commuters	Cost Prioritisation of languages
	Doors	Functionally operated by the driver and not passengers	Cannot be used to make escape or eject passenger	

**Table 10.1: Existing on-board crime prevention strategies implemented by formal stakeholders.**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
	Encourage commuters to use fewer coaches during off peak hours	Passengers congregate in specific carriages	Decrease the vulnerability of commuters	Depending on where one boards the train may not be able to sit where others are sitting
TRAIN	Call centres (Modalink Cape Town)	Information of the routes and the time tables of different modes is readily available free of charge or at minimal cost	Customer through information is empowered can plan trip etc	Cost of implementation Accessibility of resource to commuters
	Commuter satisfaction surveys	Regular surveys of commuter perceptions of operations/service	Barometer to transport provider on his level of service to commuters	Cost Time to interpret findings
	Banning on-board hawking	Banning on-board hawking	Cleaner travelling environment	May be seen as against individual empowerment (especially of previously disadvantaged)
TAXI	Electronic ticketing	Tickets in the form of smart cards	No cash in transit therefore reduces attractiveness to potential criminal	Accessibility of ticket purchasing points to passenger
	Self justice	Sorting out criminals in-house	Immediate justice and satisfaction to victim	Justice meted out may not be within the law
	Formalisation of minibus taxi industry	Restructuring of taxi industry from informal to formal	Reducing taxi violence Increase responsiveness by taxi associations to passenger needs	
	Training	Training courses on customer appreciation and treatment	Gain trust of passengers who are likely to report on-board crime when it happens	
	Prepayment of fare	Fare paid at the commencement of journey	Minimises fare evasion Reduces potential of dispute over fare	

**Table 10.1: Existing on-board crime prevention strategies implemented by formal stakeholders.**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
	Flat Fare System	One fare charged irrespective of the distance travelled	Reduces possibility of dispute with driver over fare	Can impact negatively on the transport provider in terms of revenue gained
TAXI	Queue control by designated persons bringing order at MI	Instils order in queue of passengers	Potentially slow moving queue Increased wait and frustration for some commuters	
	Zero tolerance	Firm but courteous attitude towards unruly passengers/criminals	Gain respect of passengers and criminals Safer travelling environment for travellers	
	In-house crime prevention	Encouraging commuters to report complaints however small	Informal networks can come up with results quickly	Statistics not kept in order to benchmark
	Conductors	Having additional member of staff on-board	Sharing with driver in on-board crime prevention	Loss of one seat (if conductor is seated) Overloading potential (if conductor is seated) Increased cost to operator (through wages)
	Community Policing	Encouraging communities to become involved in safeguarding their environments	A burden shared is a burden lightened in respect of safeguarding communities	No financial reward communities may be uninterested Distrust of security organisation may take a long time to overcome
	Training	Training courses on customer appreciation and treatment	Gain trust of passengers who are likely to report on-board crime when it happens	
	Mobile police stations	Mobile (in the form of a caravan) police station	Visible presence of SAPS	Cost Staffing
SECURITY	Police reservists	Volunteers enrol as backup SAPS officers	Increased number of staff for patrols	Voluntary Matric required

**Table 10.1: Existing on-board crime prevention strategies implemented by formal stakeholders.**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
SECURITY	Group Patrolling	Two by two or another. (Reason, security personnel operating on their own could be overpowered by group of criminals.)	Can deal with violent situations	Cost Staff logistics Staff may want to avoid violent situations
	Armoured vehicles	Armoured vehicles patrolling roads	Significantly impacts on reducing taxi violence	Cost to SAPS
	Plain clothed security travelling as passengers	Security officers patrolling on-board vehicles in plain clothes	Can intercept criminal in the process of committing a criminal act	Staff logistics Cost Prioritisation of crime
	Random operations	Random searches of passengers	Weapons etc can be confiscated Safer travelling environment	Reaction of passengers to infringement of privacy
	Disarmed security guards	Security officers working without being armed	Security guard's weapon cannot be used against him	Unarmed security guards are at high risk to organised crime
	Armed security patrols	Security guards are armed as they go about their duties on-board	Presence of SAPS increases passenger personal security Can deal with dangerous situations (as armed)	Firearm acts as an additional incentive for criminal

**Table 10.2: Potential on-board crime prevention strategies Formal Stakeholders**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
BUS	CCTV	CCTV in buses	Identify vandals, e.g. scholars Emergency assistance timeously when required Could also be used to show public information messages	Cost
	Seal driver compartment	Completely sealing off driver from passenger	Complete protection for driver	Lack of contact etc
	Plastic seats	Hardened material for vehicle furniture	Reduced potential for vandals	Uncomfortable on long journeys
	Centre exit doors	Additional door in the vehicle to allow exit only	There is no mixing of alighting and disembarking passengers at the same door Improved passenger flow through vehicle	Cost Vehicle design modification
	Mirrors	Mirrors placed at strategic points in the vehicle	Would be assailants can see themselves	
	Increased service frequency	More buses are run at specified times (as lengthy wait by passenger can increase tempers and negative attitudes)	Reduces potential temper of passenger against driver Improves relationship between bus operator and public	Cost Vehicle and driver logistics
	Two way radio	Radio communication between buses and central control	Emergency assistance timeously when required	Cost
	Electronic tickets/smart cards	Tickets in the form of smart cards	Reduces money changing hands	Infrastructure Cost
	Banning eating, smoking and drinking inside the vehicle	Eating , smoking and drinking not allowed inside vehicle	Reduces potential for litter Increases level of cleanliness inside vehicle	Correct and effective enforcement

**Table 10.2: Potential on-board crime prevention strategies Formal Stakeholders**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
TRAIN	Semi fast trains	Trains stop at a limited number of stops	Overcrowding relieved Shorter travel times for passengers	Metrorail Durban tried this strategy but passengers complained
	Materials modification	Materials used on-board have higher tolerance to being vandalised	Materials cannot be defaced	Cost
	Toughened glass	Glass strengthened to prevent breakage to a certain degree	Passenger safety is increased from stone throwing	Cost
	Quick cleaning and repair	Damaged vehicles/furniture repaired and replaced quickly	Cleaner/well maintained vehicle can influence passenger's perception of taking care of the environment	Cost both in terms of human, time and financial resources Identification of damaged vehicle
	Banning eating, smoking and drinking inside the vehicle	Eating , smoking and drinking not allowed inside vehicle	Reduces potential for litter Increases level of cleanliness inside vehicle	Correct and effective enforcement
	Target hardening	Affixing fixtures and fittings in a way that decreases the possibility of removal	Reduces potential for theft of the item, e.g. light bulb	Cost
	One way vision glazing	Between driver and passenger carriage	Driver/guards can see into carriage people cannot see driver	
	Two way radio	Radio communication between commuter train and central control.	Emergency assistance timeously when required	Cost
	Early termination of service	Trains terminate earlier in the evening	Operational cost savings	Stranded passengers
	Electronic ticket validation	Tickets in the form of smart cards	Reduces money changing hands	Infrastructure Cost

**Table 10.2: Potential on-board crime prevention strategies Formal Stakeholders**

MODE	TYPE	EFFECTED	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
TAXI	Two way radio	Radio communication between taxi and central control	Emergency assistance timeously when required	Cost
	Target hardening	Affixing fixtures and fittings in a way that decreases the possibility of removal	Reduces potential for the theft of the item, e.g. light bulb	Cost
	Quick cleaning and repair	Damaged vehicles/furniture repaired and replaced quickly	Cleaner/well maintained vehicle can influence passenger's perception of taking care of the environment	Cost both in terms of human, time and financial resources Identification of damaged vehicle
SECURITY	Tougher enforcement of overloading regulations	Arrest of driver on the spot Fine of driver on the spot	Increased passenger security	Open to bribery
	Communication	Regular public communication	Public are aware of security operations Public are aware of crime prevention procedures	Cost Staff requirement Potential long process



## 10.7. Summary

Due to time limitations as well as being outside the project brief, it was not part of the research to determine the extent of the operational budget for each of the transport modes which is being spent on safety and security. Having such information would place the information contained in Table 10.1 in a better perspective. In addition, the cost of implementing the various initiatives indicated in Table 10.2 has also not been determined nor was a cost versus effectiveness of security conducted.

This chapter presents a consolidated summary of formal stakeholder based on-board crime prevention strategies. The cost/benefit relationship between crime prevention methods and their successes is a fundamental factor affecting the implementation of on-board crime prevention strategies. Optimising resource allocation, when resources are in many cases being reduced, makes crime prevention all the more problematic for all these stakeholders.

## 11. POLICING CONCEPTS AND VIGILANTISM

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As shown in the previous chapter there are many crime prevention strategies (existing and potential) that can be initiated through formal channels. Concentrating on the formal law enforcers, this chapter aims to distinguish between the different concepts of formalised policing as seen in South Africa. By providing this background one will be better able to appreciate the fine line between policing and vigilantism.

### 11.1. Policing and social control

According to Reiner<sup>32</sup> (p1004) 'the idea of 'policing' is an aspect of the more general concept of social control. While the latter concept has been much debated, Reiner gives approval to Stanley Cohen's definition, in terms of which social control refers to 'the organised ways in which society responds to behaviour and people it regards as deviant, problematic, worrying, threatening, troublesome or undesirable' (Cohen cited in Reiner p1004).

Policing is a specific 'phase or aspect of 'social control (Reiner<sup>32</sup> (p1005)). However drawing a line between 'policing' and other aspects of social control would appear to be a task plagued with difficulties. Thus Reiner suggests that 'policing is the set of activities directed at preserving the security of a particular social order' but 'does not encompass all activities intended to produce order'. Thus '[it] excludes post hoc punishment, as well as activities intended to create the conditions of social order (e.g., socialisation, measures to secure family stability, encouragement of religion, or other forms of internalised ethical controls)'.

#### 11.1.1 Policing and systems of surveillance

Reiner suggests that what distinguishes policing 'as a sub-set of control processes is the creation of systems of surveillance coupled with the threat of sanctions for discovered deviance (immediately or by initiating penal processes).' Thus says Reiner<sup>32</sup> (p1005-1006) says:

'Policing may be carried out by a diverse array of people and techniques, of which the modern idea of the police is only one. Policing may be done by professionals employed by the state.... Policing may be professionals employed by specialist private security firms ... or security personnel hired by an organisation whose main business is something else..... Policing functions may be performed by citizens in a voluntary capacity within state police organisations [like Police Reservists], in association with the state police (like Neighbourhood Watch schemes), or in completely volunteer bodies (like ... the many vigilante bodies which have functioned at many times and places)'.

While it may be the case that policing is inherently difficult to define, Reiner's definition appears in some ways too broad. By focussing on 'surveillance' as the core feature of 'policing' he is able to include groups such as Neighbourhood Watch schemes but somehow seems to miss out on what, intuitively, would appear to be the key characteristics of policing.

#### 11.1.2 Policing and their 'means' of upholding the law

An alternative approach is suggested by Klockars<sup>33</sup> (p3). Citing Egon Bittner, Klockars argues that 'policing must be defined in terms of its means.' At the core of policing is the potential that force will be used where other means of achieving cooperation with the social order fail. While the police (i.e. specific police agencies which fall under government) are granted special powers to use force, 'policing generally may be taken to be a practise where

personnel are deployed with the implicit understanding that they may make use of the capacity to use force in appropriate circumstances where other means of maintaining order and security fail.' Note that this is primarily an attempt to define the essence of policing and distinguish it from other measures which are intended to contribute to the maintenance of safety and security and, more generally, of the social order.

One significant aspect of this approach, as was also the case with the approach used by Reiner, is that both the activities of 'the police' and the activities of vigilantes are defined as forms of 'policing'.

## **11.2. Vigilantism and the police**

According to Brown<sup>34</sup> (p58) the 'vigilante tradition, in the classic sense, refers to organised, extralegal movements which take the law into their own hands.' While agreeing with the latter part of Brown's definition, a definition aimed at encapsulating more modern forms of vigilantism would probably differ with Brown in at least one respect. Thus, in its modern sense the term vigilantism is not necessarily understood to refer to an organised phenomenon or necessarily to a movement. In particular, in today's world it is accepted that vigilantism may be engaged in by individuals or groups and need not necessarily be 'organised' activity in the sense that it is in some sense planned or coordinated.

### **11.2.1 Vigilantism and its 'means' of effecting its aims**

It cannot always be said that all extra-legal movements are necessarily involved in vigilantism. Not only can vigilantes be distinguished in that their activities involve taking the law into their own hands (their 'means'). Vigilantes are also distinguished by certain types of objectives. In particular the term vigilantism tends to be associated with actions which are orientated towards combating particular activities. Often these activities may be activities which are criminal in nature but history shows that vigilantes have also often been involved in countering activities which may generally be regarded as threats to particular systems of order.

Therefore, if we accept the above, Brown's<sup>34</sup> (p71) remarks that, 'groups who have frequently been the target of vigilante action have often included members of particular ethnic groups, immigrants, labourers and labour union organisers and political radicals' show that sometimes the objective of 'maintaining order' may also serve as a disguise for particular political objectives. Thus, while allegedly concerned with a crime problem, the San Francisco vigilantes of 1856 (Brown<sup>34</sup> (p70)):

'were in actuality motivated by a desire to seize control of the municipal government from the Democratic political machine that founded the nucleus of its support among the lower class Irish Catholic workers of the city. Basic to the vigilante movement was the desire to establish a business-oriented local government which would reduce expenditures, deprive the Irish Catholic Democrats of access to municipal revenues, and lower taxes.'

In general terms therefore, vigilantism consists of illegal actions involving the meting out of violence ('justice') ostensibly orientated towards combating forms of criminality or perceived threats to order and intended to punish those involved and intimidate them and/or others against engaging in activities which challenge or threaten the interests represented by the vigilantes. Vigilantism is therefore distinguished by specific 'means' (in short, unlawfully imposed violence), combined with certain types of objectives.

The above objectives generally involve discouraging crime or other threats to a particular set of interests, and thus vigilantism is necessarily involved with bolstering a specific type of order. It is thus agreed that vigilantism is a form of unlawful activity which is distinguished in

terms of its objectives in that it seeks to combat threats to order, whether these are criminal, social or political in nature. Inherently, therefore, vigilantism is a paradoxical form of activity in that it seeks to reinforce order while simultaneously involving activities which fall outside the legal framework.

In fact some of the original vigilante movements came into existence in a context where there was little in the way of a functioning criminal justice system.

'In frontier areas, law and order was often a tenuous thing. Outlaws ... took every advantage of the social disorganisation stemming from the newness of settlements and the weakness of the traditional institutions of state, society and church. Law enforcement was frequently inadequate [and] ... linked with inadequate law enforcement was an uneven judicial system.' (Brown<sup>34</sup> (p65-66)).

In such a context vigilante movements often represented a 'genuine community consensus' with 'a decided majority of the people' either participating in the movement or approving of it. Here 'vigilantism simply mobilised the community and overwhelmed the unruly outlaws and lower people' and 'the community was left in a more orderly and stable condition' (Brown<sup>34</sup> (p. 66)).

### **11.3. Distinguishing traits of the police versus those of vigilantes**

What should distinguish the police from vigilantes is that:

- The police force is a public sector institution and therefore should provide its services to all;
- Police officers are provided by law with special powers which include in particular special powers to arrest members of the public under certain circumstances and to hold them in custody, and
- They are supposed to confine themselves to actions which are authorised by these laws. Where they do so, then their use of force, unless it is directed towards preventing loss of life or serious injury, will, in general, be directed towards apprehension and they will refrain from inflicting punishment or using force for other coercive purposes.

What should distinguish the police from vigilantes is therefore simply this - the police are supposed to work within the framework of the law. Thus the special authority of the police to use force (in so far as it differs from the authority of ordinary citizens who may also use force in defence of their own lives or that of another person) is confined to the use of force for the purposes of peacekeeping and obstructing attempts by suspects to resist arrest.

Continuing with the above, the police are supposed to refrain from acts entered into as a means of meting out punishment, and be constrained by standards of fairness and due process. 'Under a regime of law, a developed legal system imposes restraints on the quest for order' (Skolnick and Fyfe<sup>35</sup> (p 26)). Where policing is carried out in terms of these restraints it therefore has the potential of encouraging respect for the law (although if it fails to contribute to order, it may fail to build such respect).

Vigilantism then makes no such claims. While vigilante activities may obtain significant community support, insofar as no reference is made to law, they will inevitably be arbitrary and unfair (although it should be recognised that laws may also be unfair and arbitrary). Vigilante actions therefore merely give effect to the power of the vigilantes. While entered into with the purpose of imposing order, they simultaneously demonstrate a contempt for the law.

In a stateless society therefore, where there is no law, policing and vigilantism are synonymous. But where there is law, what should distinguish the police from vigilantes is that the police operate within the law. However extra-legal police activity does not necessarily amount to a form of vigilantism. Strictly, in terms of the approach used here, it is only when this extra-legal activity is violence which is intended to in some ways 'solve' (punish, intimidate, eliminate) the 'problem' that it can be called vigilantism, and therefore 'police vigilantism'.

Vigilantism is therefore an activity which may involve any members of society, including members of the public and the police. Like policing within the law, it makes use of force. However it is distinguished from policing within the law firstly by its means (unlawful violence). Secondly this violence is not only unlawful but tends to be used as the 'solution to the problem' being faced.

#### 11.4. Community policing

Having defined 'policing' and vigilantism' a question still remains about the term 'community policing'. The term is in some ways misleading, as in some ways it may appear to mean 'policing by the community'.

The term is more easily understood via an understanding of the role of the police. As is the case with the term policing, there is not necessarily a broadly agreed definition of the role of the police. One attempt at defining the role of the police is that by Egon Bittner. Bittner<sup>36</sup> said the task of the police is the fulfilment of the following three roles:

- **Criminal law enforcement**  
for example, the arrest of people who have committed criminal offences or responding to emergency calls. Law enforcement is action by the police during or after the commission of an offence.
- **Regulatory control**  
for example, the enforcement of traffic regulations. In some countries (e.g. the USA) the ordinary police enforce traffic regulations, while in South Africa this is done by the traffic police.
- **Peacekeeping**  
for example, intervening in disputes between neighbours or family members, dealing with people whose behaviour is unruly, or dealing with other disturbances in the community (Bittner<sup>36</sup> (p 21-250)).

John Avery, a former Australian Commissioner of Police, defined the role of the police as 'the protection of life and property, the prevention of crime, the apprehension of offenders and the maintenance of public tranquillity' (Moir and Moir<sup>37</sup> (p220)).

A third definition is that provided in Section 205(3) of the South African Constitution, adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on 8 May 1996 which describes the role of the SAPS as 'to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law'.

It should be noted that the role of the SAPS in, for example, the provision of safety and security, or crime prevention, does not imply that the police are the only people who play this role. In each community there is usually a variety of different groups which are involved in playing these roles. In fact, one of the important aspects of community policing is that the

police are encouraged to identify ways of working with the different groups which are involved in providing safety and security in each community.

When people talk about 'community policing' they often refer to it as a 'philosophy of policing'. Very loosely this philosophy encourages:

- the police to work more closely with the community, and
- the community to be more active in assisting the police and in dealing with crime prevention.

It is important to note therefore that this concept or 'philosophy' is intended to assist the police in carrying out their 'ordinary' roles, i.e. the different roles or functions provided for in the three definitions which are quoted above. Skolnick and Bayley said that 'community policing represents a change in the practices but not in the objectives of policing' (quoted in Moir and Moir<sup>37</sup> (p220)). In other words, community policing is a concept or philosophy which relates to how the police perform the 'ordinary' job of policing.

### **11.5. Vigilantes and lawbreaking**

It should not be assumed that those who appear to be disposed to becoming involved in forms of vigilante activity are themselves necessarily in good standing in terms of their respect for the law. Thus, a Durban police officer indicated that taxi drivers will either summarily mete out justice to an alleged law breaker, or 'cover for him' depending on whether the person concerned is one of their own or not. Thus the actions of vigilantes should not necessarily be seen as representing a generalised intolerance of criminality but rather as representing a selective hostility to the criminality of 'outsiders', while the actions of fellow members of the taxi fraternity may be seen in an entirely different light.

Similarly, according to police at Marabastad, private security guards 'punish' members of the public who do not have train tickets by summarily demanding payment from them. Situations of this kind, where complaints of robbery or extortion are lodged against private security guards, present enormous difficulties to the police in relation to meeting standards of credible and effective law enforcement, intended to be carried out in 'partnership' with other policing agencies. Also included in the allegations against private security guards at Marabastad were allegations of assault by private security guards against informal traders.

### **11.6. Vigilantism and their perceived confrontational and aggressive culture**

Not only may they (members of vigilante groups who mete out justice) be involved in law breaking but the culture, particularly of the taxi industry, may be said to be characterised by a certain 'robustness'. Thus it appears that, particularly where those involved in vigilante activities are associated with the taxi industry, the task of intervening to prevent vigilantism may present the police with particular difficulties.

One member of the Durban City Police said, there were all kinds of problems associated with minibus taxi ranks. The ranks attract large numbers of people and consequently also attract criminals. But the taxi industry itself is also fairly violent. Rank managers and drivers are also often involved in harassment of women and intimidation of passengers generally, by for instance forcing them to take one taxi rather than another.

### **11.7. Summary**

It is argued that policing is a practise where personnel are deployed with the implicit understanding that they may make use of the capacity to use force in appropriate

circumstances where other means of maintaining order and security fail. Those involved in policing may have a narrowly defined role such as the protection of a particular building, or the provision of security services to particular clients (private security) or a more broadly defined role such as that of the police. Where those who are involved in policing make use of extra legal violence, they are involved in vigilantism, particularly where such violence is imposed as the 'solution to the problem'. Where those who are involved in policing focus on working more closely with members of the community as a means of achieving their objectives (e.g. the safety and security of the community) they are involved in community policing. Thus it is argued that, for members of the SAPS and other police services, the fulfilment of police responsibilities in the MI area might potentially be a fairly intimidating prospect.

## **12. VIGILANTISM AND THE POLICE IN SOUTH AFRICA**

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This chapter will discuss the issues around the concept of vigilantism and the official keepers of security, namely the police. For a historical outline (pre-1990) of the development of vigilantism in South Africa, the reader is referred to Annexure B.

Although evidence was provided of negative attitudes on the part of community members and members of the private security companies towards members of the SAPS (see Section 5.14, for example), no clear evidence was provided which specifically indicated that members of the SAPS were even aware of the existence of specific 'crime prevention groups.' There was therefore no reason for the research team to assume an attitude of distrust on the part of members of the SAPS towards these people.

The research team have therefore reformulated its approach in this and the following chapters of policing at the station areas in which the MIs lie. This approach will therefore focus on understanding the general issue of how relationships with the community are perceived by members of the police service. Also in the following chapters, police attitudes to the phenomenon of community members 'taking the law into their own hands' otherwise known as 'vigilantism', will be examined in detail.

### **12.1. Vigilantism in South Africa in the 1990's**

The 1990's have been South Africa's decade of transition from minority rule to democracy. While there is room for doubt about the degree to which statistics accurately portray overall crime trends (see Sections 2.5 and 2.6), it seems reasonable to say that there has been a significant increase of crime during this period. In this regard it appears that trends in South Africa to some extent follow those in other countries in transition. Shaw<sup>38</sup> (p157) says

'Political liberalisation brought a crime explosion, so apparently following other societies (like states in Eastern Europe and those emerging from the Soviet Union) undergoing sustained periods of democratic transition: as social controls are loosened, spaces open which allow growth in criminal activity.'

While it is not at all clear to what extent township areas have faced an increase in crime, what seems reasonably clear is that, at the same time that crime has faced South African citizens as a major concern, there has been a serious decline in the effectiveness of the Criminal Justice system, manifested most obviously in declining conviction rates.

### **12.2. Vigilantism and its manifestations**

It is not the intention of this research to provide a comprehensive account of vigilantism in South Africa, either in the 1990's or in the pre-1990 period. It will suffice to say that vigilantism has manifested itself in a variety of forms during this period and has particularly attracted attention, and become a cause for concern, in the period following South Africa's first democratic general election in April 1994, particularly following the burning to death of a Cape gang leader by the vigilante organisation People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in August 1996.

### **12.3. People Against Gangsterism and Drugs**

Since August 1996 PAGAD has attained great notoriety being suspected of a series of assassinations of gang leaders, pipe bomb attacks, the killing of at least one leading detective, and of having been involved in several demonstrations which have degenerated



into confrontations with the police. While the theme (and public perception, see Section 5.14.1) which has been explored in this project, has been that of different ways in which the police either condone or cooperate with vigilantes, or themselves engage in forms of vigilantism, it seems that, at least in the Western Cape, PAGAD may have contributed to a slightly greater degree of antipathy towards vigilantism amongst police officers.

#### **12.4. Organised vigilantism**

PAGAD represents a relatively organised type of vigilantism. Similarly organised vigilantism has also manifested itself in the Northern Province. Constituted mostly by business people, a group called 'Mapogo a Mathamaga' has also obtained a relatively high degree of prominence (and been involved in occasional wars of words with the Provincial Ministry of Safety and Security). Thus a newspaper report in 1998 indicated that the movement's president was upset with Northern Province Safety and Security MEC Seth Ntai 'because he had ordered police stations to cut ties with them' (The Star, 98/03/23).

More recently, an edition of the television programme Special Assignment depicted the operation of a 'community court' run by the Eyona taxi association in Guguletu. Members of the group were shown lashing five alleged rapists who had been rounded up by members of the taxi association after a woman had laid a complaint with members of the taxi association. Apparently similar courts also operate in the Western Cape African townships of Nyanga and Khayelitsha.

#### **12.5. Mob justice**

Though it has received less attention in the press, what is perhaps even more widespread than these relatively organised forms of vigilantism is the phenomenon of relatively spontaneous 'mob justice' against alleged criminals. A recent article in the Star, for instance, reports the case of a 'man accused of robbery' who died at the hands of a mob in Zondi, Soweto, after a six-hour beating'. According to a witness 'the mob of about 20 men and women caught Mbuyiselo Dlamini and demanded the return of their household goods, which they claim he had taken'. Dlamini could not produce the goods and the crowd began kicking, punching and beating him with a sjambok. Eventually 'his body was left in the middle of the street for a number of hours and was apparently collected by the police later that night'. (The Star, 1 March 1999).

A relatively spontaneous type of vigilantism like this appeared to be quite prevalent at the Berea Road MI and, to a lesser extent, at the Marabastad MI. While the incident in Zondi which is reported above appears to have involved a relatively loosely formed mob, what is not clear about the 'mob justice' at the MIs is whether it can be said to represent an organised response to crime.

From this research it seems that the role-players involved in mob justice may change from incident to incident, depending partly on the exact locality where the beating takes place. In other words the research team's impression is that 'mob justice' is simply part of the 'culture' or 'way of doing things' among certain groups of people, particularly those associated with the taxi industry, as well as informal traders.

#### **12.6. Police and their views on mob justice**

The research which is reported in this Section uses the police as sources for information about mob justice as a form of vigilantism. One question which this research did not attempt to answer is the exact extent and nature of the involvement of members of the SAPS in forms

of vigilantism. On an 'off-the-record' basis however, many members of the police service readily admit that assaults on arrestees are a fairly common practise.

## **12.7. Statistics on victims of police activity**

The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) started operating in April 1997 and statistics have become readily available on the number of people shot dead by the police. In the two years that the ICD has been in existence it has recorded over 1000 such deaths. While these deaths are by no means all attributable to vigilante action, it appears reasonable to assume that a certain proportion of these deaths are attributable to such action. Thus, for instance, one analysis of 165 deaths in 'police custody or as a result of police action' which included 116 deaths as a result of the use of force by the police noted that (Bruce<sup>39</sup> (p20-21)):

'Fifty-nine of the deaths recorded in this report are of people who ostensibly presented some kind of immediate threat to the lives of a police officer or other person, for instance on the grounds that they were brandishing a firearm. However, altogether in the [incidents where these people were killed], members of the police service were killed or injured in 7 incidents (13%, 1 death and 6 incidents of injury)). Altogether this means that members of the police service were killed or injured in 6% (7 out of 116) of the incidents where a person was allegedly killed by them.'

## **12.8. Police and the use of force**

Excessive reliance on the use of force was one of the characteristics of policing during the apartheid period. Thus, continuing evidence of a heavy reliance the SAPS on the use of force may to some extent simply reflect the continuities of the practise within the police service. At the same time, particularly with evidence that dissatisfaction with the performance of the criminal justice system as a whole is also prevalent in the police service, it seems reasonable to assume that what may motivate many members of the police service when dealing with a suspect is a belief that they need to punish or 'deal with' the suspect in some way, as the courts are unlikely to do so themselves. In speaking of the American vigilante organisations of the 19th century Skolnick and Fyfe<sup>35</sup> say.

'Like those contemporary police who administer street discipline, they inserted themselves and their punishments as a substitute for a judicial process they perceived as weak and inefficient'.

## **12.9. Police and their working together with criminals**

But it is not only direct acts of vigilantism by the police which are cause for concern. Brown<sup>34</sup> (p69) observes that in US law enforcement, officials have 'often connived with vigilantes.' As demonstrated in this research (see Annexure B), there is evidence that the South African Police either condoned or actively assisted the right wing vigilantes of the 1980's. The example (see Section 11.5), drawn from a newspaper report about an incident of 'mob justice' in Zondi refers to the police arriving to pick up the body of the dead person many hours after the assault on him had begun. The impression created (and there are other examples) is that at the very minimum the police tend to take a decidedly non-interventionist stance when confronted with acts of vigilantism.

While the research reported on here indicates that there are police who have at least attempted to intervene in situations of vigilantism with a view to ensuring that justice and due process prevails, the authors also believe that, in some instances, police intervention takes the opposite form: the direct encouragement and even facilitation of vigilantism. Haysom<sup>40</sup> (p68) is quoted as saying that the non-interventionist approach of the police enabled the right-

wing vigilantes to act 'brazenly as if their extra-legal violence has no legal consequences.' The research team's impression is that this continues to be the case to a significant degree, and that it is highly unlikely that those involved in vigilante action will face the legal consequences of their actions.

## **12.10. Summary**

In effect therefore, communities, radical and conservative political elements and the police themselves have contributed to a position in South Africa in which vigilantism may be said to be part and parcel of this country's history. Present day vigilantism then may be said to simply represent to some extent the continuity of an established way of dealing with alleged offenders, although it obviously also has a dimension which expresses a newly emergent desperation about dealing with a pervasive threat of crime combined with a hopelessness about the value of recourse to the Criminal Justice System. One of the factors which no doubt fosters the prevalence of vigilantism is a sense that such activities can be engaged with impunity.

In 1974, in response to the activities of the Makgotla, Brigadier Visser who then headed the Soweto Divisional Headquarters, said 'all I am against is the savage manner in which they deal with the alleged offenders' (The World, 1974:17). Having presented an overview of aspects of vigilantism in South Africa's recent history it seems that we can reasonably say that the police in South Africa have not been particularly consistent with regard to extra-legal justice, whether this has been meted out by elements of the community or by their own members.

## 13. POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIPS AND ATTITUDES

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Since police-community relationships and attitudes form the corner stone of community - based crime prevention strategy formation and implementation, this chapter will present the research team's findings in respect of the three MIs studied. For detailed analyses of the policing/security provision situation around each of the MIs the reader is referred to Annexure C.

### 13.1. Relationships and attitudes

#### 13.1.1 Marabastad/Belle Ombre

The Marabastad CPF is a sub-committee of the central Pretoria CPF. The chairperson is a (formal) trader from the area and most of its members are also traders. There is also a representative from the traffic department.

The senior police officer interviewed indicated that there appeared to be confusion about the role to be played by the CPF. He understood the objective of the CPF as being the development of a partnership with the community. The police believe that the forum should cooperate with them to combat crime. The CPF should encourage people to report crime but there seemed to be a problem with reporting. In addition, the business people appeared to want to dictate how the police should conduct their operations. CPF members sometimes tried to direct the police, for instance to arrest some of the confidence tricksters for 'trespassing', which is not within the authority of the police. According to the policeman the members of the CPF only really represent the concerns of the business people and tend only to get involved in the CPF when criminal activities directly affect them. At the same time, when their cases are taken to court they often fail to appear as witnesses. 'When it comes to assisting us, the community is not playing their part', he said. Although they show a willingness to work with the police, there is no commitment on their part.

On the other hand a representative of the CPF indicated that, in his experience, the police were largely ineffective, particularly in dealing with the crime problem emanating from the informal settlement. Furthermore, even when criminals are arrested, the Criminal Justice System currently operates in such a way that they are soon released. He indicated that the relationship with the police had been good but had deteriorated in recent years. Another factor which contributed to this was corruption of some members within the police force. Some police officers for instance, he alleged, would not arrest people who were caught in possession of stolen items but instead accepted bribes or simply took the items for their own use. Corruption therefore detracted from the ability of community members to trust the police.

At least one of the more rank and file police officers also made reference to the problem of corruption. He said that, for instance, when operations against crimes such as the illegal selling of alcohol, dagga smuggling and the illegal possession of firearms are organised in the informal settlements, it appears that people who are involved in these illegal activities receive advance warning of these operations from members of the SAPS. The police in the station area have strong links with residents, including those involved in illegal activities, in the informal settlements. The officer expressed his dissatisfaction with police in the area saying that if people were serious about addressing crime a large proportion of the police at Marabastad should be transferred somewhere else.

The Marabastad 'community' therefore appears fairly divided in relation to the crime issue. On one hand there is the informal settlement whose residents have no formalised links with the police. There also appears to be a certain degree of antagonism between residents of the

informal settlement and members of the business sector which escalates when crime levels increase. The residents of the informal settlement do not have representation in the CPF and there is little cooperation with them. The police allege that most of the people in the settlement are engaged in illegal and criminal activities. They are usually unwilling to give information to the police.

The police described the relationship between the police and the taxi people as good. However, one police officer said that there are taxi people who sell dagga and alcohol illegally and that they cannot be arrested because the police know that once they do that they invite trouble. One said that most of the times the taxi people 'solve their problems on their own', and this shows that there is constant interaction between the two parties.

The police/community relationship appears therefore in different ways to be characterised by tension or uneasiness. There appears to be little in the way of a spirit of cooperation, as both groups hold negative attitudes towards the other. Furthermore, community members generally are often afraid to be seen cooperating with the police. For instance, one police officer indicated that there had recently been a problem of people snatching cell-phones at the corner of Bloed and DF Malan Streets. The police had approached the vegetable sellers but the latter indicated that they were afraid to help for fear of being victimised.

### **13.1.2 Berea Road**

In general, according to senior police in Durban their relationships with the community are fairly good. In addition to a central CPF for the Durban Central policing area, each of the satellite stations also has a 'sub-forum' attached to it. Both the central CPF and the sub-forums meet on a monthly basis.

Both the SAPS and DCP referred to TAC as one of the groups which they work with quite closely. According to senior police in Durban they have a number of 'partnerships' in the area. One of these, at the Berea Road MI, is with TAC (discussed in detail in Section 9.2).

According to the police, the value of the partnership with the traders is that the traders 'sit on the streets and see the crime happening'. They are thus in a position to warn the police saying 'watch that guy'. Traders are encouraged by the organisation to work with the police. Sometimes they will point out alleged criminals to the police while, in other cases, they may arrest suspects themselves. However those seen to be cooperating with the police may put themselves at risk of retaliation by criminal elements.

The taxi industry is not as closely involved with the CPF although representatives from the industry may, for instance, attend the CPF annual general meeting. According to senior police this is partly because the central coordination of the taxi industry is done on a provincial basis. At the same time specific taxi associations are not Durban based but 'belong more to KwaMashu or Umlazi' or other areas. Nevertheless the police do meet with them on an ad hoc basis.

A senior member of the DCP indicated that they 'use different forums to speak to different people.' Traders are consulted with through a particular forum and there is also a taxi-liaison group. More generally the approach is to engage with specific associations around particular issues.

The DCP Auxiliary constables deployed in the Central Business District (CBD) are also directed towards a community policing style of patrol. Thus, in addition to preventing illegal traders from setting up stalls and apprehending criminal suspects, they are also instructed to go into shops and other premises on their beats thereby 'making themselves known' to community members.

But it is on street level particularly, that policing of the taxi ranks is particularly challenging. The 'robust' culture of the taxi ranks implies that deference to the authority of the police can by no means be taken for granted. While the DCP avoid 'putting people in boxes' they sometimes find that people are not suitable for working in that environment. It was also suggested, that attention be given to ensuring that police officers maintain a proficiency in self-defence.

### **13.1.3 Wynberg**

Police in Wynberg also described their community relationships as good. In addition to the Community Police Forum, representatives of the community also participate in the Coordinating Committee.

This committee is an offshoot of the CPF and meets every two weeks to discuss crime that has been occurring in the Wynberg Area and deliberate over strategies to deal with it. Included in the meeting are representatives from the Central Intelligence Unit (CIU), the Crime Prevention Unit (CPU), Modalink, the CPF and one or two representatives of the community.

The purpose of this structure is to discuss patterns and trends and ways and means of tackling crime in Wynberg as a whole. Its responsibilities include setting the agenda and priorities for the process of policing and crime prevention to unfold. The structure also enforces a level of accountability, as the police have to answer to the structure as to how far they have gone to address certain targets pertinent to crime.

At the 2 hour meeting which a member of the research team attended during the research process, it was apparent that there was a relatively cordial relationship between the Wynberg Police station and the community representatives. Discussions were frank and a prepared agenda was followed. Information about crime incidents and problems was discussed, as were the statistics from the previous two weeks as presented by the head of the CIU. A number of decisions were taken as to specific 'operations' to be undertaken with the help of police reservists to tackle particular concerns in specific areas, e.g., drug dealers who had been making use of an enclosed compound behind a collective of shops and businesses.

According to the Station Commander, his police station uses an 'open door policy' in order to create an enabling environment so that there can be sound community involvement. This has created a close working relationship with the Wynberg community and contributed to what they believe is a relatively high level of effectiveness in controlling crime.

Whilst the Station Coordinating Committee deals with specific issues of crime, there is also the CPF which meets once a month to deal with broader issues affecting the Wynberg community. It also discusses general development issues such as the building of roads, issues of health and the provision of other social services. The Coordinating Committee reports to the forum about issues discussed.

The Wynberg police also have relatively well developed relationships with the taxi associations. Twelve taxi associations operate at Wynberg, consisting of 469 taxis. According to the Wynberg SAPS, while there was conflict between the associations which dated back to 1990, they are presently very well organised and there is good cooperation between the associations and the police. This cooperation took four years to achieve but has resulted in a dramatic decrease in crime at the taxi rank.

The police met the heads of the various associations and suggested that improved cooperation with the police could assist in ensuring fairness amongst the associations and

that the taxi rank would become a safe place, attracting more customers. The SAPS presented the associations with a business plan and helped to introduce a 'marshalling system' (see Table 9.1). The business plan was accepted and the SAPS managed to help raise money to equip taxi marshals with bibs. These marshals are responsible for ensuring that the taxis obey the rules of the taxi rank. They check for drunken drivers and ensure that taxis drive safely and do not push to the front of the queue. However, the police may still be called in to resolve disputes between various taxi associations.

One by-product of this initiative has been the setting up of a 'Disciplinary Committee' amongst the various role players. Although it is run by people associated with the taxi industry, the police may attend its hearings. If a taxi driver is found to be contravening the rules, this person will be forced to attend a meeting and be fined. Drivers are not allowed to drive until they pay their fines. They may also forfeit driving for a limited amount of time which serves to punish them as they lose wages for a day or more. Although there was some animosity at first, the scheme has largely been accepted by the various associations and is believed also to have contributed to a decrease in crime at the taxi rank.

## **13.2. Police awareness of vigilantism**

### **13.2.1 Marabastad**

A senior police officer spoken to at Marabastad was unaware of a problem of vigilantism at the MI. However he was under the impression that private security guards were inclined to assault people whom they had arrested. If the assault amounts to a case of assault with grievous bodily harm (GBH) the police are required to arrest the perpetrators and hold them in custody. However the problem they have found, for instance in the complex where they are based, which is patrolled by private security, is that people (the traders who run the shops in the complex) gather outside the police station and demand the release of the private security guards, complaining that the money which they have paid for the services of the private security guards is now being wasted. Thus, where the police had attempted to enforce the law in response to acts of vigilantism, this appears to have contributed further to hostility in their relationships with the community.

Thus, where there is a widespread perception that the police are failing to deal with the problem of crime adequately, this appears to foster criticism of attempts by the police to prevent acts of vigilantism. Where this type of perception exists, intervention by the police may be characterised as 'interference' with the efforts of those who, in their eyes and, in the opinion of at least some members of the community, are playing a more effective role in combating crime.

The senior police officer indicated that the private security guards employed by the city council were also part of the problem. However rank and file members of the police service indicated that vigilantism was also a significant problem at the MI, particularly in the taxi rank area. They also believed that the security guards based at the railway station were also inclined to assault people whom they had apprehended.

### **13.2.2 Berea Road**

According to senior police officers interviewed, there had previously been a problem with the traders who 'started off taking the law into their own hands'. However senior police had held meetings with the traders and they had been 'lectured' about the legalities connected with the involvement of members of the public in making arrests. Senior police interviewed seemed to be under the impression that these meetings had been relatively effective and that the problem no longer persisted on a significant scale. They thus believed that those involved had accepted their encouragement to 'rather hand it to the police'.

However rank and file police officers indicated that this had largely been ignored. Vigilantism, particularly involving personnel associated with the taxi industry, seemed to be a relatively common occurrence. In fact during the research team's first encounters with police at this level they started discussing the problem fairly spontaneously, without any encouragement from the research team, seeming to indicate that acts of 'mob justice' are not an uncommon occurrence in the Berea Road area.

One sergeant said that 'the people, be it in the station or in the taxi rank do not wait for us when they have apprehended the criminal'. What usually happens is that they beat the person and afterwards do not even bother to call the police or hand him over them. This was confirmed by other police officers at the satellite station, saying that people are usually impatient in dealing with such cases.

### **13.2.3 Wynberg**

When asked about incidents of members of the public taking the law into their own hands the response from the respondents was that this did not happen frequently. It was also emphasised that the police in the Western Cape did not tolerate this kind of behaviour. Evidence of this type of approach was to be found at a Coordinating Committee meeting attended by members of the research team. A committee member mentioned that he was keen on setting up a block watch system, where each household in a street would contribute R10 to R20 per month to pay for people to patrol his neighbourhood. One of the more senior officers present was quick to warn the person against people taking the law into their own hands, saying that, 'as long as you people do not become vigilantes. One of our biggest threats in this part of the world is PAGAD, you know.'

The impression which the research team gained in Wynberg was that 'mob justice' was not as common-place as it appeared to be at either of the other two MI studied. One reason for this may be the relative proximity of the MIs to the police station. Not only is the MI close to the central Wynberg police station but, in addition, unlike the other interchanges studied, Wynberg, along with some of the other interchanges in Cape Town, is patrolled by security guards. Other suggestions include the fact that Wynberg is a mixed residential area. Furthermore, the taxis operating from the rank are primarily linked to coloured taxi associations while the phenomenon of taxi industry associated vigilantism has primarily been a phenomenon in African townships. Other alternatives which cannot be excluded are that, for one or other reason, the police themselves are relatively unaware of vigilantism, or simply that the research team's methodology for engaging with the police was unsuccessful in Wynberg.

While no evidence was found of a significant level of vigilantism, at least some of the people interviewed stated that those associated with the taxi industry nevertheless demonstrated the same tendency to fairly confrontational and aggressive ways of dealing with interpersonal conflicts.

At the coordinating committee meeting two incidents were mentioned, which reveal that sustaining discipline at the rank is not easy. One incident was mentioned of taxi drivers stealing shoes from a hawker. In another incident a taxi driver was driving recklessly and knocked a 10 year old child down. The father of the child attacked the driver. A while later the taxi driver came back to the scene with friends and assaulted the father of the accident victim in revenge for the earlier attack. Another incident was mentioned of a taxi driver being excessively hostile to a shop owner who complained about him being illegally parked in front of some shops.



According to one security guard, the taxi people in the area 'have tendency of solving problems through fighting and they like beating'. He referred to a case in which a person accused of the theft of a radio tape from a taxi had been beaten. Apparently, it was later discovered that the victim of the beating was innocent of the theft, suggesting that while it may not be as commonplace as at the other MIs, forms of 'street justice' still manifest themselves at the Wynberg interchange.

### **13.3. The attitudes of police to informal policing ('vigilante') activities**

#### **13.3.1 Legalism**

As to how they think they should respond in situations whereby people are engaged in meting out punishment to alleged suspects, the police responded differently. One senior police officer thinks that such people should be 'locked up' because it is totally against the law to administer this form of justice, as this constitutes a criminal offence per se.

In fact senior police in Durban indicated that they had taken steps to tackle the problem. Workshops had been organised with representatives of traders and from the taxi industry with the objective of discouraging acts of vigilantism and encouraging police to act within the framework of the law. However more junior members of the police service seemed to think that these workshops had been ineffective and that vigilantism had continued, despite the appeals which had been made by more senior police.

One sergeant said that, when they come across instances of punishment being meted out by members of the public, they should act decisively to uphold the rule of law. Referring to one example of taxi people beating a suspect at the Berea Road taxi rank, he said that when dealing with taxi people, it is necessary to use not just 'minimal force' but 'maximum force' because police action can be expected to meet with a violent response from the taxi people.

Another sergeant also supported this view saying that vigilantism was against the law. The implication was that, when police came across vigilante activity, they should arrest the person allegedly responsible for the original offence, as well as those involved in assaulting him or her.

According to a senior police officer in Wynberg this is 'purely the responsibilities to be discharged by the police in particular'. The head of the Crime Prevention Unit said that 'although we allow the community to be involved in crime prevention, we don't condone vigilante activities of beating people who are suspected of being criminals. It is totally against the law for anybody, be it individuals or the community, to act like a law enforcement agency'. He went on to say that 'the level of community involvement is restricted and closely monitored by ourselves. Theirs is to report crime cases to the police and we make follow-ups to such matters'. In a similar vein, one of the police reservists said that 'we understand that crime is a thorny issue in the community, but PAGAD activities are strongly condemned as they are part of the problem, not the solution'.

However other police officers did not show this level of intolerance for vigilantism. One police officer said that he would intervene to stop vigilantism if it occurred in his presence. However, as long as it was not being done in front of him, he did not in general object to the activities of vigilantes.

#### **13.3.2 Police support or sympathy for vigilantism**

One sergeant said that, when people take the law into their own hands, the way in which they should respond would depend entirely on the situation. For example, in a situation in which somebody is caught robbing people at gunpoint or using a dangerous weapon it is justifiable to beat such a person and this should be understood and explained as self-defence on the

part of the victims. In his opinion, the case for assault in this particular situation is groundless, as the person who was robbing was in possession of a life-threatening weapon.

He also argued that, because of the deficiencies in the criminal justice system, it is reasonable for the people to punish offenders, as the system frequently fails to deal with the criminals in an effective way. The failure of the system is manifest in many instances whereby people subject criminals to various forms of punishment, which he argues 'is not a good thing to do but in no way it can be stopped as long as the situation of crime is not adequately addressed by the government'.

He said that the trend of people taking law into their own hands may be illegal but was legitimate as, in most cases, the people respond to particular crime situations where there is little doubt about the guilt of the perpetrator. He suggested that it was understandable for the people to give the criminals 'some good lessons' which serve to provide an example to other criminals that, if the law does not deal with them, the people cannot always be passive and look to the law as the best option because it fails. He said that the system was failing to deal with the crime problem. Because of this crime levels were increasing which served to trigger off vigilante justice. He argued that people who take the law into their own hands are aware that criminals take advantage of the weaknesses in the criminal justice system and it is against this background and this context that they deal with criminals more harshly.

Referring to a recent TV programme in which a 'community court' run by members of the taxi industry in Guguletu was shown meting out punishment to an alleged rapist, another sergeant said that this was good as it taught people that they should not commit crime and that this was how criminals should be dealt with. Vigilante justice was preferable to handing people over to the police where they would be released quite easily, he said.

Referring to the same television programme, another sergeant argued that sometimes it is justifiable and legitimate to inflict punishment on the perpetrators of crime. Referring to the flogging of alleged rapists depicted in the programme he said that this 'is a very good lesson for people who commit crime and think that they can get away with it'. He said that he was aware that this was an example of vigilantism that was considered to be unlawful but that his sympathies lay with the original victim of criminality and not with the perpetrators of the crime.

A few of the police who were interviewed also indicated that they saw it as justifiable for members of the police service themselves to beat alleged criminals.

### **13.3.3 The dangers and difficulties of intervention**

Another sergeant who is involved in foot patrol pointed out that police officers, especially 'bobbies on the beat', are often faced with a dilemma, as in situations where they encounter vigilantism there are few police officers present, making it difficult for them to deal with a rampaging crowd. In these situations, he indicated, he would first evaluate whether he would be putting himself in jeopardy by intervening. His intention or non-intention would, thus be determined by whether he thought he intervene with safety or not. With regard to incidents in which members of the taxi industry were involved in assaulting someone, he said that the police would be unlikely to intervene as they fear the taxi people, believing them to be heavily armed.

In Durban one sergeant referred to a situation in which he and a colleague had attempted to intervene in a situation in which taxi drivers were assaulting an alleged law breaker. According to the sergeant, the result of their intervention had been that his colleague had been assaulted while he had only managed to escape assault by running away. Thus, he suggested, in a situation where one was likely to find oneself in jeopardy, it might be safer to simply remain passive.

Not only did members of the police service fear physical assault at the point of intervention, but at least one implied that police intervention might result in other risks. Many members of the police service are also 'clients' of the taxi industry, as they rely on the taxi industry for transport to and from their homes. Taxi drivers may even know the home addresses of members of the police service. This places them in a position where they may be vulnerable to threats or other attempts to intimidate them.

In Durban, police indicated that they would on occasions intervene in situations of vigilantism but would not take action against the vigilantes. One factor which they said mitigated strongly against taking action against the vigilantes was simply that it was not possible to arrest a crowd of people, especially when they were angry. Another factor mentioned by at least one policeman as a disincentive to arresting any of the vigilantes was that this would necessitate the police officer's appearing in court as a witness.

But it was not simply the practical difficulties which motivated against their getting involved. The police also indicated that they were afraid of dealing with these types of situation. When they received a report that a group of people was beating someone, they would frequently simply ignore the report and wait until the incident appeared to be over. At this point they might go to the scene and ensure that the beaten person was taken to hospital. While they might admonish the vigilantes, they would be unlikely to open a case, or take any other action, against any of them.

#### **13.3.4 Avoiding possible censure**

Police officers are not necessarily concerned only with the risks to their physical safety. They may also feel that intervention holds other risks. One sergeant said that it was not advisable for members of the SAPS to become involved in the use of force, as the media tended to construe these types of events as if the police officer involved was already guilty. Thus, owing to the fact that intervening in situations where members of the public were involved in taking the law into their own hands created the risk that a 'shootout' might occur, he preferred to let the situation happen without interference, in order to be 'on the safe side'. According to the sergeant, involvement in such situations increased the risk of his suspension and expulsion from the police service. Then his family would suffer. But, he indicated, no member of the police service is likely to be expelled for not arresting someone who is assaulting a criminal.

### **13.4. SUMMARY**

This chapter discussed the police-community relationships that were observed at the three research areas. As can be seen the dynamics of situations of vigilantism are, from the police point of view, relatively complex. Their approach to dealing with situations of vigilantism is influenced not only by their attitudes or police policy, but also by other factors specific to the situations which they find themselves. In particular, they find difficulty reconciling their concern to maintain or establish credibility in the eyes of the community with their legal responsibility to act against all law breakers in situations of vigilantism.

## 14. CONCLUSIONS

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One of the main aims of the study was to understand the community perceptions and responses to on board crime and crime prevention which will provide insight when strategies are formulated to resolve crime issues. The research methodology used by the team made it possible for the focus of the research to shift from the offender to the victim and enable knowledge of some first hand experiences to be gained.

### 14.1. Conclusions in respect of crime on board public transport

Some of the findings of it's research were:

- on board crime statistics are low, owing to under-reporting, especially among the Black communities and victims of common assault. Some of the FG participants, who themselves had been victims of on board crime, had failed to report such crime to any security agent.
- most crimes occurring on board public transport occurred on commuter trains and took the form of theft, e.g. robbery, pickpocketing, etc. An exception to this was seen in Cape Town where more serious crimes, such as rape and murder, take place on board public transport. There is relatively little or no crime on board commuter bus and minibus taxis that originate or end at the MIs studied with the exception, again, of Cape Town routes to and from the Cape Flats.
- the FG discussions in Durban and Pretoria revealed that for those who experienced on board crime, it was easy to move to a safer mode of public transport, e.g. from a train to a taxi, but only if it is affordable. The opposite is true for Cape Town, given the infrastructure of the city, where 80 per cent of the public transport users rely on trains for commuting. The commuters either endure the fear when travelling or are restricted in their participation.
- most bus robberies occur when it is suspected that the drivers might be carrying a large amount of cash with them, and there is suspicion that some of these robberies are self-perpetrated. Generally, statistics on board crime against transport provider staff are not available.
- the perpetrators of on board crimes could be individuals, youth groups or gangs where different opportunities to effect on board crime result in different strategies being used. There are a number of factors that give an increasing potential of on board crime. Section 5.15 gives a detailed description of these factors.
- the design of the public transport vehicle does influence the level of on board crime. Some of these design deficiencies are indicated in Table 5.2. However, despite the deficiencies in design, some FG participants indicated that it was not the design of the vehicle which is the reason for on board crime but the people being carried who represent potential victims to the criminals. They also said that the criminals focused on what they could get and not the make-up of the potential victims.
- given the different socio-economic status of the different population groups in South Africa, most of the on board crime on Whites and Indians has financial motives whereas those against Blacks and Coloureds, in some cases, lead to physical harm like rape and murder.
- tourists who use trains to commute between Johannesburg and Pretoria (as would be the case in their home countries, considering the distance between the two cities) unknowingly place themselves in the path of a potential on board criminal.

## **14.2. Conclusions in respect of taxi drive-by shootings**

We found that:

- there are certain identifiable characteristics of taxi drive-by shootings, e.g. the use of a fire-arm, rapid departure from the scene of the crime, usually in a motor vehicle etc.
- available SAPS statistics give aggregates of taxi-related violence. This makes it difficult to properly identify explicitly drive-by shootings.
- if one studies the percentage increase/decrease between certain years, it is possible that there may be a relationship between the number of arrests and the number of incidents/deaths and injuries.
- three provinces had high levels of taxi-related violence, namely: Eastern Cape, Gauteng and the Western Cape (in that order).
- owing to the erratic/spontaneous nature of taxi drive-by shootings, and the differences in statistics collected by official (e.g. SAPS) and non-official sources (e.g. newspaper articles), it is difficult to give an accurate picture of the status quo.

## **14.3. Conclusions in respect of spontaneously formed crime prevention groups at Modal Interchanges**

The research team found that:

- in recent years transport operations at all three MIs have increased substantially. This increase has contributed to various problems, such as capacity constraints, traffic congestion, inadequate facilities for commuters and taxi operators and a negative impact on surrounding land users.
- while people's views on social matters and issues always vary to a greater or lesser extent, it was found that the role players at all three MIs who participated in the research shared certain sentiments regarding the most prevalent social problems in their areas. Taken together, a number of social problems were regarded as being particularly troublesome: homelessness, traffic congestion, undocumented migrants, prostitution, conflicts between various role players and various types of crime.
- with regard to law enforcement and security, the respective role players held various opinions. It appears that, irrespective of MI there are strong feelings regarding the lack of quality policing and other security structures/measures.
- from the data collected at the three MIs, except for Berea Road station, no concrete evidence could be found of any community justice group and/or of any informally structured crime prevention initiative.
- the TAC initiative at the Berea Road Station and adjacent areas provides an important case study. While this group has managed to bridge quite a few serious obstacles, it is clear that it is grappling with a number of issues such as lack of financial support, sustaining the TAC, ensuring that its members act within the law, etc.

## **14.4. Conclusions in respect of police attitudes to informal crime prevention groups**

The research team found that:

- although evidence was provided of negative attitudes on the part of community members and members of the private security companies, towards members of the SAPS, no clear evidence was provided which specifically indicated that members of the SAPS were even aware of the existence of specific 'crime prevention groups.' There was therefore

no reason for the research team to assume an attitude of distrust on the part of members of the SAPS towards these people.

- a number of factors have contributed to a position in South Africa in which vigilantism may be said to be part and parcel of this country's history. Present day vigilantism to some extent may be said to simply represent the continuity of an established way of dealing with alleged offenders. One of the factors which no doubt fosters into the prevalence of vigilantism is a sense that such activities can be engaged in with impunity.
- the police community relationships in the research MIs varied from cordial to strained. In some cases there would appear to be little spirit of cooperation, as one or both groups (police and community) may hold negative attitudes towards the other.
- the police are amenable to the formation of partnerships/relationships with communities, as evidenced through the CPF at the MIs studied and the support given to the TAC group (based at the Berea Road MI). Nevertheless, community members are often afraid to be seen cooperating with the police for fear of being victimised if known the perpetrators of the crime are aware of such co-operation.


#### **14.5. Where should the focus lie?**

Crime in South Africa is a symptom of deeper socio-political issues and any measures put in place should be visualised against the background of criminology as a whole. One indication of this is that, despite some of the crime prevention strategies which have been implemented over the years, crime continues to affect the public transport commuters. A deep feeling of helplessness exists among transport users as well as among the transport providers themselves. The slow and, in many cases, inefficient wheels of justice are seen as one of the reasons for the present state of affairs. In many cases, those who are responsible for apprehending the criminals are seen to be colluding with them.

To resolve crime where does one start, with the individual or society? Figure 14.1 illustrates the concept of the 'society envelope.' The diagram simply tries to illustrate where should the politicians, planners, social scientists should focus their energies. The informal community groups that were investigated as part this study are one form of crime prevention strategy focussing on the community. Such strategies may not impact on the wider society and symptoms of a dysfunctional society could still continue to be a problem. As to this paradox, it is noted by Weiser-Easteal and Wilson <sup>28A</sup>, 'that one of the difficulties associated with some crime prevention techniques is that, while they may affect criminal behaviour, they do not necessarily affect criminal motivation.'

Crime in South Africa impacts not only on the national economic growth and tourist attraction, but also on the safety and security of citizens. It is argued that the solution to safer public transport lies in the hands of the communities served and in the development of a close relationship with the law enforcement agencies.

As indicated earlier, the criminals' 'modus operandi' depends on the opportunities that present themselves and all public transport users are potential victims. Every possible means should be employed to ensure their safety. Thus, in recent years various initiatives have been undertaken with the aim of broadening the base of policing in South Africa. It is argued that this initiative towards the establishment of community policing has, become 'the new philosophy' of the SAPS. Furthermore, this initiative has been motivated by the idea that improved links to the community would improve police access to information from the community. Despite the good intentions, it should be noted that the basic lesson which still needs to be more fully understood is that, with policing, - irrespective of who does the policing, goes the risk of vigilantism. Thus, any initiative which seeks to involve people in



**Figure 14.1: The Society Envelope**

crime prevention activities must, as a matter of course, take on board the task of how to restrain the impulse to vigilantism, or on the other hand, to lethargy. This is the challenge!

This challenge, complex though it is, and defining a way of measuring the effectiveness of crime prevention strategies focussing on public transport will offer new challenges to transport providers, security agents, researchers and communities as they, through committed collaboration, continue the fight against crime.

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